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This thesis chronicles the fortunes of the Anglo-German Fellowship, the British 
society founded in 1935 that advocated friendship with Hitler’s Germany up to its 
suspension in October 1939 following the outbreak of war.  Drawing on newly 
discovered and previously overlooked primary sources, thematic and chronological 
methods are combined to explore how the Fellowship’s leaders played a bigger role 
in the diplomatic crises of the late 1930s than previously acknowledged.  Supported 
by its sister organisation in Germany, the Fellowship attracted support from British 
royal, political, diplomatic, aristocratic, business, financial, military, sporting and 
intelligence elites with its membership reaching nine hundred by 1938.  Funded by 
business and financial interests and patronised by Anglo-German royalty, it was 
influenced by the German high command, welcomed by elements of the British 
establishment and infiltrated by British, German, Russian and Jewish intelligence 
agents. 
To the extent it has been covered in the secondary literature, those assessing the 
Fellowship have classed it alongside the nasty, the eccentric and the irrelevant within 
‘the Fellow Travellers of the Right’ tradition.  This thesis challenges those stereotypes, 
arguing that it has been consequently misinterpreted and underestimated both by 
scholars and in popular culture over the last eighty years.  Using primary sources to 
build an objective prosopography of its membership, evidence is offered that the 
Fellowship was more than a fringe pressure group and dining club and achieved 
international credibility as a lobbying body, diplomatic intermediary and intelligence-
gathering tool.   
Having surveyed the heritage of earlier transnational friendship societies, this thesis 
examines the business and economic motives, on both sides of the North Sea, in 
founding the Fellowship, before charting how it then recruited support from across the 
political spectrum.  Arranging landmark meetings between British politicians and the 
National Socialist leadership, it proved itself as a conduit for diplomatic dialogue with 
Germany.  The central chapters probe the prosopography to highlight the Fellowship’s 
penetration of the British Establishment before lifting the lid of respectability to 




measure the extent to which it harboured pro-fascist and anti-Semitic enthusiasts for 
Hitler’s Germany.    
As the narrative moves into the final three years before war, two chapters explore how 
the Fellowship accessed the central political and diplomatic bodies in both countries 
including Downing Street, the houses of parliament, British political parties, Hitler’s 
Chancellery, the NSDAP, both foreign ministries and their embassies while 
simultaneously establishing dialogue with those opposing Hitler’s regime and 
challenging the wisdom of appeasement.  Finally, the organisation’s legacy is 
examined to ask whether, by developing a different flavour of appeasement to 
Chamberlain’s, it offered a real alternative to war and whether this contributes to the 
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The genesis and historiography of the Anglo-German Fellowship 
In July 1939, with war looming, Ernest Tennant, the founder and honorary secretary 
of the Anglo-German Fellowship, undertook an unorthodox, secret mission to meet 
his sometime friend and colleague Joachim Ribbentrop in the recently-unified Greater 
Germany.  Although Tennant travelled in his customary guise as a City merchant with 
business interests in the country, his trip was informally sanctioned by Downing Street 
and blessed by the prime minister, Neville Chamberlain.  Ribbentrop, the former 
champagne salesman and distributer for Johnnie Walker whisky, was now (following 
a brief stint as ambassador to the Court of St James’s) Reich minister for foreign 
affairs.  With Chamberlain’s dogged attempts at appeasement evidently failing and 
war only weeks away, the story of Tennant’s lone mission seems straight from a novel 
rather than the serious world of diplomacy.  His hope was to ‘get Ribbentrop away 
from his present feeling of hostility to Britain and back nearer to his state of mind of 
seeking friendship with this country which existed until the beginning of 1937’.1  
Given the intensity of the international diplomatic crisis that summer, with Ribbentrop 
immersed in negotiations with the Russians, it is significant that he immediately 
agreed to see Tennant at a time of his choosing and offered to arrange his 
accommodation in Salzburg.  Tennant had suggested that, as ‘visiting the Foreign 
Minister in his magnificence in the Wilhelmstrasse is rather alarming for a private 
individual’, a quiet dinner might be best, so they could have ‘a real talk as we used to 
in the old days’.2  
These two friends had conceived the Anglo-German Fellowship, and its sister society, 
the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft (hereafter, DEG), five years previously, ‘to 
promote good understanding between England and Germany and thus contribute to 
the maintenance of peace and the development of prosperity’.  Wholly distinct 
organisationally, membership of the British Fellowship was only open to British 
nationals, while German Anglophiles could join the German organisation.  The DEG 
had ‘fine premises’ in the shape of a mansion on 30 Bendlerstrasse in Berlin (‘a quiet 
                                                          
1 Tennant to Chamberlain, 4 July,1939, PREM 1/335 C497340, TNA.  
2 Tennant to Ribbentrop, 10 July,1939, PREM 1/335 C497340, TNA.  




street where the American Embassy and the homes of several ministers are situated’3) 
and branches in other German cities including Bremen, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Essen, 
Stuttgart and Wiesbaden which displayed portraits of the British king and welcomed 
English visitors.4  The Fellowship meanwhile was headquartered rather more modestly 
in a flat at 223 Cranmer Court in Chelsea, albeit its banquets were hosted at prominent 
London hotels including Grosvenor House, Claridge’s and the Dorchester. 
By December 1938, the Fellowship’s individual membership had reached exactly nine 
hundred and included luminaries from each of the British ‘Establishment’ elites – 
royal, political, diplomatic, aristocratic, business, financial, military, sporting and 
intelligence.5   This study seeks to explore how the Fellowship achieved such rapid 
success and whether it is fair to regard it as a broader - and higher - church than has 
been accepted to date.  It was funded by powerful business interests, patronised by 
Anglo-German royalty, influenced by the German high command, welcomed by 
elements of the British establishment and infiltrated by British, German, Russian and 
Jewish intelligence agents.  The Fellowship from the outset was much more than a 
pressure group, dining club or study group.  Over the course of its short life, it acted 
explicitly as a lobbying body, propaganda vehicle (for both Britain and Germany), 
meeting facilitator, interpreter and travel agent.  More discreetly, it was an effective 
conduit for communications, formal and informal, between the two countries for 
statesmen, soldiers, politicians and civil servants.  Intriguingly, the British, German 
and Russian governments each used it as an intelligence-gathering tool and, it will be 
argued, what they determined from that intelligence influenced foreign policy 
accordingly.    
The Fellowship was self-admittedly elitist with, at its pinnacle, patronage from the 
royal houses of Hanover, Hohenzollern, Saxe-Coburg Gotha and their English cousins 
within the House of Windsor. Three cousins feature in the Fellowship’s royal 
adventure:  Charles Edward, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha; the Duke of Brunswick, 
and Edward VIII, His Imperial Majesty the King Emperor.  Underpinning this royal 
support was extensive representation from across the aristocratic, military and political 
                                                          
3 AGF, Brochure, 1936, KV5/3 C440756, TNA.  Bendlerstrasse was later renamed Stauffenbergstrasse 
in memory of the members of the German resistance who were executed in the Bendlerblock in 
1944. 
4 For more on the DEG see Ernst Ritter, ‘Die erste Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft (1935-1939)’ in Aus 
der Arbeit der Archive, (Boppard, 1989). 
5 AGF, Companies House filing, 8 December 1938, BT 31/33916/305554, TNA.  




spectrum in Britain and Germany.  Around one hundred members of the Houses of 
Lords and Commons were supporters and, importantly, these were drawn from each 
of the political parties and not just the far right of the Conservative party as according 
to historical tradition.  The ‘top brass’ from each of the three services was similarly 
represented.  In addition to Unilever and ICI, who provided the bulk of its founding 
capital, the Fellowship’s corporate representation ranged across the titans of British 
industry, finance and commerce including the Bank of England, Barclays Bank, 
Schroders, Lazards, Dunlop, Morris Motors, Shell, P&O and Thomas Cook.  The 
Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft had comparable backing in Germany with support 
from IG Farben, Robert Bosch, Siemens, AEG and Deutsche Bank.  
The Fellowship’s leadership had direct and prompt access to Hitler and both his 
supporters and critics in Germany.  Similarly, it spoke in person with three successive 
British prime ministers, as well as their governments, civil servants and diplomats.  To 
those British political figures public-spirited, curious or (with hindsight) foolish 
enough to engage with Germany’s National Socialist leadership, the twin friendship 
societies offered effective access to both old and new German elites - political, 
commercial and royal – and especially Adolf Hitler himself.  As explored later, the 
Fellowship organised most (and with former prime minister, David Lloyd George, the 
highest profile) of the various meetings between British visitors and Hitler.  How it 
built such credibility so quickly is intriguing.  It seems that no other non-governmental 
foreign body had such frequent direct access to the Führer and that four within its 
membership – Tennant, TP Conwell-Evans, Lord Londonderry (its leading aristocrat) 
and the infamous Führer-follower Unity Mitford – had more frequent contact with 
Hitler than any other Britons.  
While the Fellowship offered an ‘umbrella’ for some of the ‘pro-Nazi’, fellow 
travellers of the Right, their voices were always in the minority and their involvement 
was short-lived.6  In fact, the Fellowship’s leadership, even early on, had serious 
concerns about the Führer’s behaviour and philosophy, especially in respect to 
mistreatment of Jews and other minorities and took active, albeit ineffective, measures 
to influence the situation.  They were consistently, if mostly discreetly, critical friends 
to the regime throughout, to the point of riling their German colleagues.  Despite these 
                                                          
6 Richard Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, the Right Club and British anti-Semitism 
1939-40 (1998), p. 37. 




efforts, it remains a conundrum how apparently civilised and humane men reconciled 
their Germanophile enthusiasms with this evidently brutal regime.   
My central thesis is that the Fellowship has been, in George W Bush’s unmatchable 
term, misunderestimated by scholars and other commentators over the last eighty 
years.7  However total the failure of its primary mission to prevent war, it was a 
significant and whole-hearted enterprise.  As will be argued, most commentary has 
been dismissive, perfunctory and often inaccurate, relying on contemporary left wing 
political polemic as developed by a small group of historians and writers.  (Secondary 
sources covering the DEG are even less satisfactory: its main chronicler, Ernst Ritter, 
concluded in 1989 that ‘evidence of the DEG’s existence within the literature is almost 
non-existent’.8)   
Generally, the prevailing stereotype of the membership is Lord Darlington from the 
1989 Booker prize-winning The Remains of the Day by Nobel prize-winning Kazuo 
Ishiguro.  One writer painted ‘a picture of a knot of peers adrift in an uncongenial 
world, united by paranoia, pessimism and panic’, who ‘blamed the misfortunes of their 
times and class on an immensely powerful but clandestine Judaeo-Bolshevik global 
conspiracy which could be thwarted only by Fascism and Nazism’.9  Another 
dismissed the membership of the Fellowship as ‘a mixture of English Fascists, 
appeasers, anti-Semites, hard headed businessmen, fanatical anti-Bolsheviks, 
eccentric aristocrats and neurotic Mayfair society women’.10  These powerful 
stereotypes have been perpetuated in film, television drama, and popular fiction such 
as the successful 1993 film adaptation of The Remains of the Day, Stephen Poliakoff’s 
2009 film Glorious 39, television series such as Cambridge Spies (2003), Upstairs 
Downstairs (2010) and The Halcyon (2016) and historical novels such as William 
Boyd’s Any Human Heart (2002), CJ Sansom’s Dominion (2012) and Ken Follett’s 
Winter of the World (2012). Often any awareness of the Fellowship has been as a bit 
                                                          
7 Leading historians have confused its name, see for example: L. B. Namier, ‘Erich and Theo Kordt: 
Resisters after the Event’, History Today, (1951) Vol. 1, Issue 6; Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: 
Nemesis, (2000), p. 378; Andrew Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’ a biography of Lord Halifax, (1991), p. 145 
and p. 161, David Faber, Munich, (2008), p. 235. 
8 Ritter, ‘Die erste DEG’.  
9 Lawrence James, Aristocrats: Power, Grace and Decadence, (2009), p. 371. 
10 Phillip Knightly, Philby: KGB Master Spy, (1998), p. 51. 




player in three of the twentieth century’s most chronicled causes célèbres – the 
Cambridge spies, the Mitford sisters and the Hess affair. 
 
Historiography of appeasement 
Over half a century ago, AJP Taylor insisted that ‘historians do a bad day’s work when 
they write the appeasers off as stupid or cowards’.11  To date, no historian has done a 
full day’s work on the Anglo-German Fellowship and what has been done has 
emphasised stupidity and cowardice.  The Fellowship has been classed alongside the 
nasty, the eccentric and the irrelevant firmly within the ‘Fellow Travellers of the 
Right’ tradition developed by Richard Griffiths in his important trilogy and from 
which most later students of the far right in Britain have drawn their inspiration.12  
This study’s first ambition is to give a fuller narrative and prosopography of the 
organisation on its own merits.  Historians have achieved that with important studies 
of contemporary non-governmental organisations that were sympathetic to Germany 
and whose stories and dramatis personae overlapped with the Fellowship.  These 
include the Royal British Legion13, the Bank of England,14 the League of Nations,15 
the Rhodes Trust,16 The Times,17 the DEG,18 the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs,19 All Souls, Oxford,20 the Cliveden Set21 and the Round Table.22  Taken 
together, they have given students of the 1930s a deeper insight into how such bodies 
                                                          
11 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (1961), p. xxii. 
12 Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-1939, 
(1980); Patriotism Perverted; and What did you do during the war?: The last throes of the British pro-
Nazi Right, 1940-45, (2017). 
13 Graham Wootton, The official history of the British Legion, (1956); Brian Harding, Keeping Faith: 
the History of the Royal British Legion, (2001).  
 14 David Kynaston, Till Time’s Last Sand: A History of the Bank of England 1694-2013, (2017). 
15 Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations; Democracy, Citizenship and 
Internationalism, c.1918-45, (Manchester, 2011); Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of 
Nations and the Crisis of Empire, (Oxford, 2015). 
16 Philip Ziegler, Legacy: Cecil Rhodes, the Rhodes Trust and Rhodes Scholarships, (New Haven, 2008); 
Anthony Kenny (ed), The History of the Rhodes Trust: 1902-1999, (Oxford, 2001). 
17 The Times, The History of the Times, (1952), A. L. Kennedy, (ed. Gordon Martel), The Times and 
Appeasement: The Journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932-1939, (Cambridge, 2009). 
18 Ritter, ‘Die erste DEG’. 
19 Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari, Chatham House and British foreign policy 1919-1945: the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs during the inter-war period, (1994); Christian Haase, ‘In Search of a 
European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920–55’, European History 
Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3, (2007), pp. 371-397.  
20 A. L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement: a Contribution to Contemporary History, (1961). 
21 Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity, (2000). 
22 Alex May, ‘The Round Table, 1910-66’, DPhil thesis, (Oxford, 1995). 




intersected with the official organs of the British government and how together they 
promulgated appeasement.  In the Fellowship’s case, it is hoped to provide a degree 
of statistical discipline to offer ‘some welcome quantitative precision into the woolly 
and wistful world of Waugh and Wodehouse’ while challenging the stereotyping to 
which it has been subjected.23  While concentrating on the Fellowship’s impact at 
home, its influence abroad will also be examined in three specific geographies: how it 
prepared Lord Lothian for his work as ambassador to Washington, how it inspired 
Rudolf Hess in his decision to fly solo to Scotland and how, through Kim Philby, it 
fed the paranoia of Joseph Stalin.   
This study’s second ambition is to set these biographical efforts within the 
historiography of inter-war appeasement and ask whether that sheds any further light 
on the British establishment’s entanglement with the Third Reich.  Specifically, I will 
recommend that the Anglo-German Fellowship deserves to be studied as often by 
scholars of appeasement as by scholars of the British far right.   
Defining ‘appeasement’ is the first job of its student and mapping its historiography 
among the hardest.24  Now glibly used by politicians and the media to denote craven 
concessions to hostile, undemocratic foreigners, the term had a wider sense and better 
pedigree before Hitler’s war.  As Stedman insists, it should not be a ‘a lazy umbrella 
term’ for Chamberlain’s foreign policy as that adapted materially during his 
premiership and his was not the only flavour of appeasement.25  In this thesis 
appeasement is accepted as a valid political term for a potentially honourable, if ill-
advised, strategy to prevent a second European war by revising the allegedly draconian 
terms of the Versailles Treaty.  David Dutton, Robert Caputi, Sidney Aster, Robert 
Self and others have provided useful reviews of the literature and chronologies of the 
debate around the 1930s appeasement of Germany.26  But, as Martin Gilbert argued in 
1966, the concept of ‘appeasing’ Germany had a respectable heritage dating back well 
                                                          
23 David Cannadine, Pleasures of the Past, (New York, 1989), p. 197. 
24 For discussion on the evolution of the term within useful overviews of appeasement see also: R. J. 
Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement. 1935-39, (1993); Rock, 
William R., British Appeasement in the 1930s, (1977) and Keith Robbins, Appeasement, (Oxford, 
1988). 
25 Andrew David Stedman, Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler’s Germany, 
(2011), p. 10. 
26 David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain, (2001), Sidney Aster, ‘Appeasement: Before and After 
Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 445-7 (September 2008); Robert Caputi, 
Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement, (Selinsgrove, 2000); Robert Self, The Neville Chamberlain 
Diary Letters, The Downing Street Years, 1934-1940, (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 5-33.  




before the Great War’ for which Gaynor Johnson has provided an excellent review of 
the literature, including studies on the Paris Peace Conference, Chamberlain before 
his premiership and Lloyd George during and after his.27   
It was the publication of the polemic Guilty Men in 1940 that both initiated this debate 
and set its tone for a quarter of a century.  Authored by a trio of left wing journalists, 
Michael Foot (later leader of the Labour Party), Frank Owen and Peter Howard, it was 
written in just four days.  They identified MacDonald, Chamberlain, Baldwin, Simon, 
Hoare, Halifax and nine other British politicians as the architects of inter-war 
appeasement and, as such, damned them as ‘cowardly, traitorous crypto-Fascists 
leading Britain to ruin because of their own weaknesses’.28  The simple charge against 
the Guilty Men was that ‘their underestimation of the dynamism of Nazism, refusal to 
educate the public about Hitler’s expansionist ambitions and failure to rearm 
adequately, [had] contributed to the outbreak of war’.29   
As Finney has argued, this populist and party-political charge was given ‘a judicial 
imprimatur’ by the Nürnberg war trials in 1945-6.30  As the National Socialist leaders 
were found guilty of planning, initiating and waging war, the verdicts implied 
corresponding negligence on the part of the British government in not recognising that 
predetermination to wage war.  Paradoxically, it was Winston Churchill (the 
Conservative prime minister who had lost the 1945 General Election) who, with the 
publication of The Gathering Storm in 1948, then wove the Nürnberg verdicts into the 
Guilty Men tradition, damning the legacies of his two immediate predecessors as 
prime minister along the way.  In the same year, Lewis Namier and his friend John 
Wheeler-Bennett ‘helped give academic respectability’31 to the Guilty Men verdict 
with their histories of the years immediately preceding the war.32  Writing in the early 
days of the Cold War, Churchill  drew ‘parallels between the Nazi threat in the 1930s 
and the alleged threat from Soviet Russia’ thereby establishing the custom of 
                                                          
27 Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (1966), pp. 54-5; Gaynor Johnson, ‘British Policy 
towards Europe. 1919-1939’, The Historical Journal, vol. 46, no. 2 (June, 2003); see also Dutton, 
Chamberlain, pp. 160-1. 
28 Caputi, Chamberlain, p. 230. 
29 Aster, ‘Appeasement’, p. 444. 
30 Patrick Finney, 'The romance of decline: the historiography of appeasement and British national 
identity ' Electronic Journal of International History, (2000).  For more on the Nürnberg trials see Ann 
and John Tusa, The Nuremberg trial, (1983). 
31 Dutton, Chamberlain, p. 232. 
32 Lewis Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-9 (1948); John Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to 
Tragedy, (1948). 




politicians using the hapless appeasers for contemporary diplomatic polemics of their 
own.33  In this way, his first volume of war memoirs was ‘able to influence the 
historical record in a remarkable way’ and ‘enshrined the disillusion of a generation’ 
to ‘set the tone of debate for the study of appeasement for twenty years after the war’.34   
This interpretation survived well into the 1960s with historians such as Rowse still 
‘suffused with a righteous anger and a negative tone’ and Martin Gilbert and Richard 
Gott broadly following the Guilty Men line with their popular book.35  However, 
Taylor,  Gilbert (in an acknowledged example of self-revisionism),  Donald Cameron 
Watt and Keith Robbins, (spurred in due course by the release of British government 
documents under the Thirty Year Rule and the publication of memoirs by the main 
players) initiated the body of academic historical revisionist, and later counter-
revisionist and neo-revisionist, work that challenged the oversimplified and distorted 
interpretation of appeasement.36   The breadth of opinion in this debate is impressive, 
ranging from the orthodox Churchillian view that the only way to contain Hitler was 
a war fought to the bitter end, to John Charmley’s suggestion that Chamberlain’s 
appeasement bought Britain valuable time to re-arm and that, in any event, she might 
have better preserved her empire and stemmed the rise of communism by suing for 
peace with Hitler’s Germany.37  Prominent in the debate in the 1990s was Alister 
Parker whose landmark 1993 book shone a renewed and critical light on Chamberlain 
in particular.  This was followed by his (almost heretical) study of Churchill as a 
closeted appeaser.38  Beyond Parker and Charmley, Frank McDonough, Richard 
Cockett, David Dutton and Peter Neville have each dissected Chamberlain’s 
premiership and reputation.39   Other scholars have focused on the British Foreign 
                                                          
33 Finney, ‘The romance of decline’. 
34 Peter Neville, Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War, 
(2006), p. xi; Sidney Aster, ‘Guilty Men: The Case of Neville Chamberlain’ in Paths to War, ed. R. 
Boyce and E. Robertson, (1989), p. 235.  
35 Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement; Caputi, Chamberlain, p. 89; Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, 
The Appeasers, (1963). 
36 Taylor, Origins of the Second World War; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, D. C. Watt, 
‘Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School?’, Political Quarterly, (1965); Keith Robbins, Munich 
1938, (1968). 
37 John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (1989) and Churchill: The End of Glory - A Political 
Biography, (1993). 
38 R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, (Basingstoke, 1993) and Churchill and 
Appeasement, (2000). 
39 Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, (Manchester, 
2010); Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the 
Press, (1989); Dutton, Chamberlain; Nevile, Hitler and Appeasement. 




Office’s role in appeasement and have particularly informed this thesis including 
Keith Middlemas, Donald Cameron Watt and Patricia Meehan.40  As will be explored 
in later chapters, the Fellowship’s diplomatic perambulations led it into the covert 
fields of diplomacy where Wesley Wark and John Ferris’s work on intelligence and 
appeasement has been an inspiration.41   
While broad debate across the spectrum, from the Guilty Men traditionalists to the 
Chamberlain apologists, continues apace, other historians have developed new angles 
in ‘the search for the mentalité of appeasement’ in the last two decades.42  Arguing 
that ‘writing on British appeasement cannot be satisfactorily understood … without 
serious consideration of a range of cultural and ideological forces’, Patrick Finney has 
set it against Britain’s declining empire and fading world status – an approach that 
resonates with the Fellowship’s elitist and establishment biases.43  Meanwhile, 
building on her work on feminine fascism in Britain, Julie Gottlieb has explored inter-
war appeasement from the female perspective.  Both strands of her scholarship are 
pertinent given the contribution of the Fellowship’s female membership as explored 
in chapter five.44  Similarly, Scott Newton’s work on Anglo-German relations as 
implemented through economic appeasement has informed chapter one.45  Dan 
Stone’s book on British responses to Nazism before war and the Holocaust, while 
barely mentioning the Fellowship, provided analysis of the influence of the 
contemporary left-wing polemics attacking both National Socialism and appeasement 
published by Gollancz and Penguin.46  As will be explored below, these publications 
                                                          
40 Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of illusion: the British Government and Germany, 1937-39, (1972); D. 
C. Watt, 'Chamberlain's Ambassadors' in M. L. Dockrill and B. J. C. McKercher (ed.), Diplomacy and 
World Power, (Cambridge, 1996); Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German 
Resistance to Hitler, (1992). 
41 Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, (Oxford, 
1985) and ‘British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939', The 
Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 3, (September 1982); John Ferris, ‘"Now that the Milk is Spilt": 
Appeasement and the Archive on Intelligence', Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 19, no. 3, (September 
2008) and Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays, (Abingdon, 2005). 
42 Julie V. Gottlieb, ‘Guilty Women’, Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter-War Britain, 
(Basingstoke, 2015), p. 8. 
43 Finney, 'The romance of decline’.  
44 Gottlieb, Guilty Women and Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement 1923-1945, 
(2003). 
45 Scott Newton, Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, (Oxford, 
1996) and ‘The Anglo-German connection and the political economy of appeasement’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, vol. 2, no. 3, (1991). 
46 Dan Stone, Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: before war and holocaust, (Basingstoke, 
2003). 




have tarnished the reputation of the Fellowship specifically as well as the appeasers 
generally.  Other scholars have widened our understanding of appeasement by 
concentrating on prominent individual appeasers other than Chamberlain, each of 
whom broke bread (or took tea) with the Fellowship.  These include Philip Williamson 
on Baldwin, Ian Kershaw and Neil Fleming on Lord Londonderry, Anthony Lentin 
and Stella Rudman on Lloyd George (especially his Fellowship-arranged meeting with 
Hitler in 1936 as chronicled in chapter three), Andrew Roberts on Lord Halifax, Peter 
Neville on Sir Nevile Henderson and George Peden and Martin Gilbert on Sir Horace 
Wilson.47  Meanwhile Andrew Stedman’s 2011 publication offers a useful updated 
résumé of the historiography before an intriguing exploration of the practical 
alternatives to appeasement.48  These range from isolationism and economic and 
colonial appeasement to the promotion of the League of Nations, the negotiation of 
grand alliances, the urging of rearmament and the explicit threat of war.  Each of these 
were elements of the Fellowship’s interpretation of appeasement.     
Aster has argued that, far from being an abstruse academic debate, proper definition 
and understanding of appeasement has a nobler purpose. 49  In the last two decades, 
Anglo-Saxon politicians, including both Presidents Bush, Tony Blair, and, most 
recently President Trump, have ignored the progress made by historians and, vainly 
aping Churchill, have reverted to crude interpretations of 1930s appeasement to justify 
aggressive military interventions from the Middle East to North Korea.   
 
A better than average violinist 
The trajectory of Tennant and Ribbentrop’s friendship, dating back to 1932, offers 
insight into the German High Command’s volte-face on Britain’s suitability as an ally 
for the Reich.  As such, it is reasonable to include the history of the Fellowship as a 
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strand in the tangled web of diplomatic ineptitude that led to the Second World War.  
It had been Tennant who opened the doors of London socially and politically to 
Ribbentrop acting as the ‘ideal linkman… to introduce him to the important 
personages he wanted to meet’.50  Ribbentrop then claimed to be still ‘a private citizen 
with no political position’, not yet even a Nazi, and indeed told Tennant (possibly 
untruthfully) that he had only met Hitler in August of that year. 51   On the face of it 
theirs was an unlikely friendship but Tennant noted that Ribbentrop ‘spoke excellent 
English and French… liked shooting and fishing and pictures and all the things that I 
liked and he was a better than average violinist’ but also found him maddening at 
times.  Both men were polyglot, international businessmen but also imperialists and 
patriots with a mounting suspicion of Soviet Russia. 52  It was Eugen Lehnkering, C. 
Tennant and Sons’ German business agent, who had introduced Tennant to Ribbentrop 
in 1932.  One of Hitler’s earliest supporters and a veteran flying officer from the Great 
War, Lehnkering was the twenty-first member of the Nazi Party giving him significant 
credibility and status within the party hierarchy.53     
While their friendship had cooled following Ribbentrop’s departure from London, the 
two men had met again in Berlin earlier that summer of 1939 at Ribbentrop’s request.  
The newly-appointed foreign minister, ‘in one of his pompous moods’ had been 
particularly exercised by several letters that he and Hitler had received from England 
suggesting the war should be delayed ‘until after Ascot, or until after the Eton and 
Harrow match’.54   
 
Ernest Tennant 
Described by the novelist, Muriel Spark, as ‘one of those City business personalities 
who are usually seen but not heard’,55  Tennant had been acknowledged by Hitler (in 
an inscription on a signed photograph) as ‘the determined pioneer of Anglo-German 
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understanding’.56  A decorated Great War intelligence officer, he had been one the 
first three British officers to visit Berlin after the Armistice.   He was a surviving 
member of that golden generation so hard hit by the Great War and its aftermath 
(especially the rise of Communism) that shaped their world view.  Born into a wealthy 
Scottish industrialist family, he was cousin to both Lord Glenconner and Margot, Lady 
Oxford (née Tennant), the widow of prime minister HH Asquith.  At Eton (from where 
he had watched Queen Victoria’s funeral cortège) he had been a member of the elite 
Eton Society (‘Pop’), the self-electing school prefects.  His loss of family and friends 
in the Great War was unusually high: of the twenty-eight members of his year (1905) 
in Pop, nineteen were dead by 1916 while of his ‘combatant Tennant relations – 
brother and cousins – out of eleven of military age seven had been killed by the time 
[he] was passed fit for service’ in 1916.57  Put another way, only one third of his school 
peers and male family contemporaries survived the Great War.   
Tennant trained in a steel company before joining the family firm in 1908.  His 
background and training were in industry and business - he was never the ‘merchant 
banker’ claimed by many historians since.  He had volunteered in the first week of 
September 1914 but was rejected due to his ‘old lung trouble’ and injuries sustained 
following an attack by a lion in Africa.  He was only accepted for service in the 
Intelligence Corps in 1916 (for which he was awarded an OBE in 1919) and posted to 
France.  Here his business training was deployed answering questions from the House 
of Commons about unusual trade activities, ranging from the cement industry to 
‘enormous deliveries of rubber contraceptives’ to Holland (which he discovered the 
Germans were using to keep hand grenades dry) and where he developed the appetite 
for the intelligence gathering that would inspire his work in the 1930s. 58   
In January 1919, Tennant had been sent by the British Government to lead a handful 
of officers into shattered post-war Berlin to report on the food situation.  They were 
the first allied officers into the city and reported their findings to the secretary of state 
for war and the war cabinet.  Firmly linking food shortages, shattered transport links 
and unemployment with the risk of famine and rising Bolshevism, they warned that 
‘probably both… will ensue before the next harvest, if help from outside is not 
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forthcoming’.  Chillingly, their report recognised that Germany remained ‘an enemy 
country, which has not yet signed peace terms’, so recommended against mitigating 
‘the menace of starvation by a too sudden and abundant supply of food stocks’.  This 
would be ‘a powerful lever for negotiation’ especially as ‘it is still impossible to gauge 
the period within which Germany’s military power could revive’. 59  Instigated at the 
outbreak of war in August 1914, the blockade was maintained into 1919 and its effects 
haunted Tennant for decades.  Its impact on the civilian population has been debated 
by historians with estimates of unnecessary civilian deaths running into the hundreds 
of thousands.60   Writing twenty years’ later to the prime minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, a remorseful Tennant explained that his shock at seeing ‘children in 
hospital with hunger madness’ had driven his determination  ‘to re-establish friendship 
between the two countries’ and during the next twenty years he visited Germany 
around 180 times, and met Hitler and his paladins frequently, in his quest to promote 
better relations.61   
Tennant’s tool for the improvement of Anglo-German relations was the Fellowship.  
Its founding meeting had been held in the City on 11 March 1935 and was chaired by 
Sir Frank D’Arcy Cooper, the chairman of Unilever (by then ‘one of the biggest 
industrial amalgamations in European history’), that provided the financial backing 
along with Imperial Chemical Industries.62  The meeting was attended by a group of 
businessmen alongside Tennant and TP Conwell-Evans, a visiting lecturer in English 
history at Königsberg University who would later serve as secretary of the Fellowship.  
At the meeting, Conwell-Evans was asked to approach Lord Lothian, the Liberal peer, 
whom he had taken to meet Hitler two months previously, to serve as chairman of the 
Fellowship.63 
Following Lothian’s, no doubt polite, refusal to take on the chairmanship (probably 
due to his mounting workload), the Fellowship’s Council decided to approach Lord 
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Mount Temple, formerly Wilfred Ashley.  Mount Temple was an astute alternative 
choice and seems to have presided effectively until his resignation in protest at 
Kristallnacht in November 1938.  Formerly a Conservative MP and minister and now 
an active member of the House of Lords, he was well-connected in political, social 
and royal circles.  His daughter Edwina had married Lord Louis Mountbatten in 1922 
with the groom’s cousin, the Prince of Wales, serving as best man.  Edward VII had 
stood as her godfather.  Mount Temple’s house, Broadlands in Hampshire (later home 
to the Mountbattens), was ideal for entertaining German visitors and ‘every social 
asset was his - good looks, immense charm and real brilliance as a public speaker’.64  
As minister of transport, Mount Temple had been effective, introducing one-way 
streets, roundabouts and ‘arterial roads’ - the precursors of motorways.  Originally a 
Liberal, he had switched to the Conservatives and was increasingly suspicious of 
anything ‘leftish’, becoming chairman of the Anti-Socialist and the Anti-Communist 
Union.  He served in the trenches in Flanders (commanding the 20th Battalion of the 
King’s Liverpool Regiment) and was a founder of the Comrades of the Great War, a 
precursor to the British Legion.  Though broadly fitting the aristocratic, right-wing 
and conservative stereotype of one of ‘Hitler’s Englishmen’, Mount Temple had been 
promoting relations with Germany well before Hitler came to power.  No anti-Semite, 
his beloved first wife was Jewish (the daughter of Sir Ernest Cassel, the fabulously 
rich and decorated Edwardian magnate and philanthropist) and he presided at a public 
meeting in Whitechapel in March 1933 to protest at the mistreatment of Jews by the 
new German government.    
 
The Gollancz interpretation 
That fateful summer of 1939, the Left Book Club had published Tory MP 
(provocatively titled England’s Money Lords in the US) and it is this slim volume that 
has shaped the historiography of the Anglo-German Fellowship ever since.  Founded 
by the campaigning publisher Victor Gollancz at around the same time as the 
Fellowship, the immediately successful Left Book Club, as its name implies, made no 
secret of its politically evangelical purpose.  Its list of authors included luminaries 
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from the far left, including members of the Communist Party, and its prolific output 
over the period has been credited with helping the Labour Party to win the 1945 
general election, with Gollancz’s biographer claiming that ‘his colossal influence on 
a vital election remains unmatched in twentieth century political history’.65  
Affordably priced at 7s 6d and authored pseudonymously by ‘Simon Haxey’, the book 
was offered by the club in July and was an immediate bestseller.  A political polemic 
attacking the Conservative Party, it set out a detailed and (at least as far as it goes) 
meticulously-researched critique of ‘the economic affiliations of the “hard-faced men” 
who compose the ranks of the Government’s supporters’.66  The chapter entitled ‘The 
Tory Right Wing’ includes a dozen pages analysing those Conservative MPs 
connected with the Fellowship.  Consistent with the book’s wider purpose, Haxey 
sought to interpret these links with Germany as explicit support for National Socialism 
and, in doing so, attacked the Fellowship aggressively.  Most scholars and 
commentators assessing the Fellowship since the Second War have relied on data and 
analysis from Tory MP and this reliance has distorted perception ever since.   
Contemporary reviewers were less accepting of its suitability as a historical source.  
The (admittedly energetically appeasing) Times saw it as ‘propaganda as remarkable 
for its tireless research as for its fanatical one-sidedness’.67  The Manchester Guardian 
recognised it as a useful handbook for critics of the parliamentary elite but thought 
far-fetched the allegations of Fascist tendencies within the Fellowship, pointing out 
that, ‘most of the distinguished members… have long since slunk away with their tails 
between their legs and, apart from a few cranky incorrigibles, are now as anti-Hitler 
as Mr Haxey’.68  Similarly, The Times Literary Supplement lauded the book’s aims 
but regretted its ‘narrowly partisan… spirit’.69  Apparently only one historian, Robert 
Caputi, has directly questioned Tory MP’s suitability as a primary source pointing out 
that its ‘venomous tone and accusatory content had the flavour of class warfare, from 
an overly bitter and cynical perspective’.70 
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Simon Haxey was a pseudonym for a husband and wife team - Arthur and Margaret 
Wynn (nee Moxon).71  Arthur’s 2001 obituary in The Guardian painted a benign 
portrait of a leading light on the left of British politics who as ‘one half of a remarkable 
medico-sociological research team’ during ‘a long and astonishingly productive life’ 
had been a champion of mine safety and free school meals.  The couple were 
acknowledged as ‘life-long Labour supporters’ and were described as ‘a latter-day 
Sydney [sic] and Beatrice Webb - though reportedly more fun’.72  Eight years after his 
death, it emerged that Arthur had leant quite a lot further to the left when he was 
exposed as ‘Agent SCOTT’, the recruiter credited with creating the ‘Oxford Ring’ of 
Soviet spies in the 1930s.  So, it seems that most analysis of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship’s political aim and membership has been reliant on a secondary source 
written by a Soviet spy and his wife who had been a fellow member of the Communist 
Party.   
Victor Gollancz followed Tory MP with three slim volumes that together have set the 
tone of wider appeasement historiography for subsequent decades.73  Most notorious 
is Guilty Men which Gollancz claimed to be ‘probably the most famous British 
pamphlet for a hundred years’.74  In 1943, it was followed by The Trial of Mussolini 
authored by Michael Foot on his own (under the pseudonym ‘Cassius’) and selling 
150,000 copies.  Written as an allegory, it sought to expose the immoral support for 
Mussolini from Conservative politicians dating back to 1922 and named both Cato’s 
guilty men and anti-appeasers including Winston Churchill and Duff Cooper.  
Reviewing the book, George Orwell, while sympathetic politically, acknowledged the 
one-sidedness in that ‘throughout his book it is implied that only Tories are immoral’ 
and perceptively raised the unspoken corollary that ‘although it was in every way more 
pardonable, the attitude of the Left towards the Russian regime has been distinctly 
similar to the attitude of the Tories towards Fascism’.75 
The third in the series, and most relevant to the historiography of the Fellowship, was 
Your MP published in 1944.  Again, it was authored under a classical pseudonym, 
‘Tiberius Gracchus’, actually Tom Wintringham, an alumnus of Gresham’s School 
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and Balliol College, Oxford.  Like the Wynns a communist since the early 1920s 
(albeit he was expelled from the Party because of his complex love life) he was a 
shining light of the political left as a founder of both the Daily Worker and the Left 
Review and fought in the Spanish Civil War.  Far less balanced and calm in tone than 
Haxey’s work, Your MP posited a stereotypical backbench Conservative MP - Major 
RE Patriot, OBE - whose beloved son has just died in a German prison camp.  Having 
created this pathetic character sketch and back story (in poor taste, as many real 
Conservative MPs would have lost sons in the war) he collated evidence of pro-
German and appeasing statements by such MPs into a toxic cocktail of guilt for the 
death of his own son.  Major Patriot is characterised as admiring Hitler on the basis 
that ‘he loathed or feared the bestial passions of Leninism so religiously that he could 
feel quite happy at the idea of strengthening the Nazis in order that they should save 
Western civilisation and destroy Bolshevism’.76  Your MP included a full chapter on 
the Fellowship and, acknowledging the author’s debt to Haxey, highlights its 
Conservative MPs and parades (ever benefiting from hindsight) their far from sensible 
public statements before the outbreak of war. 
Belatedly, the Conservatives fought back against this leftist onslaught on their 
reputation.  They were led by the young MP, Quintin Hogg, (later Lord Hailsham) 
who went on to serve as a minister, chairman of the Conservative Party, leader of the 
House of Lords and lord chancellor.  Hogg published a review of Your MP in The 
Spectator titled ‘Waste Paper’ that damned it as ‘dismal muck-raking’ that attempted 
to ‘pillory a group of politicians by quoting their less considered utterances’.77  He 
followed the article with a slim volume published in June 1945 by Faber & Faber with 
a Gollancz-style sensationalist dust-jacket, The Left was never Right.  This defended 
the Conservatives’ record and highlighted support for appeasement, pacifism and 
disarmament from the left that, he argued, had facilitated Hitler’s aggression as much 
as Tory appeasement.  An energetic defence but, coming only a month before the 
General Election, as Hogg ruefully remembered, it was ‘too little and too late to 
counteract the impression made by the earlier Gollancz publications’ and therefore to 
stem the shift to the left ahead of the Labour landslide. 78   
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In late August 1939, a month after Tennant had reported to Downing Street on his 
meeting with Ribbentrop and only days before Hitler’s troops marched into Poland, 
the Fellowship’s full-time secretary, TP Conwell-Evans, was in a private room in the 
House of Commons briefing three of Chamberlain’s most vocal critics, Lloyd George 
(the British prime minister who had ‘won the Great War’) Winston Churchill (who a 
few days later was to be appointed first lord of the Admiralty and within a year prime 
minister) and Anthony Eden (reappointed as foreign secretary in December 1940) on 
the immediate prospects for avoiding war.  While Ernest Tennant offered much of the 
organisational drive and administrative zeal in setting up the Fellowship, it is Conwell-
Evans who should rightly be seen as its intellectual and philosophical ‘high priest’.  
Both men were committed and passionate Germanophiles, fluent in the language, and 
shared an enthusiasm for the country that long pre-dated any admiration for Hitler and 
the National Socialists.   
Treated with suspicion by most historians, it is the mysterious Conwell-Evans who is 
the central enigma in this story.  His social background, education and politics were 
starkly different to Tennant’s and the traditional Conservative and aristocratic profile 
assumed by many chroniclers of the Fellowship.  Born the second son of a master 
tailor in Carmarthen, Wales, he was educated at Queen Elizabeth Grammar School, 
then in France and Germany where he learned each language, before going up to Jesus 
College Oxford in 1911 to read modern and medieval literature and languages.  
Appointed joint honorary secretary of the Fellowship in 1936 (and full-time secretary 
in February 1937) he was an historian, political adviser, secretary, interpreter and 
intelligence agent who worked with Tennant and Ribbentrop but has never been 
subject to biographical study.  While his contribution to meetings between Hitler and 
British statesmen such as Lloyd George, Lord Allen and Lord Lothian has been noted, 
his political influence and wider work for the Fellowship is less often studied.  He has 
puzzled most historians and been dismissed by many and often, it seems, both.   
Confusion has reigned over where he came from and what he did, which this study 
hopes to clarify following the unearthing of his curriculum vitae in an application to 
join the Travellers Club and, most significantly, the recent discovery of his surviving 
personal papers.   




Richard Griffiths called Conwell-Evans ‘a rather shadowy figure’, Kenneth Morgan 
agreed he was ‘somewhat mysterious’ while Antony Lentin abandoned his attempt to 
establish his dates.79  In her recent book on Hitler’s aristocratic go-betweens, Karina 
Urbach has gone the furthest, citing a 1947 allegation by a captured German officer,  
SS-Oberführer Wilhelm Rodde, that he (and Tennant) had carried out ‘intelligence 
work’ for Ribbentrop and she concluded that consequently ‘it is not clear to this day 
what Conwell-Evans actually was’.80  Others have been merely somewhat dismissive 
- Ian Kershaw called him ‘a great admirer of the new Germany’, Peter Nevile dubbed 
him ‘the maverick English professor’ while Andrew Roberts described him, along 
with Tennant and Mount Temple, as ‘German sympathisers’.81  Earlier historians were 
more interested.  Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott were ‘most intrigued by his 
appearance in [their] story’ but ‘took a long time to track him down in the flesh’.82  
Having done so, Gilbert, by then Churchill’s official biographer, interviewed Conwell-
Evans for The Roots of Appeasement (and included his verbatim account of Lloyd 
George’s meeting with Hitler as an appendix) but made no mention of his role within 
the Fellowship.  Leonard Mosley studied him in some detail describing him as ‘a 
typical public school type [wrongly], gay, witty, debonair, superficially shallow but 
deeply sensitive beneath the surface, and much concerned about the future’.83  Also 
writing in the 1960s, Harold Deutsch acknowledged his sincerity as being ‘deeply 
dedicated to preventing war between Britain and Germany’.84  Clearly intrigued, 
Deutsch found him ‘impossible to locate’ in London in May 1967 despite ‘no report 
of his death’ when he was in fact living out his final months in Notting Hill.  Michael 
Bloch did acknowledge Conwell-Evans’s importance (alongside Lord Lothian) as an 
‘ardent intellectual advocate of Anglo German rapprochement’, but few, if any, 
historians have acknowledged his vital role within the Fellowship especially after he 
became its full-time secretary in February 1937.85  From 1935 to the outbreak of the 
war, all his activities relating to Germany were undertaken under the Fellowship’s 
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aegis and authority.  This connection has been largely ignored by modern historians, 
but, as will be evidenced, was well understood by his contemporaries.   
Such confusion may be partially the result of his changing names.  Born Evans, which 
remained the only constant, he went up to Oxford as Thomas Pugh Evans albeit 
apparently known as Phillip by his intimates (his code-name when dealing with the 
German resistance was ‘Phillipos’).  His family added Conwil as a prefix in the 1920s 
that he later anglicised to Conwell.  Confusing to any biographer, his first two books 
were published under Conwil-Evans and the last three (from the later 1920s) under his 
final moniker of TP Conwell-Evans.  His contemporaries seemed unsure how to 
address him.  Lloyd George and Sir Robert Vansittart both called him Conwell.  
Ramsay MacDonald used Evans, Lord Halifax preferred Professor while his niece, 
Rose Rosenberg (MacDonald’s secretary) and Martin Gilbert each knew him as TP.  
His death notice in The Times covers all the options by listing him as Dr Thomas 
Phillip Pugh (T P) Conwell-Evans. 86  His doctorate was hard won, being awarded by 
the London School of Economics in 1929 despite a nervous breakdown through 
overwork.  The use of the title of professor is dubious: he was only a visiting lecturer 
for two years at Königsberg and never held a chair at a university.  Perhaps, as a 
socially ambitious historian, amateur diplomat and ad hoc intelligence agent, this 
opaqueness may have been deliberate.  
Martin Gilbert, writing days after Conwell-Evans’s death, aged seventy-six in 
November 1968, admitted that, when they first met, he had been ‘one of those who 
believed that he had betrayed his country’.  Their recently unearthed correspondence 
reveals that, following an introduction from MG Christie, they developed a close 
friendship and that Gilbert coaxed him out of the life of a recluse.  Conwell-Evans 
appointed Gilbert as his literary executor and left him his surviving papers.  In a 
heartfelt letter of condolence to his niece, Gilbert wrote: ‘TP played an important part 
in our history - and sooner or later it will be recognised.  He suffered more than anyone 
I knew from the sneers and accusations of those who did not know his true 
achievements… over the years I have collected evidence absolutely refuting these 
charges.  To the contrary, he did things for our country of which no man need be 
ashamed - and few could parallel’.87  Gilbert was at the time immersed in researching 
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his magisterial twenty-four volume official biography of Churchill, the arch anti-
appeaser, and interviewing the surviving players from the period so this is an 
astounding and authoritative claim.  In the same letter, he explained to the niece that 
Conwell-Evans knew he wanted to ‘write something about him’.  The completion of 
Churchill and many other projects intervened so the project never advanced.  Thanks 
to the kind initiative of Sir Martin’s widow, the Holocaust historian Esther Goldberg, 
who, remembering a two-year old enquiry, found the Conwell-Evans papers and 
tracked down this student, it is possible to include this primary material in such a study 
for the first time. 
 
None So Blind 
Conwell-Evans’s last book, None So Blind, has itself contributed to the wider mystery.  
Based on the papers of his close friend, fellow intelligence agent and Fellowship 
Council member, Group Captain Malcolm Christie, DSO, MC, it was written in 1941 
(a year after Guilty Men) but only privately printed six years later in 1947.  Harshly 
critical of the British government’s failure to act on the intelligence supplied by 
Christie, Conwell-Evans and others, the print run was limited to only one hundred 
numbered copies before the ‘type was distributed’.   
Soon after the outbreak of war, Christie ‘feeling his work of so many years had been 
in vain began to destroy his voluminous files’.88  Thankfully for historians, Conwell-
Evans interceded and persuaded his friend to let him, as an experienced and published 
historian, develop the papers and their combined recollections into a book.  Agreeing 
it would ‘not be helpful to raise during the war issues that might be contentious’, they 
waited until 1947 to have the book privately printed by Harrison & Sons Limited, 
printers to His Majesty the King and better known for printing bank notes and postage 
stamps and for publishing The London Gazette and Burke’s Peerage.  At this point the 
story becomes more mysterious - the copies were not distributed until after they were 
both dead i.e. nearly thirty years after they were writing.  Christie’s will (dated 28 
November 1970) referenced a legal agreement between him and Conwell-Evans 
(dated 22 June 1965) concerning the distribution of the book.  It provides Conwell-
Evans (who confusingly had been dead for a year) and/or his niece Pamela Turner 
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with up to £200 to cover the cost of distributing the book to selected libraries and 
newspapers around the world.  To date, eighteen copies have been identified as 
surviving.89   
In 1992 in The Unnecessary War, Patricia Meehan pointed a finger at the British 
Foreign Office: ‘somebody, somewhere, must have embargoed the book’.90  Despite 
her book’s critical success, her question remains unanswered, so we can only speculate 
as to why the two men, having gone to the expense of having their book printed by the 
King’s printer, should have delayed distribution till after their deaths.  Analysis of 
Conwell-Evans’s recently rediscovered papers suggests that the only historian to have 
read it, prior to the 1970s, was Martin Gilbert.  He did so having signed a 
confidentiality agreement promising to show it to no one, to make no quotations 
without the author’s permission and to make no reference to Christie or his history as 
a former British air attaché.   
While None So Blind makes no reference to the Fellowship, it does detail, in the two 
years leading up to the war, how two of its Council members exploited its locus in 
Anglo-German relations to provide accurate, valuable intelligence to the British 
government.  Now an important primary source for historians, its suppression and 
limited availability even when distributed, especially in contrast to the ubiquitous 
Gollancz publications, have contributed to the opaque historical assessment of Christie 
and Conwell-Evans and their roles within the Fellowship. 
 
Traditions of Anglo-German friendship  
The custom of distinguished Britons and Germans establishing exclusive societies 
hoping to improve relations between their countries dates back (at least) to the early 
twentieth century in parallel with the traditions of British appeasement of Germany 
discussed above.  The nomenclature and identities of the various Anglo-German 
friendship societies (and their German counterparts) have confused both contemporary 
commentators and later scholars.  Clarifying that Pythonesque confusion helps any 
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analysis of the Fellowship’s predecessors and the precedent they set.  What emerges 
is an amateur tradition of the ‘great and the good’ promoting friendly relations with 
Germany independent from the professional activities of the British Foreign Office.  
These were mostly self-consciously elitist bodies and, as Conwell-Evans was keen to 
emphasise to Lothian in respect of the Fellowship, not ‘hole and corner’ 
organisations.91  
Despite rising Germanophobia at the time (portrayed in the espionage novels of 
William Le Queux, whose 1906 The Invasion of 1910 sold over a million copies), 
professing friendship towards the Germans was a respectable and normal pastime for 
Edwardian gentlemen.  The Anglo-German friendship societies that campaigned to 
prevent the First World War provided a template for the style of organisation that 
Fellowship members presumably thought they were joining.  These had enlisted broad 
support from the cream of Edwardian society, especially the political leadership, the 
aristocracy and the senior military but also extending into the law, medicine and the 
arts.  The United Anglo-German Friendship Societies had political connections with 
both Liberal and Labour parties, while the Anglo German Union Club was associated 
with the Conservative Party.  Established in May 1911 ‘with the main object of making 
a determined effort to establish a better feeling between Great Britain and Germany’, 
the former had a membership of nearly five hundred of which over one hundred were 
MPs.92  More than half were titled, led by five dukes and 28 earls and guided spiritually 
by two dozen bishops.  Liberal and Labour future parliamentary stars on the 
membership included Keir Hardie, a former leader of the Labour Party; Ramsay 
MacDonald, later leader of the Labour Party and prime minister; the Liberal Sir John 
Simon, later foreign secretary, home secretary and chancellor of the exchequer; and 
Philip Snowden, the first Labour chancellor of the exchequer.  It attracted support 
from the arts, including Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sir Edward Elgar, George Bernard 
Shaw and Ellen Terry.  Representation from the services included Major General Sir 
Douglas Haig, General Sir Ian Hamilton and a host of distinguished admirals.  Several 
members of the pre-war Society were fathers to future members of the Fellowship, 
including Lord Redesdale, Admiral Sir Compton Domvile, Lord Aberdare and Sir 
John Brunner.   
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The Anglo German Union Club had been set up earlier in 1905 with offices in Fleet 
Street ‘to promote friendship between the two Countries… to arrange meetings 
between British and German Parliamentary Representatives… and to arrange 
international sport'.93  These noble objects were also approved by aristocrats, and 
military leaders including the Duke of Connaught, the Earls of Rosebery and Spencer, 
Field Marshal the Earl Roberts and General Baden Powell.  The committee included 
prominent members of the Anglo-German community in London including Baron 
Bruno Schröder, Alexander Siemens and Edgar Speyer.  Arthur Balfour, Conservative 
prime minister until December 1905, was ‘a leading patron’ and the future 
Conservative prime minister, Andrew Bonar Law was also a member’.94  This 
involvement has helped challenge the thesis that the Conservative Party was 
organisationally anti-German at the time.   Support from such senior politicians was 
an inspiration for Conwell-Evans and Tennant in their pursuit of MacDonald, Baldwin 
and Chamberlain.  The Club sought support from the German embassy in London, 
cultivating both Count Metternich, the ambassador, and Count Bernstorff, the 
councillor (and later ambassador to the US) who had ‘taken the keenest interest in the 
movement for the establishment of this Club’.95  Such ambassadorial blessing was 
what the Fellowship sought to elicit from Leopold von Hoesch, Ribbentrop and 
Herbert von Dirksen, the three ambassadors at 9 Carlton House Terrace during the late 
1930s.  
Most often compared, and sometimes confused, with the Fellowship is the Anglo-
German Association (AGA).96  Founded in August 1928, towards the end of the 
golden era of the Weimar Republic, its ‘main and immediate object’ was ‘the 
promotion of rapprochement between Germany and Great Britain’.97  Headquartered 
in Hampstead, the president was Rufus Isaacs, Marquess of Reading, former viceroy 
of India, foreign secretary, lord chief justice and the first practising Jew to hold a 
Cabinet position in the UK.  He was supported by seven vice presidents - the Earl of 
Derby; admiral of the fleet Earl Jellicoe; Viscount D’Abernon, the former ambassador 
to Germany; Sir Robert Horne, former chancellor of the exchequer; Philip Snowden, 
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the chancellor in MacDonald’s Labour government; General Sir Ian Hamilton, and 
Herbert Fisher, the warden of New College Oxford.  Other distinguished members 
included the authors HG Wells, John Buchan and John Galsworthy as well as Gilbert 
Murray, Harold Nicolson and Sir William Beveridge.   
The Association has tended to be portrayed as the anti-Nazi counterpart to a pro-Nazi 
Fellowship.  One writer described it as a group of ‘who had banded together in 1928, 
long before the rise of Nazism, to try to repair the relationship between the two 
countries’ that should never be confused with ‘the sinister Anglo-German Fellowship, 
which was formed later, and was used as an umbrella group by Nazi sympathisers in 
Germany and Britain’.98  While the Fellowship was more palatable to the National 
Socialists than the older Association, it is wrong to depict the latter as consistently 
opposed to Hitler and his regime.  In November 1931, its secretary had suggested 
hosting a dinner for Hitler in London to General Hamilton who had thought it might 
be ‘rather fun’.  Having made enquiries with ‘important personages’, he realised ‘it 
would alienate some of our best friends on both sides’ and ‘scare the French’.99  So 
not inviting Hitler to London was a decision made for political expediency rather than 
moral principle and Hamilton went on to meet Hitler in Berlin in August 1938.100 
The Association was even more elitist than the Fellowship in that it limited its 
membership to only ‘100 gentlemen being natural born British subjects’ and did not 
admit women.101  Approximately a third of the members were MPs from each of the 
main political parties and its committee meetings were held in the House of Commons.  
It had been structured on similar lines to the later Fellowship with a German sister 
organisation, the Deutsch Englishvereinigung (‘German English Association’).  
Although there was never a formal link, several prominent AGA members went on to 
join the Fellowship, including Lord Sempill and Walter Runciman (both on the AGA 
committee) as well as Mount Temple, Londonderry, Lothian, Julian Piggott, Sir Josiah 
Stamp, Richard Meinertzhagen and MG Christie.   
The AGA encompassed a range of opinions about Hitler and debates about his regime 
led to tensions so extreme that the only solution was to dissolve.  Writing to the British 
Embassy in Berlin, Hamilton explained that the German Association was being 
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dissolved ‘some say by Hitler’s command in order that he may reconstitute it with 
pure Nazis whilst others are firm that it has dissolved itself’.102  A group within the 
English Association resisted dissolution, led, it seems, by Richard Meinertzhagen and 
Hamilton.  Crisis meetings were held, and Hamilton enlisted the help of Andrew 
Thorn, the British military attaché in Berlin, who wrote arguing against dissolution, 
pointing out that ‘the German Government and many Nazi organisations are making 
very considerable efforts to entertain English visitors and… it would be an excellent 
plan if Germans could be shown our institutions under equally friendly conditions’.103  
Despite these efforts the AGA was dissolved in April 1935.  Thorn was blunt, chilling 
even, in his advice about a possible replacement for the Association in Britain, arguing 
that ‘people who insist on living in the past, whether Jews, Monarchists, Liberals or 
Republicans, have no right to a place in the reconstituted association’.104  
While the AGA was the most significant of the Fellowship’s immediate precursors, 
there were other similar-sounding bodies in the business of Anglo-German friendship.  
The Anglo German Club had been founded by Mark Neven du Mont and Lord Sempill 
in 1931 and, by the end of 1933, had seven hundred members.105  It maintained 
premises at 6 Carlton Gardens, adjacent to the German embassy, with a sherry bar, 
ballroom, and a Bierstube ‘where a variety of snacks, iced lager and Münchener 
Hofbräu are supplied’.106  The president was Viscount D’Abernon with Earl de La 
Warr, Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, the painter Sir John Lavery, the Bishop 
of Lincoln, Harold Nicolson and Gilbert Murray serving as vice-presidents. The 
German board members were similarly distinguished and included Konrad Adenauer, 
later to serve as West Germany’s first post-war Chancellor, Hugo Eckener the 
commander of the Graf Zeppelin airship, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, the Nobel 
prize winning author and Hjalmar Schacht the economist and finance minister.107  In 
June 1934, the Anglo-German Club changed its name to the D’Abernon Club after the 
former ambassador to Berlin, presumably a more elegant way of distancing itself from 
the Nazi regime than the unseemly dispute raging at the AGA. 
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Other bodies in this cocktail of confusion include the Anglo-German Group, the 
Anglo-German Brotherhood, the Anglo-German Trade Association and, a journal, the 
Anglo-German Review.108  The Anglo-German Group was set up in 1933 and chaired 
by Lord Allen, with membership comprised mostly of Quakers, pacifists and Labour 
supporters such as Noel and Charles Buxton.109  The Anglo-German Brotherhood was 
set up by Baron Friedrich von der Ropp to promote ‘understanding between clergy 
and laity of the German and English Churches’.110  Conwell-Evans was a member for 
a while and it eventually was subsumed into the energetically pro-Nazi organisation 
The Link.  The Anglo-German Trade Association, with offices in Gordon Square 
London, had as committee members directors of Imperial Airways and General 
Electric and was ‘exclusively interested in the development of reciprocal British and 
German trade’.111   
Importantly, the Anglo-German Review initially had no direct link to any of these 
organisations.  It was founded and edited by CE Carroll, a pro-Nazi Great War veteran 
and former editor of the British Legion’s journal, who joined the Fellowship and later 
became secretary of The Link and was interned in 1940 under Regulation 18B.  
Fellowship members, including Mount Temple, contributed articles to early editions 
of the lavishly-illustrated Anglo-German Review.   As one historian has recorded, it 
was a ‘sort of celebrity magazine for the Third Reich, with extensive photo spreads 
showing Hitler and other Nazi officials relaxing and spending time with children 
featured in nearly every issue’.112  It was never, as continues to be claimed or inferred 
by historians, the official organ of the Fellowship but rather evolved into the 
mouthpiece of The Link.113  Contemporaries were similarly confused - as explored in 
chapter five, the Board of Deputies of British Jews based their analysis of the 
Fellowship’s intentions on its content and tone.  Such confusion has skewed 
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interpretations of the Fellowship, which had its own Monthly Review, especially as the 
ideological gulf between it and The Link widened as war approached.  
Conwell-Evans looked back to these predecessor societies as both inspiration and a 
warning for the Fellowship.  In 1932, a year before Hitler came to power, he had 
published a critique of the Asquith government’s slide into war which Gilbert argued 
had made ‘a serious contribution to the war guilt controversy’.114  Conwell-Evans 
regretted that, before 1914, ‘the activity of associations, such as the Anglo German 
society and the groups of MPs, who worked for an appeasement of the European 
situation, failed to arouse from the nation a deep seated response’.  
 
A note on sources  
Until the 2003 release of the heavily weeded MI5 file on the Fellowship, historians 
had found few primary sources or contemporary accounts other than the Gollancz 
publications.  The Fellowship’s archive appears lost as does that of the DEG.115  The 
MI5 file offers a better, and relatively objective, resource including a copy of the first 
annual report with membership list, the minutes of the founding meeting, two editions 
of its Monthly Journal, the founding membership list for the DEG, reports from the 
two intelligence officers infiltrated into the organisation and related reports.  
Critically, however, it is missing the second annual report, published in early 1938 
with the fullest published list of members.  Tracking down this original document 
(from which Haxey and Gracchus quoted extensively but selectively), covering the 
Fellowship’s glory years, has given us a better-balanced picture of the Fellowship and 
its membership.  Few, if any, historians have reviewed this source since it was 
published.  Collating these two membership lists, reports in The Times on guests at the 
Fellowship’s dinners, and information from its Companies House filings with 
biographical data has facilitated a database of its supporters that will be mined in 
subsequent chapters.  Perhaps ambitiously, from this it is hoped to uncover, what 
Lawrence Stone considered the first purpose of a prosopography, the ‘deeper interests 
that are thought to lie beneath the rhetoric of politics; the analysis of the social and 
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economic affiliations of political groupings; the exposure of the workings of a political 
machine; and the identification of those who pull the levers’.116 
Adding flesh to this skeleton has involved identifying supporting contemporary 
correspondence from a number of archives.  Several appear to have escaped 
examination by students of the Fellowship and no review of the primary sources has 
been previously undertaken.  As well as various prime ministerial, Cabinet and 
Foreign Office file series, these include those surviving personal papers of participants 
including Neville Chamberlain, MG Christie, TP Conwell-Evans, JCC Davidson, 
Lord Halifax, General Sir Ian Hamilton, the Duke of Hamilton, David Lloyd George, 
Lord Lothian, DM Mason, Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Mount Temple, George Pitt-
Rivers, Sir Eric Phipps and Lords Runciman, Simon and Vansittart.  Especially helpful 
are those diaries kept by contemporaries including Robert Bruce Lockhart, Alexander 
Cadogan, Henry ‘Chips’ Channon, John ‘Jock’ Colville, William Dodd, Bella Fromm, 
Oliver Harvey, Thomas Jones, AJ Kennedy, Guy Liddell, Ivan Maisky, Eric Phipps 
and AJ Sylvester.  Further valuable primary sources have been unearthed in the student 
files of the London School of Economics and Jesus College Oxford as well as the 
archives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Travellers Club, Unilever plc 
and the Weiner Library.  While Ernst Ritter’s survey and analysis of the German 
archive material is invaluable, there is doubtless further work to be done in the German 
archive which is beyond the scope of this study.  
Beyond the prosopography, a richer understanding of the founders and leaders of the 
Fellowship is overdue.  Contemporary memoirs, autobiographies and biographies of 
the protagonists have shone light on the individuals as well as the hopes and fears of 
the time.  Ribbentrop left us his memoirs hastily composed ahead of the hangman’s 
noose and completed by his widow.  Michael Bloch’s excellent biography and other 
historians have contributed to the picture of this central figure.  Ernest Tennant’s 
memoir is an important published primary source.  Rightly treated warily as a 
revisionist apologia by an old man embarrassed by his pre-war enthusiasm for Hitler, 
it is however ruefully honest.117  Tennant based it on his contemporary notes, 
especially his July 1939 briefing note to the prime minister, which are available for 
cross-referencing by historians.  It was well reviewed on publication.  The novelist 
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and wartime intelligence officer Muriel Spark (whose best-known novel, The Prime 
of Miss Jean Brodie (1961) explored British fascination with fascism) thought it 
‘delightfully rich, recounted with humorous and modest charm’.118   
But it has been the rediscovery, after forty years, of Conwell-Evans’s papers and his 
extensive post-war correspondence with Martin Gilbert that has most enriched the 
primary sources available for this thesis.  These two box files were unsorted and 
evidently incomplete but seem neither weeded nor edited.  The contents have shone 
light on the shadowy Conwell-Evans and filled gaps in the story of his work with 
Germany and the Fellowship.  Previously unknown correspondence with 
Chamberlain, Lothian, Halifax, Vansittart, Henderson and MacDonald add depth and 
colour to his relationships with these most prominent politicians and diplomats.  From 
scribbled notes for a memoir on scraps of paper (perhaps prepared with Gilbert) along 
with notes in Gilbert’s hand, it has been possible to piece together a detailed 
biographical profile for the first time.  Other important discoveries include the original 
transcript of the private meeting between Lloyd George and Hitler, photographs from 
that trip and a menu card, signed by the guests, from a dinner for the British party 
following the tea with Hitler.  Cross-referencing the Conwell-Evans papers with the 
Christie papers has allowed a detailed picture of the work undertaken by the two 
friends in the build-up to the Second World War. 
What scholarly historical scrutiny that has been applied to the Fellowship and its 
leaders has tended to be cursory and tangential within important studies focused on 
the far right in Britain,119 international diplomacy,120 economic121 (and wider) 
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appeasement,122 biography123 and social history124 (especially studies of the 
aristocracy125).  In most of these, the Fellowship has merited no more than a few pages 
and is often relegated to asides and footnotes.  This neglect applies even to those 
important recent reassessments of the leading actors in the Guilty Men drama such as 
Baldwin, Chamberlain, Halifax, Henderson, and Londonderry.126  The economic 
historians, especially Newton and Forbes, have been least dismissive - correctly 
calibrating, whatever else, the global prestige and financial clout of the Fellowship’s 
corporate backers.  The corporate histories of the companies that funded the 
Fellowship rarely dwell on involvement with Anglo-German relations and 
appeasement but do offer understanding of their subject’s exposure to Germany and 
wider international ambitions.127    
Examining the extent to which the Fellowship had an anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi 
mission, the historians of such extremism, especially Griffiths and Pugh, have found 
the Fellowship disappointingly moderate.  Nonetheless, they have compared it with 
avowedly pro-Nazi organisations such as Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists, 
Admiral Domvile’s The Link and Archibald Ramsay’s Right Club rather than, say, 
other more moderate bodies arguing for peace with Germany - such as the British 
Legion, the Round Table or the Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) - 
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with each of which it shared both members and philosophy.  A key question therefore 
is whether the Fellowship has been examined in the wrong context - tried in the wrong 
court - and therefore damned by association from the outset.  
Hardly surprisingly, involvement with inter-war bodies arguing for appeasement of 
Germany was swiftly forgotten once the war started and the Churchillian and Guilty 
Men traditions took hold.  With Tennant the exception, few mention involvement with 
the Fellowship in post-war memoirs and biographers rarely focus on it.  Just as 
aristocratic German families distanced themselves from their Nazi pasts and 
emphasized any connections to the resistance to Hitler, so the British elite that 
supported the Fellowship has forgotten such engagement.  Its recruitment success 
within society meant that several hundred Fellowship members warranted entries in 
Who’s Who, yet only Lord Mount Temple listed it amongst his many appointments.  
As will be argued, they had less to be ashamed of than thought at the time and perhaps, 
as the critical revaluation of appeasement continues, little to be ashamed of at all.  
Building on the prosopography, this study also chronicles the Fellowship’s rise and 
the pivotal moments in the development of the twin friendship societies.  The 
Fellowship’s leadership managed to play first-hand witness to key historical events - 
briefing Ramsay MacDonald on matters German on walks across Hampstead Heath; 
picking through the just-sacked Karl Liebknecht House in Berlin in February 1933; 
briefing Baldwin on the new National Socialist regime in August 1933; witnessing 
Ribbentrop’s tantrum with Hitler over his career prospects in March 1934; dining with 
Himmler in Ribbentrop’s garden on the eve of the Night of the Long Knives in June 
1934; dining with Hitler six months later to celebrate the tenth anniversary of his 
release from prison; dropping in to Buckingham Palace for an impromptu meeting 
with the new king in January 1936; warning the British Foreign Office of Hitler’s 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland planned for the next day; convincing Lloyd George 
that summer to visit Germany; over tea in the Berghof that September inviting Hitler 
to visit London; warning Halifax of the threatened invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1938; walking through Kensington Gardens with the Oster conspirators that 
same month; waving goodbye to Chamberlain at Heston airport as he took his maiden 
aircraft flight a month later to meet Hitler; dining with Ribbentrop on his private train; 
briefing Churchill and Eden on the Nazi leadership on the eve of the Second World 




War and then representing the British government in negotiations with the German 
resistance after war had been declared.   
Given their core mission was the preservation of peace, the Anglo-German Fellowship 
and the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft clearly failed.  As such, the Fellowship has 
been traditionally associated with Chamberlain’s vilified policy of appeasement.  I 
will argue that, while its leaders remained appeasers right up to the outbreak of war 
and publicly offered support for the prime minister, their flavour of appeasement was 
markedly different from Chamberlain’s, being based on a better understanding of 
Hitler, his advisers and his regime.  Close analysis will show how its leadership also 
worked with his two immediate predecessors as prime minister and, counter-
intuitively, with the ‘anti-appeasement’ camp both within the Foreign Office and in 
the ‘wilderness’.   The twin friendship societies have been written off as doomed, 
foolish and naïve ventures from the outset - no more than Ribbentrop’s clumsy 
propaganda tools for Hitler’s unavoidably bellicose foreign policy.128  More 
considered analysis of the German connections reveals conversations with the 
industrial, military and diplomatic resistance to Hitler and his regime.  Given this 
breadth of connections, it seems reasonable to ask whether the British government 
could have made better use of the wise counsel from these friends of Germany who 
may have better understood how to challenge, and even contain, the Führer.  
Chapter one explores the business, financial and economic context for the Fellowship 
on both sides of the North Sea and those businessmen that founded it, for whom 
another war was certainly bad for business.  Chapter two challenges the prevailing 
tradition that the Fellowship’s political origins were within the far right of the 
Conservative Party, instead analysing its support from a politically broader church.  
Having explored how it started and from where it came, chapter three looks at what 
the Fellowship achieved politically and diplomatically in its first two years.  Chapter 
four widens the prosopography to explore the Fellowship’s social, military and 
sporting milieu and its Anglo-German royal imprimatur.  Chapter five lifts that lid of 
respectability to examine to what extent the Fellowship deserves its reputation as a 
harbour for ‘sharks in the shallows’ alongside pro-fascist and anti-Semitic 
organisations.  As the narrative moves into the penultimate two years before the 
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outbreak of war, chapter six explores how the Fellowship adapted to the increasing 
failure of appeasement and sought to connect with those resisting Hitler’s regime.  
Chapter seven seeks to draw together the themes and narrative and examine how 1939 
was its final and defining year.  The conclusion examines what happened to the 
dramatis personae once war was declared and from there hopes to define the 
organisation’s legacy both during and after the war.   




Chapter 1  
Gold, rubber and margarine: business, finance and the Fellowship 
When invited to join the Anglo-German Fellowship, General Sir Ian Hamilton, vice-
president of the recently dissolved Anglo-German Association, declined on the grounds 
that he would not ‘touch any association with purely business connections’.1  This 
chapter will explore the context of the general’s prejudices and catalogue how Ernest 
Tennant and his colleagues corralled support and financial backing from British 
industry and the City.  While a complex story, the Fellowship’s founding was motivated 
by rational business and financial priorities albeit coloured by significant, if not 
unusual, naiveté around the direction of Hitler’s Germany.  Broadly speaking, the 
membership has been portrayed as pro-German, pro-Nazi, anti-Bolshevik, anti-
socialist, culturally reactionary, aspirationally aristocratic and probably both anti-
Semitic and sinisterly right wing.  While examples of craven admiration for Nazism 
within the Fellowship emerge later, there is no explicit evidence of any political 
perspective amongst the founding businessmen and financiers at this stage.  It was the 
perceived needs of British business that inspired the founders to play their part in the 
wider context of ‘economic appeasement’, more than admiration for Hitler and his 
regime.  The British businessmen sponsoring the Fellowship and many of their German 
counterparts founding the DEG represent a roster of names whose businesses wielded 
enormous economic power and were internationally-recognised household brands 
throughout the twentieth century (and in most cases today) – AEG, Barclays, Bosch, 
Bayer, Cooper, Dunlop, Guinness, Johnny Walker, McDougall, Morris, Nobel, 
Nuffield, Schroders, Siemens, Tate & Lyle, Unilever and Zeiss.  
As Tennant recognised, Germany had the largest population in Europe with the largest 
national market and was ‘the world’s third largest importer’.2  Notwithstanding the 
challenges of rebuilding her economy following the Great War and the economic roller-
coaster of the 1920s and early 1930s, she remained Britain’s main European trading 
and financial partner.  She was Britain’s fifth largest customer, after India, South Africa, 
Australia and Canada, and therefore the largest outside the British Empire with imports 
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valued at £20.6 million, a third more than France.3  This was a position Britain, as 
Richard Overy has argued, certainly ‘did not want to lose… at a critical time for the 
British economy’.4  German industry before 1933 can be characterised as broadly 
expansionist with its companies looking to source raw materials from around the world 
and export well-respected manufactured goods in return, ‘a necessity that mothered 
both invention and insecurity’.5  The picture is complicated by rising nationalism, 
protectionism and an array of cartel and tariff structures in different industries.  The 
more successful German companies were far from cowed by the legacies of Versailles 
and hyperinflation – IG Farben, for example, had lobbied hard to persuade ICI and the 
US giant Allied Chemical to join it in a global chemicals behemoth with IG firmly in 
the driving seat.  The new National Socialist economic model was characterised by the 
move towards autarky and the development of synthetics to achieve greater self-
sufficiency evolving into Gӧring’s Five Year Plan.  Frank D’Arcy Cooper, Fellowship 
founder, Unilever chairman and one of the most successful British businessmen of the 
first half of the twentieth century, published an article in early 1935 politely but firmly 
critical of the new German policy.  He pointed out that the ‘production of synthetic raw 
material, and other efforts designed to make the country more self-sufficient, has 
naturally aroused misgivings in the countries supplying such raw material’.  He 
appealed to the German people, ‘held in such high esteem for their great contributions 
to the spiritual treasures and material progress of mankind’, for a restoration of freer 
trade ‘by which all countries - Germany herself included - are bound to benefit greatly 
and equally’.6 
Tennant and Mount Temple had both previously been involved in Anglo-German trade 
talks at the highest level.  In October 1926, long before the Fellowship was conceived 
(and while Hitler was still banned from public speaking in Germany) Mount Temple 
had hosted ‘the largest Anglo-German economic conference of the 1920s’ at 
Broadlands, his country estate in Hampshire.  This provided a pre-Nazi model for 
industrial cooperation - driven by business not politics - that the Fellowship’s founders 
sought to emulate.  Triggered by the recent iron and steel cartel between Germany, 
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France and Belgium, the twenty-four attendees represented ‘a Who’s Who in British 
and German business during the inter-war period’.7  The British delegation included 
the presidents of the Coal Association, the Iron and Steel Association, the Engineers 
Employers Federation and the Federation of British Industry along with senior directors 
from General Electric Company, Daimler and BSA.  Their German counterparts 
included senior representatives from the mining, metals, paints and coatings industries 
along with the chairman of the Federation of German Industry and were led by Dr Cuno, 
a former chancellor of the German Reich and chairman of the Hamburg America Line.  
FC Goodenough, the chairman of Barclays Bank welcomed his counterpart from 
Deutsche Bank.  The cause of some controversy, it was held with the awareness, if not 
approval, of the prime minister and the foreign secretary and resulted in protests from 
both the French and Italian ambassadors.  Initially secret, it was widely publicised the 
weekend it happened, having been inadvertently leaked to the press in Berlin.  The 
Times reported that the conference ‘achieved so large a measure of agreement on broad 
questions of international cooperation that a joint committee has been appointed’ while 
the Daily Mail, whose political correspondent, Victor Gordon Lennox had been present, 
concluded that both sides were ‘greatly delighted with the successful nature of the 
meeting’.8    
Tennant had recently been asked by the directors of Unilever to introduce them to the 
Führer and Wilhelm Keppler, his economics adviser.  This had evolved into the 1934 
British trade mission to Germany that included directors of Unilever, Shell and Dunlop 
under the cautious blessing of Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England.  
The group, several of whom ‘had left London feeling extremely hostile to Germany and 
out to have a real row’, met Hjalmar Schacht, Norman’s friend and counterpart at the 
Reichsbank, as well as Ribbentrop, Keppler, the Duke of Brunswick, Lehnkering and 
Hitler.9  The mission had been suggested by Ribbentrop in response to the deterioration 
of trade relations between Britain and Germany as the latter’s gold and foreign currency 
reserves fell rapidly in early 1934 and rising global prices hit her exports badly.  The 
perceived success of this mission gave Tennant and his newly-enthusiastic industrial 
backers the inspiration to found the Fellowship.  On his return, Tennant briefed the 
                                                          
7 McDonough, Chamberlain, pp. 135-6. 
8 The Times, 11 October 1926; Daily Mail, 11 October 1926. 
9 Tennant, TA, p. 179. 




Board of Trade on Germany’s plans to increase autarky with the development of ersatz 
materials to reduce imports and the use of barter to get around currency controls.   The 
Department of Trade were apparently ‘amused’ and accused him of exaggerating.10  He 
wasn’t.  
The Fellowship’s launch was sponsored by the cream of British industry and finance, 
in particular Unilever and ICI who provided over half the initial funding.  Both were 
recently-created, fast-growing conglomerates led by ambitious modern businessmen 
dominating their sectors internationally.  Unilever was the largest British company in 
1930 with an estimated market value of £132 million and ICI the third largest at £77 
million.11  The British corporate landscape had been transformed by a wave of mergers 
in the 1920s as specific industries concentrated and internationalised.  The British 
champions were inspired by admiration for German and US industrial models being 
built on aggressive consolidation and product innovation, dosed with a real fear of 
competitive threat.  The corporate members, donors and prominent directors who joined 
the Fellowship represented many of the best-known industrial concerns, often, like 
Unilever and ICI, newly-created by mergers.  By late 1937, fifty-nine companies were 
corporate members each paying between five and ten guineas annual subscription and 
together contributed over £2,000 (roughly £120,000 in 2018 prices) to finance the 
Fellowship.  As well as contributing financially, each company was required to 
nominate at least one representative from its senior management.  It is notable that these 
were senior directors, founders or chairmen rather than more junior executives with 
responsibility for Germany.  The Fellowship was unapologetically exclusive, boasting 
in its annual report of strong representation from ‘the city, banking, great commercial 
and industrial concerns’.12 
While not formally incorporated (as a company limited by guarantee) until October 
1935, the Fellowship’s launch meeting was hosted by Tennant at the City offices of his 
family firm, C Tennant Sons & Co, seven months earlier on 11 March 1935 following 
extensive preparation.  This predates by three months the Prince of Wales’s famous 
speech to the British Legion and Sir Thomas Moore’s subsequent call for a ‘German 
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study group for MPs to promote peace’ which have been each cited by historians as the 
clarion call for such a friendship body to be established.13  The meeting was chaired by 
D’Arcy Cooper with Conwell-Evans present, along with a group of senior businessmen 
whose support underlines the importance of the undertaking.  A second Unilever 
director, Paul Rykens, joined D’Arcy Cooper; Charles Proctor, the UK managing 
director of Dunlop, represented the British rubber industry; Julian Piggott, manager of 
the British Steel Export Association, represented steel, while OV Asser of JC Duffus & 
Co, spoke for jute, then still a vital industrial material.  Also present was Major CJP 
Ball from FA Hughes, a plastics manufacturer while two international trading 
companies, Bird & Co and Shaw Luthke & Co sent board representatives.  The world 
of finance was represented by John Bain from insurance brokers, AW Bain & Sons, 
while Arthur Guinness attended on behalf of his family’s merchant bank, Guinness 
Mahon.  Representing the City professions was MC Spencer from Price Waterhouse, 
the leading accounting firm, (and soon to be appointed the Fellowship’s auditor as well 
as a corporate member) while Gerald le Blount Kidd served as solicitor and company 
secretary.  Only two of the attendees were not strictly from the world of business - 
Julian Weigall and Richard Meinertzhagen who both, like Tennant, had backgrounds 
in military intelligence.  So, at this stage there were no MPs, serving military, right-
wing cranks, aristocrats or other society figures involved in the nascent Anglo-German 
Fellowship. 
The selection of auditor is significant.  MC Spencer was a senior and well-respected 
partner from what was in the 1930s ‘arguably the largest and possibly the most 
prominent practice in the City and, by implication, in Britain’ with a blue-chip list of 
clients.14  Appointing a senior City figure from this leading firm for the mundane task 
of auditing the Fellowship’s modest books illustrates how keen the founders were to 
establish it as a respected and transparent institution.  Spencer was audit partner to 
leading businesses including Unilever (who presumably proposed him) Barclays Bank 
and Associated Biscuit Manufacturers.  An internationalist at a time when accounting 
was a mostly domestic profession, he had worked in Holland during the Great War and 
for the British government investigating ‘businesses suspected of trading with the 
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enemy’.15  Price Waterhouse had a successful and growing practice in Germany in the 
1930s and was auditor for the Agent General for Reparations Payments in Berlin.  
This distinguished group agreed to ‘constitute themselves as a provisional committee 
of the Fellowship’.  A list of founding members had been prepared along with a list of 
people who had ‘the question of joining under favourable consideration’ including 
more businessmen, especially from the steel industry, presumably under persuasion 
from Piggott and Tennant.  Meanwhile, a third list was tabled of ‘persons who it was 
considered desirable should be invited to join’ with designated ‘inviters’ from the 
committee. 16  A draft circular was prepared.  Brief and to the point, it opened that ‘a 
growing body of opinion in Great Britain and Germany is anxious to promote goodwill 
and understanding between these two countries’ and proposed that recruitment to the 
Fellowship will be ‘through business and personal contact and subject to invitation by 
the committee’ but otherwise with ‘no restrictions for membership’.  Germans were not 
eligible for membership but rather could join the recently-formed sister organisation, 
the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft in Berlin which ‘already has an influential 
membership’ and had set up premises in Unter den Linden, Berlin.  The annual 
subscription for individuals was set at a minimum of one guinea and at five guineas for 
firms (albeit tax deductible) while it was agreed that ‘a special appeal will be made to 
firms and companies for contributions towards foundation expenses’.17  The possibility 
of permanent premises was considered but hotels considered suitable for now with the 
Hotel Metropole and the Carlton to be approached.  Expenses were to be covered by 
subscriptions and donations with eight firms each agreeing to give a minimum donation 
of £50.   
There was an impressive urgency and energy to the enterprise matched by a swift and 
efficient covert monitoring by various British government departments.  Establishing 
the Fellowship’s respectability on both sides of the North Sea was the priority.  Piggott 
reported that he and Tennant had already briefed the German ambassador, Leopold von 
Hoesch, who was popular within London diplomatic, social and royal circles.  Wary of 
the Nazis, like many of the old school German diplomats, he had failed to develop a 
working relationship with Ribbentrop.  As reported by Piggott, his Excellency 
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‘thoroughly approved of the scheme and promised his support’.18  At this stage, 
notwithstanding Tennant’s and Conwell-Evans active friendship with him, there is little 
sign of Ribbentrop’s direct involvement nor apparently, any funding from Germany.  
Indeed, National Socialism does not yet feature in the various discussions.  
Only three days later, seeking British ministerial approval, Piggott visited the 
Department of Overseas Trade to explain its role to the minister, John Colville and 
officials from his department.  Colville had a background in steel, serving on the board 
of his family firm, David Colville & Sons where Piggott had worked in the 1920s.  He 
explained confidentially that the Fellowship planned to invite Lord Lothian to be 
chairman, briefed the officials on the membership of the DEG and supplied copies of 
the minutes of the founding meeting and supporting documents.  They asked about the 
connection, if any, between the Fellowship and the ‘Anglo-German Club’ and Piggott 
explained that it had been ‘rather frowned at by the German Embassy, but on the other 
hand the Embassy are friendly to the Fellowship’.  Piggott explained that another trade 
mission was being considered but it was agreed that no further action should be taken 
until Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary, had returned from his official trip to 
Germany. 19 
Notwithstanding this open approach, the officials were suspicious enough to brief 
colleagues in the Home Office tasked with monitoring potentially unhealthily pro-
German activity.  A confidential minute of the meeting was sent to Frank Newsam at 
the Home Office barely ten days later.  Newsam, previously principal private secretary 
to four home secretaries in succession, was now in charge of a new division whose 
‘main task was to address the problems caused by the disorders resulting from the 
activities of the British Fascists’.20  Now the wheels of government were turning 
quickly.  Special Branch produced a report barely a month after the founding meeting 
and several months before its formal incorporation.  Inspector Morse (yes, really) and 
Superintendent Canning concluded that the Fellowship was ‘evidently intended to take 
the place of the old Anglo-German Club’ following the ‘difficulties which had 
arisen…over Jewish members’ and recognised it was ‘approved by the German 
authorities, and… sponsored by many prominent National-Socialist Party members in 
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Germany’. 21  Thus can be seen how from the outset, the Anglo-German Fellowship 
was labelled as a Nazi creation and propaganda tool, a half-truth that has stained its 
reputation and dogged its historiography ever since.   
 
Margarine 
The role of Unilever and other companies in launching the Fellowship has received 
scant attention from historians of either.  Unilever provided its splendid boardroom for 
Council meetings.  Its widely-lauded chairman D’Arcy Cooper chaired the founding 
meeting and served as a Council member throughout, along with his Dutch fellow 
director, Paul Rykens (who donated £20 personally), despite their enormous executive 
responsibilities.  Another director, Clement Davies MP (later leader of the Liberal 
Party) joined as a member and attended at least one dinner.  The chancellorship of Hitler 
had caused immediate concern in the Unilever boardroom as indeed in the boardrooms 
of other international industrial, business and finance houses.  The directors were 
alarmed by the risk of nationalisation, trade restriction, regulation and anti-Semitism.  
As its official historian put it, ‘the impact of German economic policy on Unilever was 
spectacular and bizarre’.22  Created just before the 1929 stock market crash through the 
merger of Lever Brothers, the leading soap manufacturer, with the Margarine Union of 
Holland into what The Economist described as ‘one of the biggest industrial 
amalgamations in European history’, Unilever ‘bought and processed more than a third 
of the whole tonnage of oils and fats which find their way into world commerce… 
traded in more places and in more products than any other concern in the world… 
employed nearly a quarter of a million people, represented capital supplied by about 
300,000 investors, and counted its customers not in thousands but in millions’.23  It was 
the largest foreign corporate investor in Germany having committed nearly £38 million 
by 1939 (only 20% less than the total invested in Germany by the US) and Germany 
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was its second largest country of operation with nearly 34,000 employees in over one 
hundred operating subsidiaries.24   
The new German government immediately threatened Unilever’s interests on several 
fronts but most significantly in margarine, a politically and socially sensitive 
commodity.  Developed under the sponsorship of Napoleon III in nineteenth-century 
France but thereafter aggressively marketed by the Dutch, it became a crucial staple of 
the German urban diet as a cheaper alternative to butter.  At the start of Hitler’s regime 
Unilever was supplying nearly seventy per cent of Germany’s margarine needs with an 
annual retail value of approximately £1 billion at modern prices.  This dominant market 
position would rightly alarm any government as a foreign near-monopoly, let alone one 
focused on autarky.  Sensitive to German dairy farmers, many of whom had voted for 
Hitler, whose butter sales were threatened, the government introduced legislation 
requiring the addition of butter to margarine.  Unilever faced additional challenges from 
exchange controls much of which predated Hitler’s government.  Required to Aryanise 
subsidiary boards by asking Jewish directors to step down, one director complained of 
having ‘to adjust ourselves to circumstances and feelings which we do not find 
sympathetic’ and regretted that the firm had little choice but to ‘swim with the Aryan 
current’.25   
Tennant had been advising Unilever’s board on matters German since summer 1933.  
He had opened previously closed doors into the NSDAP high command and had lobbied 
hard on the company’s behalf.  Ribbentrop played a key role in setting up meetings 
with Keppler and Hitler and had been sent a detailed briefing on Unilever’s German 
operations.  That first year of Hitler’s chancellorship gives a flavour of Tennant’s 
effectiveness as a mediator, advising the company on presenting its case to the German 
authorities and its wider public relations.  Unilever used its sponsorship of the 
Fellowship as evidence to senior National Socialists of its sincere contribution to better 
Anglo-German relations.   
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ICI’s motivation for backing the Fellowship is less obvious and consequently 
intriguing.  It had links with the late Anglo-German Association as one of its directors, 
Lord Reading, was also the Association’s chairman.  ICI was a somewhat-awed rival 
to IG Farben of Germany which was apparently the leading corporate backer of the 
DEG.  There were international cartel arrangements between the two groups (especially 
in dyes) and patent-sharing arrangements, also including Du Pont of the US, as part of 
an unholy trinity established ‘to divide the world market between themselves’.26  ICI 
was another multinational giant created four years before Unilever, during the 1920s 
merger boom, as a combination of four leading British chemical companies (including 
Nobel Industries, the explosives manufacturer) in response to the creation of IG Farben.  
While another war threatened Unilever, Dunlop and others with the loss of valuable 
subsidiaries and markets in Germany, ICI was already benefitting from Britain’s limited 
rearmament as the major manufacturer of explosives.  For reasons unclear, it was never 
a corporate member but made the largest single donation of £550 to help found the 
Fellowship.  Lord McGowan, its autocratic chairman for two decades, joined personally 
(and attended the 1937 Christmas banquet) as did Lord Stamp who had been secretary 
and director of Nobel Industries in the 1920s before moving to the railways.  Tennant’s 
cousin, Lord Glenconner, was a lay director and attended the Fellowship’s July 1936 
dinner with his wife; their mutual forebear, Sir Charles Tennant, had been one of the 
founders of Nobels.   
ICI appears to have kept close to its friends in Germany thereby straying into the murky 
worlds of military and political intelligence.  The directors had British government 
encouragement to investigate IG Farben’s synthetic petrol manufacturing process and 
monitor their technical competence ‘of which the chemical industry in the rest of the 
world stood in awe’.  ICI was intimate with British government with McGowan close 
to Walter Runciman, president of the Board of Trade, and the finance director, WH 
Coates, friendly with Sir Horace Wilson, chief industrial adviser to the government.  
Reader goes as far as to conclude that ‘directors of this stamp might perhaps be 
considered informal trustees for the public interest and they certainly ensured a close 
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connection between ICI and the world of government and politics’.27  The British 
Foreign Office files include correspondence between Lord Melchett (then a director 
who would succeed McGowan as Chairman in 1940) and Lord Halifax including 
detailed intelligence from Dr Otto Fischer, head of the Reich’s Kredit Gesellschaft.  He 
was a ‘close collaborator of Field Marshal Goering, and has, it seems, the Fuhrer’s 
confidence’ and detailed the debate then raging among Hitler’s advisers around the 
wisdom of invading Czechoslovakia.28  
Reader details the central involvement of ICI in British rearmament and asserts that 
‘with war becoming every day more likely, the state needed help from ICI’ as ‘no other 
organisation, industrial or academic, privately owned or owned by the state, could 
match ICI’s combined command of scientific talent, industrial technology, and 
managerial skill’.29  During the War, ICI played a vital role in technological advances 
that helped defeat the Axis Powers’ military machine ranging from radar to the atom 
bomb.  From this, it may be reasonable to assume that ICI was using the Fellowship at 
least partially to gather industrial intelligence.  
 
Rubber, cars and sugar 
Lord McGowan had also, since 1919, been a director of The Dunlop Rubber Company, 
the leading British tyre company, and another founding Fellowship corporate member 
and donor.  Its UK managing director, Charles Proctor, had been with Tennant on the 
1934 trade mission, had attended the founding meeting and served on the Council from 
the outset.  Frederic de Paula, Dunlop’s controller of finance, also joined the 
Fellowship.  Formerly professor of accounting at the London School of Economics, he 
developed new management accounting methods suitable for these modern 
multinational enterprises and was lauded as ‘one of the most imaginative and brilliant 
accountants of his period’.30  By 1930, Dunlop was the largest tyre and rubber goods 
manufacturer in Britain and the eighth largest British company.  It had been active in 
the German market since the 1890s, but while its tyre business had prospered generally 
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during the Great War, its German operations had been sequestered by the German 
government, as had those owned by Lever Brothers.  Following the war, it had re-
invested with enthusiasm in Germany such that, by 1929, it owned the second largest 
tyre factory in the country, run by Proctor’s brother-in-law.  In contrast to Unilever, the 
Dunlop board had initially ‘welcomed the Nazi acquisition of power’ and benefitted 
from quick confirmation as an Aryan organisation.31   Such enthusiasm was short-lived 
as it was forced by the German government to buy only local raw materials, join cartels 
and deny its parent company dividends.  Back in Britain, Dunlop’s role in 1930s 
rearmament and the actual war effort has been well documented.  Rubber was a vital 
strategic raw material used in an array of military equipment that Dunlop manufactured 
ranging from tyres for military vehicles, components for tanks, guns and bombers to 
rubber dinghies, barrage balloons, wetsuits for frogmen, rubber decoy tanks, refuelling 
hoses and infantrymen’s boots. 
The Fellowship’s membership includes other household names in several industries 
notably Lord Nuffield, previously William Morris the founder of Morris Motors, by 
then Britain’s leading car producer with half the domestic market.  Often controversial, 
Nuffield was an early proponent of rearmament, a call wrongly assumed by government 
to be motivated by self-interest as, in fact, ‘he used his industrial power and his personal 
fortune to help society at large, whether through medical benefactions or the defence of 
Britain against Hitler’.32  Morris had expanded into aero-engines in 1929 and had 
offered to build them for the Air Ministry but had been ‘vigorously cold-shouldered in 
official and unofficial quarters’ until war was inevitable.33   Then the Morris works in 
Cowley were adapted to aircraft repair and fixed over 80,000 planes, while more than 
a quarter of all British tank output were produced by Nuffield Mechanisations.  
Bizarrely, lacking confidence only about his foreign language skills, Morris claimed 
that he ‘could have stopped Hitler, if only he had spoken English’.34  While never on 
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the Council, Tennant proposed him as chairman after Mount Temple’s resignation in 
1938.35  
Sir Leonard (later Lord) Lyle, chairman of Tate & Lyle and the Lawn Tennis 
Association, joined in the first year.  His company was another 1920s oligopolistic 
merger that had created the largest sugar refiner in the UK, providing three-quarters of 
the country’s sugar needs.  The Scotch whisky industry was represented by Sir 
Alexander Walker, grandson of the eponymous Johnnie Walker whose company had 
merged into Distillers in 1925 to create Britain’s sixth largest industrial concern with a 
market value of £45 million and by Archibald Board DSO, MC who was a director of 
Distillers.  Walker was friendly with Ribbentrop who had been the distributor of 
Johnnie Walker in Germany.  Charles McDougall of McDougalls, millers and pioneers 
of self-raising flour, represented the food industry.  Britain’s two leading oil companies 
were represented by directors who joined as individuals - Andrew Agnew, the 
managing director of Shell Transport and Trading and Frank Tiarks, a director of 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later to become British Petroleum) who between them 
had ‘major interests in German oil refining and distribution’.36  Julian Piggott, as 
manager of the British Steel Export Association, actively promoted the Fellowship in 
the metals sector, recruiting Firth-Vickers Stainless Steels, Birmingham Aluminium 
Casting and James Booth & Co as corporate members as well as directors of United 
Steel Co, Steel Peech & Tozer and William Beardmore & Co who joined as individuals.  
The British steel industry had suffered a ‘Black Decade’ with severe recession and 
European cartels resulting in a 45% drop in production between 1929 and 1932.37 
Alongside ICI, the British chemical industry was represented by Bush, Beach & Gent, 
the UK distributors for BASF of Germany and Brown & Forth while pioneers from the 
emerging plastics industry such as   British Industrial Plastics and FA Hughes & Co 
also joined.  Several textile companies were corporate members including Combined 
Egyptian Mills, a 1929 combination of fifteen struggling firms and a UK top fifty 
company.  FT Davies who joined as an individual member was a director of Courtaulds, 
the highly-successful pioneers of rayon.   This involvement was unsurprising as the 
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textile sector had accounted for a quarter of all British exports in 1925 but had seen that 
drop to just over 13% by 1937.  Shortage of foreign currency reserves in Germany had 
necessitated government controls on imports of wool and cotton and a shift towards 
manmade fibres such as rayon.   
Even thoroughly domestic industries signed up with Lord Stamp, president of the LMS 
(the world’s largest transport organisation, the largest commercial undertaking in the 
British Empire and Britain’s second largest employer with a quarter of a million 
employees) and Sir David Milne Watson, the managing director of the Gas Lighting 
and Coke Company, the largest gas company in the world, joining.  Nor was support 
limited to Britain’s traditional heavy manufacturing; younger, high-technology 
companies joined the Fellowship.  Imperial Airways (which merged into BOAC in 
1939) was a corporate member and represented by its energetic managing director, GE 
Woods-Humphrey.  Ever-Ready, the pioneers of branded electrical consumer goods, 
such as torches, radios and batteries, was a member as was Automatic Telephone & 
Electric Co, one of the early telephone companies.  Triplex Safety Glass who supplied 
glass for cars and planes were represented by CH Cunningham. 
An important aspect of the Fellowship’s work was to encourage tourism across the 
North Sea to promote mutual understanding, so transport interests feature in its 
corporate landscape.  The 1937 annual report recorded that in that summer ‘every week 
about 1,000 tourists arrived on board one of the German liners at Greenwich Harbour, 
and on the evening of their arrival two members of the Council delivered speeches of 
welcome’ such that by the end of September, about 15,000 had been so welcomed. 38  
The Fellowship arranged visits for interested Germans to visit ‘factories and industrial 
concerns’ and contributed to British visits to Germany such as the civic mission in 
August 1937 led by the lord mayor of Stoke-on-Trent.  Meanwhile,  Paul Einzig, the 
contemporary critic of appeasement, reported that ‘during the years of peace hundreds 
of thousands of British tourists paid visits to Germany, and almost without exception 
they came back with favourable impressions’.39  Not surprisingly therefore, Thomas 
Cook, Britain’s most famous travel agent, was an enthusiastic corporate member, 
seconding an employee, Elwin Wright, as the Fellowship’s secretary, supplying two 
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representatives to the membership and advertising in the Fellowship’s monthly journal.  
Hamburg Amerika, the leading German transatlantic shipping company, was unusually 
a corporate member of both the Fellowship and the DEG and advertised in the monthly 
journal.  Other corporate members from the world of transport included Alfred Holt & 
Co, the famous Blue Funnel Liverpool shipping line while P&O was represented by 
one of its directors, Sir Geoffrey Clarke.  Other industries represented on the corporate 
list included sports (Slazenger and Alpine Sports Limited), jute (JC Duffus & Co), 
engineering (J Stone & Co), paper (Edwards & Cleave), wine (Deinhard & Co), hosiery 
(M&H Seiflow) and - a perennial favourite with the Germans - model railways (Bassett-
Lowke). 
 
The Old Lady, the Square Mile and the Fellowship 
While the breadth of this support from industry was impressive, the links between the 
Fellowship and the City of London were also extensive and the stakes far greater.  As 
Tooze has emphasised, ‘the cumulative total of direct investment in Germany was 
dwarfed by the billions that were in default to American and European banks and bond 
holders’.40  Newton has shown that, in 1930s Britain, the wider interests of the 
manufacturing and financial sectors were frequently misaligned specifically in relation 
to Germany.  In broad terms, the City favoured freedom in currency and trade while 
industry was open to government-sponsored tariffs, cartels and even barter 
arrangements.  This tension dated back to the 1920s with industrialists resentful of the 
damage caused to industry by the City’s 1928 domestic equity issuance bubble, the 
catastrophic worldwide stock market collapse the following year and the limitations put 
on their businesses by the twin evils of high interest rates and a strong pound.  While 
few 1930s industrialists, having survived the Great War, are likely to have favoured 
war, it is clear many could and did play an enthusiastic part in rearmament and 
continued to grow their businesses by switching production to a war footing.  While 
Germany was an important market for British manufacturers, it equated to less than a 
twentieth of exports in 1938 and even Unilever and Dunlop could find alternative 
markets for their products.   
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By contrast, the City’s exposure to both Germany and war was potentially fatal.  The 
First World War had been ‘the worst thing that ever happened to the City of London’ 
triggering both financial chaos and robbing it of centuries-long-cherished independence 
from government.41  The City's cultivation of German trade finance in the 1920s left it 
exposed to any volatility in German markets and vulnerable to interference by the new 
German government in the free flow of capital and goods.  The 1931 European financial 
crisis, triggered by the collapse of the Austrian banking system, was a massive trauma 
for London based banks.  Frank Tiarks, Lord Stamp and Sir Robert Kindersley, who 
had been tasked with managing that crisis for both the City and the British government, 
each went on to join the Fellowship.  
The City was instinctively both conservative and Conservative.  While friendship with 
Germany is oft-cited as a bulwark against Bolshevism - a lesser evil perhaps - there 
was, as Kynaston emphasized, no question of such a choice in the City.  From its 
perspective, ‘Soviet Russia was beyond the pale… [and]… the City would have little 
to do with that part of the world for another sixty years’.  Even mild socialism was 
disturbing to the financiers who were suspicious of MacDonald’s Labour 
administration.  Lazards funded the Anti-Socialist Union (also chaired by Lord Mount 
Temple) to the tune of a generous £5,000.  Within the Fellowship, industrialists and 
financiers seem to have found common ground in their Germanophilia working 
together effectively and harmoniously.  The balance of activities in the inter-war Square 
Mile was markedly different to today’s - more involved with international trade, rather 
than just finance and investment.  Many industrial companies were still headquartered 
there, notably Unilever in its splendid Art Deco palace on the Thames.  The City was 
still home to exchanges dealing in commodities such as coal, corn and metals with 
physical deliveries via the Port of London’s nearby wharves as well as markets selling 
fish, meat and vegetables.  The merchant banks supporting the Fellowship were 
absorbed in international trade through ‘acceptance’ business - that is, oiling its wheels 
by guaranteeing trade debts between cross-border counterparties - and raising fresh 
equity and debt capital for higher-risk foreign ventures such as railways and mining 
exploration.  It was the commercial or ‘clearing’ banks that typically provided the 
capital for more pedestrian domestic ventures.  
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The Fellowship’s access to the City elite started in Threadneedle Street with three 
directors of the Bank of England joining, almost certainly with the blessing of Montagu 
Norman, the Germanophile governor and soi-disant ‘Pope of the City’.  Widely 
acknowledged as the father of the modern tax system, Sir Josiah Stamp (later Baron 
Stamp of Shortlands) was a trusted adviser to Chamberlain who, when war became 
inevitable, appointed him chief adviser on economic co-ordination and wanted him as 
chancellor of the exchequer in January 1940.  The other two were leading merchant 
bankers of the era: Frank Tiarks, also a member of the Fellowship’s Council, 
represented J Henry Schrӧder & Co as a corporate member and significant donor, while 
Sir Robert Kindersley represented Lazard Brothers. Both were prominent members of 
the Accepting Houses Committee ‘the innermost, and most mystique-laden, of the City 
of London’s many clubs’.42  Two other London merchant banks were corporate 
supporters: Guinness Mahon, represented by Arthur Guinness - a scion of the founding 
family (also of stout brewing fame) who also served on the Council and donated £20 
personally - and Ralli Brothers who were donors and were represented by three 
directors, Pandias Calvocoressi, George Malcolm and Henri Pfister.   
 
Merchant banking and the Anglo-German heritage  
Enthusiasm for the Fellowship from the merchant bank, J Henry Schrӧder & Co, was 
inspired by its Anglo-German heritage and painful memories of the firm’s treatment in 
the Great War but was triggered by its significant exposure to German clients.  It was 
the British bank most heavily committed to Germany with, by the early 1930s, around 
eighty per cent of its acceptance business with German clients.  There is, however, no 
suggestion of enthusiasm for the Nazis.  Baron Bruno Schröder, head of the family and 
senior partner of the still ‘bravely umlauted’ firm was vocal in his opposition to Hitler 
and active support for Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the Nazis’ arch-critic.43  (Gracchus in Your 
MP emphasised that Bruno was from the ‘same family’ as the notorious Hitler 
supporter, Baron Kurt von Schroeder, when in fact Kurt was not involved with the 
London firm and the two branches of the family had separated in the early nineteenth 
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century44).  Bruno’s partner, Frank Tiarks, alongside Kindersley of Lazard, had 
represented the City in negotiations with Germany during the 1931 financial crisis as 
chairman of the Foreign Bankers Committee and was widely considered ‘one of the 
leading international financiers of the age’.45   
Born in 1874 in London into a prominent Anglo-German family, Tiarks’s grandfather 
had moved to London in the 1820s and served as chaplain to Queen Victoria’s mother.  
It was Frank who had saved Schrӧders from British government seizure by leveraging 
his directorship of the Bank of England to have Bruno, and thereby their partnership 
firm, swiftly naturalised as British in the first few days of the Great War.  Despite this, 
the vilification of the Schröder family and firm was deeply upsetting and coloured their 
perspective when war again loomed two decades later.  As the firm’s official historian 
has recorded, ‘Baron Bruno's naturalisation was greeted with outrage by those caught 
up in the outburst of chauvinistic fervour that swept the country after the declaration of 
war’.  Questions were raised in Parliament and angry comments appeared in The Times.  
His sponsorship (alongside other distinguished gentlemen of German origin such as Sir 
Edgar Speyer and Sir Ernest Cassel, Mount Temple’s father-in-law) of the Anglo-
German Union Club, a precursor to the Fellowship, was portrayed as ‘evidence of 
treacherous sympathies’ as were his endowment of a professorship in German at 
Cambridge University, his charity to prisoners of war on both sides, his firm’s 
sponsorship of the Austrian government bond issue of 1914, and his elder son being 
forced to serve in the German Army.  Asked to explain his painfully divided loyalties, 
Bruno explained that it was as if ‘his father and mother have quarrelled’.46  Tiarks was 
similarly agonised; following the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, he decided to 
insist the firm be dissolved after the war.  He was only dissuaded from this path by 
Walter Cunliffe, then Governor of the Bank of England, who declared it contrary to the 
national interest.  
Tiarks is the epitome of a successful Anglo-German.  He, his wife and children were 
fully German by blood, and yet he prospered in England through two wars against the 
land of his forefathers without (unlike his Schrӧder partners) any real suggestion of 
divided loyalty.  Among his many achievements, he was responsible for introducing 
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the Germans to polo, a sport he played enthusiastically in England.   During the First 
World War he had helped the Bank of England deal with the fallout from severed 
financial relations with Germany, then re-joined the Navy to work in the Admiralty’s 
famous Room 40 tracking German submarines and, in 1919, served as financial adviser 
to the British army in Germany.  Not surprisingly, he continued to play a central role in 
Anglo-German relations in the 1930s, and while his conciliatory approach was seen as 
economic appeasement, there was neither suggestion of fellow travelling nor 
questioning of his loyalty to the Crown.  Indeed, the Gestapo had included his name on 
their ‘black list’ of Britons to be arrested immediately after a German invasion along 
with, inter alios, Beatrice Webb, Sir Robert Vansittart and HG Wells.47  The Tiarks 
involvement with Schrӧders was dynastic with son Henry following father and 
grandfather into the partnership.  By 1930, both Frank and Henry were partners 
alongside Bruno Schrӧder and his son, Helmut.  The two families were close.  Helmut 
and Henry were sent to Eton together, joined the family firm on New Year’s Day 1926 
and retired simultaneously, having run the business together for nearly forty years, in 
1965.48  Both families were active members of the Fellowship and attended the dinners.  
As well as his representing the firm and sitting on the Council, Tiarks’s wife and two 
sons were members.  Helmut and his mother, Baroness Bruno Schrӧder, were members 
with his wife joining them at dinners.   
While Montagu Norman was its Pope, Robert Kindersley was dubbed ‘the God of the 
City’ by Win Beyen (the distinguished president of the Bank of International 
Settlements, sometime Dutch ambassador to Paris and another director of Unilever).49   
Kindersley served as director of the Bank of England for over three decades and 
chairman of Lazards from 1919, which he transformed ‘into one of London's most 
innovative, aggressive, and successful merchant banks’.50   The British representative 
on the Dawes Committee on Reparations in 1924, he played a central role in the 1931 
crisis and thereafter helped ‘manage sterling on a day-to-day basis’.51  Described by his 
Times obituarist as ‘a man with whom it would be safe to go tiger hunting and whom it 
would probably be unprofitable to oppose’, he devised national savings as chairman of 
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the National Savings Committee persuading the  British to save £9 billion during the 
Second World War. 52  Like Schröders and four other merchant banks, Lazards ‘was 
virtually bankrupted by its exposure in Germany’ and Kindersley would have been 
personally ruined had he not secured £3 million in emergency support from his friends 
at the Bank of England. 53    
The deposit-taking banks were also exposed to the German financial crisis - albeit, with 
their larger balance sheets, less immediately vulnerable. Midland Bank had loaned over 
£2 million to Deutsche and Dresdner Banks, both of which were represented on the 
DEG.  While not corporate members, three of the ‘Big Five’ high street banks were 
represented by main board directors joining the Fellowship: Robert Barclay and Sir 
Donald Horsfsall from Barclays, Lord Barnby, Sir Leonard Lyle and the Hon. Walter 
Runciman (son of the president of the Board of Trade) from Lloyds Bank (where the 
Fellowship had its own bank accounts) and Lord McGowan and Sir Alexander Roger 
from the Midland.  Directors from Chemical Bank & Trust, British Overseas Bank, 
National & Grindleys and Coutts (bankers to the royal family) also joined the 
Fellowship.  Lord Lothian was governor of the National Bank of Scotland.  In the 
1930s, as now, London was the centre of international insurance whose leaders feature 
in both the corporate and individual membership of the Fellowship. CT Bowring & Co 
(whose representative served on the Council), Bevington, Vaizey & Foster, Hartley 
Cooper & Co, Price Forbes, Willis and Faber & Dumas were each corporate members 
while Commercial Union, Guardian Insurance, Norwich Union, and Bain & Co were 
represented by directors.  Sir Percy McKinnon, recently-retired as the long-standing 
chairman of Lloyds of London, was also a member.  
 
Money and the Fellowship 
Despite its deep-pocketed corporate backers and steady success at recruiting individual 
members, the Anglo-German Fellowship was never well-financed and recently-
discovered correspondence illustrates how precarious were its finances.  By 30 
September 1936, it was comfortably, but not extravagantly, installed in its Chelsea 
apartment having invested in office furniture and equipment valued at £200.  Nearly 
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£2,000 (or approximately £120,000 in 2018 prices) had been raised in subscriptions and 
donations in its first year with the latter accounting for three-quarters of the cash raised.  
In its first year of operations, the Fellowship generated a healthy surplus of £364 after 
establishment and running expenses and ended the year with just over £600 cash in the 
bank. 
But, after the generosity of the founding corporate donors, the value of donations 
dropped by four-fifths with only £275 donated in 1937 - £250 of which came from 
Unilever and the rest from individuals.  Ticket sales for events were an important source 
of income, rising by a quarter from £600 in 1936 to £750 in 1937, but were not a source 
of profit as the events were expensive to host.  As membership grew, the income from 
subscriptions doubled to over £1,000 in 1937 which only partially offset the loss of 
donations.  Consequently, in its second year, the Fellowship lived beyond its means 
with an ‘excess of expenditure over income’ of nearly £300 that halved its cash reserves 
to just over £300 (£18,000 in 2018 prices) by September 1937.54 
It is clear from the surviving correspondence that funding was a constant source of 
concern for the executive and the Council which, in the 1937 annual report, ventured 
‘to hope that further donations will be forthcoming’ and pointed out that ‘if the 
Fellowship is to carry out the important duties with which it has been entrusted… its 
power and efficiency should not be hampered by lack of funds’.55  This 
impecuniousness is relevant to historians questioning the extent to which the 
Fellowship was, or may have been, funded by the NSDAP and/or the German 
government.  Detailed analysis of the two sets of filed accounts offers no evidence of 
formal financial support from overseas.  One donation of £100 is noted to ‘anonymous’ 
but that has recently been identified as coming from a Jewish refugee whose brother 
Tennant had tried to rescue from imprisonment in Germany.  All the other donors were 
reputable British companies and named individuals and Tennant mentions in his 
memoir that the British Council provided some help ‘on a most limited scale’.56  Were 
the German authorities or the much-better funded DEG to be providing any meaningful 
financial support, the profit and loss account would have painted a prettier financial 
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picture.  It seems improbable that Price Waterhouse would have colluded in any 
fraudulent accounting.  However, it is known that the Germans generously hosted 
Fellowship members, providing transport, accommodation and entertainment once in 
Germany (just as they did for Lloyd George’s visit) and they may well have subsidised 
the costs of air travel between London and Berlin.  Urbach has unearthed evidence that 
Conwell-Evans, on at least of one recorded occasion, received a significant cash 
contribution from Ribbentrop.57  Given his frequent crossings of the North Sea, his 
always precarious personal financial circumstances and the Fellowship’s limited 
resources, it is hard to see how he would have managed so many trips without such 
support.  By 1939, Tennant was struggling to find sufficient finance to support the level 
of activity urged by his German DEG colleagues who were continuing to expand.  
Rather than relying on the Germans, he appealed to the British government for funds, 
arguing to an unnamed cabinet minister in February that ‘the expenditure of a few 
thousand pounds… would have immensely valuable results – equal in value as a means 
of promoting peace to equipping several divisions or to building several cruisers’.58 
 
German industrialists and the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft  
Attached to the minutes of the Fellowship’s founding meeting is a list of fifty-eight 
individual members of its Berlin sister organisation, the Deutsch-Englische 
Gesellschaft.  Apparently formed in late 1934, the British embassy in Berlin and the 
consulate-general in Hamburg had been monitoring its development and reporting back 
to the British Foreign Office which appears then broadly supportive of its aims.59  
Alongside ‘prominent members of the Nazi party’ such as Ribbentrop, Coburg, Keppler 
and General von Reichenau, it lists the leaders of several of Germany’s most famous 
and innovative industrial concerns whose membership would presumably reassure 
potential corporate members of the Fellowship of its commercial bona fides.60  While 
each was later rightly vilified for equipping the Nazi war machine, including with the 
tools of Holocaust such as Zyklon B and other extermination equipment, several of 
these business leaders were critical of Hitler and the National Socialists.  This suggests 
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the portrayal by many historians of the DEG as solely a crude Nazi propaganda tool 
and its membership as restricted to ‘good’ Nazis may be an over-simplification.61  
Writing to the prime minister in 1939, Tennant recognised this equivocal relationship 
between German industry and National Socialism: ‘many of the big German 
industrialists and others who are working so actively in the DEG are lukewarm 
supporters of the present regime in Germany and are genuinely anxious in what they 
consider to be the best interests of their country to improve relations with Britain’.62  
Similarly, Wilhelm Rodde, who had worked for Ribbentrop and been a DEG founder 
member, told his Russian captors in 1947 that (in its early days at least) ‘all the leading 
posts in the German-English Society in Berlin were taken by big financiers negatively 
disposed against the new Nazi regime’.63  The list includes four of the most prominent 
German industrialists of the twentieth century - Robert Bosch, his nephew Carl Bosch, 
Carl Friedrich von Siemens and Hermann Bücher.   
Robert Bosch founded the eponymous spark plug pioneer which grew into an 
internationally diversified electrical engineering concern.  His success as an 
industrialist, social reformer (he introduced eight-hour working days) and 
philanthropist (he left most of his wealth to charity) gave him a fame and respect in 
Germany perhaps without equivalent in Britain.  A ‘thoroughly liberal, humane 
entrepreneur, wholly immune to any nationalist aspirations’, Bosch had been dismayed 
by the Great War and dedicated himself to the promotion of international 
understanding, hosting a group of French veterans to Stuttgart in 1935.64   Asked to 
meet Hitler in September 1933, an unimpressed Bosch had urged rapprochement with 
France and upset Hitler by suggesting he must be uncomfortable sitting in Bismarck’s 
chair.  An Anglophile, Bosch had worked in England in 1885 for Siemens Brothers, 
and in 1931, his firm developed a joint venture with Joseph Lucas Limited of 
Birmingham.  During the Munich crisis, the workforces of the two companies sent each 
other anxious messages of peace and friendship and Bosch continued to speak well of 
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his English friends into the Second World War.  He came back to Britain in 1936, 
where, trailed by German intelligence agents, he visited Gordonstoun, the Scottish 
boarding school founded by his Jewish friend, Kurt Hahn, who had been critical of Nazi 
brutality, imprisoned and then driven from Germany in 1933.   
Back in Germany, Bosch engaged with the Jewish question and supported resistance to 
Hitler.  In 1937, he employed Carl Goerdeler, the former lord mayor of Leipzig who 
would have served as chancellor had the July 1944 plot against Hitler succeeded, in an 
international marketing role so he could use company premises to host resistance 
meetings.  Bosch challenged the anti-Jewish policy directly with the Ministry of 
Economics, supported the Berlin chief rabbi, Leo Baeck, hired Jewish boys as 
apprentices and funded Jewish charities.  For this work in 1969 he was posthumously 
awarded the title ‘Righteous among the Nations’ by the Yad Vashim Shrine of 
Remembrance in Israel.  Bosch had been friends since 1910 with MG Christie, a 
Fellowship Council member, and has been identified as the ‘important industrialist’ 
who supplied Christie and therefore Vansittart with valuable intelligence and 
presumably introduced Christie to Goerdeler.65   
Robert was close to his nephew, Carl, the Nobel prize-winning chemist and chairman 
of IG Farben.  Bosch and Jewish-born chemist Fritz Haber were responsible for the 
Haber-Bosch process for the synthetic production of ammonia.  Developed just before 
the Great War, this technological innovation is arguably ‘the single most important 
change affecting the world’s population’ freeing Germany from her dependence on 
imports to produce fertilisers and explosives that were critical to her survival in both 
wars.66  Frankfurt-based IG Farben was a 1925 merger of six world-leading German 
chemical companies that had expanded into pharmaceuticals.  Its subsidiaries had 
invented two of the most well-known pharmaceuticals: aspirin ‘the most successful 
drug the world has known’ and, initially for legitimate clinical use, heroin.67  Once 
merged, it had 218,000 employees, was the largest chemical company and the fourth 
largest industrial concern in the world.  While it did capitulate to the regime and 
facilitate some of the worst horrors of the Nazi regime and benefitted from wartime 
                                                          
65 Rose, Vansittart, p. 136; see also Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, p. 65. 
66 Vaclav Smil, Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food 
Production, (Cambridge, Mass, 2001).  
67 Peter Watson, The German Genius: Europe's Third Renaissance, The Second Scientific Revolution, 
and the Twentieth Century, (2010), p. 364. 




slave labour, its political leanings in the late 1920s and early 1930s were liberal.  Its 
directors were keen to avoid the twin threats of Nazism and Communism so supported 
moderate, business-friendly politics especially Gustav Stresemann and the German 
People’s Party.  Carl Bosch had refinanced the struggling liberal newspaper Frankfurter 
Zeitung.  IG Farben employed many Jewish scientists and half its Verwaltungsrat 
(supervisory board) were Jewish so his objection to anti-Semitism was ‘both personal 
and professional’.  Invited to meet Hitler in May 1933 (even before his illustrious 
uncle), he challenged him about the treatment of the Jews, at which point the Führer 
lost his temper, and threw him out threatening that Germany would, if so forced, ‘work 
one hundred years without physics and chemistry’.68  Bosch never gave up in his 
criticism of the regime; as late as May 1939 he was openly challenging Nazi economic 
policy and questioning the Führer’s infallibility.  His failure to sway the regime led to 
his withdrawal from public life, alcoholism and death in 1940 aged sixty-five. 
IG Farben seems to have seconded more directors to the DEG than any other company 
and presumably provided significant funding.  Three other board members are listed on 
the founders’ list: Hermann Schmitz, who succeeded Bosch as chairman of the board 
in 1935, Professor Erwin Selck, and Hermann Bücher, managing director of AEG, who 
was a non-executive director.  Other IG representatives joined the DEG including 
Eduard Weber-Andrae, chairman of the chemicals committee, who served as chairman 
of the Frankfurt branch and, according to an impressed Tennant,  considered his efforts 
for the DEG of ‘greater importance than his work for the IG Farben, and… wanted to 
make it his main life task’.69  Bosch, Schmitz and Weber-Andrae never joined the Nazi 
party albeit Schmitz served as chairman all through the war and was imprisoned after 
the war for four years as a war criminal.   
Carl Bosch’s friend and fellow director, Hermann Bücher, was managing director of 
AEG (Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft) - ‘Germany's other great engineering 
company, alongside Siemens’.70  He was also a close friend and hunting companion of 
Carl’s uncle Robert.  Founded in the late nineteenth century by Jewish father and son, 
Emil and Walther Rathenau, AEG had bought some of Thomas Edison’s patents and 
had an association with Vickers in Britain.  As well as inventing the hairdryer and tape 
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recorder, AEG made aircraft, fridges, irons and train locomotives.  The Times 
correspondent, AL Kennedy visited the ‘huge and wonderful organisation’ outside 
Berlin in March 1936 and noted wryly that ‘industrial cooperation between business 
houses seems to be a good deal easier than political cooperation’.71  Like his two Bosch 
friends, Bücher had little affection for the new regime, calling for international arms 
controls and challenging Schacht’s New Plan.  Implicated in the 1944 plot against 
Hitler, he was only saved from execution by the intervention by his friend Albert Speer, 
Hitler’s architect. 
Between them, AEG and Siemens controlled the German electrical industry.72  Carl 
Friedrich von Siemens, son of the founder, rescued the company after the Great War 
and built a huge industrial concern with 185,000 employees, making it the fourth largest 
private sector employer in the world.  The firm had longstanding links with Britain 
having established Siemens Brothers in London in 1858.  Following success in 
telegraphy and the invention of the dynamo, it developed the first electric railway, 
streetlights, elevators, streetcars and drills in the nineteenth century and went on to 
introduce traffic lights, medical X-rays and television into Germany.  While the 
company did use forced labour to supply the German war machine, Carl Friedrich 
expressed disgust with National Socialism from both a commercial and moral 
perspective.  Having held various important Weimar government and industry posts, he 
resigned them all when the Nazis came to power.  His firm was exporting a third of its 
production so was threatened by autarky and export control.  He had Jewish friends, 
colleagues and assistants and used his group’s international network to find work for 
them overseas.  In 1938 when it became clear that all Jews would need to be expelled 
from the business, Siemens pensioned off his remaining Jewish employees so that they 
would have some financial resources.   
Other prominent German businessmen who joined the fledgling DEG included Ernst 
Hagemeier, CEO of Adler-Werke, the Frankfurt-based manufacturer of cars, bicycles, 
motorcycles and typewriters, and Geheimrat Harting, managing director of Zeiss-
Werke of Jena, the inventor of the first SLR camera and manufacturer of binoculars, 
rifle sights and microscopes.  Like its sister organisation, the DEG brought together the 
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worlds of finance, commerce and industry.  Leading German banks including 
Westfalenbank, Commerz Bank and Deutsche Bank were represented by directors and 
the DEG organised a football match between teams from Dresdner Bank and Barclays 
Bank in 1937 and 1938.  Meanwhile, State Councillor Helfferich, chairman of the 
supervisory board of the Hamburg-Amerika Line and State Councillor Lindermann, 
chairman of the Norddeutschen Lloyd of Bremen represented the shipping industry. 
 
Less sordid motives 
So, the Fellowship was sponsored by modern businesses and modern businessmen.  
They wanted it to be, and be seen to be, a respectable, open and transparent organisation 
working to improve Anglo-German relations and reduce the risk of war.  Not for them 
the extremism of the openly pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups such as the Right Club 
and The Link.  They published the Fellowship’s financial accounts (audited by the most 
prestigious accounting firm of the day) along with its full membership list, all donations 
and separately listed the notable attendees at each dinner in The Times.  While, as 
explored in chapter four, certainly elitist, the aristocratic stereotype stemming from 
Tory MP is exaggerated.  Though elevated to the House of Lords, many of the 
Fellowship’s barons were self-made.  Stamp was son of a shopkeeper and a milliner; 
Nuffield’s father was a draper and McGowan’s a brass fitter.  Each had left school and 
started work before his sixteenth birthday.  This was a group keen to build modern 
British industrial companies that led their industries globally.  Several continue to do 
so eight decades later.   
While damning, Einzig did grudgingly admit ‘there were other pro-German bankers 
and business men whose motives were less sordid.  They were simply pro-German 
because of their vague fears that another war, no matter what its outcome, would bring 
socialism to Great Britain.  For this reason, they were in favour of avoiding another war 
at no matter what cost’.73  However one judges their political perspectives, they were 
right to worry.  The Second World War was disastrous for British business and finance; 
the peace in 1945 did usher in a socialist government and did accelerate the dismantling 
of the British Empire.  Bolshevik Russia survived the war with a communist empire 
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that would drive the geopolitical agenda for over four decades.  The worst fears of the 
merchant bankers were realised as the war, reported the Financial News, did lead to ‘an 
almost catastrophic loss of business’.74  British finance and business would have to wait 
decades before recovering a modicum of its international prestige. 
When war did come, the leading business and City supporters of the Fellowship did not 
slink back into the appeasement shadows with tails between their legs but rather put 
their skills and companies to work for the war effort with gusto.  Generally too old for 
active service, most still had another ‘good’ war: D’Arcy Cooper was awarded a 
baronetcy in 1941 in recognition of a mysterious mission he undertook for the Board 
of Trade to secure closer economic cooperation with the Americans; Tennant went to 
Norway for the British government; Piggott applied his expertise in steel at the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production; Nuffield and his company’s extraordinary contribution has 
already been noted; while Kindersley stepped back into leadership of the National 
Saving Committee in 1939 and was created Baron Kindersley in 1941 in recognition of 
his success.  While City firms were side-lined and diminished by war, industrial 
companies such as Unilever, Dunlop, ICI and Morris played critical roles in feeding, 
washing, clothing and equipping the British military and its citizenry.  This underlines 
the extraordinary economic power wielded on both sides of the North Sea by the 
industrial sponsors of the Fellowship and the DEG.  D’Arcy Cooper, Stamp, McGowan, 
Carl Bosch and Siemens had between them well over a million employees.   
While certainly nervous of the threat of socialism at home and Bolshevism abroad, the 
businessmen behind the Fellowship were more immediately focused on the rising threat 
to capitalism not from the left but from fascism and particularly National Socialism.  
Their admiration for German business and their cultivation of German markets long 
predated Hitler’s assumption of power.  Their flavour of free market capitalism was 
challenged by his promotion of protectionism, autarky, tariffs and currency restrictions.  
As will be argued in chapter five, there is little evidence of anti-Semitic views for the 
clear majority and no evidence of active support for Nazi persecutions.  Nor should this 
group be portrayed as committed supporters of Chamberlain’s appeasement, as several 
were urging greater focus on rearmament.   
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Though dismissed by many then and since, the Fellowship commercial pedigree was 
better respected by government than often suggested.  Newton is one of the few 
historians to recognise a quasi-governmental status: ‘the level of political access 
enjoyed by organisations such as the Anglo-German Fellowship… made it hard to 
distinguish between the international interests of the state and the foreign policy of 
powerful economic pressure groups’.75  It is evident that both ICI and the Bank of 
England, each peculiarly semi-governmental organisations, supported the Fellowship 
as a means of intelligence-gathering on the German state.  As will be explored in the 
following chapters, the relationship of the sister societies with the National Socialists 
was difficult from the outset as each included critics of the regime.  They differ in that 
the Fellowship offered an occasional forum for such open criticism while the DEG was 
never able to escape the close control of the NSDAP.   
This was more than a group of ‘fellow travellers of the right’ - maybe, rather, a 
fellowship of commercial travellers - a union of business-like Germanophiles and 
Anglophiles.  Montagu Norman’s biographer nicely summarised this Germanophilia 
from the British perspective (which the Fellowship insisted did not ‘necessarily imply 
approval of National Socialism’76) when he asked ‘was this not the nation which had 
produced some of the best banking brains in Europe?  Had not Germany been Britain's 
natural trading partner since the days of the Hanseatic League?  If Germany had brought 
untold harm to the world and herself in the past half-century, the fault lay with her 
political rulers, not with her thrifty industrious merchants, her workers, and her bankers, 
who deserved better now than to be ground into the dust’.77 
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Chapter 2  
Facing the politicians: the Fellowship, politics and diplomacy  
While business imperatives were central to the Anglo-German Fellowship’s 
conception, political and diplomatic objectives soon became its core purpose.  As one 
historian neatly summarised, ‘it has long been an article of faith, particularly amongst 
left-leaning critics of appeasement, that fascist sympathies amongst the British elite 
helped to explain the policy of appeasement and the early failure of the National 
Government to stand up to Hitler’.1  The Fellowship has been placed firmly within this 
tradition.  To challenge this and other articles of faith, objective analysis of the 
membership’s political hue is overdue and now practicable following the discovery of 
the 1937 annual report.  From there we can ask whether it was ever effective as a 
political and diplomatic force, whether it impacted the course of Anglo-German 
relations and whether, under different circumstances, it might have made a difference.  
In the final analysis, did it matter?  For this, it is pertinent to explore the strength, depth 
and chronology of the Fellowship’s relationships with the main political and diplomatic 
bodies in each country - 10 Downing Street, both houses of parliament, the British 
political parties, Hitler’s Chancellery, the NSDAP, both Foreign Offices and their 
embassies in London and Berlin.   
As evidenced in chapter one, the motivations of the Fellowship’s founders were 
commercial, financial and economic.  Its membership covered a relatively broad church 
with no obviously shared ideology beyond what the political theorist and author, 
Leonard Woolf, identified in 1939 as the preservation of ‘peace, capitalism and the 
British Empire’.2  Party political considerations were not then especially relevant and, 
whatever people thought about the new regime, something should be done as Britain 
needed to define its policy towards the largest economy on the Continent.  As 
Londonderry recognised, there was a ‘fundamental absence of any clear strategy in 
Whitehall for dealing with Hitler.’3   
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Once up and running, the Fellowship’s newly-created Council enthusiastically sought 
support with energetic recruitment in both Houses of Parliament and from both sides of 
the political divide.  Haxey in Tory MP painted the Fellowship’s political backing as 
firmly on the right wing of the Conservative Party and subsequent historians have 
consistently followed his lead with one recent study reiterating that ‘the overwhelming 
majority of members… were Tories’.4  Haxey alleged that its members’ enthusiasm for 
Hitler’s Germany was driven by fear of Bolshevism and socialism and, as such, was 
obstructing any chance of alliance between Britain and Russia - ‘the Tories are so hag-
ridden with prejudices about the Soviet Union that they are placing every obstacle in 
the way of such an alliance’.5  It is certainly true that few of the Fellowship’s 
membership shared Haxey’s enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and many were hostile, 
especially following the short-lived but alarming General Strike of 1926.  Mount 
Temple was chairman of the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union and ‘his 
attitudes to Russia and all left-wing ideas were explosive and condemnatory’.6  Tennant 
had argued in 1934 that Hitler’s brand of fascism was better than communism and was 
frustrated that the ‘Allied countries, headed by France openly sided with the Reds 
against Franco on the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War’.7  He admitted to having 
developed a ‘considerable distaste for communists’ following his wife’s unsuccessful 
election campaign for the strongly Labour Silvertown constituency in both the 1931 
and 1935 General Elections.  They had had their car tyres slashed, been spat at by ‘wild 
women’ while the men had shouted out ‘the nice methods they had thought out for 
murdering “our class” as soon as they got into power…’8  His fears of Bolshevism dated 
back to his work in Berlin in 1919 where he had correlated the threat of communism 
with economic chaos - ‘unemployment and hunger are the chief predisposing causes of 
Bolshevism’ - while concluding that ‘if these are removed, there is no chance of 
Bolshevism gaining a foothold in Germany’.9   
Lothian was certainly wary of Russia, writing to the Duchess of Atholl MP: ‘I am not 
sure that Russia is not more dangerous than Germany, and personally I am for re-
armament’.  He was rightly worried about the ‘impending collision between Fascism 
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and Communism’ concluding he was ‘against both.’10  In similar vein, Conwell-Evans 
wrote to Lothian soon after the remilitarization of the Rhineland that ‘a German 
hegemony in Eastern Europe would be far less dangerous than a Russian and if the Slav 
conquered the Teuton, there would be an end of European civilisation.’11  For the 
European royal families, including Edward VIII and his German cousins, ‘the murders 
at Yekaterinburg provided the single most traumatic moment… and helped produce an 
intense, almost visceral hatred of bolshevism’.12  
However, it was the supposed injustices of Versailles, the horrors of the Great War and 
the preservation of the British Empire, that I will argue (as Gilbert and Gott did more 
generally over fifty years ago13), hung as heavier clouds over the consciences of the 
Fellowship’s membership and gave them, rightly or wrongly, the justification for 
extending a friendly hand towards Germany.  As such, the Fellowship was a child of 
Flanders, Versailles and the Raj as much as a reaction to the Bolshevik menace.  
Haxey’s portrayal set the tone for subsequent interpretation by many historians of the 
1930s who have relied on his conclusions without any calm analysis of the 
membership’s actual composition.  Boyle dismissed the Fellowship as ‘a loose 
association of Conservative and other well-wishers of Hitler’, Garfield portrayed it as 
a ‘Nazi-front’, while Pugh condemned it confidently as an ‘anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi’ 
right-wing group whose members ‘discreetly raised the swastika among the 
rhododendrons, dressed up in jackboots, and drank toasts to the Führer’.14  Kershaw 
saw it as a ‘thoroughly nazified’ organisation that ‘served largely as an indirect tool of 
Nazi propaganda in high places, a vehicle for exerting German influence in Britain’.15  
Griffiths, in his celebrated studies of British right-wing enthusiasm for Nazi Germany, 
embedded his thoughtful and relatively detailed analysis of the Fellowship firmly 
alongside discussion of far nastier travelling companions.  Sounding almost 
disappointed, he did acknowledge that ‘views of the Anglo-German Fellowship have 
differed’ but concluded that it ‘obviously served German propaganda purposes’ while 
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accepting grudgingly it ‘was never rabidly pro-Nazi’.16  It is the often-glib repetition of 
his ‘Fellow Travellers of the Right’ wider narrative that has damned the Fellowship by 
association and dogged its reputation ever since.  Haxey’s analysis of the Fellowship’s 
membership forms the bulk of a chapter titled, ‘The Tory Right Wing’ and his purpose 
was explicitly to highlight empathy for Hitler’s Germany within the Conservative Party 
and its business and aristocratic backing.  He never intended Tory MP to be a balanced 
political prosopography of the Fellowship, but it has been wrongly and widely relied 
on as such by historians ever since.  
 
The Council  
The Council’s political hue is relevant to the wider picture.  Remaining relatively 
unstained by party politics, it was led by businessmen as much as politicians with both 
the Conservative and Liberal parties well represented.  The chairman, Lord Mount 
Temple, was indeed a former Conservative minister and aristocratic peer, with estates 
in Hampshire and Ireland, and saw ‘the Hitler regime as a bulwark against 
Bolshevism’.17  However, he had been second choice to Lord Lothian, a prominent 
Liberal politician and left-leaning polemicist who was haunted by the injustices of 
Versailles.  Though treated cynically then and since, the Fellowship consistently 
claimed to be ‘divorced from party politics’ with its purpose being to promote 
fellowship between the two peoples’.  It did admit that it hoped to influence the 
politicians and that ‘however much such a purpose is non-political its fulfilment must 
inevitably have important consequences on policy’.18   
As the Fellowship’s energetic honorary secretary and intellectual high priest, Conwell-
Evans was a political rather than a commercial beast and his political credentials were 
impeccably left wing.19  It seems probable that Conwell-Evans took prime 
responsibility for recruiting from the House of Commons and Elwin Wright (the 
Fellowship’s first secretary) referred to him as its ‘political secretary’.20   As an Oxford 
undergraduate he had joined the Fabian Society and on coming to London he joined the 
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1917 Club, a group of left-leaning pacifists founded by Leonard Woolf, Aldous Huxley 
and HG Wells.  Here he met Ramsay MacDonald, the future Labour prime minister, to 
whom he was to become sometime speechwriter, adviser on matters German and 
walking companion in a friendship that lasted past MacDonald’s eventual retirement as 
prime minister in 1935.  As a post-graduate at the London School of Economics he was 
supervised by Philip Noel-Baker, Cassel professor of international relations.  A 
politician, academic, Olympic silver medallist, committed pacifist, Quaker and later 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Noel-Baker had driven ambulances during the war and been 
decorated for valour.  A member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference, he had later worked with the League of Nations so was ideally qualified to 
supervise Conwell-Evans’s thesis on the League.  Sir William Beveridge, the director 
of the London School of Economics and vice-chancellor of London University (later to 
author the eponymous report on social welfare) was another mentor who took a direct 
interest in Conwell-Evans’s academic career.   
Conwell-Evans’s engagement with pacifism survived the Great War.  He had provided 
the translation for the 1919 English publication of Civilisation by Georges Duhamel, a 
French army surgeon described by a contemporary US reviewer as ‘one of the most 
influential and one of the best, of contemporary French novelists’.21  This was an 
important novel set in the French trenches, deeply critical of mechanised warfare (‘the 
tragic fate of twentieth-century man’22) and broadly anticipating the themes of both 
Robert Graves’s Good-Bye to All That and Erich Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western 
Front both published a decade later.  Civilisation won the Prix Goncourt, the 
prestigious French literary prize for young authors and a special award from the 
Académie Française.  
Conwell-Evans was well-connected to both Houses of Parliament through his work as 
secretary to the Armenian and Balkan committees.  This and his political co-authorship 
with Noel Buxton, (later Lord Noel-Buxton), a Labour MP to whom he had acted as 
secretary, gave him access to the Labour and Liberal political elite more than the 
Conservatives.  He had protested at the mistreatment of communists in Bulgaria and 
wanted to stand as a Labour candidate in the 1931 election, but poverty precluded it.  
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Tennant, while foremost a man of business, was a traditional Tory who built his best 
political connections with Conservatives such as Baldwin, Chamberlain, Mount 
Temple and Davidson.  He supported his wife’s unsuccessful parliamentary candidacy 
under a Conservative banner but still worked well with a Liberal luminary in Lloyd 
George.    
Two Conservative MPs, both distinguished soldiers, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas 
CR Moore and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Assheton Pownall, sat on the Council throughout 
its existence.  Moore had flirted with Mosley’s Blackshirts, was close to Princess 
Stephanie Hohenlohe (Hitler’s ‘spy princess’) and wrote in support of Hitler’s regime 
in the British press.23  He had famously called for the foundation of a ‘German study 
group for MPs to promote peace’ following the Prince of Wales’s British Legion speech 
once plans for the Fellowship were well underway.24  Apparently untainted by their 
involvement with the Fellowship and pro-German activities, their political careers 
prospered into the Second World War: Moore became chairman of the Home Guard 
Joint Parliament Committee and Pownall chairman of the Public Accounts Committee.  
Other Conservative politicians on the Council included Lord Eltisley, a former MP, and 
Norman (later Wing-Commander Sir Norman) Hulbert, an MP and chairman of a steel 
company who joined in 1938.  DM Mason, a pacifist Liberal former MP joined the 
Council in 1937 while Julian Weigall who served on the Council throughout had stood 
as a Liberal candidate in the 1910 general election.  
 
The Houses of Parliament 
A total of fifty-seven current, previous or future members of the House of Commons 
joined the Fellowship or broke bread as guests at its illustrious dinners.  Of these, thirty-
one were serving MPs while eleven had been elevated to the House of Lords.  The 
majority had (not surprisingly) fought in the Great War, generally with distinction and 
counted three MCs and four DSOs amongst them.  While this political support has been 
portrayed as stemming from the Conservative Party (and its right wing at that), in fact 
party affiliation spread across each of the main political parties.  Just over three-
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quarters, forty-six, were Conservative (or Unionist).  Of the remainder, eight were 
Liberal and three from the Labour Party.  This is almost exactly as Conservative a 
political mix as that prevailing in the 1931-35 House of Commons where the 
Conservatives held 76% of the seats.25   
The Fellowship included a significant membership from the traditional gentlemen’s 
clubs - ‘the London watering holes where, it appears, so much real business was done 
in Tory circles’26 - and membership of these offers another gauge of political allegiance.  
The largest contingent was indeed from the traditionally Conservative Carlton Club 
with at least thirty members, but this was balanced by at least a dozen from the 
avowedly liberal Reform Club.  So, by these simple measures at least, there is no case 
to be made that it was any more Conservative or ‘right wing’ than the parliament of its 
day.   
Liberals 
Above and beyond these eight MPs, Liberal involvement with the Fellowship was 
politically and intellectually significant.  Leading liberals from the political, academic, 
journalistic and financial worlds joined or were guests.  As will be explored, the 
Fellowship’s role in the key missions to meet Hitler by senior British political figures, 
particularly Lloyd George and Lothian, was more obviously Liberal than Conservative.  
David Lloyd George himself was never a member but, as we shall see, relied on the 
Fellowship’s leadership to conceive, arrange and execute his landmark meeting with 
the Führer in September 1936.  Despite turning down the chair, Lothian was one of the 
Fellowship’s most prominent members and relied on Conwell-Evans to advise on, 
guide and arrange his interactions with the Nazi regime.   Lloyd George’s younger son, 
Major Gwilym Lloyd George MP (later a Conservative home secretary) was a member.  
So was Clement Davies, another Welsh MP, who led the Liberal Party between 1945 
and 1956 and attended the Christmas 1936 dinner.  So wedded to his ‘Fellow Travellers’ 
thesis, Griffiths considered Davies’s membership ‘completely unlikely’ as he ‘was not 
on record as having made any public pro-Nazi pronouncements’ perhaps unaware that, 
first, he was a director of Unilever, one of the key sponsors and that, second, pro-Nazi 
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pronouncements were not a requirement for membership of the Fellowship.27  Also on 
the membership list was Lord Hutchinson, the former Liberal chief whip who served 
under Baldwin and Chamberlain as paymaster-general.  Sir Felix Brunner (a scion of 
the Brunner Mond chemical business that merged into ICI), who served as president of 
the Liberal Party in the early 1960s, was another member as was Lord Mottistone, who 
as Jack Seely had switched from the Conservatives to the Liberals in 1904 and served 
as secretary of state for war in 1912.  A war hero from the Boer and Great wars, he led 
one of the last great cavalry charges in history at the battle of Moreuil Wood in March 
1918.  A close friend of Winston Churchill, he attended the July 1936 dinner with his 
wife.  Leslie Burgin, a Liberal MP who served as minister of transport, before being 
appointed minister of supply at the start of the Second War, was a guest at the Christmas 
1936 dinner.  He had been a member of the General Council of the League of Nations 
Union and a British delegate to the League of Nations in 1935.  Also, a guest at both 
the 1936 dinners was Lord Strathcarron, previously Sir Ian Macpherson, another former 
Liberal MP who had served as under-secretary of state for war in the Great War.  
Another distinguished Liberal, Viscount Mersey, came to the July 1936 dinner.  He was 
a deputy speaker in the House of Lords and went on to be Liberal chief whip in the late 
1940s.  Like so many of the Fellowship’s political members and guests, he had played 
a role in the Paris Peace Conference having been specially attached to the British 
delegation. 
The Fellowship, presumably spear-headed by Conwell-Evans and Lothian, was 
successful in attracting Liberal academic and journalistic heavyweights to the 
membership.  William Adams, the warden of All Souls, Oxford was a member.  A 
former Gladstone professor of political theory and institutions at Oxford, founder and 
former editor of The Political Quarterly, he had been, like Lothian, one of Lloyd 
George’s secretaries during the First War.  He was, according to his biographer, a 
passionate believer in ‘the unashamed dominance of liberal-minded and rational debate 
within an intellectual élite with close links to Whitehall and Westminster’.28  All Souls 
was a centre for the appeasement debate at the time with Halifax and Geoffrey Dawson, 
editor of The Times appointed fellows and Lothian having been nominated but 
unsuccessful.  The Fellowship attracted leading Liberal figures from the fourth estate 
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including the publisher Sir Frank Newnes, another former Liberal MP, chairman of 
Country Life and a director of the Westminster Gazette (founded by his father and 
‘unchallenged as the honourable, influential, Liberal, heavyweight newspaper’29) and 
Sir George Paish, the financial journalist and economist, who had been an adviser to 
the chancellor of the exchequer and the British Treasury on financial and economic 
questions during the First World War.   
Prominent Liberals from the financial and business worlds also supported the work of 
the Fellowship.  The polymath Lord Stamp, although described by his biographer as a 
‘non-partisan figure who held aloof from politics’ nevertheless ‘regarded himself as a 
Liberal’.30  Known by the newspapers as ‘the busiest man in England’ with a Who’s 
Who entry longer even than Churchill’s, he was as a director of the Bank of England 
and president of the LMS railway well connected in the City and business.31  As 
chairman of the London School of Economics he was also a luminary in academe with 
honorary degrees from twenty-six universities.  DM Mason, a maverick retired Liberal 
back bencher, former banker and economics author, joined the Council in 1937 with 
several of his family also members and enthusiastic guests.  He had opposed 
conscription in 1916, campaigned for a negotiated peace in the First War and supported 
women’s suffrage.  He had founded the Sound Currency Association in 1920, a pressure 
group that successfully campaigned for the restoration of the Gold Standard.  
Labour  
The handful of Labour political figures involved with the Fellowship was also not 
without influence and prestige.  Edward Shackleton, son of the famous explorer, was 
himself intrepid having led the Oxford University expedition to Ellesmereland in 1934.  
After a ‘good’ Second War, he served as a Labour MP in the 1940s and 1950s.  He 
lectured at geographical societies in Germany in the 1930s under the aegis of the 
Fellowship which he had joined in 1937.  Another member who joined the Council in 
early 1938, Lord (Sydney) Arnold, previously a pacifist Liberal, had joined the Labour 
Party in 1922.  Created a peer two years later, he had a ‘significant influence on policy’ 
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within the party. 32  He served as paymaster-general and became a close confidant to 
Ramsay MacDonald, accompanying him on the first visit of a serving prime minister 
to the US.  Sir Ernest Bennett was an active Fellowship member, attending most of the 
annual dinners, and another leading Labour figure.  A journalist for The Times, 
Westminster Gazette and Guardian he was one of the first Liberal MPs to defect to 
Labour in 1916, supporting MacDonald’s National Government.  According to his 
biographer, he ‘had three predominant political concerns: anti-communism, improving 
relations with Germany, and a pro-Arab, anti-Zionist policy for Palestine’.33  Also on 
the membership list was the near-blind, pacifist Labour peer, Lord Sanderson 
(previously Henry Furniss), who had been principal of Ruskin College, Oxford, the 
working men’s (and later women’s) college.  He stood unsuccessfully as the first 
Labour candidate for the University of Oxford in the 1918 General Election and was a 
member of the Parliamentary Executive of the Labour Party in the 1930s.  True to his 
pacifist principles, he resigned from the Labour Party in 1938 to support Chamberlain’s 
Conservatives over Munich.  
Conservatives 
The Fellowship boasted a good number of belted aristocrats, eccentrics and right-
leaning backwoodsmen whose natural political home was the Conservative party, ‘long 
identified with hierarchy, privilege, monarchy, property, sound finance, imperialism, 
and the armed services’.34  However, Baldwin’s biographer, Philip Williamson, 
challenging Pugh et al, has argued that the easy association of the inter-war 
Conservative Party with supposed fascist enthusiasms has been exaggerated by left-
leaning historians and commentators.  He argued that ‘it is notable how few 
Conservative politicians and organisers were attracted by fascism as such and were 
associated with fascist or pro-fascist groups’.35  Warning against identifying 
appeasement with pro-Nazism, he claimed that ‘there were more Jewish members of 
parliament on the Conservative benches than members of the Anglo-German 
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Fellowship and that those who were fell away as the regime’s evil intentions became 
clear’.36    
In an era when public deference to the aristocracy remained high, the highest profile 
political supporters were indeed the Tory grandees.  Their attendance at Fellowship 
dinners, speeches and comments to journalists were widely reported in the newspapers.  
Most prominent was Charles Vane-Tempest-Stewart, the seventh Marquess of 
Londonderry, who had been persuaded to join the Fellowship by his friend Ribbentrop.  
He attended the December 1936 dinner, where he gave the keynote address, as well as 
the May 1938 reception. Viscount Halifax (later the first Earl of Halifax) attended the 
December 1937 dinner and gave the main speech.  Formerly (as Lord Irwin), viceroy 
of India and secretary of state for war, he was leader of the House of Lords and lord 
president of the council and was to become foreign secretary and later the ambassador 
to the US after Lothian’s untimely death.  The Marquess of Zetland came to the July 
1936 dinner.  Another former Conservative MP, he was the secretary of state for India 
and Burma.   
Alongside these were several other senior peers, mostly naturally Conservative with 
varying degrees of actual party-political activity.  The Earl and Countess of 
Malmesbury were members; he was a former lord-in-waiting to King George V, former 
honorary treasurer of the Anti-Socialist Union and attended the Christmas 1937 dinner.  
Four further earls were members.  The Earl of Airlie, another former lord-in-waiting, 
had been wounded in the First War, mentioned in despatches and awarded the MC and 
Grand Cross Knight of the Légion d'honneur.  He owned about 40,000 acres and served 
on the boards of various banks.  The Earl of Galloway had been taken prisoner in the 
Great War and thereafter served as ADC to the military governor in Cologne in 1919.  
The Earl of Glasgow also served in the war, was mentioned in despatches and awarded 
the DSO.  The Earl of Harrowby, a former Conservative MP, was a member along with 
his countess.   
Though illuminated by these grandees, the Conservative majority in the Fellowship 
encompassed a broad church within the party - politically, socially and generationally.  
It could not be characterised as a definable fringe group on either side of the party.  
Unsurprisingly, almost all the Conservative members had been affected by their 
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experiences in the First World War.  Several had direct links to the Paris Peace 
Conference as well as the efforts of the League of Nations to promote peace thereafter.  
Lord Rennell of Rodd was a member and attended at least three dinners.  A renowned 
former diplomat and MP, as ambassador to Italy he is credited with bringing the Italians 
into the First War on the Allied side.  He served as British delegate to the League of 
Nations in the early 1920s.  Robert Peel’s grandson, Sir Sidney Peel, veteran of South 
African and Great wars and a former MP was also a member.  He had served as a 
financial adviser to the Foreign Office in 1918 and, like Lothian, was a member of the 
British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference a year later.  Lord Blanesburgh was a 
judge and law lord who served as the principal British representative on the German 
reparations commission in the 1920s and came to the July 1936 dinner.  Sir Sidney 
Clive had been the British military representative to the League of Nations in Geneva 
and later military attaché in Paris.  Admiral Sir Aubrey Smith who came to the July 
1936 dinner had been the British naval representative to the League of Nations. He had 
previously served as ADC to the King and naval attaché to Russia, Sweden and Norway 
before the Great War.   
Nor was the political membership all elderly.  The Fellowship successfully attracted a 
younger generation of Conservative MPs including parliamentary private secretaries 
representing several government departments.  This was the generation that had been 
children during the Great War and included the twenty-eight-year-old Duncan Sandys.  
Churchill’s son-in-law following his marriage to his eldest daughter Diana, he had 
served in the British Embassy in Berlin in the early 1930s.  He gave a speech at the 
Fellowship’s 1937 annual general meeting.37   His direct contemporary at Eton, the 
Hon. William Waldorf Astor, was also a member.  PPS to Sir Samuel Hoare (as first 
lord of the Admiralty and later home secretary) and the son of Waldorf and Nancy of 
Cliveden fame, it was he of whom Mandy Rice-Davies said in 1963 ‘he would [say 
that], wouldn’t he’.  He also had peacekeeping credentials, having been secretary to the 
Earl of Lytton on the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry in Manchuria in 1932.  
Another member under thirty was Loel Guinness.  An MP since 1931, he went on to 
serve in the RAF in the Second War, was mentioned in despatches five times and 
awarded the Croix de Guerre.  Other PPSs who joined the Fellowship included Wing-
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Commander AWH James (PPS to RA Butler, while at the India Office and later the 
Ministry of Labour), Stuart Russell (PPS to Sir Philip Sassoon when under-secretary of 
state for air and to Sir John Simon while chancellor of the exchequer) and Lieutenant-
Commander Peter Agnew (PPS to Walter Runciman while president of the Board of 
Trade, and later to Sir Philip Sassoon).   
The thirty-five-year-old RA Butler had himself attended the Fellowship’s May 1938 
reception.  As undersecretary of state in the Foreign Office, he deputised permanently 
for Halifax in the House of Commons and was a protégé of Chamberlain.  A noted 
appeaser, he was Tennant’s local MP and their correspondence on Anglo-German 
matters survives.  Following the Second War, during which he served as minister of 
education, he served as chancellor of the exchequer, leader of the House of Commons, 
home secretary, deputy prime minister, foreign secretary and chairman of the 
Conservative Party, and was remembered by his supporters as ‘the best prime minister 
we never had’.38  
Sir Harry Brittain, journalist, politician and inveterate committee enthusiast, another 
former Conservative MP, was an active member and provides the connection to the 
Pilgrims Society which seems to have inspired the Fellowship.  He and his wife Alida 
attended dinners and his daughter (also Alida) served as a member of the Fellowship’s 
Ladies' Advisory Committee in 1937.  Brittain was one of the founders of the Pilgrims’ 
Society and served as its honorary secretary and chairman for seventeen years.  
Founded in 1902, it is, with its sister organisation the Pilgrims of the United States, the 
oldest and most prestigious society dedicated to furthering Anglo-American fellowship.  
Other Pilgrims who were also members of the Fellowship include Major (later 
Brigadier Sir) Ralph Rayner and Sir Stanley Machin.  Although the debt was never 
acknowledged, the Pilgrims served as a template for the Fellowship.  It remains to this 
day a bilateral friendship society, with British Royal patronage and an elite membership 
from politics, diplomacy, the military and society.  The Fellowship’s marketing 
material has frequent echoes of Pilgrims’ language and they had developed a tradition 
(which continues) whereby the first speech on British soil by a new American 
ambassador is to the Pilgrims’ Society while, correspondingly, the first US speech by 
a new British ambassador is to the Pilgrims of the United States. (Lothian gave key note 
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speeches to both societies in 1939). This was surely the inspiration for the speeches 
given by Ribbentrop and Henderson following their respective appointments. 
(Henderson wanted to give a speech to the Fellowship as well as the DEG but was 
overruled by Eden.)   
So, it is certainly reasonable to portray the Fellowship’s political members and friends 
as distinguished, influential and well-connected.  Nevertheless, many were somewhat 
distant from the levers of power.  Most of the members then serving as MPs were back-
benchers or PPSs.  While Londonderry, Lothian, Halifax, Zetland and Butler all 
attended dinners, several senior political figures politely declined such invitations, 
presumably anxious to avoid implying support for the Nazi regime, including Samuel 
Hoare, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden.   
 
Cranky incorrigibles 
As with the wider membership (analysed in chapter five), there were certainly several 
members from both Houses of Parliament who represented the stereotypical ‘nasty’ 
tendency (Griffiths’s ‘sharks in the shallows’) with a range of extremist right-wing 
sympathies and anti-Semitic leanings.  Fitting the Lord Darlington mould was the fifth 
Duke of Wellington who came to the December 1936 dinner with his duchess and 
donated two pounds.  ‘Prominent in right-wing and anti-Semitic circles,’ he was a 
warden of the Right Club and on the day that war broke out, was quoted as blaming the 
war on ‘anti-appeasers and the fucking Jews’.39  Two of the Fellowship’s earls, 
Glasgow and Galloway, were both wardens of the Right Club as were lords Sempill 
and Redesdale.  Major Sir Jocelyn Lucas MC, KBE, MP, pioneer of the Lucas terrier, 
was a Fellowship member and attended dinners.  He was later a guest at a controversial 
dinner hosted by Oswald Mosley in July 1939.40  A handful of MPs who joined the 
Fellowship also joined the Right Club including Peter Agnew and the Hon JJ Stourton.  
Sir Ernest Bennett was also a Right Club member, albeit judged by its chronicler as not 
necessarily anti-Semitic but nonetheless guilty of ‘naivety on fairly stupendous scale’.41  
Another member, Sir Robert Burton-Chadwick, who had served as parliamentary 
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secretary to the Board of Trade in the 1920s, had joined the British Fascists in the 1930s.  
While significant, they were never more than a small minority and there is no evidence 
they found the Fellowship an effective forum for their offensive views.  As with the 
wider membership, they were to find that outlet with the extreme right-wing 
organisations they joined in addition to the Fellowship such as The Link, the Right Club 
and the Nordic League. 
 
10 Downing Street  
Whatever its party-political complexion, the famous front door to 10 Downing Street 
remained open to the Fellowship’s leadership throughout its conception, prime and 
decline.  Three prime ministers held office during the period, each in National 
Governments.  Ramsay MacDonald, by then ostracised by his own Labour Party, was 
followed by two Conservatives in Baldwin and Chamberlain - both ‘old men, whose 
outlook and attitudes had been shaped in the Victoria era.’42  Each had a working 
relationship with the Fellowship that facilitated an extraordinary degree of access to the 
prime minister and his close advisers.  This represented an opportunity to influence 
governmental policy and implementation (effective or not) beyond envy to modern 
political lobbyists.  Baldwin and Chamberlain each replaced his ailing predecessor 
following a period of impatient understudy.  Conwell-Evans’s friend MacDonald was 
suffering from ‘failing memory, poor concentration, insomnia, glaucoma and 
depression’ when Baldwin took over as prime minister for the third time in June 1935.   
Baldwin’s own nervous collapse a year later ahead of the abdication crisis led to his 
replacement by the ageing Chamberlain in May 1937.  While historians debate their 
foreign policy achievements, none is or was considered strong on foreign affairs and 
none had a cogent plan for developing a modus vivendi with Hitler’s Germany.  
MacDonald and his cabinet were ‘baffled by Hitler’ and, broadly speaking, 10 Downing 
Street seems to have remained baffled for the rest of the 1930s.43  The challenge of a 
resurgent Germany seems to have been a headache no prime minister had enthusiasm 
to address such that ‘the often muffled or ambivalent British response encouraged 
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illusions that… [Hitler’s] tactics might prove successful’.44  Until Chamberlain’s 
celebrated flight to Munich in September 1938 (which was surely too late) none had 
been to Germany while in office and none appears to have had German friends, nor 
particular knowledge of the country.  Despite the association of Chamberlain’s 
leadership with appeasement, it is important to remember as Gilbert emphasised, that 
appeasement was the ‘corner-stone of inter war foreign policy’ and that ‘Lloyd George 
cautiously, Ramsay MacDonald enthusiastically, Stanley Baldwin doggedly and 
Neville Chamberlain defiantly [had] pursued it throughout their premierships’.45  
As Weinberg suggested, ‘with Stanley Baldwin as prime minister, ineffectual 
pessimism in foreign affairs had succeeded the ineffectual optimism of Ramsay 
MacDonald at 10 Downing Street’.46  Baldwin was alarmed by the pace of modern 
diplomacy and technology.  In a speech to Cambridge schoolboys in June 1936 he was 
nostalgic for when it ‘took sixteen days for news of Trafalgar to reach London’ and 
alarmed that ‘today the cables of the whole world are throbbing day and night… before 
a cable from your representative at Tokyo has been decoded, the telephone rings and 
the Japanese Ambassador is asking for your explanation’.47  In this context, ‘nothing 
could be more alien to the pipe-smoking, cricket-loving Baldwin than Hitlerite 
Germany’.48 
Baldwin was a prominent casualty of the Guilty Men and Churchillian analysis, but 
recent scholars have shone more favourable light.  As Williamson has argued, Baldwin 
was ‘the first Conservative leader to be confronted by Stalinist and fascist ideologies, 
and the first who had to justify rearmament to an electorate apprised of the horrors of 
modern aerial bombardment, steeped in anti-war feeling, and placing its trust in 
international peace-keeping’.  He was also ‘the only prime minister to have 
superintended a royal abdication’ during which Eden remembered he had begged not 
to be troubled ‘too much with foreign affairs’.49   Nevertheless ‘at the end of his 
ministerial career, cursed with hindsight about the continued deterioration in European 
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relations… [Baldwin] did come to regret that he had not asserted himself more in 
foreign affairs’.50  
As Kershaw has succinctly summarised, ‘without policies of befriending, removing, 
containing or deterring Hitler, Britain was left with hope, drift and forced concessions 
in turn as its approaches to avoiding another war’.51  It is against this combination of 
ignorance and failure to plan that the work of the Fellowship with Downing Street 
should be set.  It was not for want of trying by the Fellowship’s leadership.  Tennant 
had introduced the newly empowered National Socialists, in the shape of Ribbentrop, 
into the heart of the British establishment back in 1933.  Having written an article for 
The English Review entitled ‘Herr Hitler and his Policy’ (which evolved into a speech 
that summer at Ashridge College, the Conservative Party’s ‘political school’), Tennant 
was approached by JCC Davidson, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster.  Davidson 
asked him to brief his friend Baldwin, then lord president of the council and effectively 
deputy prime minister, with what was, apparently and worryingly, ‘the first picture [he] 
had had of the Hitler movement’.52   
Tennant suggested that Baldwin would be ‘the ideal person to visit Berlin’ and was 
asked by Ribbentrop to arrange a private introduction, by-passing the German embassy 
and the British Foreign Office.53  Ribbentrop was still ‘without any credentials’ in either 
the German government or the NSDAP but Davidson was under no illusion that he was 
speaking under direct instructions from Hitler.54  His themes were to become only too 
familiar: nobody understood Germany; the British press was negatively influenced by 
propaganda from ‘internationally-minded persons, mainly Jews’; Bolshevism was the 
main threat to European civilisation and that Hitler's focus was on solving domestic 
unemployment rather than war.  He explained that Germany sought ‘amicable 
arrangements’ with France and a naval agreement with Great Britain but that Hitler 
could not rely on the German diplomatic service who had opposed the National 
Socialist revolution.  Germany would not re-join the League of Nations which Hitler 
‘regarded as a sounding board for war and completely incompetent as a negotiating 
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body’ and had to have the means to defend herself as she ‘could not remain as a second-
rate power’.55   
Ribbentrop took the opportunity to invite Baldwin to visit Germany and meet the 
Führer.  This proposed meeting between the two men became for Ribbentrop, Hitler, 
and the Fellowship, a totemic obsession.  Its progress consequently offers a barometer 
of Ribbentrop’s bipolar relationship with Britain and sets the scene for the Fellowship’s 
arrangement of subsequent meetings between Hitler and other British political figures.  
Ribbentrop was then, rather comically, invited to tea that same afternoon at ‘a house in 
Downing Street’ and instructed to ring the bell but not to give his name.  As Tennant 
remembered, ‘during tea Mr Ramsay McDonald, the prime minister, dropped in,’ 
adding (somewhat unnecessarily) ‘no doubt by arrangement’.56  Ribbentrop found both 
Baldwin and MacDonald friendly and tea was replaced by whisky.  Buoyed by the 
success of the lunch and the whisky drinking session, he asked for a further meeting to 
include Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary and he passed on a specific personal 
invitation from Hitler for ‘a British minister’ to come to Germany to see the Führer who 
had yet to meet a senior British statesman. 57  Simon, appalled by this amateur and 
irregular diplomacy, insisted such arrangements go through proper diplomatic channels 
and an hour-long argument ensued.  As Tennant later complained to Chamberlain ‘the 
professional diplomats of both countries closed their ranks against this amateur, and the 
first great chance of laying the foundations of an understanding with a disarmed 
Germany was lost’.58  Baldwin did make a positive speech about Anglo-German 
relations in the House of Commons that, according to The Times, was ‘at once witty 
and constructive’ and ‘greatly impressed the House’. He warned against an arms race 
with Germany and encouraged her back into the League of Nations, reminding the 
House that ‘the France of Napoleon – viewed much like the Germany of today – had 
become the most pacific nation in Europe’. 59   This was most probably the first 
measurable public output from Tennant’s lobbying and must have offered some 
comfort to Ribbentrop and the Germans. 
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The British Foreign Office  
Understanding the interplay between the Fellowship and His Majesty’s Foreign Office 
is a challenge to historians.  The ‘Office’ of the time was ‘hesitant, unsure and often 
divided in its views on how to tackle the problem of Hitler and Nazism’.60  Its 
intelligence arm (SIS or MI6) was arguably overly-focused on Russia and under 
resourced.  It is tempting to portray the Fellowship and its counterpart in Germany as a 
competing diplomatic axis, bypassing and thereby antagonising the formal diplomatic 
channels.  The journalist AL Kennedy of The Times remarked on this in his journal in 
May 1935, following a meeting with Conwell-Evans, that ‘the way things are done now 
is curious… after the famous Anglo-French communique of February 3 Hitler wished 
to find out what sort of reply would be considered satisfactory in England… he 
mentioned this to Ribbentrop… Ribbentrop telephoned across the North Sea to 
Conwell-Evans, C-E asked Lothian, & Lothian asked Simon - & the answer went back 
through the same chain!’61  This thread of irregular diplomacy had its origins in 
Ribbentrop’s first clandestine visit to Downing Street in 1933 which had frustrated the 
professional diplomatists in both countries.  However, as the Fellowship’s work gained 
momentum, the picture becomes more complex as the attempts to mediate with 
Germany by both gentlemen amateurs and professional players became increasingly 
intertwined.   
The titan leading the professional players in the 1930s British Foreign Office and 
originator of the ‘ambulant amateur’ slur was Sir Robert Vansittart.  Permanent under-
secretary for eight years until January 1938, when he was ‘kicked upstairs’ to the newly-
created role of chief diplomatic adviser to the government, as head of the Office he 
served three prime ministers and five foreign secretaries.  Dubbed by Conwell-Evans 
as the ‘stormy petrel in the doldrums of appeasement’, he, alongside Churchill and Duff 
Cooper, was the most active critic of Chamberlain’s foreign policy setting him on a 
collision course with the prime minister following his appointment in May 1937.   
Two ambassadors served in the British embassy in Berlin during the life of the 
Fellowship - Sir Eric Phipps (August 1933 to April 1937) and Sir Nevile Henderson 
(April 1937 to September 1939) - and Conwell-Evans developed a working relationship 
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with each.  Phipps had followed Sir Horace Rumbold who, Conwell-Evans 
remembered, had challenged Hitler about the persecution of the Jews, who had taken 
‘refuge in hysterical bawling with his hair falling over his eyebrows – behaviour hardly 
likely to impress the ambassador who, for all his vitality and energy, has always insisted 
on preserving the decencies and conventions of social life’.62  Rumbold had been 
relieved of his post but nonetheless Conwell-Evans had approached him (and he 
demurred) to join the Fellowship demonstrating, if nothing else, that admiration for 
National Socialism was not a requirement for membership.  Phipps was also wary of 
the regime and struggled to build working relationships with the German hierarchy.  
While, at the time, Vansittart expressed frustration at the amateur diplomatic efforts of 
the Fellowship and its ilk, Phipps was more sanguine.  He thought it ‘particularly 
desirable to avoid giving the Germans reasons to suppose, by adopting a sulky attitude, 
that the Embassy disapproves of any efforts, however unauthorised on our side, to 
promote Anglo-German agreement and understanding.’   
Phipps was given the ‘hard sell’ on the newly incorporated Fellowship on 1 December 
1935 by Frank Tiarks when they met at a lunch given by Hjalmar and Frau Schact.  
Tiarks was keen to use the Fellowship to prevent further persecution of the Jews in 
Germany and discussed his plans with the ambassador and their host, neither of whom 
was optimistic as to his chances of success.  Briefing the Foreign Office subsequently, 
Phipps proposed not to accept any position such as ‘honorary chairman’ within the 
Fellowship on the grounds that it was a ‘private institution’ but agreed he should attend 
the DEG opening in Berlin.63  He suggested that ‘a friendly meal with us may help to 
prevent the complete nobbling of the missionary by the ineffable Ribbentrop, who is 
convinced, and probably seeks to convince all his English friends, that the Foreign 
Office, and perhaps also the Embassy, are rabidly Germanophobe’.64  He did warn 
George V, three days after attending the DEG’s launch dinner (and only three weeks 
before the King’s death) that these initiatives risked raising ‘false German hopes as 
regards British friendship and cause a reaction against it in England, where public 
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opinion is very naturally hostile to the Nazi regime and its methods’ and regretted that 
‘the movers in both countries are so keen that it is impossible to restrain their ardour’.65 
The British embassy in Berlin and the consulates around Germany kept close tabs on 
the newly-created Deutsch-Englishe Gesellschaft and briefed their masters in London.  
Douglas Filliter, British consul general in Hamburg, sent a note to Basil Newton, British 
minister at the embassy in Berlin, on the establishment of the DEG’s Hamburg branch 
in March 1935.  He explained its aims, background and membership of ‘prominent and 
representative people, both business and official’.  He advised that ‘in view of the aims 
and composition of the Society, it may be said to merit H.E.’s recognition’ and 
suggested the ambassador should attend the opening.66  A week later he wrote again, 
following a meeting with two of the founders, explaining the relationship of the new 
organisation to the previous ‘Deutsch-Englishe Vereinigung’ (sister to the Anglo-
German Association).67  Newton sent both letters to Reginald Leeper, counsellor at the 
Foreign Office in London, noting that the ‘English branch is being reconstituted’ and 
asking to be updated on ‘what has happened at home both for our information and in 
case it should have a bearing on the attitude of the Embassy.’68  
Notwithstanding Phipps’s concerns, the Fellowship had good access to the British 
embassy and a working relationship during his tenure.  Whatever the Office’s 
scepticism, the embassy staff were punctilious in their attendance at DEG events and 
several joined the Fellowship.  By 1937, the DEG could report with satisfaction that 
‘finally after initial and deliberate neglect, the members of the British Embassy have 
now become regulars’ in their attendance at the lavishly appointed club house.  The 
DEG dinner held in January 1936 was attended by the senior embassy officials; Phipps; 
Newton; Colonel Hotblack, the military attaché; and Wing Commander Don, the air 
attaché.69  Hotblack, who went on to be ADC to the King in 1939, joined the Fellowship 
as did Commander Hearson, the naval and press attaché.  The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha hosted as president, Mount Temple represented the Fellowship and senior Nazis 
including Ribbentrop and Hess, Hitler’s deputy, turned out in force.  Afterwards the 
party were guests of Gӧring at the State Opera House.  Conwell-Evans was a regular 
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guest at the embassy during the period, enjoying Sunday lunch à deux with Phipps in 
January 1936 and joining a dinner alongside Ribbentrop in October 1936.  While happy 
to accept the Embassy’s hospitality, he had a low opinion of its denizens, writing to 
Lothian that ‘there is only one man in the Embassy who is any good, the others are quite 
hopeless’.70   
The German Foreign Ministry  
In the early years, the Fellowship’s relationship with the German embassy in London 
was certainly warmer than with the British embassy in Berlin. The Council maintained 
excellent rapport with each of the German ambassadors in London, despite their very 
different personalities, and welcomed officials at all levels within the German embassy 
in London as honoured guests at Fellowship events.  Surprisingly, given its patronage 
from Ribbentrop, whom he detested, the Fellowship was friendly with Leopold von 
Hoesch, the German ambassador in London from 1932 until his death in April 1936.  
Hoesch was guest of honour at a private dinner at the Dorchester Hotel given by the 
Fellowship’s Council in November 1935 and was accompanied by Prince Bismarck and 
other members of the embassy.  Cultured and sophisticated, he has been the ambassador 
in Paris throughout the 1920s.  An old-school Foreign Office anglophile he was close 
to both Edward VIII and his mother Queen Mary.  Tennant considered him a friend 
and, bizarrely provided him intelligence on what was happening in Berlin ‘as he, the 
Ambassador, was kept completely in the dark’, illustrating Hitler’s distrust of 
professional diplomats.71  While von Hoesch’s exact degree of enthusiasm for National 
Socialism is open to debate, contemporary London saw him as no friend of the Nazis, 
especially in contrast to Ribbentrop.  Kennedy of The Times, following lunch together 
in October 1933 noted that ‘Hösch is clearly no Nazi, and hinted to me that he would 
probably have to go; but in the meantime he says what he can for the Nazi regime’72 
while the secretary of the Board of Deputies of British Jews called him ‘notoriously 
anti-Nazi in his views’.73  The Fellowship recorded its ‘deep regret’ at his sudden and 
never-fully-explained death and recorded its appreciation of his ‘sympathetic 
encouragement which he showed at the time of its foundation’.74  Meanwhile since the 
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early 1930s, Conwell-Evans had been assiduously developing valuable contacts with 
‘young officials of the German Foreign Office who occupied important posts’ that 
would later play important roles in the attempts to remove Hitler from power.75   
 
Making friends with Göring 
Conwell-Evans’s closest collaborator in the gathering of intelligence, especially from 
Göring on Germany’s political and military ambitions, was MG Christie.  Born in 1881, 
Christie had lived in Germany for nine years before the First World War and had been 
awarded the degree of Doktor Ingenieur by Aachen University.  An early aviator, at the 
outbreak of the Great War he had joined the Royal Flying Corps and remained with its 
successor the Royal Air Force until 1930 when he retired following a breakdown of his 
health.  While serving as air attaché in Washington (1922-26) and then Berlin (1927–
30), he developed a taste for intelligence gathering that ‘bordered on espionage’.76  In 
the US this frustrated his Whitehall employers, but they valued these skills when 
deployed in Germany.  
A character seemingly straight from a John Buchan novel, his obituarist recorded that 
he was ‘noted among his friends for his great courage, physical and intellectual alike’ 
and that ‘on one occasion, with his aircraft out of control, he flew straight into a hanger 
to avoid the risk to the ground staff on the airfield, escaping death only by a miracle’.77  
Independently wealthy, he established himself as a self-employed intelligence agent 
with his house on the Dutch-German border as his base of operations (with the 
Travellers Club as his London headquarters) and, as Conwell-Evans remembered, spent 
‘eight months of each year in central and eastern European countries and in France, in 
order to examine the effect of German developments on the general situation’.78  His 
gentleman amateur status was unusual, as Wark has concluded, in that ‘he was not a 
spy in the usual sense of the word because he was neither paid nor controlled by 
anyone’.79 
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Christie established senior contacts with the National Socialist leadership early in the 
regime.  He had first met Hitler in 1932 with Hess and Hitler’s economic adviser Otto 
Wagener at the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin.  As an aviation pioneer he befriended the 
‘curious fraternity of airmen’, including: Göring, whom he first met in early 1931; 
Erhard Milch, the state secretary of the Reich Aviation Ministry; Hugo Junkers leader 
of the Junkers Flugzeug-und Motorenwerke AG; and Hans Ritter, an employee of 
Junkers.80  Between January 1935 and May 1937 these gave him invaluable insight into 
the build-up of the Luftwaffe that he reported back conscientiously to London. 
Christie had first met Sir Robert Vansittart in the latter 1920s when he was air attaché 
in Washington and Vansittart was head of the American department at the Foreign 
Office.  It seems they started collaborating on German intelligence gathering as early 
as 1930.  This was the foundation of Van’s famous ‘private detective agency’ which he 
developed at the Foreign Office in the 1930s to augment the work of MI5 and SIS of 
which he nonetheless was ‘the most committed Whitehall supporter’.81  The two men 
developed an intense working relationship.  As Conwell-Evans remembered, in 
Vansittart Christie ‘found a friend upon whose discreet silence he could entirely rely, 
and one whose brilliant and unconventional mind was quickly responsive and 
sympathetic to his voluntary efforts to help’ while, as Ferris concludes, for Van, 
Christie was ‘Britain’s best source on the inner workings of the Nazi state’.82  
Quite when Conwell-Evans and Vansittart first met and who introduced whom is 
unclear.  Both men were close to Ramsay MacDonald in the 1920s and Conwell-Evans 
had sent a copy of his League of Nations book in 1929 to Vansittart, then principal 
private secretary to the prime minister and correspondence survives on international 
affairs from early 1932.83  In his unpublished autobiographical notes, Conwell-Evans 
remembered that ‘Christie put me onto Van: he took my warnings’.84  Although 
historians have noted that Conwell-Evans and Christie worked together for Vansittart, 
none seems to have associated Christie with the Fellowship nor fully explored the three 
men’s relationship.  Christie had been proposed for membership in 1931 of the Anglo-
German Association by Harold Nicolson (later famous as an anti-appeaser but at that 
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time associated with Oswald Mosley’s New Party) who recommended him on the 
strength of his ‘enormous circle of German friends, as well as being able to speak the 
language with great fluency’.85  On hand to assist Tennant’s aborted visit to Germany 
for JCC Davidson in December 1933, he joined the Fellowship soon after its 
foundation.  He donated £5 over and above his annual subscriptions and came to at least 
two events - the Brunswick dinner in July 1936 and the reception for Ambassador 
Dirksen two years later.  Notwithstanding his urgent warnings to the British Foreign 
Office of the rising threat from Hitler’s Germany, he was elected to the Fellowship’s 
Council on 17 January 1938.  It was from 1938 that he and Conwell-Evans worked 
together, and it is easy to speculate that Vansittart, a guest at Fellowship events despite 
his vocal hostility towards Germany, may have encouraged Christie to accept election 
to the Council to burnish his cover and widen opportunities for networking with leading 
Germans at that diplomatically critical time.  Though historians have overlooked his 
involvement with the Fellowship, his membership was highlighted by the police when 
they detained him en route to Switzerland in the first year of the war even though the 
organisation was by then defunct. 
Christie and Conwell-Evans’s relationship remains something of a puzzle.  Both were 
lifelong bachelors and the friendship survived over three decades.  A recently unearthed 
letter from Vansittart to Conwell-Evans from May 1941 shows how close the three men 
had become and may imply that Conwell-Evans and Christie were in personal 
partnership.  Having succumbed to calls to retire, following his intemperate Black 
Record broadcasts damning the German national character in April 1941, Vansittart 
wrote: ‘I am looking forward to making good use of my liberty in the national interest, 
and I shall more than ever need your and Grahame’s collaboration’ before signing off 
‘with my love to you both’.86  
From the outset, Christie’s intelligence was valued by the British Foreign Office and 
not just by Vansittart as permanent under-secretary.  A 1932 minute emphasises that 
‘Captain Christie’s information in the past has often been useful and he has exceptional 
opportunities for gauging certain elements of German opinion’.  Even before Hitler’s 
assumption of the chancellorship, Christie was operating sub rosa and was ‘particularly 
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anxious that he should not be quoted anywhere’.87  Determining the value of Christie’s 
intelligence is complex.  His obituarist shrewdly pointed out ‘it will be for historians to 
judge later whether Lord Vansittart’s opinions on German intentions were formed or 
merely confirmed by this class of evidence, and what impact Christie made on Foreign 
Office thinking’.88  While deserving further attention, several historians have been 
intrigued by Christie including Vansittart’s biographer who acknowledged that most of 
his ‘secret sources of information about Germany’s rearmament schemes, particularly 
in the air’ came from Christie.89  Meehan was certain that he was Van’s ‘most important 
agent’ and that the relationship he built with Göring and the intelligence he garnered 
was ‘penetration of the inner counsels of the Nazi Party beyond the wildest dreams of 
any secret service agent’.90  Von Klemperer, the eminent historian of the German 
resistance, assessed both Christie and Conwell-Evans as ‘men of extraordinary 
enterprise and ingenuity’ through whom ‘Van was able to establish ties with the 
German power elites and was encouraged in his illusion of being in the position of an 
arbiter on German affairs, on Anglo-German relations, and indeed on the question of 
war or peace’.91  Ferris has produced the most detailed analysis of Christie’s, and to 
some extent Conwell-Evans’s, contribution which informs the analysis of the 
Fellowship’s relevance to the process of gathering and communicating this intelligence 
in the following chapters. 
It was this range of carefully-nurtured political and diplomatic connections and 
networks, from Downing Street to the Wilhelmstrasse that provided the Anglo-German 
Fellowship with an unrivalled platform for its programme to influence the governments, 
diplomatic services and, counter-intuitively, the opposition to the government in both 
countries.  This programme would involve almost all the relevant political leaders in 
both countries and continue up to and beyond the outbreak of war in September 1939.   
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Chapter 3  
Coffee with Hitler: the years of optimism  
As 1935 opened, the economies in both Germany and Britain were finally emerging 
from the Depression and, in Germany’s case, benefitting from rearmament.  In an 
economic report on Germany, Tennant wrote that ‘home trade continues to improve 
and money is flowing fast and freely… the theatres, restaurants and cafes are packed’.1  
It was into this more positive atmosphere that the Fellowship’s founders ventured forth 
as amateur diplomats, having secured financial backing from leading British financiers 
and industrialists and political support from across the aisles of both houses of 
parliament.  Encouraged by the improving economy, Hitler tested international opinion 
with two bold moves.  In March, he announced the reintroduction of national military 
service, which Conwell-Evans saw as ‘strengthening his hands before negotiations’2 
and which left ‘Europe profoundly disturbed – but only for a time’.3  Two months later 
Hitler sent Ribbentrop, then special commissioner for disarmament, to London to 
negotiate the Anglo-German Naval agreement.  This was the first of Ribbentrop’s 
unlikely diplomatic triumphs that Conwell-Evans excitedly promised to Lothian proved 
that ‘Germany’s will to friendship with us is real and permanent’.4 
This optimism needs to be set in the context of what Halifax called ‘a high tide of 
wholly irrational pacifist sentiment in Britain’ following the Peace Ballot in June 1935 
in which the clear majority of the eleven million voters supported the League of 
Nations, disarmament, abolition of air warfare and international cooperation to prevent 
war.5  Those Francophile voices in the Foreign Office arguing for a more circumspect 
approach to Germany were, by the end of the year, severely embarrassed by the 
exposure of the Hoare-Laval pact following Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia.   All of 
which emboldened Hitler’s strategy combining the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 
March 1936, blatantly breaching the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, with vocal 
diplomatic reassurances to the British.  This faced no military resistance, little 
coordinated international complaint and was hugely popular in Germany.  As Weinberg 
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has argued there was no stomach in Britain for a military response.  Even Churchill was 
sanguine, failing to ‘advocate immediate and decisive action to throw the German army 
out of the Rhineland’ and accepting the British government’s ‘evasive policy of futile 
talking and negotiation’.  Eden, the foreign secretary, had been prepared to concede it 
to the Germans in any event, and, as Parker concluded, ‘it was unthinkable at the time, 
whatever anyone later claimed, that Britain would push France into firmness over a 
Rhineland demilitarised zone that most in Britain thought to be a legacy of the 
unfairness of Versailles, and something that would in any case soon be negotiated 
away’.6  But critically, as Steiner suggested, ‘the French failure to respond militarily to 
German provocation increased Hitler’s confidence’ and ‘confirmed his belief that 
despite its materially superior army, France would never act without Britain’.7   
The sympathy of the Fellowship’s leaders towards Germany’s grievances should not be 
equated with complacency about the threat she posed.  Back in March 1935 Conwell-
Evans had warned Lothian that ‘the most dangerous aspect for the future is the 
demilitarised zone’.8  In February 1936, Tennant and Conwell-Evans had warned 
leading British statesmen that the planned Franco-Russian alliance would lead 
Germany to ‘feel that her encirclement has been completed and… take drastic steps to 
meet the situation’.9   It was MG Christie who alerted the British to the impending 
action, telephoning Vansittart the night before at his Mayfair home with details of the 
timing and strength of the invasion.10  According to Tennant’s memoir, it was from then 
that his relations with Ribbentrop ‘moved down to quite a different and more distant 
plane’ and so he concentrated on expanding the Fellowship.11  According to Wright, 
the invasion of the Rhineland caused a ‘panic’ and a hurriedly convened Council 
meeting which ‘drew up an ungrammatical letter which was little more than an appeal 
to the Fuhrer to undo what he had done’.12  Nonetheless, Ambassador von Hoesch 
reported back to Berlin that ‘our old and faithful friends’ including Ian Hamilton, 
Colonel Moore and Londonderry were supportive and the next day met with Lothian 
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who was purportedly unperturbed by the remilitarisation.13  Reflecting over a year later, 
Conwell-Evans wrote to Lothian: ‘it is odd that only a great crisis threatening 
immediate war rallies our people to examine a thing on its own merits, as in the 
Rhineland case when sentiment was pro-German. In between crises Moscow 
propagandists seem to have it all their own way’.14 
The interaction between leading British and German statesmen in the five-and-a-half-
year period between early 1933 and Chamberlain’s meetings with Hitler in September 
1938 was patchy, chaotic, amateur and eccentric.  The rarity of face-to-face meetings 
between leaders of the two governments was a constant theme for the Fellowship and 
its leadership.  Tennant passionately believed personal contact with dictators was 
essential to successful diplomacy, quoting Samuel Hoare’s view that ‘with the advent 
of the dictators, the diplomats had almost ceased to exist’.15  It was specially to fill this 
diplomatic vacuum that he had created the Fellowship. 
In December 1933 Hitler had complained to Tennant that, even though he had been in 
power for nearly a year, ‘Allied statesman travel round Europe from Paris to Rome 
from Rome to London discussing him when none of them had ever seen him so knew 
nothing about him’.  He reiterated the invitation to Baldwin whom he admired for 
giving a portion of his fortune to pay down the national debt.  He suggested that, as he 
could not leave Germany, the meeting could be held ‘in a frontier town or in a battleship 
off Hamburg’ and would provoke ‘such a return of confidence that in six months there 
will be not one unemployed man in Europe’.  Back in London, Tennant briefed Baldwin 
who ‘walked up and down his room smoking his pipe and clicking his fingers’ but 
declared that, while he would like to accept, it was not his job.  Tennant suggested some 
underlings go as ‘an advance guard’ so Baldwin proposed his friend Davidson and 
Geoffrey Lloyd, his principal private secretary.  A few days later, Davidson, deeply 
apologetic, pulled out of the trip but emphasised Lloyd’s credentials to go alone.  Hitler 
insisted that Lloyd would only be welcome carrying a personal message from Baldwin 
who demurred as this would need Foreign Office blessing and the next day Lloyd pulled 
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out claiming illness.  For Tennant and Ribbentrop this debacle was a ‘serious setback’ 
and the former reported that Hitler was ‘furious’.16  
In March 1935, Sir John Simon, accompanied by Anthony Eden (by then Lord Privy 
Seal) was the first serving British cabinet minister to meet Hitler, over two years after 
he had been appointed chancellor of Germany.  In the meanwhile, apparently to mitigate 
this diplomatic cold-shoulder, an assortment of senior British political figures of 
varying hue and degrees of eccentricity made the trip to Berlin or Berchtesgaden to take 
coffee with the Führer.  Of the semi-official, the more politically significant were Lords 
Londonderry, Allen and Lothian and the former prime minister Lloyd George in 1936.  
Far from coming from the right of the Conservative party, the more important meetings 
were with senior Liberal and Labour politicians.  A flow of lesser politicians and 
businessmen, each members of the Fellowship, included lords Mount Temple, Stamp, 
Brocket, McGowan and Mottistone and, a retired MP, DM Mason.  Former diplomat, 
Harold Nicolson’s disapproval of ‘ex-cabinet ministers trotting across to Germany’ 
giving ‘the impression of secret negotiations’ is typical of the then scornful Foreign 
Office attitude to the Fellowship and its missions.17  Each mission was nonetheless a 
forerunner for Chamberlain and his umbrella at Munich.  In most, the Fellowship played 
its part in suggesting, promoting, arranging and translating (Conwell-Evans, Tennant 
and Christie each spoke fluent German).  Understanding each, particularly the visits by 
Lothian, Londonderry and Lloyd George, is central to any proper analysis of the 
Fellowship’s diplomatic and political ambitions.   
It is tempting, as Vansittart did, to divide these gentlemen from the players and portray 
the ‘ambulant amateurs’ as promoting a competing, unsanctioned, diplomatic 
choreography in this series of visits to Hitler (what the Germans term 
substitutionsdiplomatie).18  However, the boundaries of professionalism are harder to 
define and each of these meetings is part of an interlinked sequence.  Baldwin remained 
Hitler’s elusive Holy Grail while Lothian paved the way for the visit by Simon and 
Eden a few weeks later, inspired Londonderry and helped to organise Halifax’s visit.  
The two professionals, Simon and Eden, were a disappointment to both sides.  Lloyd 
George was a publicity coup and fleeting delight, while Londonderry was a warm-up 
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act for Halifax who went on to disappoint.  These tourists have been derided by 
historians as amateur, naïve, unauthorised and irresponsible - ‘a stream of distinguished 
and gullible visitors… the majority of whom came away convinced of the Nazi leader’s 
reasonableness and desire for peace with the British Empire’.19  No doubt later 
commentators have been influenced by Churchill’s conclusion that ‘all those 
Englishmen who visited the German Führer in these years were embarrassed or 
compromised’.20  However this was a distinguished, varied and intelligent group – were 
they really all gulled?    
The visitors, however amateur, were not without governmental blessing.  Lord Allen 
was the unofficial representative of Ramsay MacDonald, Lloyd George went with 
Baldwin’s blessing, while Lothian and Londonderry liaised with the Foreign Office and 
Downing Street on each of their meetings.  Nor were the official visits any less amateur.  
The patrician Lord Halifax, while not yet foreign secretary, met Hitler in November 
1937 under the guise as master of the Middleton Hunt visiting a ‘slightly absurd’ 
hunting exhibition in Berlin. 21  Clearly an awkward emissary, he initially mistook the 
Führer for a footman.22  Nor were the professional diplomatists wholly immune to 
Hitler’s charm.  Eden got on well with Hitler, preferring him to Stalin and especially 
Mussolini, whom he thought ‘a complete gangster with dreadful table manners to 
boot’.23  Hitler invited Eden to stay at his ‘cottage’ at Berchtesgaden at a later date and 
they discussed the Great War where it turned out they had served on opposite sides of 




Of the British politicians who met Hitler in the mid-1930s, Philip Kerr (from 1930, the 
eleventh Marquess of Lothian) is especially pivotal to the story of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship.  Despite declining the offer of the chairmanship, he worked closely with 
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Conwell-Evans and they met Hitler together twice (in January 1935 and May 1937) 
under the direct auspices of the Fellowship.  Hitler described Lothian as ‘the most 
helpful Englishman he has met’.25  Conwell-Evans had introduced Ribbentrop to 
Lothian in November 1934 who entertained him at Blickling Hall, his magnificent 
Jacobean stately home in Norfolk in June 1935.  Lothian recommended Conwell-Evans 
to his old boss Lloyd George as adviser on matters German.  He gave the keynote 
speech at the Fellowship dinner in July 1936 at which he gently but firmly criticised his 
German friends.  Though aristocratic by blood (his paternal grandfather was the seventh 
Marquess and his maternal grandfather a duke), his father had been an army officer who 
brought up his children in a modest dower house.  Lothian was never wholly 
comfortable with the trappings of aristocracy arriving at the coronation of George VI 
in a battered Austin Seven and favoured the American style of informality.  As a 
Christian Scientist, hardworking journalist, secretary of the Rhodes Trust and later a 
diplomat, he was far from both the Lord Darlington stereotype and the elegant nobility 
of lords Londonderry and Halifax.  While associated with the ‘Cliveden Set’, his 
political friendships and influence were wide.  Although a devoted Liberal and loyal to 
Lloyd George, he had served in MacDonald’s coalition government, lent his stately 
home to the nervously collapsed Baldwin, was an ally to Chamberlain and was 
appointed ambassador to Washington by his friend Halifax.  Thereupon he developed 
a successful relationship with the new prime minister, Winston Churchill, despite initial 
mutual antipathy.  As one of Lloyd George’s secretaries at Versailles and his eminence 
grise on foreign affairs, he had been responsible for drafting Article 231, the notorious 
German ‘war guilt’ clause.  As Kennedy of The Times wrote in May 1937, he was ‘now 
a little ashamed of his handiwork, and makes what excuses he can for it’ in both 
Germany and Britain.26   
Secretly nominated British ambassador to the US in August 1938, Lothian arrived en 
poste a year later, four days before the outbreak of war and served for just sixteen 
months before his sudden death of blood poisoning in December 1940.  As ambassador, 
against the headwinds of the US Neutrality Acts and the 1940 presidential election, he 
played a vital role in building American public support for the British war effort.  
Working with Churchill to build his relationship with Roosevelt, they persuaded the 
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president to support Britain with the Destroyers for Bases agreement and the initiation 
of Lend-Lease.  His junior colleague, the historian John Wheeler-Bennett concluded 
‘his was the hand who laid the foundation for the “Special Relationship”’.27  Jay Moffat, 
the US ambassador to Canada noted that, if Joseph Kennedy, the US ambassador to 
London, said ‘something is black and Lothian says it is white, we believe Lord 
Lothian’.28  Having considered Lothian’s appointment ‘disastrous’29, both on grounds 
of his amateur status and involvement with appeasement, Vansittart later called him 
‘the greatest of all our Ambassadors’.30  Churchill, Van’s fellow anti-appeaser, 
eulogised him similarly in a cable to Roosevelt as ‘our greatest ambassador to the 
United States’ while Roosevelt cabled his shock and horror ‘beyond measure’ to 
George VI at the loss of his ‘old friend’.31 
While now far from a household name, Lothian’s efforts in foreign affairs in the 1930s 
were well reported at the time.  After the war, and despite Churchill’s gratitude, his 
legacy was inevitably overshadowed by the Guilty Men and Cliveden Set traditions.  He 
has since been the subject of scholars of Anglo-American diplomacy who have lauded 
him as a sophisticated internationalist.32  However, analysis of his Anglo-German 
enthusiasms by both contemporaries and historians has been negative and patronising 
such that it can be hard to believe one is reading about the same man.  Despite their 
friendship, Vansittart had called him an ‘incurably superficial Johnny know-all’.33  
Bloch dismissed him as ‘an eccentric liberal’, and Griffiths as a ‘well-meaning and 
Christian-minded searcher for peace’ but ‘a leading apologist for Anglo-German 
understanding’.34  Kershaw identified ‘a certain gullibility about him’, Waddington 
damned his views as ‘naïve ejaculations’ while Cowling wrote him off as ‘not of the 
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first importance’ albeit admitting he was, at least, ‘listened to’.35  Somewhat 
desperately, his otherwise admiring biographer explained his poor judgement on a 
compartmental basis: ‘the pity was that Lothian, whose human contacts with the 
English-speaking peoples were so fruitful, knew so little at first hand of conditions in 
central Europe and altogether failed to comprehend the mentality of Hitler and his 
crew’.36  Priscilla Roberts is unusual in concluding that ‘Lothian was not an apologist 
for… Adolf Hitler’.  
These two phases and themes of Lothian’s career overlapped and represent his political 
and intellectual maturity.   As will be argued, his intelligence on Germany was better 
than most and helped persuade the sceptical American administration to support British 
military efforts in the first years of the war.  As Reynolds concluded, ‘in practice, 
Lothian’s efforts to reach some modus vivendi with Hitler and Mussolini proved little 
obstacle to his ambassadorial effectiveness'.  Roosevelt seems to have recognised the 
convictions of a convert and teased him for his earlier credulity of the Nazi regime.  
Lothian’s conviction that world peace should be built on an Anglo-American axis of 
mutual support dated back to before the Great War.  In 1909, he had sent a 
memorandum to Arthur Balfour proposing ‘an Anglo-Saxon Federation’ between the 
US and Britain to check German imperialism and persuade President Theodore 
Roosevelt away from a potential German-US alliance.  In 1915, he was, according to 
the then US ambassador, ‘red hot for a close and perfect understanding between Great 
Britain and the United States’ and was Lloyd George’s principal adviser on Anglo-
American relations.37  While campaigning for appeasement in Germany in the mid-
1930s he was still calling for improved Anglo-American cooperation.  He had built 
rapport with Franklin Roosevelt well before his name was in the frame to be 
ambassador.  In November 1934 AL Kennedy of The Times reported that Lothian had 
just returned from the USA where he had a ‘good talk on Anglo-American-Japanese 
relations with President Roosevelt’.38   
Conwell-Evans and Lothian became friends, frequent correspondents and colleagues 
and Conwell-Evans was a welcome guest at Blickling.  Both life-long bachelors 
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suffered from their nerves and had worked together at the Rhodes Trust and contributed 
keenly to Chatham House.  Lothian secured his friend membership of the exclusive 
Travellers Club which became the base for his operations.  Their efforts to improve 
Anglo-German relations were initiated in November 1934 when Conwell-Evans, fresh 
back from living in Germany, wrote to Lothian offering to brief him on the country and 
introduce him to Ribbentrop who was ‘very anxious to make [his] acquaintance’.39  He 
arranged for Lothian to meet Hitler in early 1935 with Ribbentrop translating Lothian 
to Hitler and Conwell-Evans translating Hitler to Lothian.  Lothian saw Conwell-
Evans’s involvement as ‘an immense advantage’40 while Conwell-Evans saw the 
meeting as an opportunity ‘for Germany to make clear to an independent Englishman 
of very great influence what the aims of the Nazi government are’.41   
In briefing his masters in Berlin, Ambassador von Hoesch had described Lothian as 
‘without doubt the most important non-official Englishman who has so far asked to be 
received by the Chancellor’ while Ribbentrop agreed he was ‘the most influential 
Englishman outside the government’. 42  Lothian and Conwell-Evans met von Neurath 
and von Bulow at the Foreign Ministry and discussed disarmament with Blomberg, 
Hess and Ribbentrop before a two-hour meeting with Hitler.  The Führer, following his 
customary monologue on Russia, in a rare attempt at ironic humour, challenged the 
presumption that France, with a smaller population, should be allowed a larger army 
than Germany, pointing out that ‘in the same reasoning Germany should have a larger 
army than Russia; and Luxembourg should have a larger army than that of any other 
country in the world’.  While stressing that he ‘personally had no official position nor 
diplomatic mission’, Lothian saw his trip as paving the way for a more official visit and 
promised Hitler he would report back to the British government.  Hitler concluded that 
‘the greatest madness was the war of 1914 between the two peoples – the English and 
the Germans’43 which convinced Lothian that ‘Germany doesn’t want war… her 
preoccupation is with domestic affairs; and insofar as she looks outwards it is anxiously 
towards the East, and not to the West’.44  Lothian quoted Cecil Rhodes’s ambition that 
‘USA, England and Germany would together preserve peace of the world’.  He wrote 
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immediately to the foreign secretary urging direct contact with Hitler and sent Conwell-
Evans’s record of the interview to the prime minister, Baldwin and Ribbentrop as well 
as briefing Kennedy of The Times.45 
From the start, Lothian was far from a blind admirer of, or apologist for, Hitler, writing 
in 1933 that ‘like most liberals I loathe the Nazi regime’.  Nevertheless, he argued ‘we 
should be willing to do justice to Germany’ while resisting ‘any unjust pretension which 
she herself may later put forward’.46  Writing to the Labour peer, Lord Allen, he insisted 
that ‘every time I see Ribbentrop, and every time I know anybody going to Nazi 
headquarters, I'd tell him to tell them that the present obstacle to better Anglo German 
relations today is the persecution of the Christians, Jews and Liberal Pacifists’.47  Nor 
was he averse to criticising the Nazi regime in public.  At the July 1936 Fellowship 
dinner, he appealed directly to Hitler and warned ‘there are aspects of internal policy 
of the National-Socialist state which are a serious obstacle to the establishment of 
cordial relations between Britain and the German people’.48  He also raised awareness 
of the persecution of Roman Catholics in Germany by arranging a talk at Chatham 
House.  
 
Lord Londonderry  
The two marquesses, Lothian and Londonderry, were starkly different in style, 
demeanour and political affiliation.  In contrast to the informal, sartorially rumpled, 
Liberal, Lothian, Lord Londonderry was the epitome of a truly aristocratic Conservative 
politician.  Apparently the inspiration for the character of Lord Darlington in Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day, his huge wealth, ambitious wife and London 
house staffed by forty-four servants was used to pursue what was never more than a 
second division parliamentary career.  He worried about the rising threat of the 
communists, supported rearmament and, as air minister, played an acknowledged role 
in building up the RAF.  Londonderry’s enthusiasm for friendship with Hitler’s 
Germany has been the subject of two recent re-evaluations  that have rendered him as 
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more than just a ‘pure pro-Nazi apologist’.49  They have challenged the popular 
mythology, that has similarly skewed analysis of the Fellowship, of a British aristocracy 
‘inclined to fascism’ that even ‘harboured a desire to establish a fascist government in 
the United Kingdom’.50  Fleming has also emphasised that Londonderry’s concern for 
better relations with Germany, like many in the Fellowship, long pre-dated the National 
Socialists taking power.51   
There is no evidence that the Fellowship had any direct role in arranging Londonderry's 
several meetings with Hitler that started in January 1936.  Like Tennant and Conwell-
Evans, Londonderry had developed a friendship with Ribbentrop whom he first met in 
1934.  Keen to capitalise on his friend’s social prestige, Ribbentrop directly arranged 
the practical aspects of his meetings with the Nazi high command.  Londonderry did 
use Conwell-Evans to introduce him to the German conservative resistance to Hitler in 
1938 once he realised entente might well be a lost cause.  So, while he did not need the 
Fellowship’s help to meet the ‘bad’ Germans, he did to meet the ‘good’.   
Londonderry had been a member of the Anglo-German Association before becoming 
air minister and joined the Fellowship in February 1936 under persuasion from 
Ribbentrop who was keen to promote his new venture.  Kershaw has concluded ‘there 
is no indication that Londonderry was a notably active member of the Fellowship’ but 
suggested that, by joining, he ‘was now certainly swimming among the sharks’.  
Londonderry’s daughter Lady Mairi Bury, in a 2002 interview had ‘confirmed her 
father had not been an active member’.52  This was a lapse of memory not untypical of 
families that had been members.  In truth, her father was one of the more attentive of 
the senior aristocratic Fellowship members.  He had been entertained to a special lunch 
by the DEG on his first visit to Germany in February 1936.  A few months later, he 
attended the July 1936 banquet at the Dorchester Hotel in honour of the Duke and 
Duchess of Brunswick.  Later that year, he toasted his friend Ribbentrop at the 
Fellowship banquet at Grosvenor House, noting that the Fellowship ‘was becoming a 
great factor for good’ and called for a four-nation pact, an end to the arms race and no 
repeat of 1914.53  He attended the May 1938 reception at the May Fair Hotel in honour 
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of the new German ambassador and remained a member of the Fellowship up to and 
beyond its moment of crisis.  Unlike the chairman and half of the membership, there is 
no evidence he resigned following the atrocities of Kristallnacht in November 1938.  
 
Lloyd George 
At ten in the morning on the 2 September 1936, Tennant stood on the platform at 
Liverpool Street Station.  He was waving goodbye as Conwell-Evans led the seventy-
two-year-old David Lloyd George, the ‘man who won the War’, on board a train bound 
for Munich to meet the Führer.  The party included Lloyd George’s son, Major Gwylim 
and, apparently reluctantly, his daughter Megan (both themselves MPs) supported by 
his long-suffering private secretary AJ Sylvester.  Supposedly incognito, their departure 
had been leaked to the press and a Daily Telegraph journalist was on hand to report it 
in the next day’s paper to Lloyd George’s fury.  Tennant later remembered being 
‘pleased that at least one of our leading statesmen was going to meet Hitler’ but even 
then - more than three years before the start of the war - felt ‘it was at least a year too 
late’.54  The party was later joined by Tom Jones, deputy secretary to the Cabinet and 
close confidant of prime minister, Baldwin.   
The meeting between Lloyd George and Hitler was subject to intense scrutiny at the 
time and continues to fascinate historians and biographers.  Most of those present 
produced memoirs of the trip – Tom Jones, Lord Dawson, Conwell-Evans (who was 
the only other Briton to join the private audience with Hitler), Sylvester and Emrys 
Pride.  Lloyd George’s own thoughts appeared for public consumption in a 
controversial Daily Express article and an interview with AJ Cummings in the News 
Chronicle.55  On the German side, Paul Schmidt, the Foreign Ministry appointed 
interpreter (and, according to some, covert critic of Hitler) left a detailed account.  A 
cine film taken by Sylvester survives of his master admiring the huge picture window 
at the Berghof with its breath-taking views of the Bavarian Alps.  This inspired him to 
install a similar window at Churt, his Surrey home, albeit presumably with a more 
prosaic view.   
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Lloyd George was the ‘most important British visitor to date’ and the Fellowship, now 
incorporated for nearly a year, had conceived, planned, facilitated and directed his visit 
with Conwell-Evans as his trusted adviser and interpreter.56  While his participation has 
been noted, Tennant's contribution has been ignored and the duo’s leadership of the 
Fellowship overlooked.57  This was the high-water mark of the Fellowship’s efforts to 
stimulate direct dialogue between the leadership of the two countries.  Though out of 
government for fourteen years, Lloyd George remained a political giant amongst 
pygmies with popular appeal at home and abroad.  Hitler was never more charming that 
when meeting the Great War premier for whom his admiration strayed into hero-
worship.  Ribbentrop shared his master’s adulation going so far, according to Conwell-
Evans, as to boast that ‘the Germans have in Hitler their Lloyd George’.58  For 
Ribbentrop, having failed to deliver Baldwin, Lloyd George was the biggest fish yet 
caught and this was the zenith of his Anglophile charm offensive.  His new friend, 
Edward VIII, to whom he had been introduced by von Hoesch, had acceded to the 
throne eight months previously.  That summer’s Olympics had been an international 
propaganda success and the upcoming Nürnberg Rally was planned as the most 
welcoming to foreigners to date.  Ribbentrop’s appointment as ambassador to the Court 
of St James had just been confirmed.    
Eden had vetoed a visit by Baldwin, now finally prime minister, for fear of upsetting 
the French so the Lloyd George visit was a proxy.  Tom Jones was included to give an 
aura of Baldwinite approval and prevent ‘any appearance of L. G. interfering’ while 
retaining plausible deniability in Downing Street and Whitehall.59  Lord Dawson of 
Penn, Baldwin’s doctor and confidante, also joined and the party was even asked to 
bring back some blue gentian flowers for Mrs Baldwin.  As Lentin put it, ‘Baldwin’s 
spectre, genial but wary, hovers equivocally in the background of this entire episode’.60  
During the visit, Jones kept Baldwin ‘posted with a short account of the family party’s 
progress and the people [they] met’.61  At the tea party, Dawson and Jones together 
asked Hitler to excuse Baldwin’s absence on health grounds.  Weeks later at Nürnberg, 
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with the glow from the Welshman’s visit fading, Hitler was reported by Jones to have 
wept at the fading prospect of ever meeting Baldwin.62  For one historian ‘the 
imagination boggles at the effort to visualise Baldwin and Hitler conversing’.63   
Despite its wide reporting at the time and detailed subsequent analysis, little attention 
has been paid by historians as to how and why the meeting was conceived.  Most have 
traced the idea of a meeting to a spontaneous invitation from Ribbentrop at a lunch with 
Lloyd George in the summer of 1936.64  Lloyd George himself mischievously told the 
Daily Telegraph reporter that the invitation had originated from Ribbentrop when he 
‘had called on him a short time ago in London’ implying a spontaneous jaunt to 
Germany, arranged at the last minute.  In fact, the idea had been gestating for well over 
a year.  In spring of 1935, Lloyd George had written an article that prompted Tennant 
to write, with impressive chutzpah, introducing himself as a ‘student of German affairs’.  
He explained he had visited the country ‘more than 130 times since the Armistice’ 
citing as credentials his 1919 War Office report and friendship with both Ribbentrop 
and the Führer and enclosing his latest report on Germany.65  This was Tennant’s first 
attempt to re-engage with a leading British statesman following his and Ribbentrop’s 
rejection by the political and diplomatic elite in 1933.  Lloyd George, who had ‘the 
largest postbag of any British politician’ little of which he apparently read, replied less 
than a week later asking for more information.66  From then on, Tennant and Conwell-
Evans found their way into the great man’s inner circle as trusted advisers and guides 
on all matters German. 
A month later, Tennant, yet to meet Lloyd George in person, wrote urgently from the 
Hotel Esplanade in Berlin following dinner chez Ribbentrop, inviting him to visit 
Germany.  He insisted (disingenuously) that it was he, and not Baldwin, that was ‘the 
British statesmen they were now most anxious to have visit Berlin’.67  Lloyd George’s 
office replied requesting further reports which he was finding of ‘absorbing interest’.68  
In October, Tennant was invited to lunch at Churt to discuss the German trip.  Joined 
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by his two secretaries, AJ Sylvester and Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George explained 
that he had chosen Tennant, whom he ‘bombarded with questions’, because ‘business 
men gave [him] much better information than the diplomats’.69  Lloyd George queried 
Churchill’s assessment of Germany’s rearmament supposedly running at one billion 
pounds per annum and Tennant agreed to discuss it with Ribbentrop.70  Ten days later, 
Tennant and Conwell-Evans were staying with the Ribbentrops in Berlin when he was 
handed a copy of Churchill’s speech on German rearmament.  As Tennant excitedly 
reported back to Lloyd George, Ribbentrop ‘looked very white and angry for about a 
minute’ before telling them ‘very calmly’ with a clumsy but chilling attempt at humour 
that ‘Mr Churchill is quite wrong in his figures… we are not spending a paltry 800 
millions on rearming.  We are spending £10,000 millions a month.  We are turning out 
25,000 aeroplanes a day and 1,000 big guns a minute’.  Rising to his theme, he 
explained ‘Herr Hitler is just about to pass a law making any woman liable to 
concentration camp who fails to have twins in 1936, triplets in 1937 and quadruplets 
there after and the ratio must be at least three boys to one girl… we aim at a population 
the size of India…’ before asking rhetorically ‘my God what can you do with men who 
make wild statements like that?’  Tennant reiterated the open invitation for Lloyd 
George to come to Germany, explaining that the chancellor is a sincere admirer and 
promising he can be ‘absolutely certain of a great reception’.71  A delighted Lloyd 
George promised to return to the idea after the election and, that summer, plans for a 
visit finally took shape.  At the lunch with Lloyd George, Ribbentrop reconfirmed the 
invitation and his guest accepted immediately. 
At this point, Lloyd George instructed his secretary Sylvester to enlist his fellow 
Welshman, Conwell-Evans, as ‘an admirable liaison officer… acceptable to both 
parties’.72  Sylvester had been private secretary to both Bonar Law and Baldwin in the 
1920s and worked for Lloyd George from 1923 until his death in 1945.  A skilful 
secretary, diarist, speed typist, obsessive shorthand note taker and amateur filmmaker, 
he was Lloyd George’s amanuensis - a hybrid of Moneypenny, Jeeves and Boswell.  
Conwell-Evans had been recommended by Lothian through whom he had volunteered 
his services as ‘Hon. Attaché’ suggesting that Lloyd George will ‘need someone who 
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knows the situation and the good and the great and who can speak the language and 
take independent notes’.73  He was much more than a mere ‘interpreter’ from the 
outset.74   
Sylvester wasted no time in summoning Conwell-Evans back from Germany and Lloyd 
George took ‘an instant liking to him’.75 He explained he wanted to visit Germany ‘to 
see the great roads [and] the development around the towns which has provided work 
for all the unemployed’.  Disingenuously, he claimed he was ‘not interested in the 
armament work’ but rather in the ‘industrial and agricultural developments’.  This 
interest in the German economic miracle was nonetheless sincere as he had been 
absorbed for months on how to improve the British employment situation.  Anxious to 
re-engage with foreign affairs, he had offered himself to Baldwin as foreign secretary 
suggesting he ‘might be of some use in placating Germany’.  Keen to meet General 
Ludendorff, the victor of the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, to discuss the First 
War for his war memoirs, he was also interested in understanding the position of 
religion in Germany especially the status of the nonconformist churches.  Stepping back 
on the international stage, after a disappointing election campaign and failure to join 
the new cabinet, ‘the invitation tickled his vanity, and it appealed to his dramatic as 
well as to his political imagination’.76   
Lloyd George had a relatively positive and consistent perspective on Germany.  During 
the 1919 Peace Conference, he had ‘fought consistently in the main, for moderation and 
magnanimity towards the defeated Germans’.77  There was a sense of unfinished 
business; he had last visited Germany in August 1908 while chancellor of the 
exchequer, with an interest in studying its economic and social reforms and specifically 
pensions.  Then, both Chancellor Bulow and the Kaiser had refused to meet him so ‘as 
an exercise in diplomacy, the visit was a failure from the start’.78  According to 
biographers, his real agenda was then to persuade the Germans to de-escalate the arms 
race.  The study of German pensions provided cover for the trip just as the German 
economic recovery would nearly three decades later.   
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Before he left for Germany – perhaps in the interest of balance - Lloyd George had 
lunched with his friend Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambassador to St James’s with whom 
he had developed a plan for an Anglo-Soviet axis to restrain Germany.79  Maisky 
thought Lloyd George ‘the outstanding statesman Great Britain has produced 
throughout his period’ but was alarmed by his new found enthusiasm for Hitler and 
précised for him those sections of Mein Kampf excluded from the English translation 
covering Hitler’s plans for Russia.80 
Meanwhile Conwell-Evans returned from Germany to be met by Sylvester at Croydon 
airport from where they went to dine at the National Liberal Club to finalise logistics.  
Planning was similarly thorough on the German side with Ribbentrop ‘taking the 
greatest possible interest’ and ‘all the hotel accommodation … being made officially’.81  
Conwell-Evans arranged for Tom Jones to travel from a sanatorium in Switzerland 
(where he had been sent by Dawson for a rest cure) to Munich, making it clear that his 
expenses would be met and all he needed was ‘pocket money’.82  Jones had briefed 
Dawson on the trip, who asked to join at his own expense, to which Lloyd George and 
Ribbentrop agreed immediately, no doubt delighted by the party’s growing momentum.   
Historians have speculated as to whether a face-to-face meeting between the two men 
was arranged before the party left London.83  Accepting that Hitler’s diary was 
somewhat fluid, the suggestion that it might not seems improbable.  According to 
Sylvester it had been set for 4 September before they left England.  Tennant had made 
it quite clear that Hitler was an admirer and that any visit would involve a meeting of 
the two demagogues while Conwell-Evans had told Lloyd George that he was the ‘only 
man who understood Hitler and that conversely Lloyd George was the only man for 
whom Hitler had any respect on this side’.84  The absurd idea that the two might meet 
spontaneously if their diaries permitted appears to originate from a report in The Times, 
itself presumably a panicked damage limitation exercise in response to the Daily 
Telegraph article the day before.  The former cited Colonel Tweed, Lloyd George’s 
chief of staff, who claimed ‘no actual meeting had been arranged with Herr Hitler, but 
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it was not unlikely that an opportunity would occur for a meeting’.85  Given the sixteen 
months of painstaking planning, Hitler’s hero-worship for the former British prime 
minister, Ribbentrop’s enthusiasm for the enterprise and Lloyd George’s considerable 
ego, it is almost unthinkable that a face-to-face meeting was not always central to the 
plan.  
On their first night, the party was treated to dinner by the Ribbentrops at Berchtesgaden, 
with Joachim ‘harping on Russia and the spread of Communism in Spain, France and 
China and the menace to India’.  Lloyd George challenged this obsession countering 
that Russia’s nationalism, imperialism and militarism were greater threats and that, in 
any event, the ‘French peasant will never go communist’.  The following day, after a 
leisurely lunch on the terrace with Lloyd George demonstrating the ‘loquacity of age’, 
Hitler sent his own car to collect him, Ribbentrop and Conwell-Evans for the drive to 
Haus Wachenfeld, his ‘bright airy chalet’ close to the Austrian border leaving the rest 
of the party at the hotel somewhat disgruntled.86  Funded by the royalties from Mein 
Kampf, and admired by Homes and Gardens (which featured it in a gushing lifestyle 
feature in the November 1938 edition) it was here ‘amid an unsophisticated peasantry 
of carvers and hunters’ that the ‘Squire of Wachenfeld’ in his Anglo-Saxon idyll was 
most relaxed and charming to distinguished British visitors.87  The moment of first 
meeting is captured in a telling photograph taken by Kurt Huhle, showing Hitler coming 
down the ‘large flight of stone steps leading from his house to the Alpine Road’ to greet 
his guest with a warm and gripping hand shake.88  Dawson recognised this as pure 
theatre that enabled ‘the Führer to be above his guests as the latter arrive, and… descend 
to meet them in proportion to the occasion’.89  Now, ‘face-to-face were the statesman 
who had dominated the First World War, leonine with flowing white hair, a still 
bewitching figure, and the restless, magnetic personality of Hitler’.90  It is a smiling, 
confident Conwell-Evans lifting his Homburg in the middle of the composition with, in 
stark contrast, Ribbentrop hanging back, unsmiling and anxious.  The generation gap 
(Hitler was twenty-seven years younger) is evident in clothing - Hitler sports a 
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contemporary cut suit, with turn-ups and a soft-collared shirt while Lloyd George, 
essentially Edwardian, wears his characteristic stick-up collar with neatly combed hair 
and holds his hat lightly in his left hand.  Passing through the entrance hall ‘filled with 
a curious display of majolica pots’, Lloyd George correctly identified a portrait of a 
small boy as the young Frederick the Great, to which the Chancellor responded with a 
laugh with ‘eyes beaming with benevolence and admiration’. 
Lloyd George, though enthralled by Hitler, did not lose all critical faculties as Churchill 
and others have suggested.  Picking up on his challenge to Ribbentrop the night before 
and no doubt mindful of his lunch with Maisky, he warned Hitler that ‘his emphasis 
upon the Bolshevik danger might be regarded by some people as an obsession’.  He 
raised concerns about Nationalist atrocities in Spain and damned Hitler’s ally, Franco, 
as ‘no statesman… [with]…little or no experience of war’ leading a party that was 
‘purely reactionary and military’.91  Nonetheless, Hitler and Lloyd George’s shared 
interests were wide with detailed discussions ranging from the Great War to the new 
road programme and the optimum speed for the autobahn (80 kph).  
As Sylvester recorded, Lloyd George returned from the meeting ‘in great form, very 
delighted with his talk and obviously very much struck with Hitler’.92  Megan 
facetiously greeted her father with the Hitlergruß which he returned in all seriousness 
insisting ‘he is really a great man’.93  The distinguished medic prescribed a lie down 
and a whisky and soda for his over-excited patient while Jones met with Conwell-Evans 
and Schmidt to draft a short press communiqué.  Separately, Jones ‘persuaded Evans to 
sit down and dictate … there and then what had taken place. Ribbentrop [having] 
objected to his taking notes at the interview’.94  Meanwhile, back in his Eagle’s Nest, 
Hitler was, according to Schmidt, similarly pleased with the encounter and ‘quite 
enchanted by his visitor’.95   
The next day Lloyd George’s whole party was invited to tea to meet Hitler.  They were 
joined by State Secretary Otto Meissner, ‘fat and jolly in a grey knickerbocker suit,’ 
Joachim and Annelise Ribbentrop, her brother Stefan Henkell (a DEG founder 
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member), Baron Geyr and Schmidt.  The party were served ‘tea and coffee and slices 
of cold ham and halves of hard-boiled eggs’ by white-gloved waiters with Hitler 
provided with his own supply of Zwiebacks and petit beurre biscuits.96  Conwell-Evans 
recalled that everyone present realised the historical importance of ‘the great War 
Leader of the British Empire and the great Leader who had restored Germany to her 
present position… meeting on common ground’.  Hitler presented his guest with a 
signed photograph and was asked if he would mind it being placed alongside Foch, 
Clemenceau and President Wilson.  He agreed but admitted he would object if it were 
‘put next to Erzberger and Bauer’ (German Socialist political leaders at the time of the 
Armistice).  As the party prepared to leave, Conwell-Evans was admiring the scenery 
with Hitler when Lloyd George came up to propose that Hitler should visit England 
where he would be ‘acclaimed by the British people’.  In response Hitler ‘threw up his 
hands in a gesture expressing he wished it might be true’.97  (This was presumably the 
last time any senior British political figure invited Hitler to London echoing Baldwin 
who had proposed the same through Ribbentrop and Tennant back in 1933.)  Hitler 
insisted he ‘was passionately interested in the furtherance of Anglo-German 
understanding and in proof of that he had sent his best man to England’.98   
The next morning, Jones urged Lloyd George to brief the prime minister and the foreign 
secretary before speaking to the press while Dawson pressed him to publish in the more 
upmarket Daily Telegraph and not Beaverbrook’s Daily Express as planned.  While a 
public relations coup for Ribbentrop, it is wrong to consider the visit an unmitigated 
propaganda success for the National Socialists.  Nor was the stage management wholly 
under Nazi control.  On the German side, Geyr and Schmidt were both old-school 
German Foreign Ministry, subsequently shown to be close to the conservative 
resistance to Hitler.  Ribbentrop was strangely passive during the trip; challenged by 
Lloyd George on Russia he was, according to Schmidt, ‘a shadow; during the whole 
talk he scarcely uttered a word’.99  Despite remaining in Germany for ten days after the 
tea party, Lloyd George refused Ribbentrop’s entreaties to attend the Parteitag, 
choosing instead to listen on the radio.  Credited by some for political astuteness in not 
dignifying it with his attendance, his reason may have been more mundane; Tennant 
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had warned him it was ‘complete pandemonium, incredibly tiring and uncomfortable’ 
and did not think ‘Mr L.G’s exalted rank would prove any safeguard’.100   Lloyd George 
also took the opportunity to meet leading German Baptists and several of Conwell-
Evans’s German contacts each of whom was nervous of the new regime. 
 
The aftermath 
Foolishly ignoring Dawson’s counsel, Lloyd George published his controversial article 
entitled ‘… I talked to HITLER’ in the Daily Express and was also interviewed by the 
News Chronicle a week after his return from Germany.  Hyperbolic in its enthusiasms, 
the article compares Hitler with George Washington calling him a ‘born leader of 
men… a magnetic, dynamic personality with a single-minded purpose, a resolute will 
and a dauntless heart’.  Ever the egalitarian, Lloyd George was impressed by the new 
social structures in Germany such that ‘provincial and class origins no longer divide 
the nation’.  The long shadow of the Great War - especially the 700,000 who ‘died of 
sheer hunger in those dark years’- hangs over his wider message with a strong dose of 
mea culpa.  He accepted that Germany was in breach of the Treaty of Versailles but 
suggested no worse than the other European countries.  Despite these effusions that 
have troubled his biographers and been frequently quoted by commentators, it is wrong 
to parse the speech as naively uncritical.  Lloyd George acknowledged that the ‘restraint 
on liberty’, especially the censorship of the press, was ‘repellent’ and insisted that along 
with ‘every well-wisher of Germany’ he ‘earnestly prays that Goebbels’s ranting 
speeches will not provoke another anti-Jewish manifestation’.  Despite having claimed 
no interest in Germany’s military preparedness, he highlighted German rearmament 
concluding that ‘three years of feverish preparation’ had ‘so strengthened the defences 
of Germany as to make them impenetrable to attack except at a sacrifice of life which 
would be more appalling than that inflicted in the great war’.101 Naïvely suggesting 
such preparations were defensive, he nonetheless deplored German hostility to Russia, 
and vice-versa.  Similarly, in the News Chronicle interview, he emphasised that he 
‘deplored Hitler’s political and religious repression, a terrible thing to an old Liberal 
like myself’ insisting he was ‘no advocate of the immuring of political opponents in 
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concentration camps’ and that the persecution of the Jews was a ‘grave and deplorable 
thing’.102 
Despite the controversy, Tennant and Conwell-Evans were delighted with the success 
of the visit so met for a celebratory lunch at the Travellers Club on 17 September.  That 
same day an ‘overjoyed’ Tennant wrote to Lloyd George congratulating him on the 
article explaining that ‘having been regarded with great suspicion by most of my friends 
ever since 1931 when I first became convinced that Hitler could and would save 
Germany I feel immensely encouraged to find such emphatic confirmation from 
someone as famous as you are’.  Hitler and Ribbentrop had told him at Nürnberg that 
they had derived ‘great and much-needed encouragement’ from the visit.103  Lloyd 
George was pleased with Conwell-Evans’s role and sent him a thank you letter 
enclosing a ‘token of his appreciation’ (probably the signed photograph that became a 
treasured possession along with other mementoes of the trip).   Conwell-Evans reported 
back to Sylvester that ‘the effect of the visit in Germany has been tremendous’ 
explaining how Lloyd George was especially popular with the German youth who 
admire ‘his energy, youthfulness and great broadness of mind,’ and that ‘his sense of 
fair play for Germany [was] the talk of the country’.  He confirmed that Hitler now had 
Lloyd George’s photograph on his mantelpiece and ‘now understands the meaning of 
the English phrase “grand old man’’’.104   
Ribbentrop’s biographer concluded that the meeting had ‘filled Hitler with a renewed 
burst of anglophile enthusiasm’ while Lloyd George’s biographer saw it as ‘the 
rhetorical climax of inter-war appeasement’.105  Tennant, writing in his memoirs after 
the war, reflected ruefully that ‘unfortunately nothing came of the visit’ and that ‘the 
newspaper article aroused such a stream of abuse and reproaches against Lloyd George 
that he decided for his health’s sake to winter abroad and went off almost at once to 
Jamaica’.106  Writing with the benefit of hindsight, Churchill opined that ‘no one was 
more completely misled than Mr. Lloyd George, whose rapturous accounts of his 
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conversations make odd reading to-day’ and concluded ‘there is no doubt Hitler had a 
power of fascinating men, and the sense of force and authority is apt to assert itself 
unduly upon the tourist’.107   
Otherwise admiring of Lloyd George’s judgements and achievements, historians such 
as Churchill default to what might be called ‘the momentary lapse of judgement’ school 
of analysis.  Some drip with self-righteous disapproval as ‘one more British politician 
trundled into Hitler’s presence’108 while others have a more nuanced interpretation of 
Lloyd George’s Anglo-German game plan and therefore implicitly whatever role the 
Fellowship may have played in it.  Commenting on the notorious newspaper article, 
Morgan wrote ‘despite this wild eulogy, which added to the suspicions widely 
entertained about the ageing statesman's judgement, it would be wrong to see him as 
just an uncritical advocate of appeasement of Germany’ recognising his ‘unrivalled 
knowledge of the aggressive aspects of German nationalism, and its urge to acquire 
territory in the East’.  Like Londonderry, Lloyd George had urged ‘simultaneously with 
efforts to reach diplomatic agreement with Germany, [for] a steady build-up of British 
armed strength, especially the air force, so that Britain could confront the dictators from 
a position of strength’.109  Parker emphasised that he ‘seldom limited his political 
manoeuvres to one line’ and Lentin challenged orthodoxy by asking 'who fooled whom 
in this Alpine encounter?'110  It is notable that Lloyd George was promiscuous in his 
praise of dictators.  Hoping to protect his friend Maisky from falling victim to Stalin’s 
purges, he sent a ‘warm message of admiration to Stalin, as the greatest statesman 
alive!’111  Whatever else, it seems unfair to paint Lloyd George as the Führer’s dupe.  
Hitler himself in 1942 suggested that, had Lloyd George had been in power, there might 
have been an Anglo-German understanding in 1936 - albeit with Britain as a junior 
partner in his adventures.  Given its role in bringing the two men together that year, the 
Fellowship would have been able to take some credit for having fostered such improved 
relations.    
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Chapter 4  
For King and Country: the Fellowship and the Establishment  
Having profiled the businessmen and financiers who founded and funded the Anglo-
German Fellowship and introduced the politicians and diplomats who supported it, this 
review widens into the other social elites into which it successfully embedded.   The 
rediscovered 1937 annual report reveals that membership extended beyond the 
stereotypical fellow travellers and backwoodsmen into the ‘Establishment’ to a degree 
underappreciated by earlier chroniclers and which distinguishes it from other 
contemporary pro-German organisations.1  Henry Fairlie’s 1955 definition of the 
Establishment as ‘the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power 
is exercised’ is helpful here as it encapsulates the royal, military, academic and sporting 
elites into which the Fellowship’s tentacles reached.2  Unsurprisingly, alumni from 
Oxbridge, Sandhurst, Eton and other leading public schools predominate.  Woven into 
the story are three controversial royal dukes, respectively heads of the Anglo-German 
royal houses of Coburg, Hanover and Windsor.  Separately, three of the twentieth 
century’s causes célèbres - the Cambridge spies, Rudolf Hess’s flight to Scotland and 
the ‘Cliveden Set’ cloud the picture with their notoriety.  The exclusive settings for 
these overlapping stories range from stately homes, especially Lord Mount Temple’s 
Broadlands in Hampshire, Lord Lothian’s Blickling Hall in Norfolk and Lord Astor’s 
Cliveden on the Thames, to the great interwar London hotels, Grosvenor House, the 
Dorchester and Claridge’s.   
During the first two years of the Fellowship’s existence - its golden age - Hitler made 
a ‘concerted effort to secure British friendship and continued along this path even when 
the offers produced less than he hoped’.3  In order to woo influential British visitors, he 
donned ill-fitting white tie to attend social events that were far from his natural milieu.  
The new German leadership vacillated between envy of Britain’s success 
internationally and admiration for her Anglo-Saxon royal, military and social traditions 
tempered by a deep distrust of her free press, democratic institutions and diplomatic 
links to France.  Separate from discussions with politicians, diplomats and 
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businessman, the NSDAP leaders courted the British establishment through other elites, 
especially royal, aristocratic and military, using Anglo-German royals and aristocrats 
to build better connections between the two countries.  Their forums were coffee with 
Hitler, banquets, tours of Germany and, most spectacularly, attendance at the 1936 
Berlin Olympics - in all of which the Fellowship and the DEG played central roles.   
Three royal cousins loom large in this history, giving patronage and prestige to the sister 
societies that elevated them well above other pro-German organisations.  Each was born 
an English royal prince of German blood.  The eldest, Queen Victoria’s grandson, 
Charles Edward, was born the Duke of Albany, with George V, Kaiser Wilhelm II and 
Czar Nicholas of Russia as cousins and became the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
(‘Coburg’) in 1899.4   Immediately below his name on the list of DEG founding 
members was Prince Ernest of Cumberland, the Duke of Brunswick (Braunschweig in 
German).  Another of George V’s cousins, he was head of the royal house of Hanover, 
a prince of the United Kingdom and heir to his father as Duke of Cumberland.  He 
married the Kaiser’s daughter, Princess Viktoria Luise of Prussia, herself a great-
granddaughter to Queen Victoria.  The third prince was George V’s son and heir, later 
to be Prince of Wales, King Edward VIII, and to end his life as the Duke of Windsor.  
The three princes had known each other well since before the Great War, but it was 
Ribbentrop who coordinated their support for the sister friendship societies to further 
Hitler’s plans for Anglo-German alliance.   
Coburg was the enthusiastic president of the DEG, frequently representing it at 
Fellowship events and hosting Fellowship visitors in Germany.  However, he was 
emphatically never the president of the Fellowship as reported by several historians.5  
He spoke directly, if not always intelligently, on Hitler’s behalf, with the Führer 
contributing to the drafting of his speeches.6  Born and raised in England until the age 
of fifteen, he had to leave Eton early to take up the dukedom in Germany but remained 
close to his British royal cousins - Edward VII made him a knight of the Garter and 
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stood as godfather to his eldest son, while his sister, Princess Alice, married Queen 
Mary’s brother, the Earl of Athlone.   
 
The hand of friendship   
Edward, Prince of Wales, held no official role within the Fellowship but his sympathetic 
pronouncements gave it the greatest fillip, as did his welcoming his cousin Coburg to 
London to promote its cause.  He had enjoyed his holidays in Germany up to 1913, was 
‘genetically… almost pure German’ and his mother, Queen Mary, was born German 
and spoke English with a German accent. 7  Like Tennant he had visited Germany 
immediately following the First War and so saw the country at its lowest ebb.  Fear of 
Bolshevism certainly played its part, as with Coburg and Mount Temple, and ‘by the 
end of the 1920s his thinking was dominated by sharp fear of the communist threat from 
Russia, sympathy for Germany in its economic and political woes, and doubts about 
the good judgement of the French’.8   
The prince had been a successful and popular patron of the Royal British Legion (the 
‘Legion’) since its inception in 1921 and agreed to continue in the role once king.   His 
speech to its annual general meeting on 11 June 1935 was both sensational and pivotal.  
A clarion call to improve Anglo-German friendship, it brought the fourteen-year old 
Legion and the new Fellowship into a partnership that has been largely ignored by 
students of both.  The timing was significant, coming only a week before the signing of 
the Anglo-German Naval Treaty.  In front of representatives from 4,000 branches, he 
proposed that a deputation from the Legion go to Germany insisting that ‘there could 
be no more suitable body or organisation of men to stretch forth the hand of friendship 
to the Germans than we ex-servicemen, who fought them in the Great War, and have 
now forgotten all about that’.9  The heat and noise created by this speech surprised both 
the prince and the Legion as the concept of such friendship visits was already well-
understood Legion policy.10  The Times reported that Ribbentrop, Hess and Göring were 
delighted and suggested that the speech had prompted Hitler to prioritise ‘the 
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development of Anglo-German relations in general’.11  The prince received a dressing 
down from his father and there were hostile questions in the House of Commons.  
Nonetheless, an invitation was issued and, in July 1935, a delegation led by the 
chairman, Major Fetherston-Godley, was greeted by ‘cheering crowds [and] a most 
cordial reception’.12  Included was Captain Hawes, a former naval attaché in Berlin, 
who represented the Fellowship and supplied a confidential report on the visit to the 
British Foreign Office.13  The group met Hitler who quizzed them on the Great War 
and his translator remembered ‘but for the difference in language, it might have been a 
typical meeting of old comrades’.14  Ribbentrop emphasised that these visits had 
patronage from both heads of state and noted that the King had ‘taken an interest 
resulting in several more mutual visits’.15   
While historians have analysed the overlap between the Fellowship and far right 
organisations such as The Link and the Right Club (see chapter five), this liaison with 
the Legion has been ignored.  It is significant because the Legion lent the Fellowship 
additional military respectability to its anti-war tendencies and royal gloss to its social 
aspirations.  Coburg was president of both the DEG and the German ex-servicemen’s 
associations seeking affiliation with the Legion.  Mount Temple had been a founder 
and chairman of the Comrades of the Great War, one of the Legion’s predecessor 
organisations.  The Legion shared both members and social events with the Fellowship 
and four of its senior officials joined it - Lieutenant-Colonel Crosfield, chairman; 
Captain Donald Simson, another founder; the Earl of Airlie, chairman of the Scottish 
division and Admiral Sir Henry Bruce, the metropolitan president.  Major-General Sir 
Frederick Maurice, its president, came to at least two Fellowship dinners with his wife, 
while the chairman, vice chairman and general secretary, all also enjoyed the 
Fellowship’s hospitality. 
The Germans, especially Coburg and Ribbentrop, saw Edward as an ally in building 
better relations at critical moments.  Writing immediately after the reinvasion of the 
Rhineland, the Berliner Tageblatt reported that ‘the King is taking an extraordinarily 
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active part in the whole affair’ and ‘won’t hear of there being a danger of war’.16  While 
there is no evidence of any attempt to anoint Edward patron of the Fellowship, royal 
blessing was assumed whenever possible.  The staunchly royalist Fellowship timed its 
fixtures to coincide with British royal events with delegations sent from Germany to 
George V’s silver jubilee in 1935 and his second son’s coronation in 1937.  Ribbentrop 
was convinced these visits were beneficial as they ‘helped to make more effective the 
societies, the German-English Society in Berlin, which [he] had founded… and the 
Anglo-German Fellowship in London’.17  Coburg’s efforts were effective, building on 
both his kinship with the British royal family, especially through his supportive sister, 
and the alma mater he shared with so many of England’s elite.  At Eton, he had been a 
contemporary of Fellowship members including Tennant, lords Hollenden, Esher and 
Barnby as well as senior politicians and mandarins such as Nevile Henderson, Duff 
Cooper and Alec Cadogan.  In December 1935, Coburg made his first visit to London 
on Fellowship business to attend a dinner in honour of the German sports leader, Herr 
von Tschammer und Osten.  A month later in Berlin, he hosted a DEG dinner with 
British guests including Mount Temple, Phipps the ambassador and Basil Newton the 
minister.  In his speech, he compared the British empire with the Third Reich, noting 
that ‘just as their English guests were proud to be subjects of the Sovereign of a Great 
Empire… so were they (the hosts) proud to be followers of the Führer and 
Chancellor’.18   
Days later, Coburg returned to London, briefing the press that his mission was 
‘strengthening the Fellowship arrangements and extending them to other countries’ and 
the extent of cooperation between Fellowship and Legion becomes increasingly 
evident.19  Simultaneously, a party of German veterans visited London, placed a 
swastika-emblazoned wreath at the Cenotaph before visiting the poppy factory in 
Richmond.  At a dinner hosted by the Legion, General Maurice was handed a telegram 
with Lord Dawson’s famous line that ‘the King’s life is moving peacefully towards its 
close’.  Lunch with the Fellowship the next day was hurriedly postponed and the 
delegation returned home early.  Coburg stayed to attend his cousin’s funeral, ridiculous 
in German field uniform and tin hat but nonetheless seated at the new king’s table at 
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the funeral dinner.  Staying with his sister at Kensington Palace, he entertained to dinner 
Anthony Eden, Duff Cooper, Neville Chamberlain and JJ Astor (the proprietor of The 
Times), attended a state dinner at Buckingham Palace, took tea with the widowed Queen 
and had several conversations with the King.  Reporting back to Hitler in an ‘unctuous 
and conspiratorial’ memorandum, he claimed that Edward VIII wanted an alliance 
between the two countries, thought the League of Nations a ‘farce’, disliked the 
Russians, and wanted to meet Hitler in person. 20  The King planned to ‘concentrate the 
business of government on himself’ and had asked his cousin to ‘visit… frequently in 
order that confidential matters might be more speedily clarified’. 21 
Coburg returned in October 1936 with another delegation of German veterans to 
complete the itinerary.  Addressing the Legion’s national executive committee, he 
explained that Hitler ‘hated war from the bottom of his heart’.22  Following dinner chez 
Sir Ian Hamilton, chairman of the late Anglo-German Association, and tea with 
Fellowship Council member Lord Hollenden, colonels Brown and Heath took Coburg 
to see the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace.  Hearing that his cousin was 
outside, the King spontaneously welcomed them into the palace, a gesture showing his 
affection for Coburg, which when reported back to Berlin ‘must have impressed the 
German leadership’.23  The party went on to lunch as guests of the Fellowship at the 
Holborn Restaurant, where Mount Temple toasted his guests with the hope that 
‘aggressive war should be made impossible by ex-servicemen’s organisations’.24   
 
Soldiers, sailors and airmen 
Support for the Fellowship from the three services extended beyond this harmonious 
cooperation with the Legion and, again, has been overlooked by commentators.  
Andrew Roberts has made the pointed distinction that the leading appeasing politicians 
had not seen battle while the ‘senior anti-appeasers all had fine records’.25  With the 
exception of the pacifist Conwell-Evans, the Fellowship’s leadership and membership 
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(and, of course, those of the Legion) should not all be tarred with that same brush.  
Mount Temple had been invalided out of the South African War but served in France 
during the Great War, before becoming parliamentary private secretary to the financial 
secretary to the War Office.  Tennant served in military intelligence despite his ‘old 
lung trouble and lion bites’.26  Most of the Fellowship’s Council served in the military, 
many with distinction.  Major Ball and Colonel Christie were each awarded both DSO 
and MC, Julian Piggott had an MC, Frank D’Arcy Cooper was wounded on the Somme 
and Arthur Guinness was wounded at Ypres. 
Of the wider male membership, at least a fifth used military title (implying they were 
in the services or had retired with senior rank) and at least two hundred of the 
Fellowship’s identified supporters had served in the forces.  Those born in the late 
nineteenth century would have had little choice but to serve in the Great War and, if too 
old, have any adult sons serve.  Support for the Fellowship’s cause ranged across the 
officer class, boasting five full generals, eight major-generals, two brigadiers, seventeen 
colonels, twenty-five lieutenant-colonels, supported by several dozen majors and 
captains.  The most senior serving soldier to attend a Fellowship dinner was Field-
Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, chief of the Imperial General Staff, and therefore the 
highest-ranking officer in the British army.   
These were no battle-shy appeasers, with at least 21 MCs and 32 DSOs between them.  
Many were indeed the stereotypical ‘retired military men’, including Major-General Sir 
John Duncan (Boer War and Gallipoli) and Brigadier General Sir Frederick Gascoigne 
(DSO in Khartoum and mentioned in dispatches in the Dardanelles, Egypt and 
Palestine).27  Current and future stars of the military firmament also attended, including 
General Sir Edmund (later Lord) Ironside, supposedly the inspiration for Buchan’s 
Richard Hannay and considered by Churchill ‘the army's finest military brain’.28   He 
met Hitler in 1937 and went on to be appointed chief of the Imperial General Staff in 
September 1939 and then commander-in-chief, Home Forces in May 1940.  His friend 
Major-General JFC Fuller was also a member.  Another veteran of South Africa and 
the Great War, Fuller was described as ‘one of the greatest military thinkers of our 
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century’, albeit his ‘flirtation with fascism blighted his career’, as he befriended Mosley 
and attended Hitler’s fiftieth birthday celebrations in May 1939.29 
Representation from the Navy was no less distinguished, albeit fewer in number, with 
four full admirals, a vice admiral, a brace of rear admirals, and a host of distinguished 
naval captains as members and dinner guests.  Council member and honorary secretary, 
Captain Hawes, had been naval attaché in Berlin, while Vice-admiral Sir Barry 
Domvile (the pro-Nazi founder of The Link) served on the Council for part of 1938.  
Other naval members included Admiral Sir Aubrey Smith, who had served as naval 
attaché in Russia, Sweden and Norway and represented the British navy at the League 
of Nations; Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter, a pioneer of submarine warfare; Admiral 
Wilmot Stuart Nicholson, chief of the submarine service in the early 1920s; and 
Admiral Mark Kerr, previously naval attaché in Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Greece.   
The development of powered flight in the early twentieth century had thrown into doubt 
Britain’s self-imagined invincibility as an island nation protected by a wave-ruling navy 
while overseeing a globe-spanning empire.  Aircraft attracted the aristocratic and 
wealthy, catching the public imagination just as the railways had in the previous 
century.  That these aviation elites tended towards the right wing of politics and affinity 
towards Germany is well-understood, but, as Edgerton has argued, sympathy with 
appeasement did not mean ‘being against rearmament… in most cases the two 
enthusiasms in fact went together’.30  The Fellowship attracted support from ‘air-
minded’ politicians.  Mount Temple had been chairman of the parliamentary aerial 
defence committee, while its most senior aristocrat, the Marquess of Londonderry, was 
secretary of state for air and qualified as a pilot at the age of fifty-six.  Credited with 
preserving ‘the core of the RAF at a time when even this was under threat from the 
Treasury’, he had encouraged ‘the planning of vital new fighter aircraft such as the 
Hurricane and Spitfire’ and the development of radar.31  Younger Fellowship members 
went on to serve with distinction in the RAF in the Second World War.  Council 
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member Norman Hulbert MP served as British liaison officer with the Free Polish 
Forces, while Peter Calvocoressi served in RAF intelligence decrypting Enigma 
messages at Bletchley Park before reaching the rank of wing commander.  Loel 
Guinness MP was mentioned in dispatches five times, flew in the Battle of Britain and 
bought a petrol station near his aerodrome to bypass petrol rationing.    
Lord Sempill was another flying aristocrat who joined the Fellowship and attended at 
least two events and the Ribbentrops’ reception.  He had been involved with earlier 
Anglo-German organisations and, as explored in the next chapter, joined The Link and 
was a warden of the Right Club.  He served in the various precursors to the RAF in the 
First War before retiring from it in June 1919.  He advised the Japanese air force 
between the wars and was alleged to have shared national secrets with them.  In 1932 
he arranged for the German airship Graf Zeppelin to fly to England to pick up 
passengers on a goodwill mission.  A former president of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society, he re-joined the naval air service in 1939. 
Amongst the most prominent aviators within the Fellowship were the Douglas-
Hamilton family.  The Duke of Hamilton (the Marquess of Clydesdale until the death 
of his father in 1940) and his family had been associated with the Fellowship for at least 
five years before the startling arrival by plane of the deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess, at 
their ancestral home in Scotland in May 1941.  A Conservative MP, Clydesdale was a 
famous aviator having been first to fly over Everest in 1933, bringing him celebrity in 
both Britain and Germany.  As his son explained, ‘aviators in those days were regarded 
in much the same way as the early astronauts, and aviation was looked upon as a top 
priority by the leaders of the Third Reich’.32  Clydesdale was a friend of Londonderry 
and through him had met Ribbentrop with whom he maintained friendly relations, 
spending the weekend with him at the Londonderrys’ County Durham house and 
inviting him and Annalise to his wedding.  Two of his three brothers were members of 
the Fellowship and with him they attended the dinner for the Duke and Duchess of 
Brunswick in July 1936.  The youngest brother, David, also a distinguished pilot, had 
married Prunella Stack, the ‘perfect girl’ who led the Women’s League of Health and 
Beauty, and invited Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, the leader of the National Socialist 
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Womanhood, to a dinner in London in 1939 co-hosted with the Fellowship, the 
significance of which will be explored in chapter seven.  Clydesdale’s wife was the 
eldest daughter of the Duke of Northumberland, an enthusiast for right wing and anti-
Semitic causes, but MI5 confirmed there was no evidence he shared his father-in-law’s 
views.33 
Whether Clydesdale joined the Fellowship and whether he met Hess in Germany have 
been subject of debate and, indeed, litigation.  His son, echoing Londonderry’s 
daughter, has seemed keen to distance Clydesdale from the Fellowship.34  In 1942, 
when membership was a heightened cause of embarrassment, Hamilton sued for libel 
several British communists who had published a pamphlet alleging that he and Hess 
were friends, insisting, inter alia, that he had never joined the Fellowship.  In February 
1936, the secretary had sent a membership application form and a receipt for the right 
amount survives in the Hamilton papers, but his name was never included in the 
membership lists and the receipt may have been for an entertainment.  Of the illustrious 
figures associated with the Fellowship, Clydesdale is significant in that Rudolf Hess 
chose his home rather than others associated with the pro-German lobby, such as 
Brocket Hall or Cliveden.  
 
The Cliveden Set 
Any analysis of the Fellowship’s social milieu needs to explore its connections with the 
famous Cliveden Set.  The idea of a group of superbly well-connected, pro-German 
appeasers meeting regularly at Waldorf and Nancy Astor’s Thames-side mansion to 
direct Britain’s foreign policy covertly was the mischievous invention of Claud 
Cockburn.  A journalist and passionate opponent of appeasement who had founded and 
edited a communist-sympathising news sheet, The Week, he had written an article 
criticising ‘those in high places who were working, sincerely perhaps, but as it seemed 
to [him] disastrously, for the “appeasement” of Adolf Hitler’.  This article was initially 
ignored until he coined the catchy moniker that became such an international sensation 
that ‘within a couple of weeks it had been printed in dozens of newspapers, and within 
six had been used in almost every leading newspaper of the Western world’ and, 
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following which, ‘no antifascist rally in Madison Square Gardens or Trafalgar Square 
was complete without a denunciation of the Cliveden Set’.35  
The Cliveden Set has been better studied than the Anglo-German Fellowship including 
an authoritative portrait by Norman Rose, Vansittart’s biographer.36  As a journalistic 
phenomenon this scrutiny is well-deserved as Cliveden’s role within the appeasement 
debate has echoed for eighty years.  As David Astor ruefully noted, ‘the only thing most 
people seem to remember about our family is the Cliveden Set and the Profumo scandal.  
Both stories were untrue but I think they’ll be there for ever’.37  Rose, other leading 
historians, and even Cockburn himself, all agree with him - the Cliveden Set was a 
chimera, a will-o’-the-wisp, an ‘unkillable myth’.38  As Cockburn remembered ‘within 
a year or so, the Cliveden set had ceased to represent, in anybody’s mind, a particular 
group of individuals.  It had become the symbol of a tendency, of a set of ideas, of a 
certain condition in, as it were, the State of Denmark’.39  Roberts has pointed out that 
the Astors’ visitors’ book included a broad church of opinion on appeasement such that 
‘the myth of Cliveden being a nest of appeasers, let alone pro-Nazi, is exploded by the 
regular return to its pages of the signatures of Eden, Macmillan, Duff Cooper and… 
Boothby’, all well-known anti-appeasers.  Fox agreed that ‘the most convincing 
refutation of the “Cliveden Set” myth is that the inner circle of regular guests at 
Cliveden, all powerful and influential, were divided almost exactly down the middle on 
this issue’.40  Roberts went further, alleging the myth served as ‘a fantasy required by 
a later age to shift blame and excuse itself’.41  The same could be said of the myths 
surrounding the Fellowship.    
It is evident that the two entities, the illusory Cliveden Set and the Fellowship, a 
registered company, were nonetheless confused and conflated, especially by the 
Germans and the Russians, as an umbrella term for that part of British society 
sympathetic to Germany.  If we accept that the Fellowship has been neglected by 
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historians, we might lay some blame on the over focus on the Cliveden Set.  Several of 
those alleged to be Clivedenites were also associated with the Fellowship.  The leaders, 
dubbed by Cockburn the ‘Cagoulords’ (a mischievous play on les Cagoulards, the 
1930s French fascist inclined terrorist group), were named as lords Halifax, 
Londonderry, Lothian and Astor.  Other names in the mix include Thomas Jones, the 
former deputy cabinet secretary and several past members, alongside Lothian, of Lord 
Milner’s famous ‘Kindergarten’ of young imperial administrators in South Africa 
including Lionel Curtis, Robert Brand and Geoffrey Dawson many of whom were also 
alumni of New College and All Souls in Oxford.  Of these, only Lothian and 
Londonderry joined the Fellowship, but Brand was chairman of Lazards, a corporate 
member.  Neither Nancy nor Waldorf joined but their son, William Waldorf, did.  
Halifax addressed the December 1937 Fellowship dinner fresh from his return from 
Germany.  Curtis was the founder of Chatham House, backed by Astor money, where 
Lothian, Christie and Conwell-Evans were frequent and active participants. Geoffrey 
Dawson, editor of The Times (Astor-owned) sent his journalists to Fellowship events 
and published the speeches and attendees in detail.  Jones had accompanied Conwell-
Evans and Lloyd George to meet Hitler.   
So, the two entities shared some constituency but more significant is whether they 
shared philosophies, modus vivendi and modus operandi.  Rose’s description of the 
Cliveden Set as ‘an establishment group par excellence’ could just as equally apply to 
the Fellowship.  His explanation of how ‘its pedigree impeccable, its social standing 
beyond reproach, its persuasive powers permeated the clubs and institutions of London, 
the senior common rooms of Oxbridge colleges, the so-called quality press, in particular 
its correspondence columns, and the great country houses of England’ resonates around 
each.  Both groups were ‘concerned almost exclusively with imperial and foreign 
affairs’ and ‘carried on a disparate, irregular “ginger group” soliciting “a revolution by 
dinner party”’ operating ‘within not against or outside, the parameters of conventional 
political behaviour’.42   
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The courts of three kings  
Where the Fellowship surpassed the Clivedenites was in its enthusiasm for royalty.  
While the German royal houses were well-represented on the DEG, the only British 
royal to join the Fellowship was Alexander Mountbatten, the Marquess of Carisbrooke, 
who attended the Brunswick dinner.  The son of Princess Beatrice, Queen Victoria’s 
youngest daughter, he was first cousin to George V, Coburg and Louis Mountbatten 
and served in the Royal Navy before the Great War and in the RAF in the Second World 
War.  The senior ranks of the Fellowship mixed easily in these royal circles.  Edward 
VIII, as Prince of Wales, had served as best man to Louis Mountbatten when he married 
Edwina, Mount Temple’s daughter.  Her grandfather, Sir Ernest Cassel, had been one 
of Edward VII’s closest friends and the King attended her parents’ wedding.  The 
Fellowship included a court circle who had served the monarchy as far back as Queen 
Victoria with privy councillors, lords-in-waiting, ADCs, gentlemen ushers and 
equerries to various monarchs and lesser royals joining.   
The Duke of Brunswick, the third princely cousin, and his wife were an intriguing 
double act.  According to her self-exculpatory post-war memoirs, they had been 
introduced to Hitler by Ribbentrop in 1933 specifically ‘to discuss Anglo-German 
relations’.  Committed supporters of both the Fellowship and the DEG, the Duchess 
claimed that they had both ‘worked extensively for rapprochement between England 
and Germany’ during the 1930s.43  Their wedding in 1913 had reunited the estranged 
houses of Hohenzollern and Hanover and was notably the last family gathering of 
European sovereigns before the Great War.  Their privileged position in both British 
and German royal families had been shattered by that war so the Nazi regime offered 
the opportunity for of a restoration to influence which they embraced with an 
enthusiasm shared by other German aristocrats.   
Ernest Tennant had befriended the couple through Ribbentrop and cultivated them as a 
prestigious bridge between the sister organisations.  The Brunswicks were often chez 
Ribbentrop when Tennant came to stay and, rather than the customary flowers, he was 
in the habit of bringing the duchess ‘a couple of Finnan haddock or some kippers’ to 
her delight.44  Both Brunswicks were close to their British royal cousins and 
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comfortable in English society having sent their son to Oxford and their daughter to an 
English boarding school.  Having deposited the princess there in 1934, they paid a visit 
to George V, the Duke and Duchess of York as well as the ‘old aunts’, including 
Princess Beatrice, at Kensington Palace.  The Brunswicks and the Tennants joined the 
same party at the rain-sodden 1935 Nürnberg rally where Tennant reported admiringly 
to Mount Temple that – ‘the duchess must have been an antelope in a previous 
existence; the speed at which she ran through the crowd in the rain was incredible’.45  
The Brunswicks were particularly hospitable to Fellowship, Legion and other English 
visitors.  The Tennants were entertained to tea while Conwell-Evans stayed at their 
castle at Blankenberg in June 1936, where, ever the astute historian, he was struck that 
‘their flag is practically the same as the Royal Standard which flies from St James’ 
Palace’.  This was heady stuff for a tailor’s son from Carmarthen who found them 
‘overwhelming in their kindness’ and was especially touched that the duke drove him 
personally to the railway station.46 
Back in London in July 1936 for the Fellowship dinner in their honour, hospitality was 
reciprocated.  The royal couple spent the weekend as guests of Fellowship member Sir 
Archibald Weigall near Ascot, and went on to stay with another member, Lord 
Mottistone, in the Isle of Wight.  The dinner at the Dorchester was attended by nearly 
four hundred guests including the Marquesses of Londonderry, Carisbrooke and 
Zetland, an extensive contingent from the Legion and the Bishop of Salisbury.  Mount 
Temple presided and Lord Rennell proposed the toast emphasising ‘the many ties of 
family and old associations which they had with this country’.47  Lothian and Maurice 
from the Legion also spoke while Prince Otto von Bismarck proposed the chairman’s 
health.  One guest, diarist and former spy Robert Bruce Lockhart, shared Tennant’s 
enthusiasm for the duchess’s physique noting that she looked ‘browned and athletic’.48  
In his speech, Brunswick remembered a ‘very kind’ letter from George V when his 
father died, expressing ‘the wish that friendship and understanding between the two 
countries would lead to the feeling which brought about 1914 disappearing for ever’.49   
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While Hitler saw the vestigial German royal family as a propaganda tool for his 
overtures to Britain, from the British perspective it offered an alternative to National 
Socialism and the Führer.  According to the duchess, Lloyd George had explained to 
her nephew, Louis Ferdinand, Prince of Prussia, that ‘had your House in Germany 
remained in government, then we wouldn’t need to give ourselves such headaches now 
about Herr Hitler’.  Similarly, Churchill agreed that the loss of the German monarchy 
had left ‘a yawning gap… in the national life of the German people… it was into this 
gap that Hitler stepped’.50   
 
Eton, Oxbridge and the third man 
Biographical investigations into the lists of members and dinner attendees underpin the 
extent to which the Fellowship drew from those inter-war elites most accustomed to 
this royal and aristocratic milieu.  Given its openly elitist recruitment philosophy, it is 
unsurprising that its members should have been educated at the leading public schools 
and universities, but detailed analysis adds colour.  To the extent that educational 
credentials for particular members can be confirmed, it is evident that the majority of 
the men had been educated at the leading British public schools.  Over a quarter were 
Old Etonians while the alumni of Harrow, Charterhouse, Wellington, Shrewsbury, St. 
Pauls and Winchester each feature significantly on the membership lists.  A university 
degree was not required for advancement within these elites, with many opting for 
Sandhurst instead, but where pursued, over two-thirds did so at Oxbridge.  Each of the 
better-known colleges was represented with over a dozen alumni from each of Trinity 
College Cambridge and Balliol College Oxford.51 
The two graduates of Trinity College Cambridge most infamously involved with the 
Fellowship were Kim Philby and Guy Burgess.  However, their precise involvement is 
hard to verify and has been surprisingly cursorily covered in the voluminous secondary 
literature.52  There is no dispute that Philby was a Fellowship member - his name 
appears in both published annual reports - but the status of Burgess is less clear.  
Philby’s name is on neither of the typed lists dated January 1936 suggesting he joined 
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the membership sometime between February and the summer of that year when he 
appeared in a photograph of the guests at the July 1936 Brunswick dinner published in 
The Tatler & Bystander and the corresponding list of attendees in The Times.53  It has 
been widely assumed that for both he and Burgess, whose involvement with 
communism at university had been no secret, joining a pro-Nazi organisation was a neat 
‘somersault in their politics’ to bury their communist pasts.54  If we accept a more 
nuanced interpretation of the Fellowship - pro-German rather than pro-Nazi - their 
purpose in joining needs to be reassessed.  It is implausible that their Soviet handlers, 
whose objective was to penetrate the British establishment, would have wanted them to 
join an extremist, fringe or eccentric organisation.  Rather, it was the Fellowship’s 
respectability, its political and diplomatic access and its elitism that attracted these 
social-climbing intelligence agents.  As Philby recollected in his KGB memoir, his 
handler Andre Deutsch had told him to reinvent himself ‘not in the image of a Nazi’ 
but as ‘an independent thinking Englishman who perceives Hitlerite Germany as a fact 
of middle European life in the mid-1930s and who is trying to derive from it economic 
as well as cultural benefit for his own country’.55  These were important early steps in 
the career of what MI5’s official historian has called the first of ‘the ablest group of 
British agents ever recruited by a foreign intelligence service’.56 
Several commentators have suggested Burgess introduced Philby to the Fellowship, 
presumably on the basis that his vocal pro-German enthusiasms pre-dated that of his 
friend but there is no evidence to confirm this.57  Philby joined ‘the expanding 
propaganda department of the AGF’ late in 1935 having apparently tired of his work as 
a sub-editor on the Review of Reviews previously edited by Sir Roger Chance.  Chance 
was an old friend of Philby’s father who had proposed his son for work at the Review.  
He appears on the January 1936 membership list so more probably he introduced Philby 
to the Fellowship, rather than vice-versa or, indeed, Burgess.  Another old Etonian, 
Chance had had a ‘good’ war, having been awarded the MC, mentioned in dispatches 
twice and wounded twice and went on to be press attaché in Henderson’s embassy in 
Berlin in 1938.  An enthusiastic Fellowship member, he came to at least three dinners.   
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Philby claimed he was introduced to the publisher of the failing Anglo-Russian Gazette, 
which he proposed to reposition as an Anglo-German equivalent.  Philby ‘did much of 
the legwork involved in an abortive attempt to start, with Nazi funds, a trade journal 
designed to foster good relations between Britain and Germany’.  The extent to which 
this came under the aegis of the Fellowship is unclear.  As Philby remembered, ‘in spite 
of my best efforts, this strange venture failed, because another group got in ahead of 
us’.58  This was almost certainly Carroll’s Anglo-German Review that quickly 
established itself as the leading periodical on Anglo-German relations.  Tim Milne 
remembered that his sister Angela had assisted Philby on the failed journal, and 
prepared material for the first number but, as it was never published, ‘she and Kim spent 
much of their day doing crosswords and the like’.59   
The involvement of the Cambridge spies with the pro-German lobby, and the 
Fellowship in particular, resurfaced in the 1950s as having a particular significance in 
confirming Philby as the ‘Third Man’.  In the security services files only released in 
October 2015, The Report on Enquiry pointed to the ‘strikingly similar’ career paths of 
the men in that ‘all three were Communists at Cambridge; all three at or about the same 
time purport to drop their Communist affiliations’ following which Burgess ‘renounces 
his membership of the Party and does so with the maximum of ostentation’ to associate 
with the right wing, while simultaneously Philby ‘becomes associated with the Anglo-
German Fellowship… at a time when he had just married a Jewess who was a 
Communist and who, there are the strongest possible grounds for thinking, was 
continuing to act as a Communist agent’.60  
Philby joining the Fellowship was certainly more than a smoke screen.  The concept of 
an Anglo-German alliance alarmed the Russians and Philby called it ‘the beginning of 
my actual work for the Soviet Union’.  He explained that ‘no one has so far suggested 
that I had switched from Communism to Nazism.  The simpler, and true, explanation is 
that overt and covert links between Britain and Germany at that time were of serious 
concern to the Soviet Government’.61  Philby had visited Germany in 1933 with his 
friend Tim Milne, where they had seen Hitler speak.  He spoke German, was a good 
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writer, clever, well-connected and socially adept and, therefore, an ideal candidate to 
work for the Fellowship.   
The files detailing Philby’s interrogation provide further clues as to the chronology of 
his involvement with the Fellowship.  In November 1951, when suspicion was building 
that Philby had tipped off McLean, SIS provided the Foreign Office with a curriculum 
vitae for Philby.62  This runs from his education at Westminster School in the late 1920s 
through to his appointment as the SIS representative in Washington for two years in 
1949.  There is no explicit mention of his work for the Fellowship.  The only gap in the 
chronology is between his leaving the Review of Reviews in early 1936 and his 
appointment as War Correspondent of The Times in February 1937 when he left for 
Spain to cover Franco’s army - so this was the latest point that any executive role with 
the Fellowship could have ended.   
By the summer of 1936, his biographers have agreed that Philby was spending an 
estimated one week per month in Germany on behalf of the Fellowship.63  For a young 
man of only twenty-four, he was given significant responsibility and excellent access 
to the German leadership meeting both Ribbentrop and Goebbels.  His work with the 
Fellowship had already provided valuable contacts in Germany that he used for the next 
stage of his career as an agent.  The German embassy in London supplied him with 
credentials and he was also accredited to Karl Haushofer’s journal, Zietschrift für 
Geopolitik.  This was indeed a ‘blue ribbon training for a young Soviet agent in the 
process of learning his trade’.64  Despite protesting distaste for fellow members, Philby 
enjoyed some of the Fellowship’s social activities as he dated Lady Margaret Vane-
Tempest-Stewart, the second daughter of Lord Londonderry whom he had met at the 
Brunswick dinner.  
It has been widely reported that Burgess was a member of the Fellowship and had been 
introduced to it by ‘leading member’ John (‘Jack’) Macnamara for whom he worked as 
secretary.65  A sometime soldier and intelligence agent, Macnamara was a socially well-
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connected homosexual, an MP and a friend of Winston Churchill and Harold 
Nicolson.66  However, neither Macnamara nor Burgess features on any of the 
membership lists nor does The Times report their attending any dinners.  In Philby’s 
published memoir there is no mention of Burgess being a member in the text but there 
is a publisher’s footnote explaining that ‘Philby was covering up for his early 
enthusiasm [for Communism]; Burgess who was also a member of the Fellowship 
appears to have been doing exactly the same thing’.67  Published in 1968, and obviously 
a starting point for any Philby scholar, it seems likely this initiated the myth of Burgess 
joining the Fellowship.68  Macnamara was active in Anglo-German circles and was on 
the executive council of the, wholly separate, Anglo-German Club (see introduction) 
which has more likely added to this confusion.   
 
While not a member, Burgess may, as Boyle suggested, have done some paid work for 
the Fellowship.  Boyle reported him passing his controller Samuel Borisovitch Cahan 
‘regular summaries on the AGF’s political activities and personalities, a task to which 
he brought his customary insight and flair for selective reporting’.69  Duff claims Arnold 
Deutsch had tasked Burgess to ‘develop data on German influence in Britain’ and he 
had soon became ‘engaged in writing a pamphlet for the Anglo-German Fellowship’.70  
Michael Straight, the American publisher, novelist and fellow Soviet agent, has 
suggested the Rothschild family, to whom Burgess had been providing some ‘financial 
advice’, sponsored his penetration of the Fellowship.71  Costello concurred, pointing 
out that ‘information about threats to the House of Rothschild resulting from secret 
deals between British sympathisers and the Third Reich would more than justify the 
hundred guineas a month paid to Guy Burgess’.72  This is an intriguing suggestion and 
would explain why both he and Philby became involved with the Fellowship.  It is 
consistent with the interest in the Fellowship taken by the wider Jewish community 
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represented by the Board of Deputies of British Jews.  As will be explored further, the 
involvement of the Cambridge spies, while a sideshow, is significant in the myth-
building around the Fellowship that would influence contemporary Russians and later 
historians.     
 
Dons, quacks and hacks 
Beyond businessmen, politicians, diplomats, servicemen and spies, it is striking how 
many distinguished doctors, academics and journalists also supported the Fellowship.  
Their range of enthusiasms included liberalism, pacifism and Germany and there is 
evidence of a handful (explored in the next chapter) embracing National Socialism with 
unhealthy gusto.  From the dons and schoolmasters this included Sir Raymond Beazley, 
the retired professor of history at the University of Birmingham who undertook lecture 
tours in Germany ‘on historical subjects relating to Anglo-German relations’ with the 
Fellowship’s blessing.73  He later joined The Link as did Professor Laurie, the 
distinguished chemist who pioneered the scientific analysis of paintings and helped 
develop chemical weapons in the Great War and was for nearly thirty years president 
of the Heriot-Watt College in Edinburgh.  There is no evidence that the Fellowship’s 
other donnish supporters shared such views.  Professor William Adams, like Lothian a 
former private secretary to Lloyd George, was warden of All Souls Oxford throughout 
Hitler’s era and a distinguished political scientist.  The Reverend AJ Costain was 
headmaster of Rydal School, Colwyn Bay for over thirty years and his pupils at that 
time included the historian GR Elton.  Some had an obvious academic interest in 
Germany long predating the rise of Hitler.  Hermann Fiedler was born in Germany and 
had been tutor to the Prince of Wales immediately prior to the First War.  The Taylor 
professor of German at Oxford for thirty years he donated £20 to the Fellowship and 
published, bravely perhaps, The Oxford Book of German Prose in 1943.  Another 
specialist in Germany was Professor Leonard Willoughby, the Fielden professor of 
German at University College London from 1931 to 1950.  Founder and editor of the 
journal German Life and Letters, he had published The Classical Age of German 
Literature in 1926. 
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The membership lists and dinner attendees include eminent names from the wider 
worlds of letters, publishing and journalism, many with liberal and anti-war bents.  
Beverley Nichols was a famous author, playwright, poet and journalist and had 
published Cry Havoc! advocating pacifism in 1933.  Richard Lambert was another 
prolific author, historian and broadcaster.  As a conscientious objector, he had served 
with the Friends’ Ambulance Unit in the First War.  He worked for the BBC and was 
the founding editor of The Listener, a founding governor of the British Film Institute 
and published Propaganda in 1938.  
The fourth estate was well represented at Fellowship dinners with some journalists 
presumably attending in a professional capacity.  Ralph Deakin, the foreign editor of 
The Times, came to the Olympic dinner.  The irrepressible Harry Brittain combined 
journalism with parliament and was a former president of the British International 
Association of Journalists and the patron of the Society of Women Writers and 
Journalists.  Robert Bruce-Lockhart attended the Brunswick dinner while on the 
editorial staff of the Evening Standard.  Frank Newnes, the chairman of Country Life 
was one of the Fellowship members that attended the 1936 NSDAP rally at Nürnberg.  
Philip Gibbs had been a journalist since 1902, serving as literary editor of the Daily 
Mail, the Daily Chronicle, and the Tribune.  Berkeley Ormerod described himself as a 
‘soldier, sportsman, journalist, financier, diplomat, and sometime propagandist with 
British Information Services’ and wrote for the Financial Times, Investor’s Chronicle 
and Barron’s.  Douglas Jerrold stands out from this crowd as he vocally supported 
fascism in Spain and Italy having been involved in General Franco’s coup in 1936.  
Firmly on the right of the Conservative Party, he was editor of The English Review in 
the early thirties and joined Oswald Mosley’s January Club.   
The Fellowship attracted a dozen distinguished doctors to its ranks including three 
medical knights.  Most notable was Sir Henry Dale who attended the Halifax dinner.  
Chairman of the Wellcome Trust and director of the National Institute for Medical 
Research, he had shared the Nobel prize for medicine the previous year.  Sir Milsom 
Rees, the royal laryngologist for twenty-five years, was a member as was Sir John 
Atkins, who had been deputy director of medical services during the First War and 
physician-in-ordinary to the Duke of Connaught.  Frederick Williamson-Noble, a 
leading ophthalmic surgeon and author of A handbook of ophthalmology also joined as 
did Arthur Dickson Wright, a renowned surgeon, treasurer of the Imperial Cancer 




Research Fund and father to the television chef, Clarissa.  Phoebe Chapple was a 
pioneering Australian female doctor who had been awarded the military medal for her 
heroism in the First War and was an official guest at George VI’s coronation.  The 
younger generation of doctors and surgeons also supported the Fellowship including 
another Australian, Eric Horning, who had been Rockefeller Foundation fellow for 
medical research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, then worked at the Imperial 
Cancer Research Fund and became professor of experimental pathology at the 
University of London after the war.  Gordon Mitchell-Heggs became a leading post-
war dermatologist and the author of Modern Practice in Dermatology (1950). 
 
Mayfair rushing Hitlerwards 
International sport is perhaps a surprising focus for the Fellowship but, then as now, 
sport played a role in international diplomacy and, perhaps unsurprisingly, tended 
towards appeasement.  The Olympic winter games were held a few months before, and 
the summer games a few months after Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 
blatant contravention of the Versailles Treaty.  The highpoint of the British social 
engagement with the National Socialist regime - ‘Mayfair rushing Hitlerwards’ - was 
the summer Olympiad in Berlin in August 1936.  Though the Games have been widely 
studied by historians, only limited analysis has been undertaken on the British 
contingent of over one hundred peers, peeresses, MPs and their wives that came to the 
Berlin Olympics.74  Many were Fellowship members including Lords Aberdare, 
Barnby, Clydesdale, Decies and Rennell, as well as its most notorious member, Unity 
Mitford.   
The Fellowship’s engagement with the XI Olympiad had started in December 1935 
with its inaugural dinner at the Hotel Victoria with Hans von Tschammer und Osten, 
the German Sports Leader, as guest of honour.  Mount Temple presided, and Coburg 
represented the DEG while Leopold von Hoesch, the ambassador, led the German 
diplomatic contingent.  The previous day had seen a controversial football game played 
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between England and Germany at White Hart Lane in north London.  The first 
international between the two countries since 1930, it was an event of political, 
diplomatic and sporting significance - not least because the swastika flew above the 
home ground of Tottenham Hotspur, a team then (as now) proud of its sizeable support 
from the Jewish community.75  The Germans had been invited by the British Football 
Association and 10,000 German supporters were given subsidised transport by their 
government to spectate.  Here was an opportunity to show the supposedly civilised face 
of Hitler’s regime and a foretaste of the Olympics. (Unusually, given subsequent form, 
England won three goals to nil.76)  The timing and success of the game were critical as 
the British Olympic Association was considering a boycott of the Summer Olympics 
and discussing such with its American counterpart.   
In his speech of welcome, Mount Temple applauded the good nature at the game which 
he saw as ‘the turning point in the good feeling between the two countries’ and rebuked 
its critics’ ‘attempts to sow discord’.  In response, Coburg identified ‘widespread 
sympathy in Germany for the English people, the depth of which was not yet fully 
understood in Britain’.77  This, the Fellowship’s first major banquet, established the 
template for its larger social gatherings.   Each would have a theme and guests of honour 
that elevated the proceedings above the routine work of the organisation to attract elites 
from beyond its then still predominately business membership.  The theme, key 
speeches and leading guests would all be written up in broadly glowing terms by The 
Times and other newspapers.  Notwithstanding the still cautious attitude in Whitehall, 
these were planned as significant diplomatic events rather than closed meetings of a 
single-issue pressure group. 
Given that the Fellowship had no formal role in international sport, the sporting 
credentials of the attendees that night were impressive.  Two of Britain’s three 
International Olympic Committee representatives were present.  Lord Aberdare was an 
active Fellowship member attending at least four of the major dinners.  Described by 
his obituarist as ‘a brilliant player of ball games and one of the best-known sportsman 
of his time’, he excelled at cricket, rackets and real tennis.78  Sir Noel Curtis-Bennett 
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was vice-president of the British Empire Games in 1934 and held senior posts in 
numerous sporting bodies ranging from the English Rugby League to the National 
Amateur Wrestling Association.  They were joined by successful British Olympians 
including Douglas Lowe, honorary secretary of the Amateur Athletic Association and 
a gold medallist at both Paris and Amsterdam Olympics; Sir Stenson Cooke, who 
competed as a fencer in the 1912 Stockholm Olympics; and Robert Bourne, the MP for 
Oxford, who won silver rowing at Stockholm.  The German contingent included Dr 
Carl Diem, secretary-general of the organizing committee for the Games; Prince Otto 
von Bismarck, the chargé d’affaires at the embassy; Graf von Duerkheim from the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop; and General Baron von Sweppenberg, the military attaché. 
Ribbentrop took the lead in issuing invitations to his English friends especially those 
from the Fellowship but Hitler, Göring and Goebbels also saw the opportunity offered 
by the Olympics to woo the British elite so joined in welcoming the British visitors.  
This was in the same month that the Germans introduced two-year military service and 
a month later launched Göring’s four-year plan to put the German economy on a war 
footing.  Whatever the regime’s ultimate intentions, as Steiner emphasized, Hitler at 
this stage still desired an amicable working relationship with England.79  The 
Ribbentrops’ gala dinner was followed by even more extravagant rival parties hosted 
by Göring and Goebbels.  The Fellowship members and other British visitors to the 
Olympics benefited from access to the DEG clubhouse in Berlin which Ribbentrop 
noted ‘proved very popular with English visitors’ and the Fellowship recorded deep 
appreciation for ‘the efforts made by members and staff to promote the enjoyment of 
so many British visitors, whether members or not’.80 
Into this bacchanalia of Anglo-German affability, swept the anti-appeasing Sir Robert 
Vansittart.  The head of the Foreign Office had decided to use the Olympics to 
familiarise himself with the regime in person and was then still at the heart of power, 
albeit damaged by the fallout from the Hoare-Laval Pact which he had promoted 
enthusiastically.  Two aspects of his visit are striking: that it was Vansittart who came 
and that it was unofficial.  The arrival of such an ardent critic of the Germans (he 
thought them a ‘very crude people, who have very few ideas in their noddles but brute 
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force and militarism’) alarmed his hosts.81  Von Neurath, the foreign minister, admitted 
his surprise directly to Vansittart who concluded ‘the tale of a hostile Foreign Office 
had evidently gone deep, and one cannot blame the German press when one has seen 
and suffered so much of our own’.82  Notwithstanding his Cassandra-like warnings of 
a second war with Germany, he was still searching for a diplomatic solution as well as 
primary intelligence on the regime.  
While damning of other ‘ambulant amateurs’, Vansittart had insisted his own visit was 
‘purely private and should be treated as such by the Press', albeit each step was 
diligently reported in The Times.83  He claimed to need a holiday and that his wife, 
Sarita, was required to substitute for her indisposed sister (married to Phipps, the 
ambassador) as hostess at the British Embassy.  During this supposed holiday, he held 
private meetings with Hitler, Ribbentrop, Göring, Goebbels, Hess, Dieckhoff, von 
Krosigk and with von Neurath no less than six times.  He also spoke with various 
bankers and industrialists and was guest of honour at a dinner hosted by the Führer.  
Sensitive to the comic aspects of this charade, his lengthy report on his visit is entitled 
‘A Busman’s Holiday’.  This reluctance to make visits by British statesmen official was 
a continuing pattern - Lloyd George’s tour of Germany a few weeks later was ‘private’ 
as was Lord Halifax's visit in November 1937, under the unconvincing cover of his 
attending a hunting exhibition as master of the Middleton Hunt.  This strangely amateur 
approach to foreign affairs puzzled both experienced German diplomats such as von 
Neurath and von Hoesch as well as their internationally-gauche National Socialist 
masters.   
With impressive chutzpah, Vansittart used his visit to build his contacts with the nascent 
German resistance to Hitler that, as will be explored further, he later nurtured with 
Christie and Conwell-Evans.  He met ‘the three most intelligent journalists’ each with 
links to the resistance: Karl Silex, editor of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung who was 
later associated with the July 1944 group; Paul Scheffer, well-respected editor of the 
liberal Berliner Tageblatt and a friend of Lothian’s protégé, Adam von Trott; and 
Rudolf Kircher, Berlin correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, the respected liberal 
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newspaper that Carl Bosch and IG Farben had acquired.  He also met secretly at the 
British embassy with Wilfrid Israel who asked for help to repatriate persecuted German 
Jews.84  Israel was another friend of von Trott and would have inherited the famous 
Israel’s department store in Berlin had it not been seized by the Nazis.  From a 
distinguished Anglo-German Jewish family, he benefited from a British passport and 
played a leading role in evacuating Jews from Germany up to the eve of war at which 
point he escaped to England to work with Chatham House and the Foreign Office.    
Having lobbied through the Fellowship for better engagement with the British 
leadership, Hitler and Ribbentrop were unnerved by the over six-foot-tall Vansittart - 
not least as Hitler had been told to expect a ‘small man of Jewish appearance’ and was 
wrong-footed by his fluent German.85  Vansittart despised Ribbentrop but recognised 
in von Neurath ‘a comfortable squirearchic South German’ who was not always ‘at ease 
with the present régime’.  He was amused by Göring, whom he thought enjoyed life 
with ‘the gusto of Smith minor suddenly possessed of unlimited tick at the school 
stores’, but was most impressed by Goebbels who had sent Lady Vansittart a bowl of 
orchids and whom he described as a ‘limping, eloquent, slip of a Jacobin’.86 
The first extravaganza was a gala dinner held by the Ribbentrops, on the day of his 
appointment as ambassador to London, with six hundred guests.  Count Baillet-Latour, 
president of the Olympic committee was a guest of honour and Göring, Coburg and 
Hess attended.  The English guests included the Rennells, Vansittarts, Aberdares, 
Kemsleys, Camroses, Lord Barnby and Unity Mitford.  Two days later, Ribbentrop was 
outdone by Göring’s party that left the eight hundred guests, including the Brunswicks 
and two Douglas-Hamiltons, ‘gaping at the display and the splendour’ and reminded 
Chips Channon of the ‘fêtes of Claudius, but with the cruelty left out’.  Goebbels invited 
two thousand to a party on an island that was ‘the most impressive though it lacked the 
elegance and chic of Ribbentrop’s and the extravagance of Göring’s’.  By comparison, 
the British embassy party for Empire Olympians with a thousand guests echoed the 
country’s underwhelming performance on the track and field and was damned by 
Channon as ‘boring, crowded and inelegant’.87  Overall, as one historian has concluded: 
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‘if lavish hospitality alone could have forged a link between Germany and Britain, the 
Olympic fortnight would have done the trick, for the entertainments were on a 
prodigious scale, and carried out with a degree of taste which agreeably surprised even 
the most critical of visitors’.88  
Vansittart extended his ‘holiday’ to attend the sumptuous dinner thrown in his honour 
by the Führer in the grand dining room at the Reich Chancellery.  As well as the British 
and Polish ambassadors, the Hungarian minister of finance and Konrad Henlein, the 
leader of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia, the bejewelled and bemedalled 
guests included a gaggle of Fellowship stalwarts including the Rennells, Aberdares, and 
Lords Barnby and Clydesdale.  Hitler, in ill-fitting evening tails and dining on spinach, 
eggs and water courted his neighbour, Lady Vansittart, admitting that, while he 
struggled to communicate with her brother-in-law the ambassador, he found her 
husband easier.   
Historians have written of an ‘Olympic pause’ lasting into 1937 and Vansittart 
recollected that ‘an Olympic truce lay thick above the city, and had its effect on Herr 
Hitler’s mood’.89  Ribbentrop was pleased by Vansittart’s attendance and hoped for 'a 
certain change in his attitude towards Germany'.90  Writing to the foreign secretary, 
Basil Newton, the minister in Berlin, agreed it was ‘an extraordinary success for 
Germany and for National Socialism’ but suggested the training of German athletes had 
pushed the boundaries of the amateur tradition.91  Vansittart was similarly critical of 
the ‘over specialisation of athletics’ and warned, presumably thinking of more than 
sport, that ‘these intense people are going to make us look a C3 nation, if we elect to 
continue haphazard’.92  Fellowship members returned home with varying perspectives.  
Lord Rennell, an eminent diplomat and scholar, wrote to The Times with glowing 
appreciation for ‘the remarkable man of vision who directs the destinies of Germany’.93  
Lord Decies, the long-retired soldier and noted horseman, was also critical of the 
German bending of amateurism and, equating sport with militarism, warned of ‘a new 
race of energetic, virile young people… ready to go anywhere under the orders of the 
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Führer… fully armed, equipped with the best of war material, and an air force second 
to none’.94   
Within two months of Mayfair’s return from Berlin, Britain was consumed with the 
abdication crisis.  A pivot point for both the Fellowship and Ribbentrop’s diplomatic 
mission to London, it robbed the former of its de facto royal patron as the king was 
distracted from foreign affairs during his short reign.  Similarly, the prime minister, 
Baldwin, who had cautiously welcomed Tennant’s overtures, now had little time for 
Anglo-German subtleties as the crisis unfolded.  It threw into hard relief Ribbentrop’s 
flawed judgement on Britain - he misunderstood British constitutional monarchy and 
was convinced the King would never have to abdicate.  His dream of Edward as an 
English Hitler took him into the realms of fantasy that undermined his credibility as an 
arbiter of Anglo-German diplomacy making him the subject of mockery - Nancy Astor 
called him a ‘damned bad ambassador’ to his face.95  Ribbentrop used Edward’s 
abandonment of his throne as evidence that the British were no longer committed to 
Anglo-German relations to convince Hitler that rapprochement was impossible.  He 
portrayed Vansittart’s ‘promotion’ to chief diplomatic adviser as signalling increased 
government hostility to the German regime.  Of course, the reverse was true - Vansittart 
had been ‘kicked upstairs’ to a toothless role because of his opposition to appeasement 
and vocal Germanophobia.  The abdication was followed by the premiership of Neville 
Chamberlain, Ribbentrop’s former landlord and the architect of appeasement, such that, 
as Weinberg has concluded, ‘ironically in view of Hitler’s opinions, the circumstances 
of the constitutional crisis in England helped open rather than close the way to a British 
approach to Berlin’.96   
Therefore, in the two years between the Prince of Wales’s rallying call to the Legion 
and his brother’s coronation, the Fellowship established itself deep into British court, 
social, military and sporting elites, in addition to all it had achieved in the business and 
political spheres.  The number and influence of those individuals indicates that the 
Fellowship should not be dismissed as a fringe group of eccentrics but rather a 
respected, or at least accepted, institution embedded within society.  Its involvement 
with prestigious public events in both countries - banquets, visits by veterans, the 
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Olympics, ambassadorial receptions and the Coronation gave the Fellowship a public 
profile, social status and wider influence far higher than any other pro-German 
organisations.  While outwardly achieving little, the social events hosted by the 
Fellowship and DEG in London and Berlin allowed aristocrats, politicians, 
businessmen, soldiers, sailors, spies and fanatics to rub shoulders under both Union flag 
and swastika.  They gave succour to the appeasers while celebrating the exchange of 
ambassadors, the crowning of the King, the fragile maintenance of peace and the natural 
kinship of the British and the German peoples.   
Notwithstanding their failings as individuals, the three royal princes gave the 
Fellowship and the DEG a regal glamour achieved by few other organisations on which 
they capitalised.  The involvement of the armed forces, and especially the collaboration 
with the Legion, bestowed a military blessing on the Fellowship’s anti-war sentiments 
of which other appeasing or anti-war pressure groups could only dream.  Importantly, 
this social profile resonated internationally and not necessarily as the Council might 
have liked.  The overlap with the Cliveden Set caused confusion internationally then 
and subsequently, especially in the US.  The connection with the Douglas-Hamilton 
family laid grounds for Rudolf Hess’s decision to choose their Scottish estate above 
which to bail out of his plane.  The infiltration of the Fellowship by Kim Philby and his 
subsequent role in reporting the Hess affair to Stalin fuelled the Russian leader’s 
concerns about an Anglo-German axis turning towards Soviet Russia.   




Chapter 5  
Sharks in the shallows: the Fellowship, anti-Semitism and the far right  
As explored in the earlier chapters, while attracting wider support from politics, 
business and society with a shared interest in better relations with Germany, the 
Fellowship certainly harboured some members motivated by a nasty cocktail of anti-
Semitism and admiration for National Socialism of whom the Mitfords were especially 
controversial.  Leading scholars and other commentators1 in almost all of the relevant 
literature have followed Richard Griffiths in characterising this group as being 
significant - ‘a large number of sharks lurking in the shallows’.2  These ‘sharks’, he has 
asserted in an awkward mix of metaphors, were given an ‘umbrella’ by the Fellowship.3  
The implication is that they, at some point and to some extent, drove the Fellowship’s 
agenda and defined its character as an organisation.  Several commentators have 
labelled the Fellowship an organisation explicitly both ‘pro-Nazi’ and anti-Semitic and 
have cited membership as primary evidence of anti-Semitic leanings on an individual 
basis.  In his third book on the subject, recently published under the Routledge Studies 
in Fascism and the Far Right series, Griffiths reconfirms his thesis that ‘it is, however 
significant that many apparently moderate people in high positions in government, 
commerce and industry could belong to a body which clearly went over and beyond the 
mere desire for Anglo-German friendship’.4  While the book thereafter concentrates 
expertly on the activities of the ‘sharks’ following the outbreak of war, the implication 
is clearly that the remainder of the Fellowship’s membership should have known better.  
In fact, recently-discovered correspondence in the Pitt-Rivers archive allows us to 
understand how and why the sharks, unhappy with the Fellowship Council’s equivocal 
attitude towards the National Socialist regime from the outset, did try to wrest control 
of the organisation in 1937 and 1938.  They were successfully rebuffed and migrated 
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to deploy their pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic energies with other organisations that more 
closely shared their beliefs.  By their own admission, the sharks had never held sway 
over the Fellowship’s ideology nor its strategy towards Hitler’s Germany and were 
aggressively at odds with its leadership. 
Nonetheless, the outspoken early admiration for the new Germany from the Fellowship 
and its leaders was often both uncritical and susceptible to far-from-subtle National 
Socialist propaganda.  Particularly disturbing is Tennant’s contribution of a chapter 
(based on a speech written in 1933) on Hitler to a 1934 book, The Man and the Hour: 
Studies of Six Great Men of Our Time (edited by the lauded popular historian and noted 
Nazi apologist Sir Arthur Bryant5) in which he argued that the newly-elected 
Chancellor was better than the communist alternative despite his movement’s ‘cruelty 
and brutality’.  However, Tennant was not wholly star-struck.  While he noted Hitler’s 
‘striking dark blue eyes, kindly and intelligent’, he was less than impressed by the ‘very 
unfortunate moustache, close clipped and square, making a blob covering the whole of 
his lip between his nose and his mouth’.6  In a report to JCC Davidson, he described 
Hitler as ‘very temperamental’ and ‘so easily roused to a condition of excitement’ that 
any future negotiations would be difficult.7 
Certainly, the leadership of the Fellowship, while not necessarily heroic, was repeatedly 
and quietly vocal in its determination to persuade the Nazis to moderate their behaviour 
and policies.  This was both practical - in the sense that they were clearly ‘bad for 
business’- as well as motivated by more noble and ethical impulses.  From the outset, 
there is evidence that this polite criticism antagonised and frustrated the Nazis who had 
hoped that the Fellowship would docilely toe the party line.  Indeed, it was criticised 
on several occasions as having ‘alleged Jewish sympathies’ by both the National 
Socialists and some of their British supporters such as Admiral Sir Barry Domvile who 
went as far as to allege it was funded by Jewish business interests.8  Consequently, 
while certainly sheltering anti-Semites of the worst kind, the Fellowship itself was 
never, in modern parlance, ‘institutionally racist’ and those views were not held by its 
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Council as a body.  Tennant was realistic as to how his and the Fellowship’s legacy 
would be recorded: ‘as was to be expected, at the outbreak of war, the Fellowship was 
attacked from certain quarters as having been a Nazi organisation’ but doggedly insisted 
that ‘this was absolutely untrue… we were nothing of the sort’ – a claim met with 
scepticism by historians ever since.9 
 
Elwin Wright 
Central to Griffiths’s assertion that the harbouring of these sharks gave the Fellowship 
a ‘rather ambiguous status’, is his assessment of Elwin Wright and his importance 
within it.10  He characterised Wright as ‘the AGF’s secretary and main spokesman, until 
1937… who was later to show his true colours as an outspokenly anti-Semitic member 
of the Nordic League’, an interpretation often repeated by subsequent commentators.  
Though acknowledging that Wright’s activities with the Fellowship were essentially 
harmless, he suggested this was a facade masking a covertly pro-Nazi elitist enterprise 
that could ‘attract the great and the good’, quoting Wright telling The News Review that 
‘it isn’t numbers that matter… we want “Names”, otherwise how can we have any 
influence with the Government or the Foreign Office?’11  
Wright was appointed as the salaried secretary in summer or autumn of 1935 and served 
in that role for eighteen months until he was replaced in May 1937 by Conwell-Evans, 
who had previously been on the Council and then one of two unpaid honorary 
secretaries.  Wright was never the ‘main spokesman’ for the Anglo-German Fellowship.  
Apart from the one interview in The News Review, a minor news magazine, much re-
quoted by historians (taking their lead from Haxey, Griffiths or both) there is no 
evidence of Wright having any role as spokesman.  His duties were administrative - 
arranging events, filing documentation at Companies House and chasing members for 
their subscriptions.12  He had neither the social status nor the social skills to allow him 
to sit at the Fellowship’s top table.  As an employee of Thomas Cook, the travel agency 
that sponsored the Fellowship, he had been seconded by his employer as it looked to 
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reduce headcount during the recession.  Living in a modest red-brick terraced house in 
South Harrow backing onto the Piccadilly railway line, his social milieu was a far cry 
from Mount Temple and Lothian’s stately homes, Tennant’s country house and even 
Conwell-Evans’s Kensington bachelor flat.    
During Wright’s period in office, the main spokesmen for the Fellowship were Tennant 
and Conwell-Evans.  It was they who communicated with public figures such as 
MacDonald, Baldwin, Lloyd George and Lothian, liaised with the foreign ministries, 
dined at the embassies in both countries, wrote letters to The Times and travelled often 
to Germany on Fellowship business.13  As chairman, Mount Temple typically presided 
at dinners while other Council members took active outward-facing roles with, for 
example, Piggott leading discussions with the Ministry of Overseas Trade and Mason 
presiding at the 1938 reception.  Wright was never on the Council nor the executive 
committee and had not been at the founding meeting.  Nor was he reportedly good at 
his job even with its limited responsibilities.  Tennant persuaded Mount Temple to 
remove Wright from the role, ostensibly not for his political beliefs, but because he was 
‘not a good organiser of the daily work… easily loses his head and never stops talking’ 
albeit acknowledging that he had ‘worked most loyally and energetically’.14   
Recently identified correspondence shows that Wright was unhappy with the 
Fellowship’s equivocal attitude towards the Nazi experiment and was himself 
unapologetically anti-Semitic.  He agitated for the Fellowship to take an aggressive 
stance against the British Press in support of the regime, writing to Conwell-Evans in 
May 1937 accusing the Council of being ‘supine’ and highlighting ‘a grave state of 
unrest amongst members of the Fellowship’.15  He had close links to Germany, with a 
brother-in-law in the SS, but did downplay his beliefs for tactical reasons, explaining 
to a fellow traveller that his National Socialist friends in Germany realised that it would 
‘not be in their interests, let alone ours, for the Fellowship to be purely or mainly 
identified with National Socialism itself, even if that were possible’.16  
Despite Tennant’s efforts to smooth his departure, Wright took his redundancy badly, 
sending furious letters to Council members claiming that Conwell-Evans’s appointment 
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was unconstitutional (as he had previously served on the Council) and was unlikely to 
save money.17  Tennant, rightly nervous of Wright falling into the ambit of the sharks, 
wrote hoping that he would remain loyal and ‘never divulge any information’ to any 
‘group of members who may have other views as to what the policy of the Fellowship 
should be’.18  Wright’s anti-Semitism was never far below the surface.  He wrote an 
extraordinary letter to the Fellowship’s solicitor, Le Blount Kidd, asking on behalf of a 
member of the German embassy whether Kidd had any ‘Jewish blood in [his] veins’.19  
Conwell-Evans challenged Wright as to whether he was an anti-Semite to which he 
replied defending the Nürnberg  laws as a ‘stern necessity in [the German 
government’s] treatment of the Jewish minority’.20  Cut adrift from the Fellowship, 
Wright dropped any pretence at moderation, launched a campaign of harassment 
against the Fellowship and, sometime later, called for the Jews to be executed.21  As 
will be shown from both their actions and words, such views were intolerable to 
Tennant, Conwell-Evans and Mount Temple.    
 
Polite protests from sorrowing friends 
The accepted scholarly and popular orthodoxy has been that the Fellowship and its 
leadership were, at best naïvely and at worst sinisterly, ‘turning a blind eye to the darker 
side of the Nazi regime’ right up to Kristallnacht. 22  The Board of Deputies of British 
Jews was both puzzled and frustrated by the Fellowship’s apparent silence on the 
subject of Nazi persecution, complaining that ‘no one would gather from the speeches 
given at its dinners or meetings that there is such a thing as persecution in the world’.23  
However, from the start, the Fellowship was never the obedient propaganda poodle 
which the National Socialists hoped it to be.  While less antagonistic to Hitler’s party 
than the AGA in its dying days, the Fellowship did not exclude critics of the regime 
from its membership recruitment.  Conwell-Evans tried to persuade Sir Horace 
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Rumbold to join despite his removal as ambassador because of his alarm at National 
Socialism.  Wright aside, the Council and executive of the Fellowship were troubled by 
the regime’s behaviour from the outset and said so.  In early September 1935, Tennant 
had persuaded Mount Temple to ‘give up two good days’ shooting’ to visit that year’s 
Nürnberg rally and meet Hitler when reports in The Times suggested that ‘important 
new anti-Jewish laws will be promulgated’.  Tennant immediately wrote to Ribbentrop 
explaining that he considered ‘Herr Streicher… the world’s public enemy No. 1 and far 
and away the main obstacle to better Anglo-German relations’.24  He went on to threaten 
that ‘without exception, the whole Council of the Anglo-German Fellowship is very 
strongly disapproving of Herr Streicher and his activities’, explained that if Mount 
Temple and he had been involved in ‘any big anti-Jewish demonstration’ the result 
might be to ‘bring the Fellowship to an end.’  Tennant shared the contents of this letter 
widely within the Fellowship and was perturbed some weeks later when Wright showed 
him a list of DEG members that now included both Goebbels and Streicher.25  Despite 
Ribbentrop telephoning Tennant to insist ‘there was no danger of any anti-Jewish 
trouble’,26 the Mount Temple visit was indeed postponed till October.    
These efforts by the Fellowship’s leadership were not out of character.  Mount Temple 
had focused on the Jewish issue in Germany soon after Hitler’s assumption of power 
and therefore long before he became chairman.  The secretary of the Board of Deputies 
of British Jews noted in 1937 that he had ‘never himself been an anti-Semite, and indeed 
more than once has identified himself with Jewish causes’.27  These remained a focus 
for him and his senior colleagues up until his resignation as chairman on the issue in 
1938.  As his biographer noted he regarded Hitler’s anti-Jewish policy as ‘a major 
stumbling block to a better understanding’ having presided at the April 1933 meeting 
at the Whitechapel Art Gallery protesting at the treatment of Jews in Germany.28  This 
was one month before Lord Reading, himself Jewish, resigned as chairman of the 
traumatised Anglo-German Association and only two months after the National 
Socialists came to power.  The meeting had been called to launch a Jewish Emergency 
Committee in response to the news of atrocities from Germany.  In his speech, Mount 
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Temple referenced the long history of British protests against mistreatment of Jews (for 
example in Russia in the 1880s and 1905).  He deplored ‘what is taking place in 
Germany’ and applauded ‘the disproportionate contribution of the relatively small 
population of Jews (‘630,000 out of 64 millions’) to ‘the progress that has been made 
in the cultural life of the Fatherland’.  He insisted ‘it is impossible as human beings and 
Christian men and women to look on in silence, while an important section of 
Germany’s population, namely the Jewish section, is gravely threatened in its very 
existence’.  Arguing that ‘it is a sacred duty of humanity to offer these persecuted people 
a shelter’ he called for Britain to ‘open the gates of Palestine as wide as possible’ under 
the Balfour Declaration.29  The speech resulted in hate mail from Germany. 
Also, in early 1933, Tennant had sent a letter to The Times following a trip to Germany, 
sounding ‘a note of warning’, emphasising the youth and idealism of the Nazis while 
insisting that ‘hard they are, ruthless they may be, but they know exactly what they 
want, and a war is no part of that program’.  He confidently (and indeed correctly) 
predicted that ‘nothing can now dislodge the Nazis from a long period of control in 
Germany’, so suggested that ‘a friendly hand stretched out now would be the best and 
quickest way of helping the Jews and others in Germany who are entitled to our 
sympathy and deserve our help’.30  Recent evidence has emerged of Tennant trying to 
use the Fellowship to facilitate the rescue of a Jewish man from Germany.  Documents 
in the Pitt-Rivers papers identify an anonymous donation of £100 (c £6,000 in 2017 
values) as an ‘act of gratitude’ from a Jewish refugee whose brother Tennant had tried 
to have released through Ribbentrop’s office.31  However, these words and acts 
notwithstanding, anti-Semitism was a feature of the Tennant household as his wife, 
Eleanora, moved further to the political right and, as will be explored, later voiced 
extreme views including attacks on the Jews. 
Meanwhile, in October that year, Conwell-Evans gave a talk on his ‘impressions of 
Germany’ at a gathering at Lord Noel-Buxton’s house in London the text of which he 
sent to Ramsay MacDonald and Lord Lothian.  He insisted he had been arguing to 
German ministers that friendship with England required ‘the rehabilitation in some 
form of the Jews as a race’ explaining that ‘the apparent condemnation of the Jews as 
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a race appears to English opinion to be equivalent to the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes’.  Also calling for the abolition of concentration camps and the restoration of 
the Reichstag, he did, however, defend the regime and suggest that English newspapers 
exaggerated the atrocities in Germany that were limited to ‘a very small minority of 
roughs [who] bring the movement into disgrace’.  Echoing Tennant, he reminded his 
audience of the blockade of 1918 and 1919 ‘in order to force on Germany the unjust 
treaty of Versailles… which in its entirety was responsible for the death of at least 
750,000 men, women and children.’32   
Of the three, it seems, especially from his correspondence with MacDonald and his 
personal secretary Rose Rosenberg, that Conwell-Evans had the closest connections 
with prominent Jewish figures in both Germany and Britain and was, at least in one 
case, successful in effecting the emigration of one prominent Jewish family to England.  
Such efforts were appreciated by AL Kennedy, leader writer at The Times, who 
recommended him to his editor as the paper’s next Berlin correspondent, noting that 
Conwell-Evans ‘hates the Jew-baiting and the persecution of the Church etc’.33  His 
history professor in Königsberg, Hans Rothfels, was born into a wealthy Jewish family 
but had converted to Lutheranism before the First War.34   Conwell-Evans lauded him 
to Rose Rosenberg as ‘a most delightful noble character of the first type’ and enjoyed 
cycling and walking trips with the family.35  Though a reactionary nationalist historian, 
the professor’s Jewish ancestry could not be ignored so Conwell-Evans arranged his 
emigration to Britain in 1938.  The British Consul in Berlin had been angry and 
unhelpful telling Conwell-Evans ‘see what your Anglo German friendship has led to… 
you should hang your head in shame’.36  Bypassing official channels, he therefore asked 
Lothian and Vansittart to intervene with Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary, who 
arranged for Rothfels, his wife and three children to be given permits for entry into the 
UK.37  Conwell-Evans then enlisted support from his old mentor James Brierly, 
Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford, William Adams, a 
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Fellowship member and warden of All Souls, and Ernest Barker, professor of political 
science at Cambridge which resulted in a two-year post for Rothfels at St John’s 
College Oxford at £250 a year.38 
Conwell-Evans was friendly with other prominent Jewish (or part-Jewish) figures such 
as Professor Arnold Bergstraesser, the political scientist who had to leave Germany due 
to his ancestry, whom he tried to introduce to Ramsay MacDonald in 1933.  Similarly, 
four years previously, he had been keen to bring together Alfred Zimmern and 
MacDonald and had lobbied the prime minister to recommend him for an honour.  One 
of the founders of the Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), an 
internationalist and supporter of Zionism, later the first secretary-general of UNESCO, 
Zimmern’s family were Liberal German Jews who had emigrated to Britain.  
Conwell-Evans’s correspondence with Rose Rosenberg gives us the most personal 
insight into his attitudes to the Jewish question and is particularly pertinent as 
Rosenberg was one of the most prominent and successful Jewish women in British 
public life at the time.  Born in the East End of London in 1892, she was (like Conwell-
Evans) the child of a tailor, in her case a Jewish migrant from Russia.  Known as ‘Miss 
Rose of No. 10’, she was MacDonald’s personal secretary from 1924 to 1937 and was 
the first woman to be allowed in the Strangers' Dining Room of the House of Commons. 
As a breathless American journalist wrote at the time: ‘she knows more of the inside 
dope on home politics and world politics than anyone in the kingdom outside of 
MacDonald and King George’.39  While Conwell-Evans’s sexual orientation may be 
open to debate, he seems to have developed a tendresse for Rose.  Keen to impress his 
sincerity on her both as the gatekeeper to his friend MacDonald and as a Jew, as early 
as October 1933, he wrote offering ‘some hopeful things to say [to MacDonald] about 
the possibility of Hitler changing his attitude towards the Jews’.40  Writing again in 
April 1934, he personalised the issue for Rose, asking ‘can I do anything for the cause 
which doubtless you personally have at heart?  I need hardly tell you that I have been 
doing my utmost for the Germans of Jewish extraction.’ He insisted ‘I have passionately 
pleaded in Berlin with important Nazis – again and again for the German Jews… I shall 
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go on doing so’.41  There is no hint that Rosenberg, an evidently shrewd judge of 
character, doubted Conwell-Evans’s sincerity and she replied ‘you cannot imagine how 
deeply I feel on the whole subject. I do appreciate all you are doing, nevertheless, and 
urge you to continue your good efforts.’42   
Tennant also challenged the regime on the Jewish question albeit he admitted with little 
effect.  He had asked to meet Himmler, so Ribbentrop arranged a dinner in his garden, 
surprisingly on the eve of the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, when presumably 
the NSDAP high command had more pressing concerns than charming a British 
businessman.  At the dinner, Tennant boldly badgered Himmler to authorise the release 
of certain concentration camp prisoners, proffering a list of names supplied by his 
cousin, Margot, widow of HH Asquith, the Liberal prime minister.  Tennant 
remembered ‘quite a scene’ and that Himmler ‘nearly choked’ before shouting ‘I don’t 
remember that during the South African war the Germans were invited to inspect your 
concentration camps – I don’t remember that when Hitler was in prison any of you 
English showed any interest in how he was treated – you ought to go down on your 
knees and thank God we have got those scum under control’.43   
Finally reassured by Ribbentrop, Tennant did make the journey with his wife to the 
Nürnberg Reichsparteitag but without Mount Temple.  At a lunch hosted by Hitler, 
Tennant sat next to Alfred Rosenberg, the leader of the NSDAP Foreign Policy Office, 
and pointed out that the anti-Jewish policy was ‘alienating world public opinion through 
their insults to the whole Jewish race’.  He and Conwell-Evans were both so 
‘profoundly disturbed by the new anti-Jewish legislation’ that they had asked to see 
Ribbentrop that Monday morning.  Tennant’s analysis of Ribbentrop’s justification of 
the persecution makes difficult reading to the post-Holocaust reader: ‘while many 
people will admit the Germans have justification for wishing to curtail the influence on 
German life and culture acquired by certain sections of the Jewish community… it is 
deplorable that they fail to realise how seriously the cruel and vulgar anti-Jewish 
campaign being carried on by Julius Streicher and his obscene newspaper ‘Der Stürmer’ 
is damaging Germany in the eyes of the outside world’.  Nonetheless, he was 
determined to persevere and hoped that ‘we are doing nothing to worsen the position 
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of the Jews in Germany and some day we may be able to help them.’44  Meanwhile, 
Conwell-Evans reported back to Lothian in similar terms on the meeting with 
Ribbentrop.  He had been boyishly excited to be invited to ride in the car behind the 
Führer and ‘fearfully bucked’ when picked out for a conversation by Hitler at the 
reception.  However, this was all before the announcement about the new anti-Jewish 
legislation on which, as he reported to Lothian, he had lectured Ribbentrop till he was 
‘black in the face’ but without effect. 45  
A month later, criticism of the NSDAP by members of the just-incorporated Fellowship 
created a crisis that nearly strangled it at birth.  The Council hosted a private dinner at 
the Dorchester Hotel in honour of Ambassador von Hoesch to include his deputy, the 
charmingly-mannered, but ardent Nazi, Prince Otto von Bismarck (grandson of the Iron 
Chancellor) and Karlfried Graf von Dürckheim-Montmartin, the energetically 
Anglophile head of the English section of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.  Lord Eltisley, 
in his speech following Mount Temple, made what Wright characterised as a ‘violent 
attack’ on the German government around the ‘Jewish question’.46  Von Hoesch 
reported more calmly the next day to Berlin that ‘several of the English guests had 
voiced their disapproval of Nazi internal policy and had expressed misgivings about its 
long-term effect upon Anglo-German relations’.47  Hitler reacted angrily, demanding 
the immediate recall of those Germans just arrived in London for the Fellowship’s 
inauguration celebrations and was only dissuaded by Ribbentrop playing down the 
accuracy of von Hoesch’s report.   
Nor was the Jewish issue allowed to drop.  At a Council meeting ahead of the DEG 
inauguration trip in January 1936, it was suggested that Hitler should be persuaded to 
receive a deputation from the Council which would make ‘strong representations about 
the alleged mistreatment of the Jews by the German government’.  The leading banker, 
Frank Tiarks, had told Wright that he was going to tell Hitler that ‘this treatment of the 
Jews has got to stop’.  A further meeting was held in Mount Temple’s rooms at the 
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Kaiserhof in Berlin at which Wright approvingly noted the chairman ‘resisted an 
attempt to stampede him into heading a delegation to the Fuhrer’.48 
The next summer, Lothian used his widely-reported speech at the Fellowship dinner in 
honour of the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick as a public warning about German 
behaviour, albeit without direct reference to the Jews.  There is no suggestion that 
Lothian was anti-Semitic.  He had made clear to the trustees of the Rhodes Trust in 
August 1933 that he ‘detested totalitarianism of any kind’ and ‘opposed the Nazis’ anti-
Semitism’.49  While full of appeasing sentiment, he warned of ‘aspects of the internal 
policy of the National Socialist State which are a serious obstacle to the establishment 
of cordial relations between the British and the German people’ and concluded 
‘everyone knows what they are’.  Alarmed by ‘the speed and extent of Germany’s 
rearmament’ he begged the Germans ‘not to underrate the influence these things exert 
on British policy or the weapon they give to those elements, here and abroad, which are 
opposed to Anglo-German reconciliation’. 50 
By May 1937, German sensitivity to the Fellowship’s truculence created another 
diplomatic crisis following Lothian’s visit to Berlin and the dinner to welcome 
Ribbentrop as the new ambassador.  The latter had received a letter from Berlin 
accusing the Fellowship of being ‘hostile to National Socialism’ and referencing ‘the 
alleged Jewish sympathies and aim of the Fellowship’.  Also mentioned was an incident 
when Conwell-Evans had asked Wright to remove the ‘great blatant swastika’ he had 
hung without permission beside the Union Jack in the great hall at Grosvenor House 
arguing that they would be ‘branded as Nazis’.51  Tennant and Conwell-Evans had gone 
to the embassy to discuss it with Ribbentrop who, keen to avoid embarrassment around 
his brainchild, decided they ‘should take no more notice of the affair’.52  Taken together, 
these challenges to the regime’s anti-Semitism should not have surprised the Germans.  
Aware of Mount Temple’s high profile Jewish connections and sympathies, Ribbentrop 
went so far as to crack an inept and unfunny joke that ‘this temple should not be 
destroyed in spite of the Jewish wife because its usefulness was not yet exhausted’.53  
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Similarly, as the secretary of the Board of Deputies noted, Lord Londonderry had at 
least one Jewish son-in law.   
 
Patriotic societies 
To the extent studied by scholars, the Fellowship has typically been analysed alongside 
organisations pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic that would have shared none of Conwell-
Evans’s squeamishness about the swastika.54  This ragbag of organisations includes the 
British Union of Fascists, its affiliate the January Club, the Nordic League, the Right 
Club, The Link, the Imperial Fascist League, the White Knights of Britain, the Militant 
Christian Patriots, the British Vigil, the English Array, the Britons and the Nationalist 
Socialist League.  Although several historians have acknowledged that it was less 
‘nasty’ than these, the Fellowship has been damned guilty by association and implicitly 
assumed to be the ‘gateway drug’ to harder stuff.  The most relevant comparators are 
The Link, the Right Club and the January Club.   
The January Club was founded in early 1934 with Fellowship member Captain HW 
(Billy) Luttman-Johnson as secretary.  Intended as ‘the “respectable” cover 
organisation to attract middle-class supporters to the BUF,’55 it seems fair to conclude 
its membership ‘reflected the fascist sympathies of the right-wing Conservatism’ but it 
failed to gain momentum and went out of existence in 1935.56  Both The Link and the 
Right Club were energetically pro-Nazi organisations that offered a welcoming home 
to those fellow travellers who found the Fellowship disappointingly moderate.   Both 
were creations of the late 1930s, when Hitler’s intentions were increasingly clear, so 
several years after the Fellowship was founded, and in a different climate vis-à-vis 
Anglo-German relations.  Importantly, the Fellowship was never a secret society like 
the Right Club or the Nordic League and was licenced by the Board of Trade and 
formally incorporated with articles of association filed at Companies House.  It 
published an annual report and membership list, audited by Price Waterhouse, while 
the attendees and speeches at its dinner were reported in The Times.  It made its mission 
and goals clear to government and sought to liaise with ministers and civil servants 
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wherever possible.  Contemporary analysts recognised the Fellowship’s moderate 
decency better than their successors.  The extensive British secret service surveillance 
agreed that the Fellowship was generally moderate and sincere in its Germanophilia.  
An MI5 report on the 1937 Nürnberg rally damned the British delegation as ‘with a few 
exceptions… composed of nonentities, race-purity maniacs, and undeveloped mental 
cases, with one or two really dangerous individuals’, but excepted ‘a few members of 
the Anglo-German Fellowship with a real and impartial interest in Germany’.57  
Further evidence that the Fellowship does not deserve a place in this pantheon of far 
right organisations is the degree to which it disappointed both these supposed 
equivalents as well as its NSDAP sponsors.  Writing in 1947 following his release from 
prison, Barry Domvile emphasised that, despite serving on the Fellowship’s Council, 
he was ‘never very happy about this Association’.  He deemed it elitist, overly-focused 
on business interests, and, as such patronised by ‘Judmas, and its offshoots in British 
social and business circles’.58  Judmas was his term for an imagined Jewish-Masonic 
alliance which he and his disciples believed was overtaking global politics, business 
and media.    A latecomer to the Fellowship’s Council, he was appointed in January 
1938 apparently with a mission to build a working relationship between the Fellowship 
and The Link.  His appointment (along with that of Elwin Wright) is often held up as 
evidence of the Fellowship’s successful penetration by the ‘sharks’.  But there was 
tension between Domvile and the Fellowship from the outset and his appointment was 
immediately controversial.  Conwell-Evans wrote to Mount Temple before a meeting 
with the Admiral, explaining, with some snobbery and a feeble pun, that he was hesitant 
about the Fellowship ‘linking’ up too closely with The Link which he damned as ‘so 
indiscriminate, and its members without influence and standing’.59  Tennant and the 
Council were similarly dubious; he remembered that they ‘strongly disapproved of any 
of our members joining The Link’.60  Domvile called Conwell-Evans a ‘dirty little 
twister’ for attacking The Link before resigning (along with Beazley) on April Fools’ 
Day in 1939.61 
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Despite such mutual disapproval, there was overlap in membership between the two 
organisations.  The Link, founded in July 1937, was, in contrast to the Fellowship, 
populist, developing a national network of regional offices with membership reaching 
4,300 in June 1939, more than six times that of the Fellowship.  CE Carroll, the editor 
of the Anglo-German Review, differentiated it as ‘a mass organisation with a small 
initial subscription of a shilling or two’ from the two-year old Fellowship which 
restricted membership to ‘a certain class of people’.62  Only a handful were also 
Fellowship members but these were prominent Link supporters including Domvile and 
his wife, Lords Redesdale and Sempill, Professor Laurie, Sir Raymond Beazley, CE 
Carroll, Major-General JFC Fuller and WJ Bassett-Lowke.   
The Right Club recruited on an elitist basis similar to the Fellowship with a membership 
of less than 250.  Formed in May 1939, four months before the outbreak of war, it 
offered a refuge for those for whom the rising crisis pulled them towards the Nazi cause 
rather than away.  Like the Fellowship, it had roots in the Conservative Party but was 
specifically anti-Semitic – ‘the main objective was to oppose and expose the activities 
of organised Jewry’.63  Of its 244 members, 17 (or seven per cent) were also members 
of the Fellowship and again included prominent names including Sir Ernest Bennett, 
Princess Blucher, Domvile, Lord Galloway, Lord Sempill, the Duke of Wellington, 
Fuller and Alexander Walker, the whisky magnate, who contributed £100.   
Looking at the Fellowship’s wider membership, of the 700 identified members and 340 
named guests who attended dinners or receptions, biographical data has been tracked 
down for nearly forty per cent.  Of these, 55 have been cross-referenced to published 
scholarly research as being known to have held extreme views.64  This large shoal of 
sharks should not be underestimated but nevertheless represents only about five per 
cent of the total.  (By comparison, a greater percentage were Old Etonians - albeit with 
some overlap…)  More may well have quietly shared such views and failed to be noted 
for posterity - but this data still would not support the thesis that the Fellowship was 
institutionally pro-Nazi or anti-Semitic.  Additionally, as we have seen, the rest of the 
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membership included prominent individuals from respectable backgrounds and 
professions - the ‘great and the good’ - who would have had no obvious reason to join 
an extremist organisation had they not already made clear they held such extremist 
views.    
While the Fellowship was successful in attracting pro-German British aristocrats to its 
membership, it is a step too far to portray it as the natural forum for aristocratic and 
other British friends of Hitler.  Many Nazi-supporting aristocrats are notable for not 
having joined the Fellowship including the Dukes of Westminster, Buccleuch and 
Northumberland, the Marquesses of Tavistock and Graham, Viscount Lymington, the 
Earls of Erroll and Mar and Lord Ronald Graham despite being eminently socially 
qualified to do so.  Archibald Ramsay, the founder of the Right Club, the publication 
of whose infamous Red Book exposed pro-Nazi sympathies of so many aristocratic and 
society figures in the 1930s, never joined but rather forged links with the Nordic 
League, The Link and Oswald Mosley.  There was surprisingly little fellow-travelling 
between the Fellowship and the British Union of Fascists.  Although his wife’s family 
were stalwart members and his background both aristocratic and parliamentary, there 
is no evidence that Mosley or his party ever engaged meaningfully with the 
Fellowship.65  Rather, they used the January Club as their means to charm the British 
social elite. 
Bernard Wasserstein, a respected scholar of Jewish history, has recently argued, in 
response to the furore caused by the film of members of the Royal Family giving the 
Hitler salute, that we risk exaggerating the fascination for Fascism within the British 
aristocracy.  He pointed out that ‘for the most part the British aristocracy was no more 
inclined to fascism than any other segment of the population’.  He explained that the 
BUF attracted members from ‘all classes, including proletarian racists from the East 
End of London’ and argued that ‘the limited extent of British upper-class support for 
fascism stands out in an international comparison’, especially with the French, where 
the ‘great majority of families with aristocratic handles were sympathisers with the far 
right’.66   
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In January 1940, a private ambulance was waiting by the dock at Folkestone to transport 
the injured Unity Mitford (‘Bobo’ to her family), the most infamous member of the 
Anglo-German Fellowship.67  Of all of Hitler’s British admirers, it was she who had 
become closest to the Führer.  Her immediate response to Britain’s declaration of war 
against her beloved Germany was reportedly to settle her affairs in Munich, go to the 
Englischer Garten and shoot herself in the temple with the gun given her by the 
Führer.68  The bullet lodged in her brain leaving her incontinent and mentally impaired 
but took eight years to end her life.  Despite the priorities of his just-launched war, 
Hitler visited her in hospital, arranged for her to receive Germany’s best medical 
treatment, put her furniture into storage and, once she could travel, sent her in a special 
ambulance train to Berne in Switzerland – all at his own expense.  There she was met 
by her anxious mother, Lady Redesdale, and youngest sister, ‘Debo’ (later to become 
the Duchess of Devonshire), who accompanied her back to Britain.  The exploits of the 
six Mitford sisters and their no less eccentric parents, who were active members of the 
Fellowship, have supported the publishing industry ever since.  Unity’s return from 
Germany provoked intense interest from both British and American media, with the 
invalid’s sad party being mobbed by journalists seeking pictures and interviews with 
‘The Girl who loved Hitler’. 
Examining the sharks in the shallows of the Fellowship, one surprise is that the female 
seems deadlier than the male.  The Council were all men as were, apart from the 
redoubtable Betty Pomeroy and her stenographers, the executive.  While most of the 
membership was male, there were over 300 lady members and women who attended 
events as guests.  From this pool was drawn the innocent-sounding Ladies Advisory 
Committee, set up in early 1937 under the chairmanship of Lady Domvile, offering help 
‘with the functions and providing luncheons, sightseeing tours and weekends at country 
houses for German tourists’. 69    
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In contrast to the male leadership, several within this group held extreme pro-Nazi 
views and played prominent roles in the far-right movement in the 1930s.  Nine women 
attended the preliminary meeting of the committee: Lady (Alexandrina) Domvile, Miss 
Margaret Bothamley, Miss Alida Brittain, Countess de la Field, Mrs Dorothy 
Eckersley, Miss Susan Fass, Mrs Arthur Findlay, Mrs Hawes and Mrs Bruce Wilson.  
Of these, the chairwoman would be interned with her husband during the war under 
Defence Regulation 18B, another two would escape to Germany just before its outbreak 
to work for the Germans and a fourth had known Fascist links.  Lady Domvile 
enthusiastically supported her husband’s founding The Link and joined him in various 
meetings with Mosley and Archibald Ramsay, founder of the Right Club, right up to 
the eve of war.   
Margaret Bothamley was amongst the most extreme of the lady sharks with an 
impressively wide involvement with far right (and often secret) societies.70  Secretary 
of The Link’s ‘violently pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic’ central London branch, she was 
also a founder of the Imperial Fascist League and a member of the Nordic League, the 
British People’s Party and the Right Club.71   As well as attending at least one 
Fellowship banquet, she was the speaker at an informal dinner held in April 1937 where 
she spouted pure Nazi propaganda on ‘The Position of Women in Germany’.72  She 
wrote to Mount Temple in May 1937 complaining that the Fellowship had failed to 
counter the ‘thinly veiled derision towards Germany’ then prevalent in the British press, 
especially following Guernica.  She urged it to do more than hold ‘social functions and 
pleasant speeches’ and claimed the Council was dominated by ‘interests… furthering 
business activities of their own’.73  She was on holiday in Germany when war was 
declared and remained there for the duration ‘assisting the enemy’ by broadcasting 
twice weekly to Britain on the joys of Germany and the evils of Bolshevism.    
Her friend Dorothy Eckersley was the wife of Peter Eckersley, considered ‘British 
radio‘s most important technical pioneer’, and both Eckersleys were members of the 
Fellowship. 74  Dorothy was a pro-German fascist who came to dinners in 1936 and 
1937 and the 1938 reception and had stalked the Führer with Unity Mitford at his 
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favourite restaurant, the Osteria Bavaria.75  Also a member of The Link, the Right Club 
and the Imperial Fascist League, her most significant contribution to Nazi propaganda 
was recruiting William Joyce, better known as Lord Haw-Haw, for a career in German 
wartime radio for which he would be hanged in 1946.  She undertook radio propaganda 
work for the Germans in the war with her son and they were imprisoned by the British 
in October 1945 for a remarkably lenient one year for assisting the enemy.  Her husband 
Peter had been a supporter of Mosley but from 1937 worked for MI6 setting up radio 
propaganda systems deployed against the Germans.   
Mrs Bruce Wilson was the wife of Colonel HC Bruce Wilson who had been involved 
with both the British Fascists and the British Union of Fascists.76  Mrs Hawes was the 
wife of Captain Hawes, who served on the Council and had been the naval attaché in 
Berlin in the early 1930s while Alida Brittain was the daughter of the ebullient MP, 
Harry Brittain.  There is no evidence of either of them nor indeed Countess de la Field, 
Susan Fass and Mrs Arthur Findlay sharing the extreme views of their peers on the 
Ladies Advisory Committee.   
Lady Domvile’s reign over the Ladies’ Committee was short-lived in any event.  By 
December 1937, the lady members had been ‘most active’ and had ‘resolved themselves 
into various committees’ with the main one reformed under the chairmanship of Lady 
Helen Nutting, the famous campaigning feminist, with Lady Hollenden and Mrs 
Haslam as Vice-Chairmen and Mrs OM Mallard and Tennant’s wife as members.77  
Three sub-committees were established: the Hospitality Ladies’ Committee under Lady 
Swann, the Social Functions Committee under Mrs Tennant and the Visits to Germany 
Ladies’ Committee under Mrs Haslam with the ever-resourceful Mrs Pomeroy acting 
as secretary.  It is not clear whether Domvile, Bothamley and Eckersley were purged 
from the committees because of their extremist views or voluntarily decided that other 
groups offered better ‘umbrellas’ for their pro-Nazi ambitions.   
Other prominent aristocratic female fascists joined the Fellowship.  Most notorious was 
the ‘young and beautiful’ Unity Mitford who Tennant noted at the time ‘really believes 
that Hitler is divine in the Biblical sense’ and whose infatuation with Hitler has 
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fascinated commentators ever since. 78  Her anti-Semitism was far and above the 
aristocratic norms of the day: Harold Nicolson recorded in his diary that she wanted 
‘the Jews to be made to eat grass’.79  She joined the Fellowship with her parents, the 
Redesdales, who also ardently admired Hitler and were regular attendees.  Their son 
Tom joined them at the 1937 Christmas banquet, while their eldest daughter, the 
estimable author Nancy, was then married to Peter Rodd whose parents, Lord and Lady 
Rennell of Rodd were both prominent members.  Another aristocratic fascist and anti-
Semite, Viscountess Downe, was a former lady-in-waiting to Queen Mary (who is 
supposed to have queried her joining the Blackshirts - ‘is that wise, Dorothy, is that 
wise?’) and had been involved with the British Fascists since the 1920s.80   
This strand of ‘feminine fascism’ has been expertly dissected by Julie Gottlieb.  Quite 
why the female sharks penetrated the Fellowship deeper than the male is open to 
speculation.  Whatever their political views on fascism, the male membership was 
mostly involved in politics, business or the military and therefore had professional 
reasons for joining the Fellowship that may have meant that ideology played less part 
in their thought processes. 
 
The attempted palace coup 
In the spring and summer of 1937, the tension within the Fellowship between the sharks 
of both genders and its more moderate leadership escalated into a battle for control of 
the Council and through it, the organisation’s philosophical and strategic direction. The 
ejected and indignant Elwin Wright found allies in the form of George Pitt-Rivers and 
his secretary and lover Catherine (a.k.a. ‘Becky’) Sharpe.  The twice married Pitt-
Rivers was the wealthy landowning grandson of the founder of the eponymous Oxford 
museum of anthropology.  As well as inheriting an interest in anthropology, he was also 
an enthusiast for eugenics, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism and a noted admirer of 
Hitler and Mussolini.  A published author, he had written articles for the Anglo-German 
Review and his activities would later earn him detention in the Tower of London under 
Regulation 18B.  The attractive and seductive 23-year-old Sharpe, a cousin of Unity 
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Mitford who had introduced her to Hitler, was a member of the Fellowship.  Pitt-Rivers, 
to his indignation, had been refused membership in February 1937 following a spat at 
the Ribbentrop dinner between him and the Fellowship’s solicitor, le Blount Kidd, who 
considered Pitt-Rivers unsuitable for membership because of his extremism.  The 
Council had concurred, with Mount Temple telling the meeting that Pitt-Rivers was 
‘mad… all his family are mad’, and that his famous grandfather had been ‘notoriously 
mad’.  Weigall explained that the Athenaeum Club had ‘deeply regretted’ admitting 
Pitt-Rivers to the membership while Colonel Sir Thomas Moore recollected that Pitt-
Rivers had ‘once shot a man in a hotel in Johannesburg’.81  Consequently, his 
application for membership was rejected. 
Spotting the opportunity for deep-pocketed aristocratic patronage for his grievances 
against the Fellowship, Wright befriended Pitt-Rivers and Sharpe and supplied them 
with copies of confidential Fellowship correspondence, especially around the 
circumstances of his dismissal and Pitt-Rivers’s being blackballed.  Their war of 
attrition started in early 1937 with Sharpe’s attempt to get her lover elected to the 
Fellowship, before expanding into a broad attack on the leadership and ideology of the 
Fellowship that ran into the summer of 1938.  The surviving correspondence on the 
matter is voluminous, vindictive, tedious and repetitive but sheds light on this critical 
aspect of the Fellowship’s history and politics that has been previously obscure to 
historians.  With Wright’s support, the couple refused to accept the Council’s rebuff 
and lobbied to get Pitt-Rivers elected.  They enlisted the help of a small clique of sharks 
within the membership.  Pitt-Rivers joining the Fellowship had been first suggested by 
Luttman-Johnson and his close friend, Richard Findlay, who had formally proposed 
him for membership.82  Findlay was later a member of the council of the Nordic League, 
vice chairman of The Link’s central London branch and a steward of the Right Club.  
Luttman-Johnson had been secretary of the January Club and was imprisoned under 
Regulation 18B during the war. Other supporters included familiar names from the far 
right including Yeats-Brown (Hitler’s favourite British author), Margaret Bothamley, 
General Fuller and Carroll, the virulently anti-Semitic editor of the Anglo-German 
Review.  
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From late 1936, Pitt-Rivers had attended several Fellowship events as Sharpe’s guest 
provoking letters from Conwell-Evans insisting it was inappropriate to bring rejected 
applicants for membership.  Over the summer, the campaign developed into an attempt 
to reshuffle the Council and specifically to deprive Mount Temple, Tennant and 
Conwell-Evans of their tight control over the organisation.  Prone to both conspiracy 
theorising and exaggeration, the agitators accused the leadership of: representing 
Jewish business interests, especially with Tennant as the ‘only non-Jewish director’ of 
Palestine Potash Ltd; seeking to undermine the National Socialists; developing and 
exploiting undue influence over Ribbentrop as ambassador; failing in its supposed 
duties as a channel for German propaganda; and of ignoring the interests of its 
membership.83  Mount Temple tried to calm the situation by inviting Pitt-Rivers to 
Broadlands for lunch and maintained a civil correspondence with Wright well after he 
and Tennant had fallen out.84  His efforts failed and, in June, Sharpe tried to enlist the 
support of the ten percent of the membership needed to call an extraordinary general 
meeting to change the leadership.  Sharpe contacted Bottomley, Sir Raymond Beazley 
and Domvile and a draft letter (dated 3 June 1937) was prepared with General Fuller, 
Arthur Kitson (a member of both the Britons and the Imperial Fascist league) and 
Bottomley as signatories.  They complained that the Fellowship was failing to 
counteract the ‘gross misrepresentation and distortion of facts in the reporting of 
German news’, accused the Council of being ‘overweighted by city interest and 
company directors’ and bemoaned the improper removal of Wright, the blackballing of 
Pitt-Rivers and the failure to rotate Council membership as required by the articles.  It 
is not clear whether this was ever sent, or an extraordinary general meeting held.  
In parallel, and more damagingly to its interests, they raised similar grievances and 
allegations with the Fellowship’s German associates.  Pitt-Rivers sent a package of 
relevant correspondence to Ribbentrop in February.  In May, Wright wrote to 
Ribbentrop, sent a fourteen-page letter to Carl Budding (a DEG founding member and 
Prussian civil servant) and, most seriously, sent a letter in German to Goebbels.  While 
this campaign damaged relations with the Germans, the agitators failed to unseat the 
elite controlling the Fellowship.  By spring 1938, they were still trying to rally ten 
percent of the membership, even going as far as to claim it was in the ‘virtual control’ 
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of ‘Zionist forces’ and that the true aim of Mount Temple, Tennant and Conwell-Evans 
was to ‘corrupt or crush National Socialism in Germany’.85   
Two scholars have characterised this power struggle within the Fellowship as a 
fundamental change of regime and a corresponding shift in approach over time.  
Griffiths concluded that ‘there is no doubt the leadership of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship had changed its stance by early 1939’ and emphasised that, by then, ‘its 
Council was almost entirely made up of the great and the good of industry and 
commerce, with almost no trace of the pro-Nazis who had graced it up to November 
1938’.86  The distinctions may be subtle but are important for a fuller understanding: 
the Council had been dominated by this ‘great and the good’ since the founding 
meeting.  Accepting the inclusion of Domvile for just over a year, there was never a 
period in the Council’s existence when it was ‘graced by pro-Nazis’, albeit its concerns 
about the regime only reached crisis point with Kristallnacht.  Similarly, Hart, writing 
about the Fellowship’s activities in 1937 (having wrongly assumed the Anglo-German 
Review was the Fellowship’s ‘own periodical’) determined a doctrinal shift, with it 
‘rapidly splitting between its pro-business and pro-Nazi factions’.87  While right to 
highlight the distinction between the two groups, the latter never held sway nor dictated 
ideology, it was always little more than a noisy, nasty minority that failed in its 
attempted coup.   
 
Kristallnacht  
The Kristallnacht pogrom against the Jews in Germany and Austria in November 1938 
ignited a crisis for the Fellowship that was a culmination of tensions that dated back to 
its foundation.  This was not, as commentators have suggested, the point at which the 
leadership started to question Hitler’s regime.  On 18 November 1938, barely a week 
later, the Council met to discuss the crisis.  HR (‘Gert’) Schlottmann, chairman of the 
Berlin branch of the DEG, had been sent specially from Berlin to investigate on behalf 
of the NSDAP.  He was given a ‘long tale of woe’ by Conwell-Evans who ‘informed 
him that the recent persecutions in Germany were having a disastrous effect on the 
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Fellowship and its work’.  Schlottmann returned to Germany ‘extremely depressed and 
very shocked’ at both the ‘narrow-minded views of the British public’ and ‘the 
repercussions which the persecutions have had on the Fellowship itself’.88 
Lord Mount Temple resigned as chairman (but remained a member of the Fellowship) 
‘as a protest against the treatment of the Jews by the German Government’,89 while the 
Council published a formal announcement in The Times and wrote to the membership 
explaining that it deeply regretted ‘the events which have set back the development of 
better understanding between the two nations.’90  (It was still not yet ready to abandon 
the cause completely and promised to maintain its efforts to support the prime 
minister’s appeasing efforts.)  These announcements brought Fellowship concerns 
about German anti-Semitism into the public domain.   There is no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of Mount Temple’s resignation; he was, as Bruce-Lockhart noted spikily in 
his diary, ‘father of two half-Jewesses in Lady Louis Mountbatten and Mrs 
Cunningham-Reid by his first wife, Cassel’s daughter’.91  The Evening Standard 
pointed out that ‘were Lord Mount Temple a German subject, this non-Aryan 
connection would be enough to make him ineligible for chairmanship of the Deutsch-
Englische Gesellschaft in Berlin’.92  The Jewish community, previously not 
unreasonably suspicious of the Fellowship, was pleased, setting this new vocalism in 
the context of broadening public condemnation of Jewish persecution.  The American 
Jewish Yearbook noted both Mount Temple’s resignation and the Council’s resolution 
concluding that ‘even the most ardent advocates of Anglo-German friendship had 
finally become convinced that the persecution of the Jews was more than an internal 
German problem and much more than a sentimental obstacle in the way of cooperation 
with the Nazi state’.93  Mount Temple’s personal archives include an impassioned letter 
of appreciation from a Jewish correspondent who insisted that ‘now that we can see the 
animal in its true uniform’ and begged Mount Temple to use his ‘good offices’ against 
the spread of ‘Jew-baiting’ in Britain.94  Another Council member, DM Mason, the 
former Liberal MP who had met both Hitler and Goebbels in September 1936, wrote to 
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The Times challenging Goebbels’s insistence that ‘England shall take no interest in the 
way we in Germany solve the Jewish question’ and argued rather it was of legitimate 
interest to Britain because of ‘its worldwide appeal to our common humanity, and… 
because the refugee question very directly concerns us as a nation and as individuals’.95  
Not all the members admired Mount Temple’s principled stand - CE Carroll wrote 
sarcastically to Pitt-Rivers that it would be a ‘big blow’ for the Fellowship asking ‘what 
will their tea parties be without him now!’96 
Some historians have downplayed the seriousness of this crisis citing an Evening 
Standard article (reproduced by Haxey) that reported only twenty of the members as 
having resigned in sympathy with Mount Temple’s protest.97   The MI5 file paints a 
very different picture.  In a detailed report, Friedl Gaertner (codenamed Gelatine or 
M/G), one of the security service personnel who had successfully infiltrated the 
Fellowship, confirmed a full-blown crisis.  There is no reason why she would have been 
inclined to exaggerate or dissemble.  She recorded that ‘it is reliably reported that the 
Fellowship has lost nearly 50 per cent of its membership in the last few weeks. 
Subscriptions have fallen to a deplorably low level and the few remaining members are, 
to quote Mrs Pomeroy, “only a lot of useless fanatics”’.   Attitudes towards the National 
Socialists had hardened within the Fellowship in that ‘so many of their influential hosts 
and hostesses have announced their intention of refusing to officiate at any Anglo-
German Fellowship function at which a member of the NSDAP is present’.  Gaertner 
described Pomeroy as a ‘very intelligent and sincere woman who she thinks is 
genuinely horrified at the recent turn of events’.98  A second MI5 note three months 
later reported the disappointment with the Fellowship of the Nazis, noting that ‘Berlin 
have been counting very considerably on the influence which the AGF might exert 
during a crisis and it is considered that they completely failed in this in September’.99  
German diplomats in London were under no illusion as to the damage done.  Just a 
week after Kristallnacht and only a month after he had been guest of honour at a 
Fellowship dinner at Claridge’s, Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador in 
London, sent an agitated report to the German Foreign Ministry.  In this, he explained 
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that the ‘anti-Semitic wave in Germany’ was disastrous to the morale of ‘those sections 
of the British public who actively supported Anglo-German friendship’ and ‘grist to the 
mill’ to the anti-German lobby resulting in a ‘loss of prestige’ for Chamberlain. 100  
It is essential not to confuse Germanophile myopia within the Fellowship with bright-
eyed Nazi fanaticism fuelled by rabid anti-Semitism.  Despite progress in setting 1930s 
pro-German sentiment into a subtler context, in the reappraisal of Lord Londonderry 
for example, the popular association between the Anglo-German Fellowship and the 
far right has survived into the twenty-first century.  Richard Ingrams, the former editor 
of Private Eye, has been forced to defend his late father against a supposed ‘reputation 
for anti-Semitism, based on his alleged membership of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship’.101  Similarly, in 2002, the eighth Duke of Wellington (by then an MC-
awarded veteran of el Alamein in his late eighties) was ambushed by an interviewer 
from The Times with claims that his uncle Charlie’s (the fifth Duke) being a member 
of the Fellowship put him ‘alongside the traitor William Joyce, also known as Lord 
Haw-Haw’.102 
Despite a willingness to promulgate Nazi propaganda in its publications, the 
Fellowship’s leadership was, from the outset, effective and often brave in 
communicating criticism of NSDAP policy to the heart of German government.  That 
this riled both the German leadership and its most ardent British supporters, such that 
both lost faith in the Fellowship as a tool to bring Britain closer to National Socialism, 
suggests it does not deserve its casual reputation as a pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic 
institution.  That around one in twenty of the members held and expressed views that 
chimed with the worst ideologies of National Socialism should not be dismissed, but 
that minority having been such a focus of scholarly attention has distracted historians 
from the other nineteen.  It was this majority that defined the Fellowship and led it 
through the three years leading up to the outbreak of war in September 1939 and the 
story of which forms the backbone of the next two chapters.   
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Chapter 6  
The ‘brink of peace’: from Coronation to Munich  
Having assessed how the Fellowship garnered support from the political, military, 
social and business elites in Britain by 1937, this and the following chapter develop the 
narrative in the three years leading up to the outbreak of war.  The celebration of George 
VI’s coronation, following the constitutional crisis of his brother’s abdication, opens 
this second act as the Fellowship matured into a credible intermediator and forum for 
diplomacy.  During the period, the Fellowship’s Council doubled the membership and 
developed its close association with the NSDAP leadership, especially Ribbentrop and 
Göring, such that it became a valuable conduit for the previously hostile British Foreign 
Office.  In parallel to this acceptability as an intermediator, it became entangled with 
the most significant pre-war attempt to de-throne Hitler.  Several historians have argued 
that the German opposition in 1938, and specifically the ‘Oster conspiracy’, was ‘well 
planned and had reasonably good prospects for success’.1  This chapter seeks to explain 
how the Fellowship used its unique, eccentric and often contradictory status in both 
countries to advance the cause of these resisters.  That they failed is a greater tragedy 
than acknowledged to date because historians have underestimated the determination, 
coordination and credibility of the Fellowship and its friends within the German 
resistance.  
By January 1937, the Fellowship had been established for nearly two years and had 
recruited 450 members with prestigious commercial and political backing.  The new 
year brought it a new king, a new prime minister, a new ambassador to Berlin and a 
new full-time secretary when Conwell-Evans took over from the increasingly extremist 
and less than competent Elwin Wright.  Each appointment was pivotal for Anglo-
German relations and contributed to a ‘happy and memorable year’ for the Fellowship, 
especially as Britain’s prime minister and his ambassador to Berlin were committed to 
appeasing Germany.2  Hitler had professed peace in a speech on 30 January, insisting 
that Germany did not want to be isolated and calling for international cooperation, 
better trade, the return of German former colonies, and restrictions on armaments, 
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especially for the air force.  These were sentiments ‘soon to prove even more cynical 
than it appeared at the time’, especially given Ribbentrop’s disenchantment with Britain 
and his influence over Germany’s foreign policy.3  As Conwell-Evans’s friend Christie 
reported from Germany, German ‘armament production… was proceeding at an 
astounding rate and the supply of raw materials could barely keep abreast of the 
demand’.  His local sources confirmed Hitler’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy 
and speculated, with impressive foresight, that armed conflict was likely with ‘the end 
of 1939 as the probable date when the Nazis would launch the war’.  He explained that 
the Germans had four immediate aims: to separate France from Russia; to separate 
Great Britain from France; to ‘pave the way for the early conquest of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia’ and to rearm aggressively, especially the Luftwaffe.4  His intelligence 
cast shadows of doubt over Chamberlain’s appeasement strategy.   
The Fellowship’s chairman, Mount Temple, at this stage, did not share Christie’s 
cynicism around Hitler’s ability to deceive ‘his credulous neighbours’.5  In the House 
of Lords a few weeks after Hitler’s speech, Mount Temple criticised the Franco-Soviet 
Pact and the British Foreign Office’s hostility to Germany, asking his fellow peers: 
‘why should we always do what the French ask us to do and never do anything to placate 
and to help the Germans?’  Referencing Hitler’s speech, he reassured his audience that 
the Germans ‘bear us no ill will for the War, and all they want is to resume the old 
relationship which existed between our two countries before the War in 1914’.6  
Ribbentrop wrote a letter of thanks.  
 
Preaching brotherly love to a rogue elephant  
As 1937 progressed, cooperation between the British embassy in Berlin and the 
Fellowship moved from polite but irritable tolerance to a warm welcome that fuelled 
its evolution from a ‘ginger group’ to quasi-governmental body.   In May, Chamberlain 
appointed Sir Nevile Henderson to replace Sir Eric Phipps who, having struggled to 
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engage with National Socialist Germany, had accepted the Paris posting.7  Henderson 
was well-disposed to the Fellowship from the outset and the admiration was initially 
mutual with Conwell-Evans describing him to Mount Temple as ‘so different from his 
predecessor’.8  Henderson had met and befriended Mount Temple on the SS Cap 
Arcona as they travelled back to Europe from the US in March 1937.  The Fellowship’s 
Council gave a private dinner for Sir Nevile in London in May 1937 to wish him bon 
voyage.  A month later, the DEG hosted a dinner at its clubhouse in Berlin to welcome 
the new ambassador underpinning how the twin societies now claimed a role on the 
diplomatic circuit.  Mount Temple, Major Ball and Tennant represented the Fellowship 
while Henderson and Tennant’s schoolfriend, Coburg, played host as president of the 
DEG.  Mount Temple used the opportunity to meet Hitler for the first time followed by 
a separate ‘exchange of views’ with the German foreign minister, von Neurath.9  
Conwell-Evans had arranged this through Ribbentrop, bypassing the British Embassy, 
having explained that ‘he alone on the German side is able to put the thing through’.10   
Over the next two and a half years, the respective assessments by the Fellowship and 
the ambassador of Hitler’s intentions and how best to manage him increasingly 
diverged.  Henderson, ‘taking advantage of the license granted [him] by Mr. 
Chamberlain’ used the occasion of the DEG dinner to give his maiden speech as 
ambassador - just as Ribbentrop had done six months earlier at a Fellowship banquet in 
London.  This was the first of his three speeches at DEG dinners that resulted in his 
appeasement strategies being reasonably, but wrongly, associated with the Fellowship.   
The widely-reported speech resulted in accusations of his pro-Nazi bias in the House 
of Commons and earned him the sobriquet ‘our Nazi British Ambassador at Berlin’.11  
Henderson quoted a verse of ‘American pacifist doggerel’ from the Great War that 
included the line: ‘who dares put a rifle to his shoulder to kill another mother’s darling 
boy?’  An appalled Christie pointed out that to recite this before an audience of ‘tough 
militant German leaders’ that included: Himmler, chief of the Gestapo; Victor Lutze, 
commander of the SA; Christie’s friend General Milch, secretary of state at the Air 
Ministry; Frantz Seldte, Reich minister for labour and Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, 
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the finance minister, was ‘about as appropriate as to try to preach brotherly love to a 
rogue elephant’.12  Flattering his hosts, Henderson emphasised how the sister societies 
had contributed ‘so much to a better understanding between nations’.  After praising 
the Nazi regime, he suggested English critics should ‘lay less stress on Nazi dictatorship 
and much more emphasis on the great social experiment which is being tried out in this 
country’, a sentence he later ruefully admitted had given ‘most offence to the Left wing 
and others in England’.13  Ivan Maisky, the alarmed Russian ambassador in London, 
advised Vansittart that the speech had caused ‘“amazement” in Moscow, not to mention 
more definite emotions’.14 
Both the Fellowship and the DEG celebrated their relationships with these senior 
diplomats.  Replying to Henderson’s speech, Coburg was delighted that ‘the highest 
representative of Great Britain in our Fatherland has the fullest sympathy for our work, 
just as the German Ambassador in London gives his warmest interest and fullest support 
in the pursuance of its aims to our sister society’.15  Less flattering parallels between 
Ribbentrop and Henderson were made by Oliver Harvey, personal private secretary to 
the foreign secretary, who hoped nervously in his diary that ‘we are not sending another 
Ribbentrop to Berlin’.16     
1937 was a transition year for Anglo-German relations, following the post-Olympic 
glow of late 1936, as the ‘foreign policy drift’ under Baldwin’s premiership was 
replaced by Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement and rearmament.17  Now we see the 
Fellowship gaining confidence and credibility as it coordinated effectively with the 
Foreign Office, the Berlin embassy and 10 Downing Street, despite the disagreement 
between the three over foreign policy.  The Fellowship also developed its links with 
opponents of Chamberlain’s appeasement beyond Vansittart including Winston 
Churchill and Lloyd George.  Ironically, as the British government firmly embraced 
appeasement, the Fellowship’s doubts about the German regime will be shown to 
escalate.  As such, it diverged ideologically from the British government - just as it 
achieved respectability as an institution.  
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Lothian and Hitler meet again  
The Germans remained enthusiastic to arrange meetings between their politicians and 
British counterparts.  Ribbentrop was doggedly determined to lure Baldwin to meet 
Hitler in Germany.  Now installed in London as ambassador, and only a week before 
Baldwin started his long-anticipated retirement, Ribbentrop still had his name atop a 
list of ‘influential Englishman’ whom he claimed would ‘visit Germany in the course 
of the summer, and… be received by the Führer’.18  In fact, it was Lothian and Conwell-
Evans, each worried about the deterioration in Anglo-German relations, who returned 
to Berlin in May 1937 for coffee with Hitler.  Keen to improve the situation, the duo 
met Göring on 4 May for two and a half hours in the morning, followed by a similarly 
long meeting with Hitler in the afternoon.  The next day they met Hjalmar Schacht, 
president of the Reichsbank, still seen as an Anglophile and moderating influence.  
After the meeting, Conwell-Evans remarked to Lothian that Hitler seemed ‘to have 
changed’ and now claimed to be ‘schwe verbittert’ (very embittered) against England.19  
Lothian felt that the ‘situation was both more dangerous and more soluble’ and, in a 
report sent to the prime minister, the Foreign Office and the dominion prime ministers, 
argued for a series of concessions to prevent Germany resorting to force with ‘terrifying 
strength, decision and violence’.20  This was condemned as naive by senior Foreign 
Office mandarins and Vansittart complained his visit ‘was being mischievously and 
unintelligently misused, particularly at the Imperial Conference’ where it fuelled 
Dominion demands for disengagement from European commitments. 21  Chamberlain 
was more positive.  Horace Wilson reported to Theo Kordt that the prime minister had 
been pleased to hear that Hitler saw England and Germany as ‘two pillars upon which 
the European social order could rest’.22  Lothian sent a copy of the report to his friend 
Norman Davis, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations and Roosevelt’s 
sailing companion, emphasising that it was ‘for your own eye and that of the President 
alone’.23  This started Lothian’s engagement with the American president and his 
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advisers on the German problem that built on his experience as a prominent appeaser 
under the auspices of the Fellowship and the guidance of his friend Conwell-Evans.   
This increased familiarity between the sister societies, the Berlin embassy and the 
German leadership, following the replacement of Phipps with Henderson, frustrated 
Vansittart.  Following a request from Mount Temple to debrief the prime minister on 
his meeting with Hitler, Vansittart fired off an irate memorandum insisting that ‘the 
P.M. should certainly not see Lord Mount Temple – nor should the Secretary of State.  
We really must put a stop to this eternal butting in of amateurs – and Lord Mount 
Temple is a particularly silly one… Sir E. Phipps rightly complained of these ambulant 
amateurs’.24  In similar vein, a Foreign Office note recorded that ‘the prime minister 
had not much opinion of Lord Mount Temple and that he was not at all anxious to 
encourage the intervention of these amateurs into foreign policy and in particular into 
Anglo-German relations’ and suggested he see the foreign secretary instead.25  As 
Middlemas has noted, ‘there is here and elsewhere evidence of how the unofficial 
visitors to Germany were resented - reflection both of the pride of the Office and its 
normally superior expertise’.26  These memoranda are often cited as evidence of the 
British government’s dismissive attitude to the ambulant amateurs and the Fellowship 
but, as will be shown, cooperation between the Office and the Fellowship improved 
soon after Vansittart’s outburst.  
 
Tea with the Archbishop of Canterbury  
That spring brought the Coronation, a national event offering social opportunities in 
London for Anglo-German enthusiasts, as had the Olympics in Berlin the summer 
before, to which the Fellowship contributed with gusto.  Although the Germans entered 
into the celebrations with outward enthusiasm, the exercise seems somewhat flat 
compared to what might have been if Edward VIII had had his day in Westminster 
Abbey.  Hitler sent as his representative, Field-Marshal von Blomberg, the German 
minister of defence, in place of Göring and von Neurath who had each volunteered but 
been vetoed by Ribbentrop.  Neither ever did visit Britain and it is intriguing to 
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speculate that, if they had, whether Ribbentrop’s dead hand on diplomatic relations 
might have been loosened.  The previous month, Göring had sent his chief of personal 
staff, Colonel Karl Bodenschatz, on a reconnaissance during which he visited Oxford 
and took tea at the Plough Inn, near High Wycombe.  There were separate plans to 
invite Göring, the country sports enthusiast, to shoot pheasants at Chatsworth or 
Sandringham or watch the Grand National, which the Foreign Office noted ‘excites 
great interest in Germany’, as well as a last-ditch proposal for him to visit Britain in 
August 1939, just days before the invasion of Poland.27    
Capitalising on the visit by such a senior German to a landmark royal event, the 
Fellowship held a tea reception for Blomberg at the May Fair Hotel where he ‘warmly 
welcomed the work of the Anglo-German Fellowship to foster good relations’.28  
Meanwhile, Mount Temple contributed a foreword to a Coronation supplement of the 
Hannoverscher Kurier ‘showing the close bonds between the two people, both racial 
and historical’.29  The Fellowship’s own commentary on the Coronation in its Monthly 
Journal nicely illustrates both its appreciation of royalty and its preoccupations in the 
spring of 1937.  Underscoring the Fellowship’s loyalty to the British Crown, it 
celebrated that ‘the peoples of his Majesty [are] at peace with their neighbours in all 
the five continents’ and insisted that there is nothing disloyal ‘in promoting relations of 
friendship with the most powerful nation on the Continent of Europe, a nation akin to 
the British peoples, and led by a Chancellor whose bedrock policy is co-operation with 
Great Britain’.30   
Conwell-Evans was honoured to act as ‘English ADC’ to von Blomberg.  They drove 
down to the Kent house of Lord Astor and were received en route by the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, who showed them the ‘beauties of the cathedral’.31  Meanwhile, keen to 
capitalise on the celebratory mood to burnish their social credentials in London, the 
Ribbentrops threw a lavish house warming reception at the newly refurbished German 
embassy on the day after the Coronation.  Billed by the News Chronicle as ‘one of the 
biggest diplomatic receptions held in London for many years’ with around 1,300 guests, 
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the Duke and Duchess of Kent were the guests of honour with ‘the Duke in scarlet tunic 
uniform and the dark blue ribbon of the Garter, and the Duchess in white satin with a 
necklace of sapphires and diamonds and a tall tiara to match’.32  The Fellowship proudly 
reported that its Council fielded eighteen members including Mount Temple, Tennant, 
Conwell-Evans and D’Arcy Cooper.  Three of the Fellowship’s marquesses 
(Clydesdale, Londonderry and Lothian) and four of its lords (Rennell, Redesdale, Noel 
Buxton and McGowan) attended, as did Gwylim Lloyd-George and British Legion 
friends including Maurice and Crosfield.  Following the blow of the abdication this was 
on the face of it a social triumph for Joachim and Mrs Ribbentrop whose ‘frock was of 
softly falling chiffon of a light blue which might be termed duck’s egg or light 
periwinkle (a colour also worn by Mrs Eden on this night)’.33     
However, fracture lines were showing in Anglo-German circles with even the 
Fellowship’s enthusiasts voicing concern.  Ribbentrop had received a letter from Berlin 
alleging that the Fellowship was ‘hostile to National Socialism’ and harboured ‘alleged 
Jewish sympathies’.  Conwell-Evans reported that ‘objection was taken to Lord 
Lothian's visit to Berlin’ and to his ‘having wished to take down the Nazi flag at the 
Ribbentrop dinner’.34    The background to this were a mystery until the historian 
Bradley Hart found the relevant correspondence in the Pitt-Rivers archive.35  Conwell-
Evans’s predecessor as secretary, Elwin Wright, taking his enforced early retirement 
badly, had mounted a concerted and malicious campaign against the Fellowship’s 
leaders.  The day before Hitler’s meeting with Lothian and Conwell-Evans, Wright had 
written a poisonous letter to Joseph Goebbels in which he urged the minister for 
propaganda to intervene to cancel the meeting.  He recounted the drama around the 
removal of the Nazi flag arguing that it showed Conwell-Evans to be no longer a friend 
of Nazi Germany.  Reporting an ideological split between the leadership and the 
membership, he alleged financial impropriety, conflicts of interest and that the 
leadership was secretly planning to push towards the re-establishment of Jewry in 
Germany.36  Quite how seriously these allegations were taken by the Germans is hard 
to assess but it was sufficient to warrant a special communiqué to Ribbentrop who was 
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irritated that Wright had written to Goebbels directly.37  Conwell-Evans and Tennant 
met Ribbentrop in person to discuss the allegations but the ambassador agreed they 
should ‘take no more notice of the affair’.38   
Despite his sang-froid in relation to the letter, this was when Ribbentrop fell out of love 
with Britain and the British.  As his biographer concluded, ‘during the late spring and 
summer of 1937 Ribbentrop, the former Anglophile, the man on whom Hitler had 
counted to bring home rapprochement, suddenly emerged as a violent antagonist of 
Great Britain, and would henceforth represent her to Hitler as Germany’s ‘most 
dangerous enemy’ and therefore the ‘main obstacle to her ambitions’.39  As Conwell-
Evans noted in his handwritten memoir, ‘Ribbentrop had an inferiority complex’ as he 
was ‘treated like a commercial traveller by the British aristocracy’.40  Tennant 
confirmed to Chamberlain in July 1939 that Ribbentrop’s ‘state of mind of seeking 
friendship with this country’ had ended in early 1937.41  This was a pivotal point for 
the Fellowship’s leadership as it lost its crucial German patron.  The conundrum is why 
it continued its mission for two further years.  
 
The von Neurath visit  
Conwell-Evans, whose contacts within the German Foreign Ministry gave him a 
shrewd understanding of its personalities and power plays, had complained to 
Ribbentrop about the cancellation of von Neurath’s proposed visit to London arguing 
that it would have offered an ‘opportunity of getting down from the general to the 
concrete’.42  Eden, the foreign secretary, had instructed Henderson to invite the German 
foreign minister and he had accepted, only to cancel at short notice blaming the alleged 
Spanish submarine attack on the German warship Leipzig.  Henderson believed it was 
Ribbentrop who had forced the cancellation just as he had blocked Göring joining the 
Coronation.   The Chamberlains had been excited about a visit, with Neville telling his 
sister Ida they were planning a ‘cocked hat lunch… with enormous zeal and capacity’ 
and publicly expressed regret at the cancellation of the visit in a speech at the Albert 
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Hall and ten days later in the House of Commons.43  Christie berated Göring for the 
cancellation, explaining that ‘much good work had been undone’ as ‘Neurath’s 
presence in London might have led to a most helpful discussion of all kinds of existing 
questions and obstacles’.44  Although Eden was sceptical, the prospect of von Neurath 
visiting London had become totemic for the British government, now fully committed 
to improving Anglo-German relations, feeding the belief that face-to-face meetings 
could build bridges across the choppy waters of international diplomacy.  Its 
cancellation was toxic just as had been Baldwin’s failure to reach German soil. 
The diary of the Russian ambassador, Ivan Maisky, corroborates this tension between 
the British ambulant amateurs and their National Socialist friends.  Having noted as 
early as December 1936 that Lothian’s ‘Germanophilia had faded’, four months later 
he reported that ‘even Lothian treats Germany with suspicion’.45  By December 1937, 
Maisky sensed that Lothian’s support for the Cliveden set appeared to have been 
‘wavering’, and by August 1938, he reported that Lothian had explicitly refused 
Halifax’s request to intercede with Hitler following Ribbentrop and Henderson’s 
furious row and that he disapproved of the British ‘capitulary policy’.46  Jan Masaryk, 
the Czech ambassador, confirmed Lothian’s disaffection, reporting to his government 
in July 1938 that having previously been ‘the most dangerous, because the most 
intelligent friend of Germany’, the ‘recent events in Austria and the whole cynical 
cruelty of the regime’ had convinced him he was ‘on the wrong road’.47  
In None So Blind Conwell-Evans dated his own Pauline conversion to the summer of 
1938 admitting ‘like the great majority of my fellow countrymen [he was] sadly late in 
perceiving the real nature of the Nazi German menace’.48  Contemporary 
correspondence shows that his discontent with the regime, like Lothian’s, had been 
growing for at least a year, and so, well before Munich.  In August 1937, he had a 
disturbing meeting in London with Ribbentrop ahead of the ambassador’s return to 
Germany on leave.  Conwell-Evans had gone straight round to the Foreign Office to 
warn Vansittart who briefed the prime minister, Halifax and Eden that this encounter 
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had ‘evidently somewhat shaken the Professor’.  In his note, he emphasised that 
Conwell-Evans was ‘one of the leading influences’ on the Fellowship and that he was 
‘in reality a great deal more… Ribbentrop’s principal guide and adviser in this 
country’.49     
 
Inspector Morse and ‘M’  
As the Fellowship matured as an intelligence gathering forum working with the Berlin 
embassy, 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office, it attracted the attention of the 
security services hunting fellow travellers, intelligence risks and even traitors.  
Ironically, as the overt organs of government became more trustful of the Fellowship’s 
aims and intelligence, the covert departments became more suspicious.  MI5 had 
opened a file on the Fellowship in the spring of 1935, even before it was legally 
incorporated.  Inspector Morse and Superintendent Canning of the Metropolitan 
Police’s Special Branch had produced a report in April 1935.  Morse was a leading Nazi 
hunter tasked with monitoring espionage risk among pro-Germans in London while 
Canning later investigated Wallis Simpson and accompanied George VI and Queen 
Elizabeth to the US in 1939.  Their report, sent to Guy Liddell, deputy director of 
counter-espionage at MI5, had noted correctly that, while sponsored by leading 
National Socialists, the Fellowship was not under their direct control as it did not admit 
German members.  However, it was not until the summer of 1937, a full eighteen 
months later than Russian agents, that the security services visited its headquarters in 
Chelsea.  The agents were impressed by the building - ‘a large block of about 250 
modern high class flats’ - and estimated the rent at ‘probably not less than £350 per 
annum’.  With a surprising interest in interior decoration, they noted that the ground 
floor flat had six rooms, including one for visitors and admired the ‘expensive modern 
style fittings’.50  There is no escaping the irony that within that well-appointed flat had, 
until recently, worked certainly one (and possibly two) of the most successful Soviet 
spies of the twentieth century.  While finding no evidence of illegal behaviour, MI5 did 
complain that the Fellowship’s activities were ‘wholly directed towards making English 
people friendly towards Germany and not towards making Germans friendly towards 
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England’.51   This was patently unfair given its extensive social activities with its 
German counterparts and the many thousands of German tourists it had welcomed to 
Britain.   
In October 1937, MI5 increased their surveillance and arranged for an agent, Jimmy 
Dickson (codenamed M/3) to apply to join as a member, having supplied him the 
subscription of one guinea (about £63 in 2018 prices).52  He met Conwell-Evans who 
‘went out of his way to be very charming’ and, with presumably unintended irony, had 
explained that he liked to meet new members as there had been people trying to join 
the Fellowship with the ‘intention of causing friction’.  Dickson promised his employers 
he would ‘take as active a part in the proceedings of the Fellowship as it is possible for 
him to do’.53  Whether he was successful is unclear but, about six months later, MI5 
employed a second agent to infiltrate the Fellowship, again under false pretences.  The 
Austrian twenty-six-year-old sometime model and cabaret singer, Friedl Gaertner, 
codenamed GELATINE (because her male colleagues thought her a ‘jolly-little-thing’), 
had been introduced to MI5 by a Stuart Menzies (later head of MI6) whose brother was 
married to her sister.  She was interviewed by Maxwell Knight (known as ‘M’), head 
of section B.5b, in charge of monitoring fascists and communists in Britain.54  Knight 
assessed her an ‘extremely level-headed and intelligent person’ noting lasciviously ‘her 
very considerable personal attractiveness’.55  Gaertner is significant because her 
perceptive reports give us first-hand, and probably objective accounts of the frictions 
as the Fellowship faced the drama of Munich and the atrocities of Kristallnacht.  She is 
of wider interest to historians of British intelligence for her later roles in the 
Wolkoff/Kent spying case and the Double XX deceptions.  Infiltrating the Fellowship 
was her first assignment and proved her mettle as an intelligence agent, just as it was 
and did for Kim Philby working for Russian intelligence.  
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Sending a curate to visit a tiger 
Following the success of the Fellowship visits to the Berlin Olympics and the 1936 
party rally, a delegation including Tennant was sent to the 1937 ‘Rally of Labour’ 
(Reichsparteitag der Arbeit) at Nürnberg.  Invitations were issued by Ribbentrop’s 
office and signed by Walther Hewel, the charming anglophile and Ribbentrop’s liaison 
with Hitler who was ‘far more liked by the Dictator and everyone else than the preening 
Foreign Minister himself’.56  One of the Führer’s few personal friends, having been 
imprisoned with him at Landsburg in 1923, he was a founder member of the council 
and sometime treasurer of the DEG in Berlin.  Tennant considered him the ‘best friend 
England has among Hitler’s immediate entourage’ and developed a rapport with him in 
the months leading up to war.57  The British guests were escorted by an impressive team 
of five ‘courteous, helpful and always charming’ German hosts including Gert 
Schlottmann, the Berlin secretary of the DEG and Baron von Geyr, who had supported 
Lloyd George the previous summer.   
Controversially, and in contrast to his predecessor, Henderson attended without the 
blessing of the British Foreign Office and sent back glowing reports.  He concocted a 
plan with Göring for Halifax to visit Germany as the Reichsmarschall saw Britain as 
increasingly perceived as an enemy in Germany.  His biographer has rightly identified 
the famous pilgrimage to Berchtesgaden as another proxy for a visit by Stanley 
Baldwin.58  As Tom Jones, who had accompanied Lloyd George and Conwell-Evans 
on their trip to the Berghof in 1936, advised Ribbentrop ‘if the attempt to secure SB 
failed, the sooner Halifax met the Führer the better’.59  Eden and his Foreign Office 
preferred the meeting to be held in Berlin, recognising the psychological advantage the 
Führer engineered by receiving visitors at his country retreat near the Austrian border.  
One hundred and fifty kilometres south-east of Munich, it was an arduous journey from 
Berlin, equivalent to the British prime minister inviting foreign statesmen to meet him 
at a fishing lodge in Loch Lomond.   
The political and diplomatic sands had shifted in the fourteen months since Lloyd 
George’s visit and the styles of the two British politicians could hardly have been more 
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different.  The charming and wily Great War prime minister had flattered and charmed 
Hitler more effectively than any other British visitor.  They found common ground on 
Frederick the Great, Great War reminiscences and had even talked of the Führer visiting 
London.  By contrast, the meeting with the patrician former viceroy of India was tense 
and awkward with Halifax famously mistaking the unprepossessing Hitler for a 
footman.  As Churchill wrote after the war, ‘one could hardly conceive two 
personalities less able to comprehend one another’ contrasting the ‘High Church 
Yorkshire aristocrat and ardent peace-lover’ with ‘the demon-genius sprung from the 
abyss of poverty, inflamed by defeat, devoured by hatred and revenge, and convulsed 
by his design to make the German race masters of Europe or maybe the world’.60  Lloyd 
George was similarly sceptical, comparing the enterprise to ‘sending a curate to visit a 
tiger’.61 
The Fellowship had no role in the clumsily choreographed visit by the lord president of 
the council (he did not become foreign secretary for another three months) so it is 
notable how he soon after began to rely on Conwell-Evans for counsel on German 
affairs.  As Andrew Roberts has evidenced, contrary to later mythologizing, the British 
Foreign Office, including Eden, was intimately involved in the decision for Halifax to 
go.  While Ribbentrop had helped organise the earlier British visits, von Neurath and 
Henderson took the lead and the German ambassador was, at Halifax’s request, kept in 
the dark.  In an attempt to give the visit the least degree of British governmental blessing 
- what Lloyd George called ‘an innocent, though amusing and rather ridiculous pretext’ 
- Halifax, as master of the Middleton Foxhounds, was invited to the Berlin Hunting 
Exhibition.62  The invitation was delivered through the offices of The Field, then as 
now a periodical favoured by the hunting and shooting set, from Göring as Reich 
Jägermeister (the game warden of the Reich).  A meeting with the vegetarian, animal-
loving Führer was admitted as being under consideration but only if both men’s 
schedules allowed.  While something similarly fanciful had been floated with the Lloyd 
George visit, the mismanagement of the press and the consequent chaos was far more 
damaging.  Plans leaked to The Evening Standard, which speculated that Hitler was 
looking for a ten-year truce on the colonial issue and a ‘free hand in Central Europe’.63  
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Meanwhile, Vansittart leaked it to The Week, Claud Cockburn’s political gossip sheet, 
which described it as an ‘extraordinary and somewhat sinister affair’.  Thereon, the 
public relations continued to be chaotic as ‘the fiction of the Exhibition as the main 
reason for the visit had to be adhered to, despite its looking mangier by the day’.64  So 
this was ‘ambulant amateurism’ at its most amateur - neither an official visit properly 
organised through the foreign offices and embassies nor an unofficial, plausibly 
deniable, meeting arranged by the Fellowship.  Those visits that the Fellowship had 
arranged for Lloyd George, Lothian, Allen, Stamp, Mount Temple et al may have 
achieved little, but did, at least run smoothly. 
Despite the controversy, the Fellowship’s Monthly Journal reported breathlessly that 
its members ‘greatly welcome the fact that Lord Halifax paid a visit to the German 
Chancellor’ and optimistically claimed that ‘German circles regarded the conversation 
as having been a promising first contact between the British and German 
Governments’.65  Chamberlain was pleased, judging it had ‘gone well’ as Halifax had 
reiterated the invitation for von Neurath to visit Britain.66  Writing during the war, 
Conwell-Evans recollected dejectedly that ‘the visit achieved little; Hitler interpreted 
this friendly approach as an expression of British timidity’.67   
Less than two weeks after his return from Germany, Halifax attended the Fellowship’s 
Christmas banquet, his first recorded engagement with the organisation.  Halifax was 
the most senior government figure to attend a dinner and his speech notable as he had 
been Chamberlain’s emissary and would be appointed foreign secretary two months 
later.  This cemented the much-improved relationship with the British government and 
gave the Fellowship confidence that it had ‘taken its place, young though it is, as one 
of the institutions of the country’.68  Nearly five hundred guests joined Halifax at 
Grosvenor House with the Duke of Coburg as ‘chief guest’ and Ribbentrop, only two 
months away from being appointed foreign minister in Berlin, also in attendance.  
Vansittart, then in the last month of his eight-year career as head of the Foreign Office, 
came with his wife.  Mount Temple praised the duke’s work with war veterans before 
reporting that membership had reached seven hundred including ‘citizens drawn from 
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all parts of the British Isles, with important groups in the North and the Midlands’, 
emphasis presumably designed to mitigate any suggestion it was a metropolitan elite.69  
Both The Manchester Guardian and The Times reported laughter when Halifax wryly 
reminded his audience that his trip to Germany had been ‘for the purpose of visiting the 
great hunting exhibition’.  Echoing Henderson in Berlin, Halifax praised his hosts’ 
work emphasising that ‘the understanding between nations which the Anglo-German 
Fellowship existed to promote was without any doubt the greatest necessity with which 
the world today stood confronted’.70   
Despite having been excluded from the arrangements, Ribbentrop claimed credit for 
Halifax’s visit on behalf of the sister societies on the grounds that they had created a 
‘better atmosphere’ in Anglo-German relations.  Meanwhile, the Germany embassy in 
London reported to Berlin that the dinner had been a success and that the press had 
covered it in a ‘satisfactory way’.71  Halifax’s enthusiasm survived the dinner - writing 
to Conwell-Evans that he was ‘sure it will have a good effect’ and was ‘glad to make 
such contribution as [he] could to its success’.72   
 
The brink of peace 
On New Year’s Day 1938, Vansittart relinquished his post as permanent 
undersecretary.  Determinedly keeping his office next to the foreign secretary, he was 
given the grand-sounding title of chief diplomatic adviser to the Government but was 
stripped of his executive authority such that the Germans remained puzzled as to 
whether the infamous Germanophobe had been promoted or demoted.73  The next day, 
Ribbentrop sent his painstakingly-crafted and absurdly-misleading memorandum to 
Hitler that signalled the changing fortunes of Anglo-German relations.  Both a letter of 
resignation as ambassador, the role he now hated, and application for the post of foreign 
minister, he argued that Britain, backed by France, would never allow German 
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expansion in Eastern and Central Europe and that Chamberlain’s appeasement was 
merely the British playing for time.74   
Meehan has defined 1938 as the year ‘the world went to the brink of peace’ and this 
applies to the Fellowship as it processed the sequence of events: the Anschluss in April, 
the May Crisis over Czechoslovakia, escalating diplomatic tensions over the summer, 
growing resistance to Hitler’s regime and meetings between statesmen in the autumn 
that culminated in the Munich agreement.75  In March, Christie reported to Vansittart 
the increasing split on foreign affairs among Hitler’s paladins with the moderates 
(Neurath, Blomberg and Göring) still favouring ‘a working understanding with Great 
Britain’ while the radicals (Himmler, Goebbels, Rosenberg and Ribbentrop) preferred 
‘to go the whole hog with Italy and Japan’.  He saw Hitler leaning towards the latter 
but reported that Ribbentrop’s influence had waned not least because of ‘Adolf’s 
irritation’ over the Halifax meeting.76  A month later, Ribbentrop was finally appointed 
Reich foreign minister which Christie reported had come ‘rather as a surprise’ even to 
Ribbentrop.77  Hitler also dismissed Blomberg, another moderating influence and the 
Fellowship’s guest at the Coronation, whose ‘imprudent marriage with a woman of 
questionable character gave the High Command the pretext which they desired’.78  The 
next day, Hitler held his last ever cabinet meeting and assumed direct control over the 
offices of government.  Despite these shifting sands, the strength of both Conwell-
Evans and Tennant’s friendship with the new foreign minister, coupled with the close 
bonds formed with his far-from-loyal senior staff, meant that the Fellowship maintained 
vital access to the NSDAP leadership up to the outbreak of war.  Eden, frustrated by 
what he saw as Chamberlain’s craven attitude to the dictators, resigned as foreign 
secretary and was replaced by the unflappable Halifax supported by Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, his ‘resourceful, straightforward and emollient’ permanent under-secretary.79   
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While Tennant and Conwell-Evans, despite frustrations, nurtured their bonds with 
Ribbentrop and his staff, Christie continued to exploit his decades-long friendship with 
Göring who, despite losing influence to his rival Ribbentrop, stubbornly kept a hand in 
German foreign policy.  This connection was especially valuable to British intelligence 
because, as Ferris has asserted, between 1933 and 1938, ‘the SIS had no direct access’ 
to Göring.80  His biographer has acknowledged how Christie was exceptionally well-
briefed on Germany’s attitudes and plans by the Reichsmarschall himself.  During 
lengthy discussions in 1937, they covered the ‘ideas expressed by Hitler’ at the secret 
November 1937 conference recorded in the ‘Hossbach memorandum’.81  Three months 
later, Christie reported on a secret lecture given by Göring on 8 February to senior 
Luftwaffe and army officers as well as ‘high officials of the War Industries 
Department’.  In his authoritative report, Christie laid out Hitler and Göring’s plans and 
dejectedly predicted a feeble British response.  As it was ‘not yet practicable to get at 
Great Britain or France’ he predicted ‘the immediate (sofortige) annexation of Austria, 
and the conquering (Eroberung) of Czechoslovakia’ following which ‘Hungary and the 
Balkan states would automatically come under Germany’s economic dictatorship’.  
Göring, he continued, had proposed an early ‘lightning’ war against Czechoslovakia.  
Christie noted that Göring’s talk had been received with ‘much applause by the air 
officers and economic experts’ but ‘less heartily by the army staff’, reminding the 
reader that Germany was in ‘no condition to sustain any protracted war’ as the astute 
soldiers knew well.  He urged the British government to encourage the ‘reasonable 
elements’ in Germany on the basis it would help the army leaders ‘avoid a disastrous 
war and… prevent foreign policy being carried on by a series of adventures’.82 
The current priority of German foreign policy was now the incorporation of Austria 
into a greater Germany.  In January 1938, Christie had reported ‘rumours of a 
forthcoming putsch’ to be staged so it appeared to be ‘the spontaneous wish of the 
Austrian people, and thus avoid coming to cross purposes with Mussolini again’.83  
Further warnings followed in February and, on 12 March, Hitler’s troops did march into 
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Austria to achieve the long-awaited Anschluss.  The news of the invasion reached 
London as the Ribbentrops were enjoying a farewell lunch hosted by the Chamberlains 
at 10 Downing Street.  Embarrassingly for Ribbentrop, he had been excluded from the 
enterprise so was as bewildered by events as his hosts.  Tennant sent Mount Temple a 
report following the plebiscite to ratify the union of Germany and Austria that was 
sympathetic to the cause of a greater Germany and shared his German friends’ 
frustration at the negativity of the British press.  Still convinced that the ‘probability of 
war with Great Britain does not come into the calculations of the Germans’, he reported 
that his informant had argued that Britain had nonetheless ‘ridden Germany for 20 years 
with a very tight curb’ and must now recognise that the Germans were ‘equals with 
equal rights to zones of influence around [their] frontiers’.  Tennant recommended 
returning ‘a couple of colonies as a safety valve… if only to prevent the autarkists 
gaining complete control’.84  Christie, in contrast, reported prophetically that ‘the 
invasion of Austria is, however, only one small step toward other and bigger events’.85  
Despite Tennant’s acquiescence, the Fellowship’s Council as a group was alarmed 
enough by events (according to one disgruntled Fellowship member) to send a letter to 
Ribbentrop ‘criticising the German government’s action in effecting the Anschluss’.86  
This is unlikely to have pleased the Reich’s foreign minister.  Lothian, who had 
positively excused the re-invasion of the Ruhr, similarly accepted the Anschluss but 
‘deplored the use of force’.87   
 
The May Crisis 
The implications of the Anschluss had been barely absorbed when attention was 
distracted by a rumoured invasion of Czechoslovakia sparked by mistaken reports that 
Germany was massing troops on its border.  Prompt action by the Allies resulted in an 
embarrassing climb-down for Hitler and Ribbentrop but crystallised their plans for an 
autumn 1938 invasion of Czechoslovakia codenamed ‘Operation Green’.  Vansittart 
saw the May crisis as evidence that standing up to Hitler was effective, indeed essential, 
while his disastrous appointee as ambassador, Henderson, believed that it should never 
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be repeated for risk of provoking the Führer’s ire.  While his foresight about Austria 
was impressive, Christie showed poor judgment on one key aspect as the 
Czechoslovakian situation escalated.  On 13 May, he brought Konrad Henlein, the 
leader of the German Sudeten Party in Czechoslovakia (SdP), to lunch with Winston 
Churchill in what appears the first engagement by one of the Fellowship’s leading lights 
with the future prime minister.  The respected Czech historian, JW Bruegel, writing in 
the 1960s, chronicled the two men’s dealings and concluded that the ‘mysterious’ 
Christie was ‘commissioned by someone in London to sound out Henlein’.88  Also 
present at the lunch were Sir Archibald Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal Party, and 
Professor Lindemann, Churchill’s scientific adviser.  Writing to thank him for lunch, 
Christie flattered his host, saying Henlein thought Churchill represented ‘the real 
strength of the British’ in stark contrast to ‘those wretched defeatists whose gutless 
attitude encourages both ends of the Axis to rev up their demands relentlessly’.89  
Christie arranged for Henlein to give a talk at Chatham House (where he, Conwell-
Evans and Lothian were active members) at which he claimed the Prague government’s 
link with Moscow made Czechoslovakia ‘Russia’s aircraft carrier’.90  Christie arranged 
for MP Harold Nicolson to host a tea party to introduce him to other young MPs, 
similarly suspicious of Germany, all of whom seemed convinced of the Sudeten 
leader’s reasonableness.  Subsequently, Henlein was to throw his support 
comprehensively behind Hitler, but as Faber has concluded, ‘the government’s faith in 
Henlein was hardly surprising, given that he had successfully pulled the wool over the 
eyes of even Churchill and Vansittart’.91  Vansittart, Conwell-Evans and Christie were 
each later coy about this wool-pulling.  Henlein is barely mentioned in None so Blind 
and, when Bruegel contacted Christie in 1964, he ‘expressed himself unable to help 
clarify the matter’ because of ‘age, illness and loss of memory’ while Vansittart was 
selective in remembering his dealings with Henlein after the war in his memoirs.92 
Amid the crisis, on 18 May, the Fellowship held an afternoon reception for Ribbentrop's 
successor as ambassador, Herbert von Dirksen.  The party included heavyweight 
Foreign Office guests including Vansittart and his wife; RA Butler, under-secretary of 
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state; Alec Cadogan, Vansittart’s successor as permanent undersecretary, and nearly 
150 others including Sir Josiah Stamp, Lords Lothian and Londonderry, Brigadier 
Hotblack, the military attaché in Berlin, as well as Christie, Conwell-Evans and Mount 
Temple.  The guest lists at these events hosted by the Fellowship demonstrate how 
effectively it had proven itself as the forum for co-mingling between the professional 
diplomatists as well as the ambulant amateurs from the two countries. 
By June, Conwell-Evans, demonstrating his particular faculty for befriending 
politicians and diplomatists had won the trust and admiration of the new foreign 
secretary.  Now we see Halifax, civil servants and official minutes (including those of 
Cabinet meetings) referencing Conwell-Evans, the Fellowship and the DEG as 
authoritative sources.93  Conwell-Evans had frequent, prompt and privileged access to 
the innermost corridors of British political and diplomatic influence including Sir 
Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s closest confidante.  He had briefed Wilson (who briefed 
Cadogan) as far back as March 1938 that Göring was urging Ribbentrop to be 
‘forthcoming’ with the British.94  Now, the Fellowship’s communications with the 
British government were verifiable, credible and valuable intelligence rather than the 
obviously pro-German public relations material, which some would class propaganda, 
that was typical of the earlier period.  
 
Summer with Ribbentrop  
As spring slipped into summer, the sense of chaos within Anglo-German relations 
continued.  Despite Ribbentrop changed attitude towards Great Britain, his mood 
swings and undiplomatic outbursts, Tennant and Conwell-Evans maintained cordial 
relations with, and perhaps some affection for, him well into 1939.  Ribbentrop suffered 
twin humiliations in May with the pantomime of the German state visit to Italy followed 
by the Czech mobilisation.  Soon after, Tennant, while visiting Berlin, received a call 
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from Ribbentrop, whom he had not seen for a year, inviting him to tea.  A car was sent, 
and Tennant met the foreign minister at the front steps of an ‘immense Schloss’ at 
Sonnenberg ‘dressed in white cotton plus-fours’ to play golf on the adjoining nine-hole 
course.  Despite not having played for thirty years, Tennant won the first five holes 
whereupon Ribbentrop ‘lost his temper, hit all the balls… into a distant wood and 
stalked home in rage’.95  
Conwell-Evans’s dealings with his sometime friend were no less disturbing.  Recently 
discovered handwritten notes, presumably prepared in collaboration with Martin 
Gilbert, and draft typescript, presumably for None so Blind but never used, give insight 
into the conversations between them at this time.  At a lunch, also attended by his friend 
Erich Kordt, Conwell-Evans was insistent that Hitler and Ribbentrop’s foreign policy 
would lead to war.  Conwell-Evans told him his policy was ‘quite unreasonable’ and 
that his aggression would ‘lead to the destruction of Germany’, to which Ribbentrop 
responded ‘words, words, words…’  Conwell-Evans appealed to his old friend’s 
humanity asking whether he wanted to see ‘those young men – just mutilated bodies – 
die?’ to which Ribbentrop responded by raging about the Czechs for mobilising in May 
and threatening to ‘massacre the whole lot, seven millions of them’.96  Furiously, 
Conwell-Evans insisted that Britain and France would respond to any aggression 
against Czechoslovakia with force and stalked out of the building.  Returning home, he 
recognised that Ribbentrop was too craven to Hitler to give cogent counsel and 
contrasted him with Göring who would have given better advice.97  He warned Halifax 
about the dangers of other Britons, especially Lord Brocket, feeding Ribbentrop flawed 
advice to fuel his delusions.  
By now, Ribbentrop was extending tentative feelers of friendship towards Soviet 
Russia, and the NASDP’s loathing for communism could no longer ‘stand in the way 
of a revival of good relations with Russia’.98  The British Foreign Office files include a 
‘very secret’ letter from one of Vansittart’s informants within Hitler’s ‘immediate 
entourage’ forwarded by him to Halifax and by Oliver Harvey to the prime minister.  
This confirmed that ‘the blow delivered to the Führer’s schemes’ by the May crisis had 
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resulted in ‘a complete muddle and lack of direction’ within the German government, 
that it had ‘seriously damaged [Hitler’s] personal authority and prestige’ so he was 
‘moved by a wild desire for revenge’ and prone to ‘brutal outbursts’ and ‘long Sphinx-
like silences’.99   
But, despite Ribbentrop’s hostility to Britain and the rising crisis, the sister societies he 
sponsored continued to expand their activities.  Tennant remembered that ‘a desperate 
urge to make friends with Britain seemed to spread over Germany during 1938 and 
1939’ resulting in the DEG’s causing the Fellowship ‘great embarrassment by wanting 
to open branches in far more towns than we could cope with’.100  The Berlin clubhouse 
was overstretched having welcomed 13,000 visitors in 1937 alone, so a nineteen-
roomed house had been acquired on 83 Fasanenstrasse in the affluent Charlottenburg 
neighbourhood for development as a larger clubhouse.  John Carvell, the British consul-
general, briefed Henderson on a plan to open a Munich branch of the DEG which he 
suggested might ‘give English visitors a chance of meeting and talking with Germans 
who although ardent national socialists, are not primarily high-pressure professional 
propagandists’.  Henderson concurred and authorised him to give it ‘discreet 
encouragement and support’ by attending meetings.101  
 
The Oster conspiracy and the Kordt brothers 
During that summer of 1938 the Fellowship began to build connections with those in 
Germany who offered a potential alternative to Hitler’s regime.  Desperate that they 
should understand that Hitler planned to invade and subdue all of Czechoslovakia and 
that protecting the downtrodden Sudetens was an excuse, the resisters urged the British 
and French to take a firm stance and not try to bluff Hitler.  They insisted there was a 
credible opposition to Hitler behind the conspiracy led by Major General Hans Oster.102  
Oster, deputy head of the Abwehr, planned to overthrow Hitler should he attack 
Czechoslovakia and install a replacement government that would be acceptable to 
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Britain and her allies.  It was Conwell-Evans’s flat at 31 Cornwall Gardens, a quiet tree-
lined square in residential Kensington, that became the meeting place for a series of 
meetings between British government mandarins and the German conspirators 
supporting Oster.  Tennant identified the military leaders supporting the conspiracy as 
including Colonel-General Ludwig Beck (chief of the General Staff), Colonel-General 
Franz Halder, Admiral Canaris, (Oster’s boss as chief of the Abwehr), General von 
Witzleben, Count Erich von Brockdorff-Ahlefeld and others.103  The civilians 
supporting the conspiracy included Conwell-Evans’s friends in the German Foreign 
Ministry centred on the Kordt brothers.  Rightly or wrongly these men and women saw 
the Fellowship as a secure channel for communication with the British government.  
Aside from Ribbentrop, and obviously for different reasons, Conwell-Evans’s most 
important contacts in Germany were the Kordt family.  He formed a close association 
with brothers Erich and Theodor, Theo’s wife and their cousin Suzanne Simonis that 
developed into a focused intelligence cell and survived into the war.  The ‘brilliant and 
sceptical’ Erich was assigned to work for Ribbentrop by State Secretary von Bülow in 
1934 as an ‘official aide and unofficial watchdog’.104  Despite many frustrations, for 
seven years he stuck close to his master who relied on him to ‘repair his fractured prose 
and to tidy up his various messes’.105  In 1936, Erich was made first secretary when 
Ribbentrop was appointed ambassador to London from where he reported back 
discreetly to von Neurath.  He encouraged Ribbentrop to appoint Ernst von Weizsäcker, 
with whom he had worked closely in Switzerland, to be head of the German Foreign 
Office and became his ‘closest confidant’ there.106  In early 1938, when his master 
became foreign minister, Erich was made chef de cabinet, a ‘position which gave him 
unique access to the machinations of the Führer and his foreign minister’.107  Anxious 
to maintain a trusted ally in the German embassy on Carlton House Terrace, Erich 
arranged  for his brother Theo to be moved from Athens to London as councillor.  The 
two brothers enlisted the support of their cousin Suzanne, a reporter for Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zietung, to travel between Berlin and London with sensitive messages from 
the German resistance using her journalistic credentials as cover. 
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Erich’s status as a founding member of the DEG gave him cover for frequent meetings 
with his friend Conwell-Evans and he attended at least two of the Fellowship’s banquets 
in London.  He had been responsible for assigning as Hitler’s personal interpreter Paul 
Schmidt, who translated for the Führer during the visits by Lloyd George, Halifax and 
Chamberlain and was sympathetic to the resistance.  He also installed von Dirksen, who 
disliked his predecessor, as Ribbentrop’s successor as London ambassador.  Meehan 
goes as far as to characterise these manoeuvrings as the establishment of an effective 
opposition group within the German Foreign Office and credits Erich’s influence for 
putting the players in place by March 1938.  While there remains a wider debate (well 
beyond the scope of this study) about the extent to which the German Foreign Office 
harboured ‘good’ Germans, there seems little doubt as to the brothers’ commitment to 
remove Hitler which included an aborted assassination attempt.  
In July, General Beck, whom Conwell-Evans admired as ‘perhaps the ablest, certainly 
the most respected of the old school’, sent Erich Kordt to meet Conwell-Evans secretly 
in Cornwall Gardens.  Parssinen ventured this was Erich’s first engagement with the 
resistance.108  As Kordt remembered, they had decided to warn the British government 
of Hitler’s plans to invade Czechoslovakia and hoped to ‘influence the British at the 
proper time which position to take in the event of a German-Czech crisis’.   He 
explained that ‘a firm declaration by Britain’ would allow Beck to ‘incite the Army to 
active revolt against the regime should Hitler go to war against Czechoslovakia’.109   
The two men met again for lunch in early August at the Travellers' Club where Kordt 
challenged Conwell-Evans’s faith in Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague given what 
they both now knew of Hitler’s thinking.  Christie also met Halifax to discuss the 
‘Central European situation’ urging the mobilisation of the navy and air force.  He 
warned Vansittart that the National Socialists were ‘in full war cry’ and would invade 
Czechoslovakia in September despite the ‘growing fear of war amongst German 
people’.110     
The following months brought an intensity of engagement between German 
intelligence sources and the British government choreographed by Fellowship Council 
members to a degree previously unacknowledged by historians.  In the middle of 
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August, Christie (signing himself as ‘Colonel Blimp’) wrote to Vansittart that his 
sources had confirmed that ‘Japan had already joined the German-Italian military 
alliance’ and that Ribbentrop and the Japanese ambassador had signed the document.  
Two days later, Theo Kordt, deputising for Ribbentrop, met Horace Wilson at Conwell-
Evans’s flat, their host having just returned from a holiday with Christie ‘scrambling 
around in the Jura mountains’.111  Theo detailed Hitler’s war plans and urged the need 
for a consistent policy from the British government.  Conwell-Evans rushed back to 
Berlin the next day where he stayed for five days. 
On 29 August, Christie reported intelligence from Otto Abetz, Ribbentrop’s adviser on 
France, confirming the planned Czech invasion while Conwell-Evans warned Wilson, 
with a copy to Vansittart, on similar lines.  The next day, Chamberlain recalled his 
colleagues from holidays for a secret meeting of the cabinet.  Eighteen ministers 
attended and were joined by Henderson who was recalled from Berlin.  Halifax spoke 
for an hour followed by the ambassador who argued against antagonising Hitler.  
Vansittart précised Conwell-Evans’s intelligence in a memorandum for the foreign 
secretary detailing the German threat to Czechoslovakia, rather than just the 
Sudetenland, and explaining that Hitler ‘dismisses all the objections of his Generals and 
of the Moderates with the statement that France and Great Britain will remain neutral’.  
He explained Conwell-Evans’s Damascene conversion:  how, despite being ‘the most 
ardent Germanophil [sic] in this country’ and Ribbentrop’s ‘bosom friend’, now the 
‘scales have dropped from his eyes in regard to the Nazis’.112   
The next day, Conwell-Evans gave Halifax his ‘personal impressions of Berlin’ and, 
like Christie, recommended mobilising the British fleet.  He met Theo Kordt and 
Vansittart at his flat and penned another letter to Halifax urging him not to try to bluff 
Hitler, explaining that the Führer had ‘a strange, uncanny and prophetic instinct of 
distinguishing bluff and realities’.  Before leaving that evening to return to Berlin, he 
assured the foreign secretary: ‘I have devoted my life to Anglo German relations and 
am still doing so to the end’ but begged him not to reveal his name in correspondence 
to protect his German informants.113 
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Also, that August, Lothian was secretly offered and accepted the ambassadorship to 
Washington opening a channel between the Fellowship and the US government 
including the president.  The appointment marked his transition from ardent appeaser 
of Germany to leading champion of improved Anglo-American relations with the 
specific mission to secure US support in any European conflict.  Before he left for a 
trip to Australia on Rhodes Trust business, he telephoned the Czech ambassador to 
confirm that he had ‘ceased to be a Germanophile’.114  
 
September 1938 
As the crisis deepened, September saw many in the Fellowship’s story - Conwell-
Evans, Tennant, the Kordts, Henderson, Christie, Horace Wilson and, of course, 
Chamberlain - shuttling back and forth between London and Germany in the search for 
peace.  Although familiar to historians, the chronology of this fevered period is worth 
reviewing to illustrate the central, albeit frustrated, role played by the Fellowship’s 
dramatis personae.115   
On 3 September, the German resistance made another direct approach to the Fellowship 
when its military leadership - General Halder, General Beck and Colonel Oster - sent a 
retired army colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel Hans-Werner Bōhm-Tettelbach to London.  
Fluent in English, the colonel came to meet Julian Piggott, one of the Fellowship’s 
founding Council members, whom he had known as British high commissioner of the 
Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission at Cologne immediately after the Great War.  
Piggott had ‘arranged subsequent introductions’ to other senior British figures.  On 6 
September, Theo Kordt visited Wilson at 10 Downing Street on behalf of Erich and 
secretary of state Weizsäcker for a two-hour meeting.  According to Tennant, this 
meeting had been arranged by ‘a leading member of the Fellowship Council’ - 
presumably Conwell-Evans.116  Theo, putting ‘conscience before loyalty’ warned 
Wilson that Hitler planned to invade Czechoslovakia on the 19 or 20 September.  
Wilson briefed Cadogan on the meeting who understood the personal risk being taken 
by ‘Herr X’, noting in his diary that ‘the man’s life is at stake, and I can’t jeopardise it 
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by putting the name on paper’.117  Wilson and Cadogan judged the credibility of this 
intelligence sufficient to warrant again recalling the prime minister from holiday in 
Scotland and for the foreign secretary to cancel his imminent trip to the League of 
Nations.  Kordt recommended the British government should take a firm stance and 
issue a warning radio broadcast to Germany.  As Faber concluded, this was more than 
grumblings from the marginalised resistance as Kordt was ‘not some little-known 
emissary from within Germany, but was the officially accredited second-in-command 
at the German embassy, and was a respected figure in diplomatic circles’.  A further 
meeting between Kordt and Halifax followed the next day with Kordt required to arrive 
surreptitiously through the garden entrance at Downing Street to evade the press corps.  
Given Kordt’s authority, Faber has argued that ‘it seems extraordinary in hindsight that, 
because his suggested course of action was so out of step with British policy at the time, 
no further action was taken or advice sought’.118   
By the second week of September, Conwell-Evans was back in Germany for meetings 
with Ribbentrop and others and to attend the Nürnberg Rally.  Erich had arranged a 
room for him at the Grand Hotel, an honour as one British journalist present noted 
usually reserved for ‘guests of honour’ and ‘the Führer’s personal friends’.119  His 
German Foreign Ministry friends reported that Henderson had alarmed Weizsäcker 
with his naivety in swallowing Hitler’s protestations of peace and were frustrated by 
the ambassador’s failure to ‘speak plainly to Ribbentrop’ so urged Conwell-Evans to 
warn him in person. 120  That year, to celebrate the Anschluss, the Parteitag was billed 
as ‘The Party Day of Greater Germany’ (Reichsparteitag Grossdeutschland).  As in 
previous years, the Fellowship fielded senior representatives including Brocket, 
Conwell-Evans and Tennant, who remembered it as ‘an alarming and depressing 
experience, with Hitler and Goering screaming threats at the Czechs and defiance at the 
rest of the world’.121  Henderson attended the rally, which he admitted he was unlikely 
to ‘forget in a hurry’ and which historians agree was ‘the low-water mark of his 
career’.122  He was supported by an attentive and observant DEG member, SS-
Untersturmführer Baumann, who detailed Henderson’s activities in a sixteen-page 
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memorandum to the German Foreign Office.123  Conwell-Evans met Henderson, by 
now seriously ill with throat cancer, in the train provided as accommodation for foreign 
diplomats from the democratic nations in contrast to Conwell-Evans’s comfortable 
billet at the Grand Hotel.  Early on the sunny morning of 8 September, the two men 
walked between the railway tracks for ninety minutes where Conwell-Evans explained 
that ‘Hitler himself had taken the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in a fortnight or 
so’.124  Deeply frustrated, Conwell-Evans was unable to convince the ambassador but 
did get his authorisation to return at once to London to brief the foreign secretary.  
Baumann, who knew Conwell-Evans by reputation as a leading light in the Fellowship, 
arranged a car to deliver him back to town and noted the visitor was ‘striving to conceal 
a great shock’.125  
Meanwhile at 10 Downing Street on the same day, Theo Kordt had again met Halifax 
and Wilson following which Halifax sent direct and unambiguous instructions to 
Henderson to deliver an explicit message to Hitler and Ribbentrop about 
Czechoslovakia.  This was widely trailed in the British Press with the Daily Mail 
trumpeting ‘BRITAIN WARNS GERMANY TODAY – WILL NOT STAND ASIDE 
IF CZECHS ARE ATTACKED – INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO AMBASSADOR’.126  
With extraordinary disobedience, Henderson refused to deliver the message, arguing 
that it would be ‘ill-timed and disastrous in its effect’.127  
By Saturday, Conwell-Evans was back in Germany at a tea party given by Ribbentrop 
for Hitler and three hundred guests where he managed a ‘hurried talk’ with Weizsäcker 
that was ‘under the eyes of Hess, but removed from his ears’.  Weizsäcker and Erich 
Kordt urged Conwell-Evans to persuade Chamberlain to write a letter to Hitler 
proposing a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia which Weizsäcker said would secure popular 
German support so Conwell-Evans at once left Nürnberg for Downing Street.  At the 
same tea party, a far less critical Lord Brocket was delighted to be sat next to the Führer 
to whom he talked for half an hour.  Also on Hitler’s table were Lords Stamp and 
McGowan, while other members attending included Lord and Lady Hollenden and 
Norman Hulbert.  A wealthy landowner and former Conservative MP who attended at 
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least three Fellowship dinners, Brocket’s enthusiasm for the National Socialist regime 
survived longer than Tennant’s and Conwell-Evans’s.  To the latter’s frustration, 
Brocket, having won the confidence of Chamberlain, reported his conversation to 
Wilson insisting that the Führer had ‘no intention whatever of attacking England at any 
time, or of going to the West or attacking France’ and had joked that he was as likely 
to want to conquer China.  Brocket had urged the Führer to meet Chamberlain in person 
to which he had responded: ‘I cannot leave my country, and meet him in a foreign 
country, he cannot leave his country and come here, we can not meet in aeroplanes in 
the air, and I am always very seasick on the sea!’128 
Back in London the next day Conwell-Evans had his second meeting in a fortnight with 
the foreign secretary and urged him ‘for heaven’s sake [to] mobilise the Navy’ as Hitler 
was planning an attack between 20 and 29 September and was confident Britain and 
France would not go to war over Czechoslovakia.129  Conwell-Evans emphasised the 
opposition within the German Foreign Office to Operation Green and explained that 
they would therefore welcome a ‘more explicit warning’ from Britain.  He admitted 
that he doubted ‘whether the ambassador fully appreciates the position’ but had 
graciously allowed him to canvass Halifax directly.130  Given the Fellowship’s 
chequered track record with the Foreign Office, the immediacy and frankness of his 
dialogue with foreign secretary and ambassador are noteworthy.  He followed the 
meeting with a memorandum and letter emphasising the widening gulf between the 
German government and the German people, arguing that a ‘plebiscite would most 
effectively defeat [Hitler’s] policy’.131  Circulated to Vansittart, Halifax and 
Chamberlain, his memorandum explained that Hitler had decided to launch an attack 
on Czechoslovakia and was now ‘bordering literally on the insane’ such that the links 
established with the German Resistance were vital as never before in history had ‘the 
highest members of the foreign office of the great power, and other leading personalities 
of the state… made appeals through trusted intermediaries to a foreign government to 
save them from war’.132  
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Hitler ended the Nürnberg Rally with a speech demanding self-determination for the 
Sudetendeutsch that attracted international coverage, especially in ever-more-nervous 
London and Paris.  A crowd of 10,000 gathered outside Downing Street, the Evening 
Standard printed 150,000 copies of the speech while the BBC interrupted its 
programmes to broadcast it live.  Two days later, Theo Kordt again met Wilson at the 
Travellers Club for lunch, while Conwell-Evans, confirming information from Christie, 
briefed Vansittart on Germany’s preparedness for war.  She had only two months’ 
reserves of petrol and ‘the Siegfried Line was far from complete, some parts consisted 
practically only of barbed wire’.  Christie had also hurried back to Britain to brief the 
government on information supplied by Captain Fritz Wiedemann.  Wiedemann, 
Hitler’s adjutant and former commanding officer, confirmed the Führer had declared: 
‘we must over-run Czechoslovakia as soon as possible… next year is France’s turn… 
the year after (1940) we have to settle Britain and then my world Empire will be 
completed’.133  Christie warned of the ‘provocations’ that would be arranged in 
Czechoslovakia by the Germans to justify their invasion and which gave Hitler (rightly 
as it turned out) the confidence that Britain and France would not come to their ally’s 
aid.   
 
Henry IV going to Canossa again 
Despite the now established formula for British politicians visiting Germany (as 
facilitated by the Fellowship and explored in earlier chapters) and the thinner trail of 
German politicians leaving the Fatherland to visit England, the idea that Neville 
Chamberlain should fly to Germany to meet the Führer seems to have originated from 
the prime minister alone.  Writing to his sister Ida from Balmoral, Chamberlain outlined 
‘Plan Z’, a plan ‘so unconventional and daring that it rather took Halifax’s breath 
away’.134  He had proposed it to, no doubt, startled colleagues at a meeting including 
the foreign secretary, his parliamentary undersecretary and the chancellor of the 
exchequer.  On hearing the plan, Halifax insisted Vansittart join the meeting and the 
unsurprisingly appalled chief diplomatic adviser became ‘thoroughly worked up and 
fought the idea tooth and nail’ arguing it was ‘Henry IV going to Canossa again’.135  
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Undaunted Chamberlain presented it as a fait accompli to his cabinet less than a week 
later and, despite some misgivings, the idea gained momentum and approval.  The next 
day, armed with his umbrella, the sixty-nine-year-old Chamberlain left Heston 
aerodrome to make his maiden aeroplane flight to meet the forty-nine-year-old German 
dictator.  Waved off by Theo Kordt, the Halifaxes and Fellowship stalwarts, Lords 
Brocket and Londonderry, he was met in rainy Munich by Ribbentrop and the 
ambassadors Henderson and von Dirksen.  Hearing of this trip, many miles away in 
Australia, an alarmed Lothian wrote to Nancy Astor that, while Chamberlain was 
‘heroic and courageous’, the venture seemed ‘terribly liable to lead to another Hoare-
Laval plan’.136  Exactly a week later, Chamberlain was again seen off by Kordt and 
Halifax for a second meeting at Godesberg.  On 30 September, he returned from his 
third visit after the Munich conference with his celebrated piece of paper and Tennant 
was one of forty guests invited to meet him on his ‘triumphal return’.137  By then, the 
British government had finally mobilised the fleet as advocated by Conwell-Evans and 
Christie back in August.  Returning to Germany in the middle of October, Conwell-
Evans was advised by a German Foreign Ministry official that it was, indeed, this 
mobilisation that had prevented Hitler from launching his planned attack on the Czechs. 
While it has proved possible to piece together, for the first time, the activities of the 
Fellowship’s principals in both Britain and Germany during the crisis that culminated 
in the Munich conference, it remains harder to determine if they made any difference.  
In this regard, Halifax’s place in the Fellowship’s story deserves sharper focus.  
Perceived as one of the ‘Guilty Men’ firmly aligned with his master Chamberlain, 
especially in contrast to the mercurial Eden, Halifax’s attitude to Hitler and the National 
Socialists shifted during the Munich crisis.  Specifically, he baulked at the degree to 
which the British were required to coerce the Czechoslovak government to accede to 
Hitler’s unreasonable demands and was convinced of the need for accelerated 
rearmament.  His biographer traced this ‘almost Damascene conversion from appeaser 
to resister’ to an uncharacteristically sleepless night of 24 September 1938, fuelled by 
Halifax’s own moral code that had been sparked by a firm talking-to from Cadogan that 
evening.  However, it can be inferred that the repeated, considered and consistent 
intelligence he had absorbed from Conwell-Evans, Christie and Vansittart contributed 
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to this changing heart.  Ferris has argued convincingly that in late 1938, both Cadogan 
and Halifax had ‘drifted towards Vansittart’s views of Germany’ and that consequently 
the non-confrontational foreign secretary had challenged Chamberlain in Cabinet the 
morning after his sleepless night. 138  Apologetically (‘I feel a brute’) he led a successful 
revolt against the prime minister’s position urging him to call Hitler’s bluff by 
threatening a military response. 139  By 29 September, Oliver Harvey was confiding in 




While the leadership of the Fellowship no doubt shared the sense of relief felt around 
Britain when Chamberlain returned with his famous piece of paper, they had 
consistently urged a stronger line with the German leadership over Czechoslovakia.  
Under no illusions that Hitler could be pacified by the Sudetenland on its own, the 
intelligence they supplied to the British government was mostly impeccable with the 
notable exception being their assessment of Heinlein’s bona fides.  Far from being a 
marginal ‘ginger group’ of ideologues struggling to influence events, the Fellowship 
had by now secured astonishingly direct and quick access to the leaders of the British 
government including the prime minister; his special adviser, Wilson; the foreign 
secretary; his parliamentary undersecretary, Cadogan; the chief diplomatic adviser, 
Vansittart and the ambassador, Henderson.  On the German side, the intelligence 
Christie and Conwell-Evans garnered from senior and loyal military sources such as 
Göring and Milch was balanced by that from the military leadership then conspiring 
against Hitler.  Combined with the information emanating from the resistance within 
the upper ranks of the Foreign Ministry centred on the Kordts, this was extraordinary 
by any measure.  Given how well they understood his failings and prejudices, their 
interpretations of Ribbentrop’s dangerous counsel to the Führer added powerfully to 
this mix. 
Barely a week after Chamberlain’s return, Christie reported back to London the effect 
of ‘Munich’ on German policy and the personal disdain felt by both Hitler and 
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Ribbentrop for Chamberlain.   He reported that Ribbentrop had gleefully remarked to 
General Keitel that Chamberlain had signed the ‘death warrant of the British Empire’ 
which, he told others, Germany would inherit ‘as easily as one inherits the estate of an 
old aunt during her lifetime, piece by piece, merely by coaxing with persuasive 
words’.141  Christie later learned that Hitler, at a meeting with his press chiefs on 6 
November 1938 had ‘made jeering remarks about foreign statesmen, chiefly directed at 
Daladier, Benes, Chamberlain and Halifax’ and claimed that he had ‘tapped the cables 
between Prague and Paris, and Prague and London, during the recent crisis’.142  Any 
reassurance Conwell-Evans may have drawn from Munich presumably faded as quickly 
as for Christie and he secretly met Theo Kordt in late October in Lausanne, Switzerland 
as travelling in Germany was no longer considered safe.  Whatever else Chamberlain 
signed at Munich, it was certainly the death warrant for the Oster conspiracy as his 
concessions to Hitler had frustrated his plans to invade Czechoslovakia thereby 
mitigating the immediate threat of a European war which would have given the 
conspirators their casus belli.  
Amidst all this, the Fellowship continued its outward social whirl with a dinner held on 
19 October at Claridge’s to honour Ambassador von Dirksen.  Whatever the misgivings 
of Christie, Lothian and Conwell-Evans, the dinner was still bathed in a post-Munich 
glow.  Mount Temple, speaking publicly only a month before his resignation in protest 
at the treatment of the Jews and, despite the reservations of his colleagues, said that 
‘never since the Anglo-German Fellowship started had they met under fairer 
circumstances’ despite having ‘come within an ace of war’.  Von Dirksen suggested 
that ‘the recent time of great strain and crisis had proved a blessing in disguise, as it 
had served to bring the two peoples nearer together and to create a better 
understanding’.143  Friedl Gaertner, reporting back to her masters at MI5, was appalled 
by this collective self-delusion, and ‘amazed that this collection of British people of the 
middle and upper classes could display the pathetic ignorance of foreign affairs, and 
German affairs in particular’.  She was particularly unimpressed by Lord Brocket, who 
in introducing the guest speaker General Tholens (deputy chief of the German public 
service camps), had attacked Germany’s critics including Duff Cooper, Eden and 
                                                          
141 Vansittart memorandum to Halifax, 19 October 1938, FO C12655, TNA and Conwell-Evans, NSB, p. 
157. 
142 Conwell-Evans, NSB, p. 166. 
143 The Times, 20 October 1938. 




Churchill as being ‘impotent’, the Evening Standard for publishing extracts from Mein 
Kampf and its cartoonist David Low for facetious disrespect.  Tholens replied for over 
an hour, which Gaertner reported as being ‘so dry and so boring that even the most 
enthusiastic member of the AGF ceased to listen’.144  A few weeks later, the Fellowship 
held a cocktail party at the Hans Crescent Hotel for over one hundred people with Dr 
Karl Silex, a journalist from the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as guest speaker.  Again, 
Gaertner was present on behalf of MI5 but this time was struck by the contrast between 
the cocktail party and the previous dinner in that the guests were ‘of a far more 
intelligent type’.  Unlike General Tholens, Silex made a first-class speech ‘significantly 
free from bombast’ and so was considered by her much more dangerous. 
Exactly a week after the Silex drinks party, the cause of Anglo-German relations 
suffered the devastating blow of Kristallnacht when the SA and civilians attacked Jews, 
their homes, businesses and synagogues in an orgy of violence in both Germany and 
Austria.  Kristallnacht was impossible to ignore even for Hitler’s most enthusiastic 
supporters within and without the Fellowship.  As Conwell-Evans’s friend and literary 
executor, Martin Gilbert, later wrote, ‘no event in the history of the fate of the German 
Jews between 1933 and 1945 was so widely covered by the newspapers while it was 
taking place’.145  The day after the pogroms, Conwell-Evans returned to Berlin to meet 
his German Foreign Ministry informants secretly.  They told him the attacks had been 
arranged to ‘harden and brutalise the German people, so as to make them less unwilling 
to go to war’.146  Conwell-Evans reported that they had caused ‘as great a revulsion of 
feeling among the German people as they have done in England, and Hitler and the 
régime have suffered a further loss of prestige’.147  As Steiner emphasised, Kristallnacht 
was ‘specifically intended to stifle the euphoria in Germany created by Munich’.148  It 
was triggered by Chamberlain’s short-lived success at appeasing Hitler and, not long 
after, contributed to the rapid erosion of popular support for his policy in Britain.  As 
detailed in the earlier chapters, Kristallnacht was the catalyst for the Fellowship’s 
existential crisis among the wider membership with crisis meetings, letters of 
condemnation and Mount Temple’s resignation.   
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As 1938 ended, the Fellowship had evolved from an amateur business-backed pressure 
group irritating the professional diplomats and politicians into a respected forum for the 
promotion of Anglo-German relations.  It had never been better-placed with the British 
government and yet retained its access to the NSDAP elite, despite its bona fides having 
been challenged.  Despite their loyal pronouncements, its leaders had failed to embrace 
Chamberlain’s brand of appeasement and had highlighted the folly of his and 
Henderson’s handling of the German leadership.  Chamberlain’s Plan Z ignored their 
carefully-crafted advice and undermined the trust built with the resistance in Germany 
that arguably represented the ‘last chance for Europeans to stop Hitler from taking the 
path that would lead to the loss of fifty million lives’.149  As Griffiths has rightly 
concluded ‘it is ironic that Conwell-Evans, who had been ignored by Baldwin when he 
had put forward pro-German views, was ignored by Chamberlain when his views 
changed; it is equally ironic that the Foreign Office, which opposed him in 1933-5, had 
been trusted by Baldwin, but that the same Foreign Office, backing his views in 1938, 
should have been mistrusted by Chamberlain’.150  
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Chapter 7    
Fading into war: the failure of appeasement  
On about 28 August 1939, as he recorded in his hand-written memoir, Conwell-Evans 
was summoned by AJ Sylvester, Lloyd George’s long-suffering private secretary, to 
the House of Commons for a meeting with his master.1  Arriving at the room, he found 
Lloyd George accompanied by Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden.  Presumably with 
tongue in cheek, the former prime minister Lloyd George introduced Conwell-Evans to 
the two future prime ministers as ‘my Nazi’.  Churchill asked about the Germans’ 
intentions, whether war could be avoided and whether Hitler could be ‘bought off’.  
Conwell-Evans replied that war was inevitable but ‘might be postponed for six months 
by concessions – but no longer’.  Churchill then asked for his view on the leading Nazis, 
to which he responded that they were ‘all a bad lot – except perhaps Göring… he was 
the nearest thing to a gent’, at which Churchill and Lloyd George burst out laughing.2 
This chapter continues the Fellowship’s story during the final year culminating in that 
meeting and details its frantic, last ditch attempts to leverage its influences in Germany 
to preserve peace.  It has been generally assumed that the Fellowship shamefacedly 
abandoned its activities in the months immediately following Mount Temple’s 
resignation in protest at Kristallnacht in November 1938.3  In reality, in the twelve 
months leading up to war, Conwell-Evans had been, as he told Lloyd George, ‘in almost 
daily contact’ with the British Foreign Office.4  While his close working relationship 
with Christie and Vansittart has been acknowledged, the intensity and frequency of his 
direct communications with Lord Halifax (evidenced in their surviving 
correspondence) indicate a closer relationship with the foreign secretary than 
previously appreciated.  Halifax’s biographer has claimed that the foreign secretary had 
ordered the Fellowship's ‘indefinite closure’ in March 1939.5  In fact, a letter dated 19 
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March from Halifax in the Conwell-Evans papers - three days after the invasion of the 
remainder of Czechoslovakia - indicates a more nuanced stance.  Conwell-Evans had 
asked the foreign secretary for guidance on what to do with the Fellowship and Halifax 
was elegantly gentle in his advice.  He did not ‘wish to see anything done which would 
break down all the bridges between the two peoples’ and, echoing a frequent theme of 
Christie’s advice, wanted to retain ‘such means as we can of showing that the British 
people have no quarrel with the German people’.  However, given the tensions between 
the two governments, he suggested deferring any further meetings of the Fellowship 
‘for another month or two’ until the situation was clearer.6  Conwell-Evans did finally 
suspend the Fellowship’s activities on the day Germany invaded Poland and the last 
Council meeting was held in the Unilever boardroom on 6 October 1939 - more than a 
month after war had been declared.  Even then, the register of members was kept in the 
hopes of a resurrection ‘when peace comes’ and the Fellowship was not formally 
dissolved as a company until 1949.7 
Halifax certainly valued the intelligence he and his Foreign Office received from 
Vansittart, Christie, Conwell-Evans and their network of German informants.  This 
stream of intelligence continued right up to and beyond the outbreak of war.  According 
to Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the 
patrician foreign secretary had previously taken a ‘gentlemen-don’t-read-one-
another’s-mail-attitude’ to intelligence.  Now, as his biographer noted, he had changed 
his views following the Sudeten crisis.8  On 14 November 1938, he shared confidential 
reports with the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee from intelligence sources, 
especially Conwell-Evans and Kordt who used their association with the sister societies 
as cover to gather and communicate their intelligence.   
Similarly, Halifax now embraced another vulgar tool of modern diplomacy: 
propaganda.  Again, the sister societies had a role to play.  Rather than seeking to close 
the Fellowship, Halifax now proposed to use the DEG as a conduit to increase and 
improve British propaganda in Germany (this was appropriate given how the NSDAP 
had always hoped it would promulgate German propaganda to Britons).  In a wider plan 
presented to Cabinet in December 1938, he estimated Germany was spending £5 
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million a year on ‘skilfully done’ propaganda but reported that the Germans were 
fearful of British counter propaganda. Consequently, he proposed a coordinated effort 
involving the BBC, personal business contacts, a Berlin version of the British Library 
of Information in New York and targeted pamphlets from the British Council.  Under 
the heading ‘long-term policy’, he suggested further cultural and educational 
propaganda by the British Council as well as ‘sending lecturers, especially scientists, 
to Germany, both to the Deutsch Englische Gesellschaft and to German universities’.9 
That same month the Fellowship reported to Companies House that it now had exactly 
900 members.  This was its highest recorded membership and followed the recruitment 
of 200 new members since February that year, so an average of twenty new joiners per 
month.10  Any celebration would have been short-lived, no doubt, as so many members 
were now withdrawing their support in protest at Kristallnacht.  Thus, in charting the 
Fellowship’s recruitment efforts, it would be reasonable to determine late 1938 as both 
its apex and its nadir.  On the 8 December, the Fellowship held a meeting in Mayfair 
attended by 150 to 200 people.  This was the first social event since the crisis meeting 
held immediately following Kristallnacht and was similarly infiltrated by Friedl 
Gaertner on behalf of MI5.  The guest speaker was Colonel TP Etherton, an author and 
explorer who had recently toured Germany and the Sudetenland. He had challenged 
Göring about Goebbels’s ‘ill-advised attacks on Great Britain and the British press’ and 
how he regretted seeing ‘notices in shops and on windows and walls attacking the 
Jews’.  Gaertner reported that such explicit criticism of the German regime meant that 
‘the whole tone of the meeting was utterly different’ from its predecessor and had 
caused ‘extreme surprise’ to many present.  She presumed that Berlin had sent 
instructions that ‘the AGF should be given a more British outlook and that propaganda 
should be less blatant’.  She suggested as much to Betty Pomeroy, the Fellowship’s 
membership secretary, who acknowledged that it had ‘a choice between adopting an 
entirely new line or running the risk of its extinction’.11 
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The New Year memorandum 
Also that month, Vansittart commissioned Conwell-Evans and Christie to compile a 
‘fairly comprehensive account of their impressions of German policy… gathered in 
recent weeks’.12  Vansittart’s memoranda were traditionally criticised for their 
circumlocutory style but this one, though detailed, could not have been clearer.  It ran 
to eighteen pages, professionally printed as numbered copies, labelled ‘Most Secret’ 
and stamped ‘The Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government’ with instructions 
for it to be ‘kept under lock and key’, all presumably to encourage it to be read by 
anyone who saw it.  Early in the New Year, Vansittart sent it to Halifax with a note 
explaining it had been written ‘by the two Englishmen who know Germany best’ and 
were ‘strong and pronounced Germanophils’, in contrast to he himself who had been 
‘unjustly… attacked as a Germanophobe’.    Shrewdly, Vansittart used his colleagues’ 
previous enthusiasms for the National Socialist regime to add credibility and balance 
to those voices (such as his own) who had been critical of the regime since the outset.  
This document confirms the definitive volte-face by both Conwell-Evans and Christie 
on the National Socialist regime that had been gestating since 1937.  Conwell-Evans 
admitted  that ‘the early promise’ which he had ‘endeavoured at first to claim for the 
National Socialists was deceptive in the highest degree’.13  Christie had similarly 
acknowledged to Vansittart that he had believed ‘in the sincerity and applicability of 
national socialism‘.14  Now both realised Nazism was characterised by ‘aggressive and 
fanatical nationalism, racial intolerance and arrogance, idolatry of man, the worship of 
physical might [and] contempt for everything humane’.15   
Halifax included the full memorandum in the briefing papers he sent to the Cabinet 
Foreign Policy Committee for its 23 January meeting.  It included a detailed critique of 
Hitler’s regime and predicted its direction while urging the British government to take 
a firmer stand against Germany.  Hindsight shows it to have been remarkably accurate.  
Conwell-Evans opened his section with the blunt warning that ‘our country and empire 
are faced by a greater peril that has yet threatened them in their history’.   He explained 
that Hitler felt thwarted by Chamberlain as he had planned to conquer Czechoslovakia 
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and concurrently invade Romania.  The Sudeten Germans were merely the ‘pretext with 
which he hoped to induce the German people to make war’.  Hitler was ‘little better 
than a monster in his ruthlessness and cruelty’ and was now driven by a ‘hatred and 
envy of England which amount to an obsession’.  In fact, Conwell-Evans reported that, 
were he to update Mein Kampf, the only revision would be to remove the proposed 
friendship with England.  He predicted that 1939 was ‘going to be the most menacing 
year both in internal and external affairs’ and that one informant had explained Hitler 
would push forwards ‘on a vast and rapid scale eastwards, and… in 6 or 12 months… 
would turn westwards and proceed to reduce England to the position of a second-rate 
Power’.  During the year, ‘the German people, whose humane sentiments [were] not 
yet crushed, [would] be treated to continuous campaigns of propaganda about the 
essential criminality of Jews, the worthlessness of democracy and the ideas of a 
decadent and weak England’. Hitler’s conquest of Eastern Europe would be rapid: ‘the 
revision of the Polish frontiers, the setting up of the Ukraine and giving Germany 
control of the Black Sea coast, the conquest of the Baltic states, ending with an alliance 
between Russia and Germany, may be accomplished in 1939’.  Conwell-Evans urged 
the British government to ‘distinguish between the regime and its victims’, emphasised 
that the German people were still shocked by Kristallnacht and that ‘Hitler has felt the 
pressure of German public opinion in regard to his latest treatment of the Jews’ and 
warned ‘if we do not at once pull ourselves together and take the most drastic measures, 
the year 1940 may witness the collapse of the British Empire’. 
Meanwhile in his supporting addendum, Christie detailed how the German economy 
was now on a war footing, with the confiscation of Jewish property, attacks on private 
enterprise, sourcing of essential materials and the introduction of state-controlled 
barter.  Christie was sanguine about the seriously-weakened opposition to the Reich 
who were ‘practically gagged’.  He hoped that they might engender popular support in 
Germany if Hitler did attack France and Great Britain, but warned that ‘the strength of 
the opposition inside Germany should not be overrated’.  The German army was 
broadly supportive of Hitler as he offered better job prospects than the alternatives.  
Christie predicted Russia’s pivotal role in a future war and anticipated the German 
failure to overwhelm the Russians: ‘obviously if things went awry in the invasion of 
Soviet Russia, if the bulk of the red Army remained intact, adopted the tactics of retreat 
and refused to desert Stalin or form a Germanophil government, then the vigorous 




intervention or mediation of Great Britain and France might cause the downfall of the 
Nazi government and its replacement by saner men of reason’.  Characteristically 
pulling no punches, he concluded that Britain’s ‘salvation depends upon the adroitness 
of our statesmen’ particularly in separating Mussolini from Hitler, and explained that 
his German friends were ‘praying that Great Britain and France will no longer yield an 
inch to the threats of force and violence’. 
Vansittart needed these credible alternative messengers to counteract the opinions 
promulgated by Henderson and accepted by Chamberlain and Wilson in particular.  The 
widening gulf between the British ambassador in Berlin and the leadership of the 
Fellowship is central to understanding the stance of each in 1939.  Conwell-Evans 
politely explained in his memorandum how Henderson failed to understand the German 
regime because Soviet-style monitoring of his embassy by the German secret police 
meant he was isolated and therefore ‘frequently deceived’.  Vansittart was 
characteristically more blunt, telling Halifax that he, Conwell-Evans and Christie were 
‘in complete disagreement’ with the ambassador.16      
Whether anyone in authority listened to these warnings that so starkly contrasted with 
Henderson’s sanguinity is open to debate.  In None So Blind, completed in 1941 as 
Britain stood alone in the darkest days of the war, Conwell-Evans ruefully 
acknowledged that his and Christie’s advice fell on deaf ears and, ‘as late as March 
1939, British ministers apparently still refused to believe that Britain had been marked 
down as an ultimate victim’.  He was frustrated that Henderson was so naïvely confident 
that Hitler was now ‘satisfied with his achievements abroad, wished to settle down, and 
devote attention to home affairs’, and disappointed that the government, including 
Halifax ‘apparently placed the fullest confidence in Henderson’s reports’.17  However, 
this is almost certainly unfair on Halifax (if not his Cabinet colleagues) whose 
biographer has argued was the ‘first politician in the government to see what was 
happening and the major force in steering the way from an appeasing to a resisting 
tack’.18   
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Careful analysis of the surviving documentation would indicate that Conwell-Evans 
and Christie were taken more seriously than they themselves believed.  The foreign 
secretary respected the New Year Memorandum (and other secret intelligence including 
suggestions that Germany might attack Holland) and welcomed alternative opinions on 
Germany to the blandishments emanating from his ambassador.  Calling a meeting of 
the Foreign Policy Committee to consider ‘Possible German Intentions’, he emphasised 
that these sources had ‘in the summer and early autumn of last year… so unhappily 
proved, on the whole, accurate and correct’.19  He warned committee members bluntly 
that the secret sources risked ‘liquidation’ if any material leaked.  Alec Cadogan (by 
now Vansittart’s replacement as permanent undersecretary and still sceptical of his 
predecessor’s Cassandra-like warnings) noted that the committee ‘didn’t pooh-pooh’ 
these warnings and shared the intelligence with the American government 
immediately.20   
The next day, Cadogan drafted a telegram to Washington based on Vansittart’s secret 
intelligence, signed by Halifax and approved by Chamberlain, that echoed the 
memorandum in explaining how Hitler was ‘bitterly resentful’ about Munich, 
humiliated by Great Britain, and planning a ‘further adventure for the spring of 1939’.  
It explained that ‘His Majesty’s Government have no wish to be alarmist’ but the 
sources included ‘highly placed Germans of undoubted sincerity who are anxious to 
prevent this crime’.  As Dilks has explained (writing only a couple of years after 
Conwell-Evans had died) ‘the telegram to Washington is noteworthy not only because 
it indicates the difficulties of assessing secret Intelligence but also because it disposes 
of the legend of a bemused administration awakened from roseate dreams only by the 
events of March.’21  
Other voices within the Foreign Office corroborated Christie and Conwell-Evans’s 
interpretation of German intentions.  In early February, George Ogilvie Forbes, the 
chargé d’affaires in Berlin deputising for the seriously-ill ambassador, wrote to Halifax 
predicting that ‘the turn of the year can also be regarded as the turn of the tide of 
National Socialism from the East to the West’.22   He reported a build-up of military 
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resources in ‘preparation for action either physical or spiritual in the West in aid of 
[Hitler’s] Italian ally’ that would likely involve a direct threat to France and therefore 
to war involving Britain.  Cadogan remained sceptical, noting that ‘our sources of 
information have lately become so prolific (and blood curdling) that I am beginning to 
regard them with a degree of suspicion’.23  
 
Lothian and Roosevelt 
While the US government benefitted from Conwell-Evans and Christie’s intelligence 
on the German threat embedded in the Halifax/Cadogan telegram, that same month, 
Lord Lothian visited the US for a seven-week tour.  He wanted to see his many friends 
among the political leadership to discuss Hitler and National Socialism and to 
emphasize how Britain urgently needed America’s help to control the seas.  As his 
biographer has emphasised, Lothian was ‘probably more nearly in touch with American 
thought than any other man in British public life’ and he went on to be lauded as one 
of Britain’s most successful ambassadors to Washington despite his premature death.24   
In this context, his direct knowledge of the German leadership, which had been 
facilitated by the Anglo-German Fellowship and Conwell-Evans, seems relevant to any 
analysis of his effectiveness as an envoy.  On the 2 January he met with the President.  
The two men had first met at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and Lothian had last 
visited three years previously when he made clear his support for appeasement of 
Germany.  He visited as a private citizen rather than as the British ambassador 
designate, having insisted his appointment, agreed the previous August, not be 
disclosed even to the President until the spring of 1939.   Initially intended as a fifteen-
minute courtesy call, the meeting ran to an hour and evidently involved heated debate 
between the two men.  There Lothian started the long and complex process of 
persuading the highly sceptical Roosevelt that Britain had the mettle (if not the metal) 
to resist Hitler but needed and deserved American support.  As explored by Barbara 
Farnham, Roosevelt had been quick to grasp how Munich and its aftermath had been a 
victory for Germany who ‘had gained a distinct psychological advantage due to the 
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emergence of considerable scepticism about the will of Britain and France to withstand 
pressure from the dictators’.25   
Lothian’s volte-face on the National Socialists mirrored that of his friend Conwell-
Evans and his previous public enthusiasms were embarrassing.  As explored above, he 
had been having doubts about the regime for several years, but by early 1939, was in 
no doubt, as he told the President, of the German threat and assured him that 
appeasement was dead in England.  Roosevelt recollected (in late 1939) that he had 
taken this ‘with a grain of salt and [had] wanted more proof’.26  Struck by the future 
ambassador’s seismic shift on Germany, at the same meeting, Roosevelt had ‘twitted 
Lord Lothian with his confidence in Hitler 2 years ago’.  Lothian now insisted that ‘no 
one could talk with Hitler’ which the President later repeated to Harold Ickes, the 
Secretary of the Interior, who noted it in his diary.27  Rising to his theme, an 
impassioned Lothian advised Roosevelt that ‘Britain has defended civilisation for 1000 
years’ and portentously (but as it would turn out accurately) that now ‘the spear is 
falling from her hand and it is up to you to take it and carry on’.28  According to FDR’s 
recollection of the January meeting, he had asked Lothian if he still believed ‘Herr 
Hitler is a gentleman with whom you can negotiate?’ to which Lothian had ‘thrown up 
his hands and said he had been wrong’.29  So just as Vansittart enlisted former 
apologists for National Socialism to strengthen his arguments that the regime was now 
beyond redemption, Lothian had no hesitation in using his own history of appeasement 
and subsequent Damascene conversion to underpin the urgency of the situation. As the 
author James Fox has perceptively summarised, ‘it was Halifax who appointed Lothian, 
shrewdly calculating that someone who had gone the last mile trying to get on with 
Hitler would be the right person to persuade an insuperably cautious, neutral America, 
entrenched in isolationism, that it was in its own vital interest to support Britain’.30  
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‘Completely bewitched by his German friends’  
While Lothian was completing his US trip, in February 1939 Conwell-Evans made his 
last pre-war visit to Germany.  Vansittart had soon after warned him he could ‘no longer 
safely travel in that country’ as he was ‘under observation’ given concerns in Berlin 
about his ‘political reliability’ and his increasingly evident links to the German 
resistance.31  He stayed for eight days and attended the annual dinner of the DEG in 
Berlin at which Sir Nevile Henderson and Lord Brocket gave speeches.  The German 
guests included State Secretary von Weizsäcker, SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz 
representing Ribbentrop, and other ‘representatives of Reich ministries, the Party, and 
the Armed Forces’.  Ambassador Henderson used the DEG’s hospitality, just as he had 
in 1937, as an opportunity to give a widely-reported speech to promote his views on 
appeasement.  These, Conwell-Evans (and subsequently others) have assumed, came 
directly from the prime minister rather than the Foreign Office which was increasingly 
uncomfortable with Chamberlain’s policy.32  It was such a heartfelt plea for the two 
countries to ‘reach an understanding and become firm friends’ that The Times dryly 
considered it delivered with a ‘frankness and directness unusual for an ambassador’.  
Apparently ignoring the wider diplomatic perspective and the interests of Britain’s 
allies and potential allies, he called for ‘Anglo-German understanding based on actual 
respect for the vital interests of Germany as a continental and Great Britain as an 
oversea power’.  This thereby offered Hitler what he had always wanted – a free hand 
in continental Europe in return for Britain’s empire remaining unmolested.  
Consequently, The Times noted it ‘aroused great interest in political circles in Berlin’33 
while a furious Vansittart reported to Halifax that it ‘created the impression that we are 
again inclining to be duped’.34  A clearly shocked Conwell-Evans saw that Henderson’s 
tone and messaging had alarmed the moderates and industrialists present who avoided 
the ambassador as it would be ‘dangerous to communicate anything to him’. 35  
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In his speech in reply, the Duke of Coburg quoted Hitler’s aspiration (from his 30 
January speech) that ‘our two peoples’ could ‘co-operate in full confidence with one 
another’ before welcoming the recently signed Anglo-German coal agreement.  He 
concluded with the hope that ‘a new and fruitful element in the cooperation between 
the two nations has been established’ and then announced that Sir Nevile Henderson 
had accepted honorary membership of the DEG.36  Henderson soon after briefed 
Chamberlain that Coburg’s speech had, at the last moment been re-written ‘under 
higher authority’ and had the ‘personal approval of Herr Hitler himself’.  Chamberlain 
was hugely encouraged by this, sending his sister Hilda a précis of the duke’s speech 
and writing that ‘all the information I get seems to point in the direction of peace and I 
repeat once more that I believe we have at last got on top of the dictators’.37  
Chamberlain responded positively in a speech in Blackburn the next week emphasising 
the benefits to trade, industry and employment if international tension could be reduced 
so plans were put in place for Oliver Stanley, the president of the Board of Trade, to 
visit Germany to advance the cause of economic appeasement.  
While in Berlin, Conwell-Evans also lunched with Ribbentrop at what was to be his 
last meeting with his erstwhile friend.  Also present were: Lord Brocket; Hewel, 
Ribbentrop’s liaison with Hitler; and Lorenz.  Ribbentrop (whom Conwell-Evans had 
‘never found so difficult’), now ‘rapidly succumbing to a type of megalomania’, 
launched abuse at Roosevelt as the ‘mouthpiece of Judah and the instrument of the 
Comintern’.  Hitler, he said, knew the US president was ‘the only statesman who sees 
through him’ and was ‘making preparations to bring about the Chancellor’s defeat’.38  
Now, not even pretending to tolerate the Jews, he insisted that ‘every Jew must leave 
Germany’.  Conwell-Evans also took the opportunity of his visit to meet his German 
Foreign Ministry friends discreetly in a suburb of the city where they updated him that 
‘the decision had been taken two or three days previously to finish off 
Czechoslovakia’.39  Having always moved comfortably in senior National Socialist 
circles, he was now deeply alarmed by his experiences.  He noted the increasing 
takeover of the Foreign Ministry by Himmler’s SS officers such that ‘an atmosphere of 
terror’ was hanging over its conservative members.  He also highlighted the gulf 
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between Ribbentrop and Göring being widened by ‘personal jealousy and bitter 
rivalry’.40   
Meanwhile, Ambassador Henderson had sent a telegram to Halifax following a tête-à-
tête with Göring.  Just like his two DEG speeches, this directly contradicted the stance 
taken by Vansittart, Christie and Conwell-Evans in all their reports to the Foreign 
Office since and including the New Year Memorandum.  Despite having been away 
from Berlin for four months on sick leave, Henderson had reassured Göring that he did 
not anticipate ‘any immediate serious international trouble unless Italy made it’ and that 
‘a preventative war, attributed to some British politicians, carried no weight at all with 
the great mass of British public opinion’.  Even the arch dissembler Göring dryly 
commented that ‘he wished that he was as confident’.41  Clearly keen to foster calm in 
the Foreign Office, Henderson, less than a month before the German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, confidently reassured his London masters that ‘Hitler did not 
‘contemplate any adventures at the moment’ and explained that, while ‘Czechoslovakia 
may also be squeezed’, Hitler would not ‘force the pace unless his own hand is forced’.  
A furious Vansittart noted ‘“squeezed” is not the word’.42  This gulf between the 
ambassador and the chief diplomatic adviser would define the debate for the rest of the 
year; as Cadogan noted in his diary ‘Nevile H is completely bewitched by his German 
friends… Van, on the contrary, out Cassandras Cassandra in a kind of spirit of 
pantomime’.43 
On 21 February Vansittart sent Halifax a memorandum from Conwell-Evans reporting 
on his final Berlin trip.  In the covering note he insisted the latter’s advice was more 
credible than the ‘dangerous rubbish’ promulgated by the ambassador as ‘Professor 
Conwell-Evans knows Herr von Ribbentrop at least ten times as well’.44  Conwell-
Evans confirmed Hitler and Ribbentrop’s enduring hostility to Britain and their low 
opinion of the strength of the Anglo-French alliance.  He reported on the very real 
economic challenges facing Germany (echoing similar reports from Christie) that had 
resulted in the very public nervous breakdown of Rudolph Brinckmann, vice-president 
of the Reichsbank.  These included wage inflation and a breakdown of the national 
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railway system.  The General Staff were frustrated by Hitler’s frequent changes of 
foreign policy.  Plans to invade the Ukraine and Holland had been dropped and now 
‘the complete incorporation within the Reich of Bohemia and part of Moravia’ resulting 
in the ‘wiping out of Czechoslovakia as an independent state’ was the highest priority.   
Critically, while the sense of confusion within the Foreign Office is evident from any 
reading of the files, the warnings from Vansittart and others finally seemed to be 
gaining audience such that, as Ferris concludes, ‘right or wrong, over coming months 
all this intelligence drove the Foreign Office, Halifax and some other ministers away 
from Chamberlain’s policy and towards a tougher line’.45  Unlike several of Vansittart’s 
more hectoring memoranda that were filed but appear to have been little read, this one 
was clearly taken seriously.  Cadogan read and annotated it carefully, particularly 
endorsing the criticisms of Lord Brocket.  A few days later he prepared a minute on 
Conwell-Evans’s report accepting that Hitler’s intentions were ‘strictly dishonourable’ 
but questioning the value of the intelligence given Hitler’s frequent changes of plan and 
suggesting Conwell-Evans may have been used by the Germans to spread 
misinformation.46  Thus, while Vansittart was making progress in getting his 
interpretation of the German regime accepted, not all his colleagues were convinced all 
the time.  In an apparent attempt to dilute the impact of Conwell-Evans’s messaging, 
Frank Roberts (then a relatively junior official in the Foreign Office’s Central 
Department who would later serve as British ambassador to the USSR) added a minute 
to the file pointedly directing his colleagues to Brocket’s ‘different account of the views 
expressed’ by Ribbentrop at the lunch.  This more optimistic interpretation was adopted 
by the prime minister who briefed the parliamentary press correspondents privately - 
without liaison with either foreign secretary or his office - on 9 March.  It appeared the 
next day as press reports opining that ‘the situation was brighter than it had been for 
some time’ which Cadogan characterised as a ‘rainbow story’ and as ‘much too 
optimistic’ while Halifax wrote the prime minister a letter of rebuke.47  
Meanwhile, it was the well-publicised social activities of the Fellowship and the DEG 
during that spring that have defined its legacy more than anything from the previous 
years.  While Conwell-Evans had, following his February visit, abandoned any attempt 
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to persuade the National Socialists to negotiate with Britain, Ernest Tennant continued 
his own dogged shuttle diplomacy right through to the late summer of 1939.  In March, 
he attended a banquet in Cologne given by the city’s Bürgermeister, Dr Schmidt, to 
mark the opening of the DEG branch in that city.  Frank Tiarks, a director of the Bank 
of England, senior partner at J Henry Schröder and one of the founders of the 
Fellowship (see chapter one), accompanied him.  Other guests included Ambassador 
Henderson and Count Schwerin von Krosigk, the German finance minister.  Tiarks’s 
speech, delivered in German and then translated and printed for distribution, 
emphasised his own close connections with the country and those between the City of 
London and Germany, especially the Hanseatic cities.  His themes provided a 
convincing historical context for the economic appeasement that had driven the 
founding of both the Fellowship and DEG back in the Baldwin years and which, given 
the failure of diplomatic appeasement as practised at Munich, now seemed worthy of 
revival.  On a different tack, Henderson’s speech (which The Manchester Guardian 
noted was ‘widely reported in the German press’), echoed his pacific theme at the DEG 
dinner in Berlin the previous month and emphasised that Britain’s rearmaments were 
‘for defence purposes only’ with no question of Britain ‘using them aggressively, or to 
attack Germany’.  
 
The perfect German woman  
Three days later and back in London, the Fellowship welcomed Frau Scholtz-Klink, 
Hitler’s ‘perfect Nazi woman’.48  In his New Year memorandum, Conwell-Evans had 
emphasised the role of Germany’s womenfolk in the rise of National Socialism, 
crediting them with both bringing Hitler to power (as they hoped ‘employment would 
follow for their workless husbands and sons’) and also being the ‘first to be critical of 
Hitler when the mobilisation of their menfolk was ordered in September’.49  Now, he 
had assisted in the arrangements for the last major social event hosted by the Anglo-
German Fellowship, a dinner at Claridge’s welcoming Scholtz-Klink, the leader of the 
National Socialist Women’s League.  She had been invited to London by Lady David 
Douglas-Hamilton (formerly Prunella Stack) head of the Women's League of Health 
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and Beauty that had been founded by her mother in 1931.  Stack had the previous year 
married Lord David Douglas-Hamilton, scion of an enthusiastic Fellowship family 
headed by the Duke of Hamilton.   
Scholtz-Klink was accompanied by Frau von Dirksen, the wife of the German 
ambassador, as well as Theo Kordt and his wife.  The dinner was attended by an 
impressive range of predominantly female British guests (according to the Daily 
Telegraph50) many of whom were not members of the Fellowship but were involved in 
leading British women’s organisations.  This included a selection of aristocrats 
including Lady Halifax, wife of the foreign secretary, the Countess of Leitrim, 
(representing the London Lock Hospital for Women), the dowager Countess of Airlie, 
(former vice-president of Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service), the 
dowager Marchioness of Reading (chairman of the Women’s Voluntary Services for 
Civil Defence and widow of the chairman of the long defunct Anglo-German 
Association), Lady Cynthia Colville (president of the Townswomen’s Guilds), and 
Lady Violet Astor (controller of the County of London Auxiliary Territorial Service).  
The British Red Cross was represented by Dame Beryl Oliver while a host of other 
women’s organisations sent representatives ranging from the Mothercraft Training 
Society and the Women’s Gas Council to the Association for Moral and Social 
Hygiene.  Scotland Yard’s women’s police were represented by Dorothy Peto, Britain’s 
first female police superintendent.    
Scholtz-Klink opened her speech (in German) with a pointed attack on the press, 
introducing herself sarcastically as the woman who ‘in the opinion of various 
international journalists, is the leader of the most oppressed women in the world’.51  She 
continued by extolling the healthy virtues and employment of German womanhood 
under National Socialism before attacking the Weimar period and the evils of 
Bolshevism.  Her themes were soundly Nazi, and the dinner gave her a prominent 
platform in central London with the cream of British society as her audience only six 
months before the outbreak of war.  Florence Horsbrugh, the Conservative MP for 
Dundee (and later minister of education in Churchill’s 1951 government) gave a speech 
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in reply commending the work of women’s organisations in the country, while Lady 
David Douglas-Hamilton spoke of those devoted to women’s physical fitness. 
Unusually, this Anglo-German Fellowship swansong has benefited from recent 
scholarly scrutiny.  In an important article titled ‘Peace at any Price’, Julie Gottlieb and 
Matthew Stibbe have examined the significance of her visit in the context of 
‘internationalism between the wars and specifically the role of women in appeasement 
and pacifism’.52  Rightly, they have labelled the visit as ‘poorly timed and highly 
contentious’.  Indeed, the timing seems odd from both German and British perspectives.  
Hitler’s army was days away from invading Prague and Anglo-German relations were, 
as explained above, at a low ebb following Kristallnacht and the evaporation of post-
Munich optimism.  They have suggested that Scholtz-Klink’s invitation dated from 
December 1938 – so two months after Munich and Kristallnacht.  They detailed debates 
among the German authorities as to whether it should go ahead in March 1939 given 
that the Fellowship was out of favour with the National Socialists and such soft 
propaganda in Britain was no longer a priority.  It is now clear (from correspondence 
unearthed in the Pitt-Rivers archive) that the dinner had been originally scheduled for 
the spring or early summer of 1938 - so well before Munich - when Anglo-German 
relations were generally rosier.  Catherine Sharpe, Pitt-Rivers’s secretary and mistress, 
having sent a cheque for 12s 6d for the dinner in May 1938, had asked for it to be 
returned when notified it had been postponed (for reasons unspecified) to November.53  
While there is no other mention in the surviving Fellowship correspondence, the visit 
was evidently further postponed to March 1939.  Consequently, it is now clear that this 
event was nearly a year in planning so was conceived in a less contentious diplomatic 
atmosphere from that in which it was hosted – albeit still surprising that it went ahead 
at all.  
In the weeks following the Scholtz-Klink dinner, Anglo-German relations were 
redefined by a series of diplomatic events that would shape the deteriorating global 
situation for the remainder of the year. Following his emphatic warnings of the threats 
to Czechoslovakia in February, Christie met his German friends on the continent on 10 
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March who warned him that ‘the German army would occupy Bohemia and Moravia 
at some suitable hour during the week March 12 to 19’.54  He rushed back to London 
to deliver his report in person on 12 March.  Three days later, the German army invaded 
the remainder of Czechoslovakia.  Despite his litany of evidently poor advice, the 
British government (at least publicly) supported its hapless ambassador.  The chancellor 
of the exchequer insisted in the House of Commons that same day that ‘it is no reflection 
on our very competent ambassador that he was unable to predict this very sudden action 
which depended upon the decision of a single man’.55  Privately, Cadogan now admitted 
Vansittart had been right and changed his own view.56  Two weeks later, Chamberlain 
announced to the House of Commons that Britain and France would guarantee 
protection to Poland.  A week after that, Erich Kordt came to London to see his brother 
and, on Easter Saturday, they met Vansittart.  Erich warned them about the negotiations 
of an alliance between Italy and Germany which was to result in the ‘Pact of Steel’ 
between the two countries announced three weeks later. 
 
No Happy Returns  
The elaborate celebrations of Hitler’s fiftieth birthday in April were ‘a mammoth 
display of the might and power of the Third Reich, calculated to show the Western 
powers what faced them if they should tangle with the new Germany’.57  This was the 
second event that contributed to the mythology of the Anglo-German Fellowship 
because of the particular prominence of one visitor - Lord Brocket.  Given the political 
mood following the occupation of Prague, attendance at Hitler’s birthday - barely a 
month later - was understandably controversial and provocative.  France and Britain 
were not represented as the ambassadors of both countries (and that of the US) remained 
withdrawn in protest at the invasion of Prague.  The British foreign secretary had 
instructed the chargé d’affaires not to contribute to a corps diplomatique birthday 
present for the Führer.  Cadogan had arranged that the King would send customary 
congratulations but pointedly not wish the Führer ‘happy returns’.58  Sensibly, having 
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accepted Halifax’s guidance to soft-pedal the Fellowship and Vansittart’s not to risk 
travelling to Germany, neither Conwell-Evans nor any member of the Council attended 
the celebrations.  The two members of the Fellowship who did attend were the 
irrepressible Brocket (whose misreading of Hitler had so infuriated Conwell-Evans the 
previous September) and Major General Fuller, a noted pro-Nazi, whom were invited 
as ‘private guests of Herr Hitler’.59   
Reporting on the celebrations, The Manchester Guardian described Brocket as ‘vice-
president of the Anglo-German Fellowship’ clearly implying he was representing the 
Fellowship in an official capacity.  While he may have assumed this title, he was never 
entitled to it and was not representing the Fellowship.  There is no record of him ever 
having served on the Council nor of him (or anyone else) having the title of ‘vice-
president’.  There is evidence of Brocket self-promoting within the Fellowship so he 
himself may have wilfully misled The Manchester Guardian’s correspondent.  A month 
previously, the Duke of Coburg had written to his sister, Princess Alice, mentioning 
that he had seen Brocket and that the latter was ‘now Chairman’ of the Fellowship.60  
Several leading historians have picked up on this presumption of office with one going 
so far as to describe Brocket as having ‘taken over’ the Fellowship.61  Given his fluent 
German, passion for appeasement and powerful connections - especially his friendship 
with the prime minister - it is certainly credible that Brocket may have been considered 
for a senior role in the, by now, fading Fellowship.  However, aged 34, he would have 
been the youngest on the Council whose membership ranged in age (where known) 
from 36 to 74 and averaged over 56.62  Therefore, he would have been improbably 
young to be asked to preside over it.  A notification about his appointment in the 
Fellowship’s file at Companies House would have been required but was never filed.  
Nor is there any reference to it in the MI5 file which covers the 1938-9 period 
reasonably thoroughly as its agent, Friedl Gaertner, was by then well embedded.  Given 
Halifax’s guidance to Conwell-Evans, both men’s dim view of Brocket and the 
secretary’s close control over the Fellowship right up to the outbreak of war, it seems 
ever more unlikely.   
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Clarifying this point is critical in assessing the Fellowship’s reputation in 1939 because 
any of its leaders attending Hitler’s birthday party would have been so provocative 
given the diplomatic mood.  It would also imply a huge disconnect with the British 
government when, in fact, Council members were working closely and effectively with 
ministers and civil servants.   
Brocket had wilfully ignored the highest British authorities by attending Hitler’s party.  
Two weeks earlier, Alec Cadogan, head of the Foreign Office, having consulted the 
prime minister, had instructed him not to ‘junket with Hitler on his birthday’ and to 
advise Theo Kordt not to issue invitations to others.  Undaunted and ignoring these 
instructions, Brocket flew out on 15 April with the Duke of Buccleuch, whose pro-
Hitler enthusiasms had so embarrassed George VI.  They were armed with an eccentric 
proposal (that had appalled Halifax) from a society vicar, the Rector of St. Paul’s, 
Knightsbridge, that Hitler should summon an international conference on his birthday.  
A clearly furious Cadogan noted in his diary: ‘Ye Gods and little fishes! Is the world 
upside down?... those 2 … must make it perfectly clear that they have no sort of official 
approval of any kind’.63   
As he reported to his sister Ida, Chamberlain was briefed by Brocket and Buccleuch on 
their return from Berlin.  They had been ‘received in the most friendly fashion’ and 
everyone was ‘cheerful and calm’.  The Germans ‘denied that they had broken the 
Munich agreement’, Hitler still ‘considered himself bound by the declaration’ he had 
signed with Chamberlain at Munich and they were pleased that Henderson was being 
returned to Berlin as ambassador following his temporary withdrawal.  Even 
Chamberlain was unsure he could accept this German propaganda at face value but 
hoped that ‘Hitler has realised that he has now touched the limit and has decided to put 
the best face on it’.64 
 
Questions in the House 
Possibly inspired by the negative publicity surrounding both the Scholtz-Klink dinner 
and Hitler’s birthday, during March and April 1939, hostile questions about the Anglo-
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German Fellowship were for the first time asked in the House of Commons.  These 
attempted to establish it as a ‘pro-Nazi’ organisation promoting German propaganda 
and may have seeded similar interpretations later that year in Tory MP and thenceforth 
in wider historical analysis.  On the day the German army marched into Prague, William 
Gallacher, the only British communist MP, accused the government of betraying 
Czechoslovakia.  He called for the government's removal, and drew the House’s 
attention to ‘the list of Members of the House, and the list of bankers and big insurance 
company directors who are associated with the so called Anglo-German Fellowship’.65  
A month later, Geoffrey Mander, the Liberal MP for Wolverhampton East (and later a 
Gollancz author of We were NOT all wrong) pointedly asked Sam Hoare, the Home 
Secretary, about German support for ‘pro-Nazi organisations’ such as the Fellowship 
and called for a committee of enquiry.66  Hoare firmly dismissed the idea of a committee 
and was broadly supportive of the Fellowship.  He emphasised its ‘genuine object… to 
promote better understanding between British subjects and the German people’ but did 
acknowledge the risk of it being ‘used for other purposes’ so assured Mander 
(truthfully, given MI5’s engagement) that it was being monitored carefully.  
Unconvinced, Mander asked whether its ‘main object’ was ‘pro-Nazi propaganda and 
anti-Semitism’ provoking a furious response from two MPs who were also members of 
the Council - Sir Assheton Pownall and Sir Thomas Moore.   
The next day, the Conservative MP Vyvyan Adams, an anti-appeaser who had opposed 
the Munich agreement, asked the home secretary whether the Fellowship’s activities 
might ‘result in injury to our national interests’ and ‘serve as a channel for Nazi 
propaganda?’  Four days later, he asked if the home secretary had a list of its members 
and whether ‘any surviving members of the Anglo-German Fellowship [would be] 
vigilantly encircled?’  Sir Arnold Wilson, the Conservative MP for Hitchin (noted as 
an admirer of Franco and Hitler but never a member of the Fellowship) was outraged 
at such use of ‘the Privileges of this House in order to cast innuendoes on a body which 
includes Members of both Houses of Parliament and a large number of men of known 
repute throughout the United Kingdom’.  Adams’s interventions were reported in both 
The Times and The Manchester Guardian.67  
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Widening contacts with the Resistance  
While the Fellowship was coming under attack in the House of Commons and Conwell-
Evans now felt excluded from his beloved Germany, he and Christie were prioritising 
lines of communication between their friends in the German resistance and the British 
government.  Between April and September 1939, as Conwell-Evans detailed in None 
So Blind, Christie’s ‘well-placed informants’ in Germany supplied him and Vansittart 
with ‘much detailed information about the progress of Hitler’s plans’.  This focused on 
three main themes: the Germans were convinced that Britain would not go to war to 
honour her diplomatic commitments  in Eastern Europe given her ‘many years of armed 
weakness and surrender to force’; Hitler planned to attack Poland in the late summer 
before the weather worsened; and there were very real negotiations between Germany 
and Russia.68  Vansittart harassed the Foreign Office to take seriously the threat of such 
an alliance and to build relations with the USSR instead as urged by the ‘ubiquitous 
Christie’.69  As Klemperer documented, in June 1939 ‘the members of the German 
Opposition once again went into top gear in search of a dialogue with London’ with 
Conwell-Evans central to that dialogue.70   
The intensity of these activities should put paid to any lingering suggestion that 
Conwell-Evans was a traitor to his country.  On 15 June, he hosted a meeting between 
the Kordt brothers and Vansittart at his flat in Kensington.  This was one of a series of 
clandestine meetings hosted by the secretary of the Fellowship between the Kordt 
brothers representing the German resistance and the British government represented by 
either Vansittart from the Foreign Office or Horace Wilson from 10 Downing Street.  
Leonard Mosley (a journalist and author who would later be the Sunday Times special 
war correspondent) interviewed Erich Kordt, Wilson and leading National Socialists 
for his 1969 narrative account, On Borrowed Time: How World War Two Began.  The 
German opposition feared the Polish and other guarantees would provoke Hitler’s 
paranoia of being encircled and feared the talks between Britain and the Soviets were 
desultory.  Kordt broke the news of ‘the Führer’s intention to enter into a friendship 
treaty with the Soviet Union’ and explained that, ‘if the British got to the Russians first, 
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the Führer would not move… if, however, the British failed, Hitler would feel safe’.71  
Vansittart reassured the brothers that the British government was definitely concluding 
the agreement with the Soviet Union and they believed him.72  
The Fellowship's web of connections with fragmented German opposition extended 
beyond the Kordts.  Tennant claimed he was ‘never directly involved in any of the 
conspiratorial negotiations’ but did admit he had been ‘occasionally used as a sort of 
liaison’ and that Erich Kordt had stayed at his country house.  He noted ruefully that 
‘all these schemes and plots came to nothing because the policy decided upon by the 
French and British government was that of appeasement and not defiance, and when 
Hitler’s intuition once again proved right, the most powerful opposition to him inside 
of Germany melted away’.73  Nonetheless Conwell-Evans doggedly engaged with the 
German resistance supporting Christie’s full-time intelligence gathering from his well-
established network that has been better chronicled by historians.  In June, Colonel 
Oster, bruised by Chamberlain’s Project Z having undermined his attempted coup the 
previous year, sent Gerhard von Schwerin, a German General Staff officer in the 
Intelligence Department to reconnect with the British government and urge a stronger 
line with Hitler.  He met influential figures in the British establishment, including the 
Fellowship, and secretly with Germans in London sympathetic to his cause such as the 
German ambassador.74  He was monitored by the British Security Service who noted a 
telephone conversation with Paul Rykens of Unilever, a member of the Fellowship’s 
Council and an intelligence source for the Foreign Office.  Conwell-Evans arranged for 
him to meet Lord Londonderry and he also saw Lord Lothian and various MPs 
including RA Butler.    
While Christie provided so much intelligence to Vansittart while operating in Germany 
under his own cover as a Germanophile businessman and distinguished airman, 
Conwell-Evans used the sister societies as his means of access.  He remembered in his 
memoir that he collected ‘anti-Nazis in Germany under the aegis of the Anglo-G 
Fellowship’ even using transport kindly supplied by the Gestapo to meet contacts.  One 
informant was Eugen Diesel, son of the eponymous engine inventor, who provided 
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Conwell-Evans with a personal profile of the regime in late 1938 which he passed to 
Vansittart.75  Another friend was Eduard Brücklmeier, who had been at the London 
embassy with Ribbentrop and returned to Germany in 1938.  He gave Conwell-Evans 
a debrief on the regime’s post mortem on Munich and was later executed following the 
1944 plot against Hitler’s life.76  Similarly, Lothian maintained close contact with the 
resistance through his patronage of Adam von Trott whose mission to Britain that 
summer has been the subject of much scholarly interest.77  
 
The Tennant mission  
Though wary of the intelligence world, Tennant was still keen to deploy his talents as 
an ambulant amateur diplomat so undertook a bizarre, secret, but officially sanctioned, 
mission to Germany in July 1939.78  His final attempt to secure lasting peace with 
Germany shows how, unlike Conwell-Evans and Christie, he still naïvely hoped that 
Hitler and Ribbentrop were ‘anxious for friendship with this country’, a claim even 
Horace Wilson found improbable.79  He later explained that, ‘as one of Ribbentrop’s 
oldest friends’, he had been urged by friends in Germany and Britain to attempt a final 
‘personal approach to see whether anything could be done to relieve the tension’.  He 
wrote to the prime minister (with whom there is no evidence of a previous connection) 
enclosing an unnecessarily-detailed 23-page report on his relationship with Ribbentrop 
offering to try to get the German foreign minister ‘away from his present feeling of 
hostility to Britain and back nearer to his state of mind of seeking friendship with this 
country which existed until the beginning of 1937’.80  The prime minister read both 
letter and report and swiftly authorised a meeting between Tennant and Horace Wilson 
who recognised that Tennant had ‘a very clear appreciation of the situation as between 
ourselves and Germany’ but instructed him to ‘make it perfectly clear’ to Ribbentrop 
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that Britain would ‘fulfil its obligations’ if there were any further ‘attempts at over-
running other States’.81   
Tennant duly arrived on Wednesday 26 July and spent the afternoon and evening with 
Ribbentrop in an old castle about twenty-five kilometres from the Nazi summer capital 
at Berchtesgaden.  His host, looking ‘well and alert’ in his customary outfit of ‘white 
cotton knickerbocker suit and brown stockings’, dispelled Tennant’s concerns based on 
rumours circulating in London that he was out of favour with Hitler.  The next day, 
Tennant noted the crowds gathered at train stations to watch the foreign minister and 
concluded he was ‘much more popular’ there than in London where he had become a 
figure of fun.  Ribbentrop courteously avoided reference to world affairs until after tea 
but then subjected Tennant to a four-hour harangue against the Poles - ‘insects who 
could be crushed by a small portion of the German army’.82  He threatened that ‘if 
Britain wants war…she can have it at any time - Germany is ready’ to which his guest 
responded that Britain ‘was also ready and vastly stronger at sea and equal to Germany 
in the air’.  A shaken Tennant concluded that ‘war has almost been decided upon 
although Germany will not be the one to declare it’ and travelled with the foreign 
minister by train to Berlin in two special coaches.  They were accompanied by Walter 
Hewel whom Tennant had known and liked for several years and who enjoyed closer 
contact with the Führer that summer than most other paladins.83  Hewel reassured 
Tennant that ‘nothing is likely to happen in August’ but anticipated ‘a stormy autumn 
unless the Poles come to their senses’.  He insisted Hitler still harboured ‘hopes and 
plans for friendship with England’ but required the return of former German colonies 
and a settlement on Poland while acknowledging that Germany was not self-sufficient 
in cereals and therefore a bad harvest would be economically destabilising.  
This was a poignant swansong for the two friends’ shared vision in founding the 
Fellowship.  Ribbentrop acknowledged to their fellow diners Tennant's championing of 
‘Anglo-German understanding since 1931’ and role in introducing him to Baldwin.  
Over dinner he explained how the Führer was excited about a factory being built to 
‘make wool out of potato peelings’ and two secret power plants, one of which ‘expects 
to get its power by splitting the atom’.  Ribbentrop’s last words to Tennant as they 
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parted on the platform in Berlin were ‘Goodbye, and let us remember your English 
proverb: it is never too late to mend.’   
How useful the British Government found this intelligence is hard to judge and Tennant 
makes no comment in his memoir.  Notwithstanding the rising prospect of a European 
war, like most of the British Cabinet, Civil Service and the service chiefs, at this crucial 
point Tennant went on holiday for August (in France) leaving his contact details with 
10 Downing Street.84  By 20 August, alarmed by ‘international affairs… slowly moving 
towards a climax’, he wrote to RA Butler, the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 
offering to intervene with Hewel by meeting him at the upcoming party rally.  
Explaining they were ‘old friends’ and that Hewel wanted ‘peace as much as we do’, 
he pointed out that through Hewel ‘anything could be passed on unofficially to both H 
+ von R as he is the main liaison with him’.  Modestly, he admitted his offer was 
unlikely to be of the ‘slightest use at this late stage’.  Butler seemed to agree but passed 
it to Wilson should he wish to follow up.85   
However, while Tennant’s influence in Downing Street had, by his own admission, 
faded that August, Conwell-Evans and Christie suffered no such marginalisation at the 
Foreign Office and remained at the centre of events up to the declaration of war.  While 
Tennant was meeting Ribbentrop in Salzburg, Conwell-Evans, now avoiding Germany, 
was monitoring the Germans in London.  Still welcome at the German embassy, he 
attended a party given by General Wenninger, the air attaché, in late July.  An assistant 
told him bluntly that ‘the Germans would not be satisfied with Danzig’ and spoke of a 
‘Fourth Partition of Poland’.  Conwell-Evans warned him that would mean war, but the 
young German derided British military preparedness relative to the Nazi war machine.  
Conwell-Evans noted increased Gestapo surveillance at the embassy with a man 
wearing ‘the golden badge of the party’ evidently keeping a watch on Ambassador 
Dirksen and the others.  He asked Vansittart to brief Halifax on this and emphasise the 
‘extraordinary difficulties under which our friends work, and the terrible ruthlessness 
of the German government’ and insisted that ‘only overwhelming force can stop them’.  
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Vansittart sent this to Halifax calling it ‘foam straight from the horse’s mouth - and a 
horse with a red bow in its tail too!’86   
On Friday 18 August, Cadogan heard from ‘C’ (head of SIS) that Hitler had prioritised 
Germany’s scarce railway transport resources for the upcoming Party Rally rather than 
the widely rumoured mobilisation for war.87  Any reassurance derived therefrom was 
undermined when Vansittart appeared at the permanent undersecretary’s house that 
night after dinner.  He was in such a ‘high state of excitement’ that Cadogan noted he 
had never ‘seen a man nearer nervous collapse’.  Van’s source in Germany had told 
him that Hitler had decided to launch his war between 25 and 28 August.88  While 
suspicious of Van’s source, Cadogan realised he could not ignore it and recalled Halifax 
from his holiday in his beloved Yorkshire.  The next day, a Saturday, Cadogan drafted 
a detailed letter for Halifax to send to Chamberlain based on this latest information and 
recalled the chief of the Air Staff, the first sea lord and the Cabinet secretary from their 
various holidays.  The prime minister was due to return from fishing in the north of 
Scotland on the Monday, so the letter was dispatched to meet him en route.  It confirmed 
that Hitler had been irritated by Mussolini’s counsel of calm and had now ‘pretty well 
decided… to take action against Poland any day after the 25th’ of that month and 
believed the British would not fight and, even if they did, he could ‘crush Poland before 
we can come in’.  Halifax proposed a personal letter from Chamberlain to Hitler 
appealing for calm.  On 22 August, news reached London of the planned treaty of non-
aggression between Germany and the USSR.  That day Vansittart was called in to 10 
Downing Street for the first time since Cadogan’s appointment as his replacement to 
assist in the escalating crisis.  This marked his return into the Downing Street fold and 
signalled the official acceptance that his advice had been broadly right for months.  That 
night Lothian dined with Cadogan ahead of his departure finally to take up his post in 
Washington.  Two days later, Vansittart cabled Conwell-Evans to ‘return at once’ from 
Switzerland where he was presumably meeting German contracts on neutral territory.89  
On 26 August the ‘ever resourceful’ Christie sent Vansittart what the latter’s biographer 
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acknowledged were ‘precise details about Germany’s operational plans against 
Poland’.90 
A few days later Conwell-Evans briefed Lloyd George, Churchill and Eden at the 
House of Commons on the Germans’ intentions.  On 30 August, Theo Kordt met 
Vansittart at Conwell-Evans’s flat for the last time bringing the document detailing the 
latest plans for Poland.  Their meeting was interrupted by a telephone call from Theo’s 
wife reporting that Hitler had outmanoeuvred Poland such that war was now days away 
and the proposals redundant.  When the furious Vansittart had calmed down, the three 
men agreed to keep open a channel of covert communication even after the outbreak of 
hostilities.  Kordt would send Vansittart a postcard from neutral Switzerland bearing a 
verse from Horace - ‘Si fractus illabatur orbis impavidum ferient ruinae’ (‘If the world 
should fall and break he will stand serene amidst the crash’)91 - with the postmark 
indicating the location where Conwell-Evans should meet Kordt exactly two weeks 
after the date stamp.  Four days later, Hitler’s army invaded Poland.  Two days after, 
Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.  Conwell-Evans immediately 
suspended the Fellowship’s activities and, a week later, wrote to Lloyd George: ‘well 
the worst has happened, as I feared, I only regret that we did not take a stronger line 
last year, as I begged the government to do’ before concluding grimly that ‘now we 
have to work to defeat the enemy’.92 
The wavering fortunes of the Anglo-German Fellowship in these twelve months 
preceding the outbreak of war set the tone for its reputation thereafter as a far-right, 
pro-Nazi and therefore both misguided and unpatriotic organisation.  These themes 
would develop during the war, especially with the publication of Tory MP, followed by 
Guilty Men and the wider Churchillian interpretation of the appeasement years.  As 
argued in the introduction, this reputation has dogged the Fellowship and has formed 
the basis for most historical interpretation ever since.  Two events during the first half 
of the year had tainted the Fellowship's reputation in particular - the March dinner for 
Scholtz-Klink and the fiftieth birthday celebrations for Adolf Hitler, held a month later 
and attended by two leading members of the Fellowship.  Henderson’s two speeches at 
DEG dinners (in Berlin in February and Cologne in March) had been listened to by 
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representatives of the Fellowship and leading members of the German government.  
Widely covered by the Press of both countries, both speeches were highly placatory 
towards Hitler at a time when support for Chamberlain’s policies was falling away 
among both the British Cabinet and the wider public.  While not responsible for the 
British ambassador's views, unsurprisingly his approach to appeasement was assumed 
to be shared by the Fellowship given the platform provided him by its sister 
organisation.  By April 1939, questions were being asked in the House of Commons of 
the home secretary casting aspersions as to the purpose and loyalties of the Fellowship 
and its members.  Despite vigorous responses from its supporters in the House, there 
seems little doubt that this mud stuck.   
Meanwhile, most commentators have overlooked both the core activities of the 
Fellowship's leaders at the time and their significant ideological dislocation from the 
appeasement favoured by the prime minister, his closest adviser, Wilson and the 
ambassador Henderson.  Rather than organising or attending social events, Conwell-
Evans, Christie and (more clumsily) Tennant were focused on continuing to provide 
real, mostly accurate and timely intelligence to the heart of the British government from 
credible German sources especially arch-rivals Ribbentrop and Göring and their 
respective entourages.  Between them, Conwell-Evans and Christie correctly predicted, 
to within days, Hitler’s two greatest initiatives of the year - the invasions of 
Czechoslovakia in March and Poland in September – while also warning the British 
government of Germany‘s diplomatic outreach to Japan and Russia.  There were, of 
course, other noises off predicting Hitler’s next steps but none seems as accurate nor 
offered the quality of background analysis and colour on the National Socialist regime.  
In parallel, the two friends were keeping close to the struggling German resistance to 
Hitler and exploring opportunities with them to avoid a total war.  Given the 
Fellowship’s crumbling reputation, what is surprising is the currency this intelligence 
was now achieving with the British and US governments, up to and including President 
Roosevelt, and the extent to which Conwell-Evans, Christie and Tennant remained in 
the ‘thick of things’ right up to the outbreak of war.   
So, 1939 was the defining year for the Fellowship both reputationally and because, just 
as for the wider policy of appeasement, its efforts reached denouement with the 
outbreak of war.  As an agent of peace, the Fellowship had clearly failed but, as an 
agent of intelligence and persuasion, it can be argued it had greater success.  Realising 




the true nature of Hitler’s regime before Kristallnacht and the consequent seriousness 
of the global situation, the Fellowship’s leading lights had helped re-educate Halifax, 
Cadogan and, months later, Chamberlain and Wilson.  They had influenced, albeit to 
no practical effect, certain of Hitler’s close circle, notably Göring and Hewel, who still 
tentatively counselled caution to their leader as late as that August.  Even Ribbentrop 
had taken time to listen to his old British friends from the Fellowship that year albeit 
he ignored all he heard.  Meanwhile in the US Lothian had the president’s ear and, it 
seems, greater credibility on German matters than has been typically acknowledged to 
help bring the US into the European conflict.  In the centre of all this confusion stood 
Vansittart whose influence was, as Ferris has argued convincingly, greater following 
Munich than commentators including his own biographer had assumed.  In the final 
analysis, Van had ‘helped to change minds about Hitler’ and, in that process, used the 
Fellowship’s leadership, network and credibility most effectively.93  The British 
government may not have been ready for this war with Germany but perhaps was less 
ill-prepared than otherwise it might have been. 
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War and legacy 
In March 1940 during a week’s sick leave with German measles, the writer Peter 
Fleming (elder brother to James Bond’s creator Ian) wrote a short humorous novel, The 
Flying Visit, that was published that July.  The story imagines the German Führer 
parachuting into the Oxfordshire countryside following the explosion of a ‘time-bomb 
in a thermos flask’ that had ‘completely destroyed Herr Hitler’s aeroplane with all of 
its occupants save one’.1  Unable to speak a word of English, his only knowledge of 
Britain gleaned from maps, he realised he was tantalisingly close to Hymper Hall, the 
stately home of Lord Scunner, an ardent admirer of the Führer who had visited him in 
Germany a few years previously.  While the conceit of a muddied and bruised Hitler 
stumbling through the British countryside encountering drunk party goers and fierce 
terriers provides splendid comic entertainment, the book’s satirical twist (and prophetic 
insight) develops as the British government, despite enlisting Churchill’s assistance, 
faces a propaganda dilemma as to what to do with the captured German leader.2  Lord 
Scunner, ‘more florid and less astute than his father’ and also a ‘bigger snob’, is the 
stereotypical member of the Anglo-German Fellowship that had been originated by 
Haxey in Tory MP and developed by Wintringham as Major Patriot in Your MP and by 
Ishiguro as Lord Darlington in The Remains of the Day.3  It is this stereotype of 
aristocratic British support for Hitler that survived in the perception of both the British 
public and leaders in Germany and Russia, particularly Rudolf Hess and Joseph Stalin. 
The closure of the Fellowship on 11 October 1939, six weeks following the declaration 
of war, marked its demise as an organisation.  As Griffiths acknowledged, unlike 
several ‘patriotic’ societies that continued to operate underground, it was ‘definitively 
disbanded’ and ‘none of the members of the Council appears to have undertaken pro-
German activity thereafter’.4  In Britain, any previous association with appeasing 
Hitler’s regime, including membership of the Fellowship, was an embarrassment.  As 
his biographer concluded, Lord Londonderry’s dealings with the Nazis left him 
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‘exposed to public ignominy and without political friends, other than the few, like him 
out in the cold, who shared his views’.5  Similarly, the once cocksure Lord Brocket 
suffered a nervous breakdown as a consequence of the opprobrium directed at him and, 
too unwell to serve in the military, he spent the war on his estates.  Lord Redesdale, 
Unity Mitford’s father, was so irked by the publicity around his daughter’s return from 
Germany, the letters of abuse and the restrictions on his movements, that he felt it 
necessary to insist in a letter to The Times that he wanted Britain to win the war and 
was not, ‘nor, never have been and not likely to become a Fascist’.6 
The Fellowship’s shutters coming down and the scramble by former champions of 
Anglo-German harmony to distance themselves from such enthusiasms do not fully 
explain how its legacy faded so quickly and why any surviving reputation has been so 
distorted.  During and after the war, reference to the Fellowship, including in the House 
of Commons, became an easy shorthand to describe pro-German appeasers with 
allegedly dubious motivations.  In a 1944 debate on ‘war and the international 
situation’, Sir Geoffrey Mander, Liberal MP and author, warned the House that ‘there 
are other Germans who will come along with their smiles saying in a friendly spirit, 
"after all, we are relations… let us be good friends"’.  He reminded his colleagues that 
‘they tried that before the war with some success with Members of this House who were 
taken in and with others who were not’ before remembering ‘the Anglo-German 
Fellowship, which was nothing but a weapon of German propaganda and has now been 
exposed to the world’.7  Nearly sixty years later, in the House of Commons debate on 
Iraq and the controversial weapons of mass destruction, Mike Gapes, a Labour MP, 
echoed Mander’s theme by using it as justification for the military intervention.  He 
reminded the House that ‘we no longer quibble about whether it was right to go to war 
in Poland… in the 1930s, 140 Tory MPs lined up with Adolf Hitler in the Anglo-German 
Fellowship’.8 
Despite the insinuations levelled in both houses of parliament and elsewhere, the 
Fellowship was never credibly accused of treachery, disloyalty to the Crown nor of 
harbouring a fifth column.  Nonetheless, although its pro-German social events ceased 
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immediately, those other activities undertaken by its principal players that defined it 
over the previous two years continued well into the war.  Those arguing for peace 
continued to argue, those supporting the Nazi cause continued to support and those 
conspiring with the German resistance continued to conspire.  The real-world 
inspirations for lords Scunner and Darlington were galvanised into action by the 
declaration of war.  Several members of the House of Lords pressed their fellow peer, 
Lord Halifax, to sue for peace with Hitler.  This aristocratic ‘peace lobby’, while neither 
focussed nor precisely defined, centred on the Duke of Westminster who, in September 
1939, hosted meetings at Bourdon House, his Mayfair home, to promote the cause of a 
negotiated peace.9  Several ennobled Fellowship alumni, including lords Londonderry, 
Arnold (a former Council member), Brocket, Noel-Buxton, Mottistone and Sempill 
attended alongside such a sweep of aristocratic non-members, including the Duke of 
Buccleuch, that Halifax’s biographer wryly concluded that ‘it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that a pro-peace Cabinet might have been the most aristocratic in 
composition since that of the Duke of Grafton’ in the 1760s.10  Londonderry tried to 
persuade the retired Stanley Baldwin to intervene with Hitler to propose peace terms 
possibly by travelling to Berlin.  While far-fetched, the suggestion (ignored by Baldwin 
as before) seems less eccentric than it might, given Hitler’s fascination with the former 
British prime minister and the extensive efforts over the previous seven years, detailed 
in chapters three and six, to affect a meeting between the two statesmen.  
 
Regulation 18B 
In parallel to these peace-mongering lords, the other group campaigning for the 
cessation of hostilities were the fellow-travelling sharks examined in chapter five.  
Griffiths has chronicled their ‘immediate flurry of disorganised activity’ with a frantic 
round of secret meetings and furtive communications that were monitored by MI5.11  
These sought to bring together the relics of various pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups 
including Mosley’s BUF, Domvile’s The Link and Ramsay’s Right Club.  Attendees 
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included former Fellowship members such as Major-General Fuller, Major Yeats-
Brown, Lady Redesdale, Professor Laurie and Richard Findlay. 
These activities, at best unpatriotic, at worst treasonous, ended abruptly with the 
widespread arrests initiated under Defence Regulation 18B in late May 1940.  The 
emergency powers allowed for the suspension of habeas corpus and the indefinite 
detention of people suspected of being sympathetic to National Socialism.  Membership 
of the BUF was the most common reason for detention.  A total of 1,769 individuals 
were detained, the majority between May and July 1940.12  Past membership of the 
Fellowship was not, in itself, grounds for detention but prominent members whose pro-
Nazi activities had taken them beyond the Fellowship were detained.  Barry Domvile 
and his wife were well-publicised detainees in July 1940 (and he the only former 
Council member to be arrested) and were incarcerated for three years.  CE Carroll, the 
secretary of The Link and editor of the Anglo-German Review, was detained that 
summer and only released in November 1943.  The trouble-makers that plotted against 
the Fellowship’s leadership in 1937 were rounded up, including Pitt-Rivers, his two 
sponsors for membership (Luttman-Johnson and Findlay) along with Elwyn Wright, its 
hate-fuelled former secretary.  Catherine Sharpe (Pitt-Rivers’s girlfriend and Conwell-
Evans’s scourge) avoided detention having left Pitt-Rivers in mid-1939 and married a 
doctor she had had met on the boat to South Africa.  Margaret Bothamley and Dorothy 
Eckersley, prominent lady ‘sharks’, avoided detention by escaping to Germany.  
Other members included Viscountess Downe, Queen Mary’s former lady-in-waiting 
and friend, General Fuller and Sir Jocelyn Lucas MP, fall into a grey area of avoiding 
detention, while perhaps deserving it, because of their establishment credentials.  
Griffiths identified ‘considerable reluctance… to imprison prominent, usually titled 
people’, but quantifying how much enthusiasm for National Socialism merited 
detention was an imperfect process and several of the best-connected were detained 
including Mrs Winston Churchill’s two cousins (Pitt-Rivers and Diana Mosley) much 
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to the amusement of her children.13  There had even been rumours in the House of Lords 
that Londonderry might be detained.14   
 
Vansittartism 
Conwell-Evans, Christie and their patron Vansittart had nothing to do with either the 
aristocratic peace initiatives floating around the House of Lords nor the manoeuvrings 
of the so-called patriotic societies.  With the conviction of the convert, Conwell-Evans 
was furious with his old boss Noel-Buxton, writing angrily that ‘how anybody can talk 
of negotiating with Hitler passes [his] comprehension’ and insisting that a truce would 
give the Germans, who are ‘bullies in victory, and whine in defeat’, the respite needed 
to launch an attack on Britain.15  The next day he wrote in similar vein to Lloyd George 
(who had just called in the House of Commons for a negotiated peace) insisting that 
‘Hitler’s chief aim is to bring down the British Empire’ and arguing that the former 
prime minister’s attitude would only help Hitler ‘undermine that resolution of the 
British and French peoples to defeat him’.16  In 1940 he burned his once-treasured 
signed photograph of the Führer. 
Conwell-Evans’s fury with former clients underscores his conversion from Britain’s 
‘most ardent Germanophil’ to passionate proponent of ‘Vansittartism’.17  Defined by 
Van’s biographer as ‘an extreme and obsessive anti-Germanism’, this ideology blamed 
the war not just on National Socialism and Hitler’s leadership, but on an innate German, 
or more precisely Prussian, bellicosity that dated back over centuries.18  Christie, who 
had lived in Germany since the 1920s, now defined National Socialism as the ‘last and 
most hideous manifestation of the Prussian Militarism’ and Vansittart was convinced 
that ‘eighty percent of the German race are the political and moral scum of the earth’ 
insisting that it was necessary to ‘eradicate not only Hitlerism, but Prussianism’.19   
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Vansittartism reached a wide audience when the chief diplomatic adviser was invited 
by Duff Cooper, the minister of information, to broadcast a series of lectures on the 
BBC Overseas Programme that was successfully published by Hamish Hamilton as 
Black Record: Germans Past and Present in early 1941.  Though reflecting and fuelling 
popular anti-German sentiment, contemporary commentators were disturbed by the 
splenetic tone of his attack and there were hostile questions in the House of Commons 
and pamphlets published questioning the implications of his argument after the 
cessation of hostilities and the propriety of a senior civil servant making such charged 
broadcasts.20  
Vansittartism contributed both to the Fellowship’s fast-fading legacy and to its 
historiography as developed through the Gollancz and Churchillian interpretations.  
Conwell-Evans and Christie made no mention of the Fellowship in None so Blind and 
Vansittart distanced himself - albeit still loyal to his friends behind it.  In a House of 
Lords debate on enemy propaganda in February 1945, following the Yalta Conference 
and against the background of rising Allied military successes, he disparaged the 
Fellowship ‘as if this organisation had been a dangerous one, and as though all those 
belonging to it should come under suspicion’.21  Stung by this assertion, Tennant wrote 
to The Times pointing out, correctly, that the future of the Fellowship had been reviewed 
after Munich but claiming, incorrectly, that Vansittart had advised against closure.  
Having checked with Conwell-Evans, Vansittart explained that it was Halifax, as 
foreign secretary, who had given the stay of execution.  While factually correct, Van’s 
posturing seems pusillanimous given how closely he had worked with the Fellowship’s 
leaders, between Munich and the invasion of Poland, to leverage its networks to gather 
intelligence on the German regime.   
The outbreak of war had done little for the employment prospects of the Fellowship’s 
most vocal supporters.  Lord Lothian was a notable exception, arriving as ambassador 
in Washington on 29 August to news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and absorbing himself in 
bettering relations with President Roosevelt, the State Department and the American 
press.  The New York Times credited him with substantial success concluding that 
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‘American sentiment [in September 1939] was generally favourable to the cause he 
advocated, yet without Lothian’s earnestness and ability, the confidences he won and 
the energy he expended tirelessly, America’s contribution might have been 
substantially less’.22   
While Lothian was settling into Washington, Christie proposed to Vansittart the 
establishment of a ‘German Advisory Committee’ to focus their shared expertise and 
intelligence on Germany to support the British war effort and salvage something from 
the ashes of the networks he, Conwell-Evans and Vansittart had nurtured.  Suggesting 
it could be accommodated at the Fellowship’s now redundant offices in Chelsea, its 
purpose was to design propaganda that should be ‘tuned flawlessly to the different 
moods and mentalities of all classes in Germany’ and would operate under complete 
secrecy.  He proposed staffing it with one or two Germans of ‘proved ability and 
reliability’ (paid no more than £50 per month) overseen by a ‘mixed committee of 
British and Germans’ with Conwell-Evans as the obvious candidate as secretary and 
Vansittart as chairman.23  From the Germans, he recommended Dr Hermann 
Rauschning and Dr Otto Strasser.  Rauschning was a conservative former president of 
the Danzig Senate who had fallen out with the NSDAP in 1934 and was then living in 
Paris.  Christie thought he had a ‘first class brain’ and a ‘close personal knowledge of 
Hitler and the Nazi Party’.  An early member of the NSDAP, Strasser had been 
prominent within its left wing but was expelled in 1930.  His brother had been murdered 
during the Night of the Long Knives in July 1934.  The scheme seems never to have 
gone past concept stage although Vansittart later advised Hugh Dalton, the minister of 
economic warfare, and the two Germans became prolific propagandists against Hitler 
with Rauschning publishing Hitler Speaks: a Series of Political Conversations with 
Adolf Hitler on his Real Aims in 1940 and Strasser publishing The Gangsters around 
Hitler in 1942. 
Evidently anxious to find a wartime role, three weeks previously Conwell-Evans had 
written to Lloyd George asking to be recommended for a job with Winston Churchill 
who was ‘so keen and imaginative’ and ‘ought to have a political secretary who is an 
expert on contemporary Germany’.  He reminded Lloyd George that there was ‘hardly 
                                                          
22 The New York Times, 13 December 1940. 
23 Christie to Vansittart, 28 September 1939, CHRS. 




anyone in England who knows more about the inside of things in Germany’, an 
immodest but not ridiculous claim to which Vansittart would be able to testify.24  
Similarly, Tennant persuaded his cousin Margot (widow of the former prime minister 
Asquith), for whom he was a trustee, to write to ‘dearest Winston’ two weeks after he 
was appointed prime minister to find a role for Tennant.25  In October 1939, Tennant 
was sent by the Ministry of Supply to Norway to report on the ferro-alloy industry, on 
which Britain was dependent for the manufacture of steel and armaments.  The trip was 
not without drama as the  German legation heard of his mission, so he went home by 
sea under an assumed name.  He returned in March 1940 by plane a fortnight before 
Hitler invaded Norway and Denmark.   
 
October in Switzerland 
While the German Advisory Committee came to nothing, Conwell-Evans and 
Christie’s liaison work with the German resistance stepped up a gear once war was 
declared.  Still under the direction of Vansittart, whose star in the Office had risen now 
his worst fears had proven well-founded, their efforts had the prime minister’s blessing.  
Though convinced there should be no negotiated peace with Hitler, their German 
network, especially the Kordt brothers and the ‘South German’ group cultivated by 
Christie, now became the conduit for intense discussions around ‘the possibility of 
getting rid of Hitler and coming to terms with an anti-Nazi Government under Goering 
on the basis of restoring independence to Poland and Bohemia, disarming all round, 
and agreeing to leave inviolate the unity and boundaries of Germany proper’.26   
Having accepted Britain’s declaration of war in person, Theo Kordt had left Carlton 
House Terrace for Berlin with a letter from Christie offering ‘deeply felt Auf 
Wiedersehens’, thanking him ‘a thousand times for all your noble work’ and assuring 
him ‘come what may, we shall regard you always as a great gentleman and a great 
Christian’.27  The maintenance of a secure channel of communication between the 
resistance and London being his highest priority, Kordt had arranged to be posted to 
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Bern in Switzerland barely a week after the declaration of war.  Here, his ‘primary 
object [was to] to find out what the British attitude would be in the event of an internal 
coup’.28  So, following the protocol agreed with Vansittart and Conwell-Evans at their 
final peacetime meeting at Cornwall Gardens, his wife sent Lady Vansittart a postcard 
of the Zum Weissen Kreuz, a small hotel in Interlaken, with a message quoting Horace.   
This was the signal for Conwell-Evans to find his way to Switzerland.  As Halifax’s 
biographer drolly concluded, there were, by then, ‘so many amateur and professional 
contacts between the protagonists in the various neutral countries that one is left with 
the impression that it must have been hard to get to the bar in any Swiss café during the 
Phoney War for all the spies discussing peace terms with one another’.29  However, it 
is reasonable to suggest that the series of meetings held by Conwell-Evans and Christie 
with the plotters in Switzerland had a greater chance of fruition that most of these 
amateur intelligence enterprises.  Although Conwell-Evans’s account made no mention 
of Christie joining his trip to Switzerland, it is now clear from recently-opened MI5 
files that the two friends travelled together with Conwell-Evans staying in Lausanne to 
meet Kordt and Christie meeting up with his South German group including Prince 
Max von Hohenlohe.  Their joint enterprise was sponsored by Vansittart and watched 
closely by 10 Downing Street with Jock Colville, then an assistant private secretary to 
the prime minister, recording their progress in his diary.  Intriguingly, given that the 
source of funding for his numerous peacetime trips to the Continent remains unclear, 
Conwell-Evans noted in his handwritten memoir that his expenses were paid by HM 
Government albeit with officials grumbling to Vansittart that he was overspending.   
Much to Vansittart’s annoyance, their first attempt to board an Air France flight from 
Heston Aerodrome to Paris on 23 October was frustrated by Police Sergeant Ashwell-
Cooke who detained them and confiscated their papers as they did not have clearance 
from the security services.  Interestingly, given that his association with the Fellowship 
has received so little attention then or since, the authorities noted that Christie was ‘a 
member of Chatham House and Anglo-German Fellowship’.  They noted to MI5 that 
the purpose of his visit was ‘to discuss some sort of coup d’état in Germany which 
would result in the settling up of a Government from which the leading Nazis would be 
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excluded’.30  Presumably after intervention by Vansittart to confirm their official 
clearance, the pair were granted leave the next day for a three-day trip.  Conwell-Evans 
stayed in a hotel in Lausanne for a series of clandestine meetings with Kordt in Berne.  
He had brought a hurriedly-handwritten note that was later produced as evidence at the 
Nürnberg trials and reproduced in facsimile in Kordt’s book.  This included extracts 
from a recent speech by Neville Chamberlain copied out from Chamberlain’s 
handwritten original in Vansittart’s room at the Foreign Office.  Assured by Van that it 
‘had been specially written… with the conspirators in mind’, Conwell-Evans still 
thought it ‘too vague’ but it nonetheless convinced the plotters that the British 
government would negotiate peace terms with a future German government led by 
moderates.31  Probably overestimating the extent of prime ministerial blessing, Theo’s 
wife took the note to brother Erich in Berlin.  Recognising it as a ‘trump card which 
would remove the inhibitions of the General Staff’, Erich shared it with fellow 
conspirators, Colonel Oster and General Beck, whose attempted coup in autumn 1938 
had been so frustrated by Chamberlain’s direct intervention with the Führer.32   
Meanwhile, Christie had admitted to the airport police that the purpose of his visit was 
to meet with Prince Max von Hohenlohe (codenamed ‘Vanloo’) and Vansittart’s 
biographer assumed he also met others from his South German group including: Dr 
Joseph Wirth, the former German Chancellor; Fritz Thyssen, the industrialist; Hermann 
Rauschning, whom he had proposed for the German advisory committee; and his most 
valued informant, Hans Ritter (aka ‘Kn’), all of whom had sought refuge in neutral 
Switzerland.  Hohenlohe made specific peace proposals and while the Foreign Office 
was (according to Colville) ‘rather defeatist about the prospect of securing peace’, 
Chamberlain was prepared to accept most of his nine-point plan, subject to Hitler 
playing ‘no part in the proposed new order’ and the addition of ‘some safeguards for 
the Jews and the Austrians’.33  A few days later, Colville recorded further discussions 
with Hohenlohe who had wanted to come to England but Christie was sent to Holland 
instead.  Now the barrier to progress was Vansittart and Halifax who refused to 
negotiate with Christie’s friend Göring.  Two months later, Colville remained 
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cautiously optimistic that ‘all hope of engineering an internal coup d’état does not seem 
to have been abandoned’.34  
Emboldened by the messaging from Conwell-Evans, Erich had embarked on a plan for 
he himself to assassinate Hitler with a bomb supplied by his friend Oster, who had 
access to the counter-intelligence explosives laboratory.  Of the several assassination 
attempts on the Führer, this ranks amongst the less hare-brained and might have 
succeeded but for two events in early November.  A bomb attack at a Munich beer cellar 
where Hitler was celebrating the 1923 putsch resulted in a tightening of his personal 
security.  The disastrous Venlo Incident when two British intelligence agents, believing 
they were negotiating with the German resistance, were duped by undercover Gestapo 
agents and abducted into Germany, marked the end of the Foreign Office’s patience 
with such Continental adventures.  Leading historians have agreed that Erich’s 
assassination plan, ‘by virtue of the total unexpectedness of such an assault inside 
Hitler’s heavily-guarded inner sanctum’ had stood ‘every chance of succeeding.’35  
Despite the many peace proposals that found their way to the sceptical British Foreign 
Office, there had been an openness to those connected with the ‘moderates’ represented 
by the Kordts through Conwell-Evans and Christie, who remained respected by the 
Office and Downing Street.  Halifax told Lothian in late 1939 that it would be 
advantageous if the British government ‘could formulate objectives that would be 
acceptable to any “moderate” section in Germany that might have any chance of 
overthrowing the present regime’.36  Kordt and Conwell-Evans had further clandestine 
meetings in December, January and February with a fourth planned for April 1940 but 
cancelled following the German invasion of Norway.  Meanwhile, Conwell-Evans 
continued to have access to the foreign secretary, supplying him with intelligence 
following his final trip to the Continent with Christie in March 1940.37  None of these 
intelligence missions bore fruit but the two friends remained in close touch with their 
spymaster, Vansittart.  A year later, reflective ahead of retirement, he wrote to Conwell-
Evans to celebrate his becoming ‘a free man, able to speak and to write… without the 
handicap which officialdom necessarily imposes’.  Admitting that having his ‘advice 
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rejected for eight years and neglected for three’ had not been pleasant, he insisted he 
would continue ‘more than ever’ to need Conwell-Evans and Christie’s collaboration.38  
And, despite their differences dating back to before Munich, Conwell-Evans remined 
in touch with the discredited, and now ill, Nevile Henderson.  In June 1940, a few days 
after German troops marched into Paris, the former ambassador wrote to Conwell-
Evans concluding that ‘France is on the verge of collapse and surrender, and it is Britain 
alone at last’.  Having just completed Failure of a Mission, his mea culpa 
autobiography, and still seeking to justify his diplomatic strategies in Berlin, he offered 
to meet his critic and insisted that it had been ‘useless to try to prevent a certain measure 
of German predominance in Eastern Europe’ and that ‘by turning German eyes 
eastward we should keep her from turning them westward’.39  
 
The Flying Visit 
Of all the nobles calling for a negotiated peace with Hitler, it was the Marquess of 
Clydesdale whose involvement with the Fellowship and entanglement in the Hess affair 
is most pertinent to the Fellowship’s wartime legacy especially in German, American 
and Russian eyes.  A month after the outbreak of war, Clydesdale had laid out his 
assessment of the situation in a letter published in The Times and broadcast on German 
radio that night.  It has been claimed Lord Halifax advised on the drafting but, either 
way, his biographer  concluded that ‘for all its good intentions, [it] betrayed a certain 
naivety’.40  Speaking on behalf of his generation (he was thirty-six), he started on a firm 
line: ‘if Hitler is right when he claims that the whole of the German nation is with him 
in his cruelties and treacheries… then this war must be fought to the bitter end’.  But 
offering an appeasing olive branch, he acknowledged the ‘injustices done to the German 
people… after the last war’ and proposed a ‘just and comprehensive peace’, including 
territorial concessions, ‘provided that Lebensraum is not made the grave of other 
nations’ and that ‘no race will be exposed to being treated as Hitler treated the Jews on 
November 9 of last year’.41   
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Eighteen months later, on the night of 10 May 1941, Clydesdale was paid a visit as 
extraordinary as Fleming’s comedy, with the arrival by parachute of ‘Hauptmann 
Alfred Horn’ soon identified as Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, at a farm just south of 
Glasgow.  As in The Flying Visit, the German leader asked his captors to take him to 
the nearby stately home of an aristocratic sometime friend of Germany - in this case, 
Dungavel House, seat of the Douglas-Hamiltons.  A few days later, Kim Philby, by 
then working for both MI6 and Soviet intelligence, was the first to report the incident 
to the Russian authorities.  
The far from fully-explained Hess affair suggests how the legacy of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship, despite it being defunct for two years, still resonated in both Hitler’s 
Germany and Stalin’s USSR.   Some commentators have acknowledged echoes of the 
Fellowship, but again it has not been properly explored.  While attention has focussed 
on its connections with Ribbentrop and Göring, the Fellowship also had a powerful 
friend in Rudolf Hess.  Scribe for Mein Kampf and Hitler’s most constant companion, 
Hess was appointed deputy Führer in 1933 and was third in the NSDAP hierarchy after 
Göring and Hitler.  He befriended Tennant, who had proposed that he should visit 
Britain back as 1934 and supported the establishment of both the DEG and the 
Fellowship.42  Unlike most of the German leadership, Hess was an internationalist.  His 
parents, whom Tennant also met, had lived in Egypt where Rudolf had been born, so 
he was not as ‘completely lacking in knowledge of conditions outside of Germany as 
were most of the Nazis’.43  He had met most of the Fellowship’s leaders and supported 
meetings between Hitler and British visitors including Lothian in January 1935 and 
Londonderry when attending the Winter Olympics.  Guest of honour at the DEG 
opening ceremony in January 1936, photographs show him leading the party into dinner 
alongside the Duke of Coburg and the British ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps.   
Clydesdale and his family had been associated with the Fellowship for at least five 
years before Hess’s startling arrival at their ancestral home.  He came to Berlin for the 
Olympics with two brothers and a sister (with each being provided with a chauffeured 
car by the German government) keen to investigate the rearming of the German air 
force.  There, he befriended Albrecht Haushofer, lauded by MI5 as ‘the greatest 
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authority in Germany on the British Empire’, and the son of Karl Haushofer, Hess’s 
former professor at the German Academy.44  As the inventor of ‘Geo-Politics’, 
Haushofer senior has been credited with developing the intellectual framework of 
lebensraum as explored in Mein Kampf.  A long-term admirer of Britain, Karl was a 
founding board member of the DEG and was awarded honorary life membership of the 
British Legion.  By 1934, Albrecht was Hess’s personal adviser and special adviser to 
both Hitler and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop. 
During the Berlin Olympics, Albrecht had introduced Clydesdale to Göring who 
arranged for General Milch to give the marquess a tour of the Luftwaffe allowing him 
to size up Germany’s air power covertly.  Albrecht thereafter stayed with Clydesdale 
when he visited England and a friendship blossomed between the two men that was 
monitored by British intelligence for four years before Hess’s arrival in Scotland.  
Clydesdale introduced Albrecht to the foreign secretary who arranged for the Foreign 
Office to include him as an intelligence asset.  
Whether or not formally a member of the Fellowship, Clydesdale attended Anglo-
German events including the von Blomberg reception and Ribbentrops’ housewarming.  
In early 1939, the Fellowship, with ‘strong support’ from the British Council, 
approached him to give a series of lectures on ‘aviation and physical training and the 
Everest flight’ in Germany.  The chief of the Air Staff advised Clydesdale that ‘there is 
no objection to your giving these lectures, in fact we welcome the idea’ and offered to 
second the director of intelligence to assist.45  Abandoned due to escalating diplomatic 
tensions, the proposal indicates nonetheless how the RAF and the British Council still 
saw the Fellowship as an appropriate conduit for a propaganda exercise masquerading 
as a friendship visit.   
In July 1939, Albrecht, acting ‘clandestinely for von Hassell’s opposition circle’, sent 
Clydesdale a letter that he showed first to his friend Winston Churchill and then to 
Halifax and the prime minister.46   Both ardent anglophiles, the Haushofers had been 
sceptical of Hitler from the outset and Albrecht had used the Olympics to recruit 
sympathetic British friends.  He was convinced that war loomed and that ‘any date after 
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the middle of August may prove to be the fatal one’.  Convinced that Germany ‘cannot 
win a short war and… cannot stand a long one.’  Bravely and perceptively, he had 
advised Ribbentrop and Hitler over a year before that the British suspected ‘a new 
imperialism’ behind National Socialism and predicted that their government would 
‘have the whole nation behind it’ to launch ‘a crusade for the liberation of Europe from 
German militarism’.47 
Among the Britons that Hess had encountered, both from the Fellowship and elsewhere, 
the obvious question is why he choose Clydesdale.  By then Duke of Hamilton and a 
senior RAF officer on active service, he was no longer an MP and had no direct 
association with ‘men such as RA Butler, Sir Samuel Hoare or Lord Halifax, the sort 
of high ranking politicians who believed it would be best to make peace with 
Germany’.48  Beyond Hamilton’s involvement with the Fellowship, it was the duke’s 
wider social and political connections, coupled with his friendship with the Haushofer 
family, that explains the choice.  Albrecht had proposed Hess approach Hamilton with 
peace feelers, albeit he suggested first trying ambassadors sympathetic to appeasement 
such as Hoare and Lothian.  He emphasised the duke’s royal connections to Hess who, 
like Ribbentrop, underestimated the limitations of the British constitutional monarchy 
and confused social standing with political power.  In fine ‘ambulant amateur’ tradition, 
by choosing Hamilton rather than the ambassadors, Hess was seeking ‘to bypass the 
diplomatic circles serving Churchill’s government which had proved impervious to all 
previous peace feelers’.49  Hamilton had been appointed lord steward of the royal 
household in 1940, following the dismissal of the Duke of Buccleuch for joining 
Hitler’s birthday party, and was hereditary keeper of Holyroodhouse, the monarch’s 
official residence in Scotland.  On hearing of Hess’s arrival, George VI warily noted 
the irony of the situation, wondering: ‘perhaps the post of Lord Steward is bewitched 
or is it Germanised?  Hess might have landed two miles from Drumlanrig [Buccleuch’s 
castle] instead’.50   
In the fortnight following Hess’s arrival, Hamilton’s involvement brought unwelcome 
attention from the British press and questions in the House of Commons.  The US press 
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had no hesitation in connecting Hess, Hamilton and the Fellowship.  The New York 
Times ‘revealed’ that the duke had ‘belonged to the now condemned Anglo-German 
Fellowship Association [sic]’ albeit accepting that there was no indication that he was 
‘connected in any way with a peace movement’.51  Two years later, in a sensationalist 
article alleging his flight was authorised by the Führer and no surprise to the British 
authorities, The American Mercury explained that his intended audience was not the 
British government but ‘a group of influential Britishers, among them the Duke of 
Hamilton, who belonged to the since discredited Anglo-German Fellowship 
Association [sic]’.52 
So, while an odd choice, the young duke did have the access for which Albrecht and 
Hess hoped.  In his History of the Second World War Churchill remembered the call 
from Hamilton on the evening of Sunday 11 May and, once assured ‘the matter was 
one of the urgent cabinet importance’, agreed for him to come at once.53  Similarly, 
Albrecht’s confidence that Hamilton could arrange an audience with the monarch 
proved merited, as he lunched with the king five days later to discuss the recent arrival. 
 
The Russian Reaction 
The reaction of the Russians to Hess’s flight to Scotland offers the opportunity to draw 
together these loose threads connecting the Fellowship, Hess, the Haushofers, Hamilton 
and Philby for the first time.  As Gorodetsky has summarised, ‘the outstanding and 
lasting feature of Soviet foreign policy in the interwar period… was a pathological 
suspicion that Germany and Britain might close ranks and mount a crusade against 
Russia’.54  The New York Times reported that ‘British sources’ had ‘intimated that Herr 
Hess in deciding to fly to the enemy, felt that Germany should make peace with Britain 
rather than cooperate with the Bolsheviks’.55  Stafford has emphasised it was the 
Russians who originated the conspiracy theories about Hess, ‘running strongly ever 
since’, but it was Philby who, as the first to report to Moscow the arrival of the deputy 
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Führer in Scotland, promoted the spectre of Anglo-German alliance that so influenced 
Stalin’s thinking for several years.56  As Haslam has concluded in his recent history of 
Soviet intelligence, ‘all too conscious that perfidious Albion was perpetually up to no 
good, Stalin became obsessed with uncovering the truth behind the Hess affair’.57   
Philby, whose analysis of the Fellowship had, as Urbach has argued, ‘raised fears in 
Moscow’, prodded his masters in Moscow by telling them that Hess ‘might become 
“the centre of an intrigue” to conclude a compromise peace, one serving both the peace 
party in England and Hitler’.58  Lord Beaverbrook, the press baron, further fuelled 
Stalin’s paranoia at a dinner in October 1941, supplying a transcript of his interview 
with Hess that developed into an article in Pravda that was broadcast on Moscow radio.  
Both contemporaries and historians typically associated this pro-German element with 
Cliveden, which can, as argued in chapter four, in this context be taken as a proxy for 
the Fellowship.  Maisky, the Russian ambassador, had been tasked with watching ‘the 
so-called “Cliveden” elements in the government while encouraging the anti-appeasers, 
notably Eden and Churchill’ while Oleg Tsarev, the former KGB officer turned 
historian, similarly associated Hamilton with the ‘so-called Cliveden set’.59    
Intentionally or not, the Germans had also helped to promote this bogey of an Anglo-
German alliance even after war had been declared.  Valentin Berezhkov, the Soviet first 
secretary, was astonished to see ‘the reappearance of pre-war pamphlets entitled 
“German-British Friendship”’ in the waiting room at the German Foreign Ministry.  
Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office used Hess’s flight to manipulate the Russians: 
‘a whisper was made to the Russians through covert channels that Hess’s flight 
indicated growing dissatisfaction in Germany over Hitler’s policy of collaboration with 
the Russians’.60   
From such mischief-making are myths built.  Churchill, during his visit to Russia in 
1944, was ‘astonished to find Stalin still convinced that Hess had been involved in 
organising a joint British-German crusade against Russia which had “miscarried”’.61  
Back in Britain, the Communist Party was able to use these Soviet-inspired conspiracy 
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theories for its own purposes.  As Jo Fox has revealed, British communists ‘sought to 
keep the Hess mystique alive since it served their own interests or those of their political 
masters and allowed them to connect home-front rumour with propaganda abroad’.  
They accused the aristocracy of ‘close association with the Nazis, contending that they 
were united by the forces of imperialism, plutocratic governments, and capitalism’.62  
Taken in tandem with the Gollancz interpretation outlined in the introduction, these at 
best partial truths underline how a substantially left-wing interpretation of the 
Fellowship has prevailed ever since.  When stirred into the orthodoxies and conspiracy 
theories surrounding appeasement, the Guilty Men, the Cliveden Set, Rudolf Hess and 
the Trinity Spies, such biases and distortions have dominated the historical 
interpretation of the Fellowship ever since.   
 
Post war legacy 
Following the end of war in Europe, the legacy of the Fellowship (closed since October 
1939 but only formally dissolved in 1949) and its champions faded from embarrassment 
into irrelevance.  Any status it may have achieved within the pre-war British 
Establishment was quickly forgotten.  The trials of the major war criminals at Nürnberg 
sealed the fates of the Fellowship’s German champions.  Their verdicts confirmed that, 
as the chief US prosecutor had alleged, they had ‘planned and prepared for… an 
aggressive war… over a long period of time with no small skill and cunning’ which had 
correspondingly ‘condemned those in the democracies’ including the Fellowship ‘who 
had failed to perceive and foil the conspiracy’.63  At his trial, Ribbentrop had asked to 
call distinguished Britons including King George VI, Nancy Astor, Winston Churchill 
and lords Dawson, Vansittart and Londonderry as defence witnesses.  Included in his 
application were his two closest associates within the Fellowship, Tennant and 
Conwell-Evans.  Tennant was asked to confirm that he had indeed introduced 
Ribbentrop to Baldwin, MacDonald and Davidson over a decade previously in the 
search for Anglo-German harmony.  To Tennant’s relief, the British prosecutor, Sir 
David Maxwell-Fyfe (later attorney general, home secretary and lord chancellor) 
rejected this request as the ‘acme of irrelevance’.64  With similar disdain, Maxwell-Fyfe 
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dismissed Conwell-Evans’s suitability as a witness on the grounds that he was ‘not even 
in Who’s Who’.65  Without any benefit from Fellowship leaders appearing as character 
witnesses, Göring, Hess and Ribbentrop, each sponsors of the sister societies and the 
three most senior Nazis on trial, were in any event found guilty.  Ribbentrop was hanged 
on 16 October 1946, two days after Göring had committed suicide, and Hess was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Just before his execution, Ribbentrop had written to 
Sir Alexander Walker, his former business associate and Fellowship member, asking 
him to employ his son Rudolf.   
The war trial that particularly contributed to the Fellowship’s fading legacy was The 
USA vs. Ernst von Weizsäcker, et al. (also known as the ‘Ministries’ or 
‘Wilhelmstrasse’ trial).  While historians of German diplomacy continue to question 
the extent of ‘good’ Germans opposing Hitler’s regime from within the German Foreign 
Ministry (and Weizsäcker’s mercurial attitude to resistance specifically), Meehan has 
catalogued how the British Foreign Office downplayed its contacts with those Germans 
(good or bad), keen to avoid any suggestion that war might have been prevented or 
shortened had its engagement been less grudging.66  Vansittart’s behaviour in 
connection with this trial does him no credit.  Weizsäcker’s supporters, led by the Kordt 
brothers, had asked Vansittart and others to confirm that their former chief had worked 
to restrain, and even undermine, Ribbentrop’s disastrous foreign policies.  The now 
retired chief diplomatic adviser damned Weizsäcker as ‘the chief executant of 
Ribbentrop’s policy’ and, while admitting that the brothers were ‘anti-Nazi’, wrote that 
‘neither of them, so far as I know, ever did anything to demonstrate the fact’.  Given 
the secret meetings in Downing Street, Cornwall Gardens and Switzerland, their 
bravery in gathering intelligence for him (detailed in chapters six and seven) this is 
shockingly disingenuous.  He even suggested that, to be truly brave, Theo should have 
stayed in London at the outbreak of war despite having encouraged him to go to 
Switzerland having devised the Horace-quoting postcard routine with Conwell-
Evans.67  Halifax’s response to the same request puts him in far better light.  The former 
viceroy of India, foreign secretary and ambassador to Washington, now retired to his 
estates in Yorkshire, supplied an affidavit explicitly contradicting Vansittart.  He 
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confirmed that Weizsäcker had been a ‘convinced opponent of Nazi ideals and policies’ 
and had used his position to obstruct Ribbentrop by suppling relevant intelligence to 
Britain through intermediaries such as the Kordts and Conwell-Evans.68  
Halifax was exceptional within the British establishment as his former subordinates 
ignored or denigrated the efforts of their German diplomatic counterparts.  Nor was 
such selective memory limited to the diplomatists.  Leading historians at the time were 
quick to rubbish any suggestion that the German resistance might have deserved better 
support.  Namier, Trevor-Roper and Wheeler-Bennett (himself a former diplomat) 
created an orthodoxy that prevailed until the work of Peter Hoffman and others from 
the 1970s.69  Such debates are beyond the scope of this study but help answer why any 
legacy the Fellowship may deserve was lost.  The intensity of this vilification of the 
opposition to Hitler, and by extension, its support from the Fellowship’s Council, 
implies that, had they instead been ‘heeded and responded to with goodwill, and their 
warnings acted upon, the consequences for the benefit of all might have been 
immeasurable’.70  Infuriated by the attitudes of Vansittart and others, Erich Kordt (by 
then professor of international law at the University of Cologne having spent the war 
in Japan and Shanghai) published his version of events as Nicht Aus Den Akten (‘Not 
from the files’) (Stuttgart 1950).   
The other German players in the Fellowship’s story fared less well than the Kordts.  
Eugen Lehnkering, who had introduced his business partner Tennant to Ribbentrop in 
1932 and served as treasurer of the DEG, had ‘turned anti-Nazi’ following the outbreak 
of war.71  Sent to dig trenches in Holland, he had escaped to the American lines but had 
died soon after war ended.  The Duke of Coburg, president of the DEG throughout, had 
remined loyal to the Führer and was also president of the thoroughly-Nazified German 
Red Cross.  He benefitted from lobbying by his sister, Princess Alice, and her husband 
the Earl of Athlone, that secured his release from imprisonment by the Americans in 
1946.  He spent the rest of his life in seclusion but did attend the local cinema the year 
before his death to watch the coronation of Elizabeth II, his cousin’s granddaughter. 
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Several of the Fellowship’s British champions had not survived the war.  Mount Temple 
died in the summer of 1939 after a long battle with Parkinson’s while Lothian, refusing 
medical treatment as a Christian Scientist, died from blood poisoning in the Washington 
embassy in December 1940.  He was followed a year later by Frank D’Arcy Cooper, 
aged just fifty-nine, who had just been awarded a baronetcy having served as chairman 
of the executive committee of the Export Council of the Board of Trade.  Of the 
survivors, Tennant had remarried in 1950 having separated from his first wife Eleonora 
at the end of the war.  She had embraced far-right and anti-Semitic politics leading two 
extreme nationalist groups (the Never Again Association and the Face the Facts 
Association) and thereafter moved back to her native Australia.  He used his 
comfortable retirement in his Hertfordshire country house to write his memoirs which 
were published in 1957.  According to his grandson, having avoided the ignominy of 
appearing as Ribbentrop’s character witness, he was alarmed by Eleonora’s political 
activities and threats of embarrassing disclosures so felt it necessary to publish his mea 
culpa to distance his engagement with the Third Reich from her politics.72     
Despite his lobbying, Conwell-Evans had failed to secure formal government 
employment so concentrated on writing None so Blind, completed in 1941, and articles 
and reviews for The Nineteenth Century and After which included attacks on Halifax 
and Henderson for their failure to heed his and Christie’s warnings.  In 1945, he moved 
from Cornwell Gardens, the scene of his meetings with the German resistance, to 
Pembridge Crescent in Notting Hill where he became a recluse.  Resigning his 
cherished membership of the Travellers Club and leaving no forwarding address, he 
eluded the Kordts who wanted him as a witness in the Wilhelmstrasse Trial.  In the 
early sixties, Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott overcame similar challenges to track him 
down through Christie.  Gilbert and his first wife befriended Conwell-Evans who 
assisted the young historian in researching several of his books. 
Christie, who had suffered from ill-health since the Great War, also spent his post-war 
years as a recluse but we know from the Conwell-Evans/Gilbert correspondence that 
he and Conwell-Evans kept in close touch and shared their Christmases.  Having 
decided (or perhaps agreed under official pressure) not to distribute None so Blind until 
after his death, Christie avoided discussion of his work in pre-war Germany.  He only 
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came back into the public eye aged ninety when, on 3 November 1971, he threw himself 
from the window of his flat in Cranmer Court, Chelsea (the building which over thirty 
years previously had housed the Fellowship) and was pronounced dead on arrival at St 
Stephen’s Hospital.   
Unlike Vansittart, Tennant, Christie and Conwell-Evans, Julian Piggott never gave up 
on the cause of Anglo-German friendship.  Having been a member of the Weimar-era 
Anglo-German Association, having played a central role in the Fellowship’s founding 
and served on the Council throughout its four-year existence, in 1951 following an 
appeal in The Times, he and others founded a new friendship society, confusingly also 
called the Anglo-German Association.  It had an in-house publication titled Anglo-
German Review and a new affiliated Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft founded in 
Dusseldorf in 1949 with branches around Germany.  Serving as secretary and then 
chairman, he enlisted Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis as president and recruited 
the archbishops of Canterbury and Westminster, Anthony Eden (now the Earl of Avon) 
and the German ambassador as patrons.  It held dinners in smart London hotels attended 
by the British foreign secretary and leading German diplomats and politicians including 
Chancellor Adenauer.  Two things are striking about the newly-minted association: it 
followed the protocols and formulae of the Fellowship almost to the letter and 
apparently made no mention of its predecessor in any context.73  Unlike its 
predecessors, the Anglo-German Association has survived, changing its name to The 
British-German Association in 1995, with the Duke of Kent as patron and a continuing 




The Fellowship played a bigger role in the diplomatic crises of the late 1930s than the 
British have tended to remember, attracting broad support from each of the relevant  
Establishment elites.  But, while elitist, it does not fit comfortably within the aristocratic 
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‘fellow travellers of the right’ tradition.  The breath and quality of its support should be 
the focus for interested historians rather than the lazy typecasting prevalent in popular 
media ever since.  Its founders and leaders, especially Mount Temple, Lothian, Tennant, 
Conwell-Evans, Christie, Piggott, Tiarks and D’Arcy Cooper, were neither stupid nor 
cowardly.  On balance, these were better men doing better jobs for better reasons than 
often inferred.  Though guilty of naivety and gullibility in the early days, they voiced 
their fears about Hitler’s intentions and determination well before Chamberlain and his 
government.  Their intelligence and advice to the British government were based on 
mostly impeccable sources at the heart of the National Socialist administration and 
included both its ardent critics as well as supporters.  
As Stedman has concluded, it was, at the time, ‘easy to criticise Neville Chamberlain 
from the sidelines’ but far harder ‘to suggest a constructive, coherent alternative that he 
could have pursued’.  The Fellowship did propose alternatives to the British 
government throughout its short life – specifically, more energetic and professional 
diplomacy in the earlier years (1935 and 1936) underpinned by economic appeasement 
that would weave together the two economies.  In parallel, they encouraged continuing 
rearmament and the taking of a ‘firmer stand’, including through alliances with France 
and Russia, against Hitler’s expansionist military forays, particularly from 1938.  Their 
contacts within the German opposition to Hitler had given them insight to support the 
thesis that his regime was more fragile than others presumed.  While certainly 
classifiable as appeasement, this was at odds with the strategies adopted by each of the 
three pre-war prime ministers and especially divergent from Chamberlain’s brand of 
appeasement once he launched Project Z.  This, they had advised, was a step too far 
and would not be taken seriously by the German government.  They had excellent 
access to, and audience with, but were ultimately ignored by, Chamberlain, Wilson and 
Henderson who each fatally misread the Führer.  For Conwell-Evans and Christie in 
particular (who among subsequent historians of appeasement would have agreed with 
Parker especially), those three were indeed the ‘Guilty Men’ - late in understanding 
Hitler’s determined intentions and stubbornly resistant to any contradictory advice.  
Following the invasion of Poland, Conwell-Evans and Christie felt this very strongly, 
recognising that there was ‘no doubt that the Ambassador based his policy on 




instructions constantly received from 10 Downing Street and not on the views of the 
Permanent Head of the Foreign Office’.75   
The Fellowship was a child of business and finance, and while the profit motive was 
rarely ignored, those supporters were capable of higher motives in arguing for peace.  
It had wide engagement with the British military, who like their counterparts across the 
North Sea and the founding businessmen, looked at the prospect of a second European 
war with dread.  Whatever else, it was a poor place for the promotion of those poisonous 
ideologies around race and religion that defined the Third Reich and rightly still 
preoccupy modern commentators.  In Britain, the Fellowship was, in its time, taken 
more seriously by government, parliament, the intelligence services, the press, business 
and the military than it has been ever since.  Its fall from both grace and relevance in 
Britain was almost immediate once war was declared even when the prospect of a 
negotiated peace with either Hitler or his replacement seemed a real prospect.   
Surprisingly, its reputation and relevance outside Britain fared better than at home.  
Although confused with the chimeric Cliveden Set, the Fellowship’s legacy lingered 
longer among the Germans, the Russians and the Americans.  For Rudolf Hess, 
encouraged by Albrecht Haushofer with whom he shared a dream of an Anglo-German 
alliance, it was the Fellowship that he hoped to find in Scotland.  Meanwhile for Joseph 
Stalin, his paranoia about such an alliance fuelled by Kim Philby, it was what he most 
feared Hess might find in Scotland. 
Understanding Anglo-German cooperation before 1945 is important, if only to put 
Anglo-German conflict in its proper context.  Not least, given the cultural links between 
the British and Germans, a peaceful modus vivendi between the two most powerful 
economies in Europe remained a logical diplomatic strategy in the first half of the 
twentieth century - despite nine years of war.  Britain and France were awkward allies 
throughout the period and the isolationist United States was a most reluctant one.  
Prestigious organisations such as the Fellowship had a role to play promoting Anglo-
German friendship before, between, and after, both world wars.   
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Appendix I Dramatis personae  
 
Aberdare, Lord (Clarence Napier Bruce), (1885–1957)  
Athlete.  Educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford.  Fellowship member and attended 
at least four dinners.  International Olympic Executive Committee, 1931-51.  Chairman of 
National Advisory Council for Physical Training and Recreation, 1937-39.  British and US 
amateur champion in both rackets and tennis.  
Arnold, Lord (Sidney), (1878-1945) 
Liberal then Labour politician.  Educated in Manchester.  Served on Council from 1937 and 
attended several Fellowship events.  Paymaster-general, 1929–31.  Joined the Labour Party in 
1922 but resigned in 1938 on account of his disagreement with its foreign policy. 
Baldwin, Stanley, (later Earl Baldwin), (1867–1947) 
Conservative politician.  Educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge.  Introduced by 
Tennant (q.v.) to Ribbentrop (q.v.) in 1933.  Prime minister, 1923-24, 1924-29 and 1935-37.  
Lord president of the Council, 1931-35.  Member of the Travellers Club.  
Ball, Major Charles, (1893-1973) 
Soldier and businessman.  Educated at Charterhouse and London University.  Attended 
Fellowship’s founding meeting, served on Council throughout and attended several events.  
Director of FA Hughes & Co., a pioneer of alloys and plastics for aircraft (with links to IG 
Farben and ICI) that was a corporate member and donor.  Served in Royal Artillery, 1914-23, 
and on Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control (disarming Germany), 1919-23. 
Beazley, Professor Sir Raymond, (1868-1955) 
Historian.  Educated at St Pauls, King's College, London and Balliol College, Oxford. Served 
on Fellowship’s Council throughout.  Professor of history, University of Birmingham, 1909–
33 and previously Ilchester lecturer (Russian history), Oxford, 1913.  Frequent lecturing visits 
to Germany 1930-7.  Regular contributor to the Anglo-German Review and a council member 
of The Link.   
Blomberg, Field Marshal Werner von, (1878-1946) 
German soldier.  Minister of war, 1935-38.  Represented Hitler at George VI’s coronation. 
Guest of honour at a reception held by the Fellowship in May 1937.  Resigned following 
disclosure that his new wife had a criminal record for prostitution.   
Brocket, Lord, (Ronald), (1904-1967) 
Conservative politician and landowner.  Educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford.  
Fellowship member and frequently attended events.  Former member of parliament and 
barrister.  Attended Hitler’s fiftieth birthday celebrations.   
Brunswick, Duke of, (Ernest Augustus), (1887-1953)  
German aristocrat and soldier. Founder member of DEG. First cousin of King George V.  
Married Princess Victoria Luise of Prussia (1892-1980), the only daughter of the German 
Kaiser, William II, in May 1913. Their wedding was attended by most of Europe’s royalty.  
Guest of honour (with his wife) and speaker at a banquet held by the Fellowship at the 
Dorchester in July 1936. Honorary member with wife of the Royal British Legion. 




Butler, Richard Austen, (‘RAB’ later Lord Butler), (1902-1982) 
Conservative politician. Educated at Marlborough and Pembroke College, Cambridge.  Guest 
at Fellowship’s May 1938 reception.  Under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1938–41.  
Later minister of education, chancellor of the exchequer, home secretary, deputy prime 
minister, and foreign secretary.  
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, (1884-1968) 
Diplomat, civil servant and diarist.  Educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford.  Guest at 
Fellowship’s May 1938 reception.  Permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1938-
1946. Previously deputy under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1936-37, and ambassador 
to Peking, 1933–36.  Later chairman of the BBC.  
Chamberlain, Neville, (1869-1940) 
Conservative politician.  Educated Rugby and Mason College, Birmingham. Prime minister, 
1937–40. Chancellor of the exchequer, 1923–24 and 1931–37.  Visited Germany three times in 
the autumn of 1938 to meet Hitler.  Died from bowel cancer six months following his 
resignation as prime minister. 
Christie, Group-Captain Malcolm Grahame, (1881–1971)  
Aviator, diplomat and intelligence agent.  Educated at Malvern College and the University of 
Aachen where he obtained the degree of Doktor Ingenieur, with first-class honours in 
chemistry.  Fellowship member, donor and served on the Council from January 1938.  Also a 
member of the inter-war Anglo-German Association.  General manager of the Otto Cokeoven 
Company of Leeds and president of Otto Coking Corporation, New York.  Member of the 
Travellers’ Club and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.   
Met Göring and Hitler in 1932.  Reported to Sir Robert Vansittart (q.v.) on the German political 
situation from 1934.  Introduced Vansittart to Konrad Henlein (q.v.) and Karl Goerdeler, former 
mayor of Leipzig and civilian leader of the German resistance.  His activities in the 1930s were 
chronicled by his close friend and collaborator, Conwell-Evans (q.v.) in None so blind: a study 
of the crisis years, 1930-1939, based on the private papers of Group-Captain M G Christie, 
published in 1947. 
Previously a pioneering aviator having learned to fly in 1910.   Served in the RAF, 1919-30, 
and the Royal Flying Corps, 1914–18.  Awarded an MC in 1916, a DSO in 1917, and appointed 
CMG in 1919.  Air attaché in Berlin, 1927–30 and Washington, DC, 1922-6.  Retired due to 
ill-health in 1930 to live in Germany near the Dutch border.  Following the Second World War, 
lived in London in apparent seclusion.  Committed suicide in November 1971, aged ninety.  
Clydesdale, Marquess of, (Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, from 1940, Duke of Hamilton), (1903-
1973)  
Boxer, aviator and Conservative politician.  Educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford.  
Member of parliament, 1930-1940.  The first man to fly over Everest, in 1933.  From 1940, 
hereditary keeper of Holyroodhouse (the monarch’s official residence in Scotland) and lord 
steward of the royal household. Served in the RAF during Second World War. Published The 
Pilot’s Book of Everest in 1936. 
  




Coburg (Saxe-Coburg-Gotha), Duke of, (Prince Charles Edward, Duke of Albany), (1884–
1954) 
Anglo-German royal prince.  Born in England and educated at Eton and Bonn University.  
Posthumous son of Prince Leopold, Duke of Albany, Queen Victoria's youngest son.  Founder 
member and president of the DEG.  President of the German Red Cross from 1933 and an 
NSDAP party member from 1935.  Arrested by the Americans at the end of the war but released 
in 1946.   
Conwell-Evans, Dr Thomas Philip (TP), (1892-1968) 
Historian, political secretary and sometime intelligence agent.  Second son of Thomas Conwil-
Evans [sic], a master tailor.  Educated at Carmarthen Grammar School, privately in France and 
Germany, Jesus College, Oxford and the London School of Economics where he was awarded 
a PhD.  At Fellowship’s founding meeting and thereafter was joint honorary secretary until 
February 1937 when he became salaried secretary until October 1939.  Visiting lecturer in 
English history at Königsberg University, East Prussia, 1932-34.  Previously political secretary 
to Lord Noel Buxton, Labour minister of agriculture, and secretary to two parliamentary 
committees - the British Armenian Committee and the Balkan Committee.  It was with Noel-
Buxton and the MP Ben Riley that Conwell-Evans first met Hitler in the spring of 1933.  A 
member of the Travellers Club and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.  Friend, 
neighbour, walking companion and sometime speech writer to Ramsay Macdonald (q.v.).  
Following the war, he moved to Notting Hill, London and lived in relative seclusion until his 
death in 1968. 
Translated Civilisation 1914-1918, by Georges Duhamel from French for publication in Britain 
in 1919. Co-authored with Noel Buxton Oppressed Peoples and the League of Nations in 1922.  
Published The League Council in Action: a study in the methods employed by the council of the 
League of Nations to prevent war and to settle international disputes in 1929; Foreign Policy 
from a Back Bench 1904-1918, a study based on the papers of Lord Noel-Buxton in 1932; and 
None so blind: a study of the crisis years, 1930-1939, based on the private papers of Group-
Captain M G Christie in 1947. Regular contributor to Nineteenth Century and After. 
D'Arcy Cooper, Sir Francis (Frank) Bt., (1882–1941)  
Accountant and industrialist.  Educated at Wellington. Chaired Fellowship’s founding meeting 
in March 1935, was a personal donor and served on executive committee and Council 
throughout.  Chairman of Lever Brothers (later Unilever) from 1925 following death of Lord 
Leverhulme.  Unilever was the largest corporate donor to the Fellowship.  From 1940, chairman 
of the executive committee of the Export Council of the Board of Trade.  Partner in accountancy 
firm, Cooper Brothers & Co.  Served and was wounded in the Great War. 
Davidson, Viscount, John Colin Campbell (JCC), (1889–1970) 
Conservative politician. Educated at Westminster and Pembroke College, Cambridge.  
Introduced Tennant (q.v.) and Ribbentrop (q.v.) to Baldwin (q.v.) in 1933.  Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, 1923-24 and 1931-37.  Previously chairman of the Conservative Party and 
PPS to Bonar Law and Baldwin. 
Dirksen, Herbert von, (1882-1955) 
German diplomat.  Succeeded Ribbentrop (q.v.) as German ambassador to the Court of St 
James’s 1938-39.  Previously ambassador to Japan and Soviet Russia.  Guest of honour at a 
Fellowship dinner in October 1938. 




Domvile, Admiral Sir Barry, (1878-1971)  
Royal Navy officer and author.  Fellowship member and served on Council from January 1938 
to April 1939.  Director of Naval Intelligence, 1927-30, commanded the Third Cruiser 
Squadron, 1931–32 and president of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 1932-34.  Published 
The Case For Germany in 1939.  Interned during second world war under Defence Regulation 
18B, 1940-1943. 
Eden, (Robert) Anthony, (later Earl of Avon), (1897–1977) 
Conservative politician.  Educated Eton and Christ Church, Oxford.  Foreign secretary, 1935-
1938 and 1940-45. Lord privy seal, 1934-1935. Later prime minister.   
Eltisley, Lord, (George Douglas Cochrane), (1879-1942)    
Conservative politician and company director.  Educated at Eton and Trinity College, 
Cambridge.  Served on Fellowship’s Council throughout.  Former member of parliament.  
Chairman Central Chamber of Agriculture, 1934, Council of Agriculture for England, 1922–
23, and Water Companies Association, 1923–31.  
Evans, Jack, (1890-1937) 
Served on the Council and the executive committee.  Donor and representative of corporate 
member, CT Bowring & Co (Insurance), Ltd. 
Gaertner, Friedl, (Born 1911) 
Austrian model and intelligence agent.  Codenamed Gelatine or M/G.  Having married a Jew, 
she left Austria for Palestine in 1934.  Arrived in London in 1938 and was introduced to the 
security services by Stewart Menzies (later chief of MI6) whose younger brother, Ian, had 
married her sister.  On behalf of MI5 she infiltrated organisations in Britain with connections 
to Germany including the Fellowship which she joined in 1938 and subsequently attended 
several events.  From 1941 she worked as a double agent with MI6’s XX programme sending 
misinformation to contacts in Germany.  
Gollancz, Victor, (later Sir), (1893-1967) 
Left wing publisher and writer.  Educated at St Paul’s and New College Oxford.  Founded 
Victor Gollancz Ltd in 1928 and the Left Book Club in 1936 with a particular focus on 
challenging the rise of National Socialism.  Published Tory MP in 1939, Guilty Men in 1940 
and Your MP in 1944.  Authored and published Shall our Children Live or Die? A reply to Lord 
Vansittart on the German Problem in 1942. 
Göring, Field Marshal Hermann, (1893-1946) 
German pilot, politician and art collector.  Commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe from 1933, 
president of the Reichstag, prime minister of Prussia and Hitler’s designated successor. Reich 
Jägermeister (the game warden of the Reich).  Found guilty of war crimes in 1946 and sentenced 
to death.  Committed suicide hours before planned execution.  
Guinness, Arthur Rundell, (1895-1951)   
Banker.  Educated at Winchester.  Attended founding meeting, served on Council throughout 
and on executive committee.  Partner, Guinness Mahon & Co. which donated £50.  Later a 
member of the League of Nations Special Joint Committee on Private Foreign Investment, 1945 
and president of the International Chamber of Commerce, 1947–49. 




Halifax, Earl of, (Edward Frederick Lindley Wood), (1881-1959) 
Politician and diplomat.  Educated at Eton, Christ Church, and All Souls, Oxford.  Foreign 
secretary, 1938-1940.  Later British ambassador to the United States, 1941-46.  Previously 
leader of the House of Lords, 1935-1938, lord privy seal, 1935-37 and viceroy of India, 1926-
1931.  Chancellor of the University of Oxford, 1933-1959.  Master of the Middleton 
Foxhounds. 
Hamilton, Duke of: see Clydesdale, Marquess of 
Hamilton, General Sir Ian, (1853-1947) 
Army officer and writer. Educated at Wellington and privately in Germany.  Veteran of Afghan, 
Boer, Russo-Japanese and Great wars.  Vice-president of the inter-war Anglo-German 
Association.  Declined membership of the Fellowship.  President of the Royal British Legion 
(Scotland).  Lord Rector of Edinburgh University, 1932–35.  
Harvey, Oliver, (later Lord), (1893-1968) 
Diplomat and diarist.  Educated at Malvern and Trinity College, Cambridge. Counsellor and 
principal private secretary to secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1936–39.  Later ambassador 
to Paris.  
Haushofer, Albrecht, (1903-45) 
German professor, diplomat and member of the German resistance.  Son of Karl Haushofer 
(q.v.).  Educated at Munich University.  Professor of political geography at the Berlin School 
of Politics. Secretary of the Geographical Society in Berlin, 1928-38.  Befriended Clydesdale 
(q.v.) in 1936 at the Olympic Games.  Adviser to Rudolf Hess and head of the Information 
Section in the Foreign Ministry from 1938.  Visited the UK on several occasions in the late 
1930s.  Lectured at Chatham House in 1937.  Shot by the SS in April 1945. 
Haushofer, Karl, (1869-1946) 
German general, editor and professor.  Educated at the Munich Gymnasium, in the army and at 
Munich university.  Founder member of DEG.  Professor of geography, 1921-1939.  Pioneer 
of the theory of ‘Geopolitics’ linking German imperialism with National Socialism. Editor of 
the periodical Geopolitik.  Rudolf Hess (q.v.) was his student and sometime assistant.  Father 
to Albrecht Haushofer (q.v.).  Believed that peace with Britain should be central to German 
foreign policy.  Arrested after the July 1944 plot against Hitler and committed suicide in 1946 
in reaction to his son’s murder. 
Hawes, Captain MA, RN, (1887-1963) 
Naval officer.  Honorary secretary in 1936, served on executive committee and Council 
throughout and attended Fellowship events.   Naval attaché in Berlin, 1929-1933.  Member of 
Royal British Legion delegation to Germany in July 1935.  His wife was a member of the 
Fellowship’s ladies advisory committee. 
Henderson, Sir Nevile, (1882–1942) 
Diplomat.  Educated at Eton and abroad.  Frequent guest of the Fellowship and DEG. Honorary 
member of the DEG.  Ambassador to Germany 1937-39, ambassador to Argentina 1935-37.   
Published Failure of a Mission 1937-9 in 1940 and Water under the Bridges posthumously in 
1945. 
  




Henlein, Konrad, (1898-1945) 
German-Czech gym instructor and politician.  Founded the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SDP) in 
1933 and campaigned for autonomy for the Sudeten minority in Czechoslovakia.  Introduced 
by Christie (q.v.) to Churchill and other British politicians in May 1938.  Committed suicide in 
an Allied prisoner of war camp in May 1945.  
Hess, Rudolf, (1894-1987) 
German politician. Educated at University of Munich. Deputy leader of the NSDAP from 1933. 
Guest of the DEG at opening ceremony in Berlin January 1936.  Imprisoned in 1923 with Hitler 
whom he assisted in writing Mein Kampf.  In May 1941, flew solo to Britain where he was held 
as a prisoner of war.  Found guilty of war crimes in 1946 and imprisoned in Germany until his 
death in 1987.  
Hewel, Walther, (1904-1945) 
German diplomat.  Educated at the Technical University of Munich.  An early member of the 
NSDAP, he participated in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch while still a schoolboy and maintained a 
close friendship with Hitler up till the dictator’s death.  He was an early employee of the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop.  Founder member and on Council of the DEG.  Served as liaison 
between Ribbentrop (q.v.) and Hitler from 1938.  Guest of honour at a Fellowship sherry party 
held at the Langham Hotel in December 1937.  Met with Conwell-Evans (q.v.) at his last visit 
to Germany in February 1939 and with Tennant (q.v.), who considered him a friend, in his last 
visit in July of the same year.  Committed suicide in May 1945. 
Hoesch, Dr. Leopold von, (1881-1936)  
German diplomat.  Educated at universities of Geneva, Heidelberg, Munich and Leipzig.  
German ambassador to the Court of St James’s 1932-36.  Guest of honour at a Fellowship 
dinner in November 1935. Succeeded as ambassador by Ribbentrop (q.v.) in 1936 following 
his unexpected and unexplained death in office. 
Hollenden, Lord (Geoffrey Hope Hope-Morley), (1885-1977)  
Aristocrat and JP. Educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge.  Served on Council 
throughout, frequent attendee at Fellowship events and donated £100.  President of the 
Wholesale Textile Association and former High Sheriff of the County of London.  
Hulbert, Norman J, MP, (later Wing-Commander Sir), (1903-1972)  
Conservative politician.  Educated at Tonbridge.  Member of parliament 1935–64.  Served on 
Council from 1938.  Later served in the RAF, 1939-43, and as British liaison officer with Polish 
Forces, 1943-45.  Later PPS to president of Board of Trade and minister of production, 1944–
45. 
Hunter, William  
Served on Council from 1937. Representative of corporate member William Hunter & Co of 
Bradford. 
Kerr, Philip Henry see Lothian, Marquess of   
Kordt, Erich (1903-1969)  
German diplomat and member of the resistance to Hitler.  Rhodes scholar at Oxford University. 
Appointed by von Neurath (q.v.) as Ribbentrop’s assistant in 1934.  Thereafter chief de cabinet 




to Ribbentrop as minister of foreign affairs, February 1938-December 1940.  Previously first 
secretary at the German embassy in London.  Founder member of the DEG.  Attended 
Fellowship dinners in October and December 1937. 
Kordt, Theodor (‘Theo’) (1893-1962) 
German diplomat and member of the resistance to Hitler.  Older brother to Erich Kordt (q.v.).  
Chargé d’affaires in the German embassy in London.  Attended the March 1939 Fellowship 
dinner in honour of Gertrud Scholtz-Klink (q.v.).  On 3 September 1939, received the British 
declaration of war on Germany in London.  Previously chef de cabinet to the state secretary, 
von Bülow. 
le Blount Kidd, G    
Lawyer.  Member and served as solicitor to the Fellowship throughout.  Present at the founding 
meeting. 
Lehnkering, Eugen  
German aviator and businessmen. Twenty-first member of NSDAP.  German business agent 
for C. Tennant & Sons who introduced Tennant (q.v.) to Ribbentrop (q.v.) in 1932.  Founder 
member of the DEG. 
Lloyd George, David, (later Earl Lloyd George), (1863-1945) 
Liberal politician.  Educated Llanystumdwy Church School and privately.  Visited Germany in 
September 1936 and met Hitler as part of trip conceived, planned and managed by Tennant 
(q.v.) and Conwell-Evans (q.v.).  Father of the House, 1929-1945, leader of the Liberal Party, 
1926-1931, prime minister, 1916–22, chancellor of the exchequer, 1908–15.  
Lloyd George, Gwylim, (later Viscount Tenby), (1884-1967) 
Liberal and later Conservative politician.  Son of David Lloyd George (q.v.).  Educated at 
Eastbourne College and Jesus College, Cambridge.  Fellowship member and accompanied his 
father to Germany in 1936.  Parliamentary secretary to the Board of Trade, 1931 and 1939-41.  
Later minister of food, 1941-42, minister of fuel and power, 1942-45.  Post-war home secretary 
and minister for Welsh affairs.  
Londonderry, Marquess of, (1878-1949) 
Conservative politician.  Educated at Eton and Sandhurst.  Fellowship member and attended 
several events.  Previously a member of the inter-war Anglo-German Association.  Guest of 
honour at DEG lunch in February 1936.  Secretary of state for air, 1931–35, lord privy seal and 
leader of House of Lords, 1935.   
Lothian, Marquess of, (Philip Henry Kerr), (1882–1940)  
Writer, Liberal politician and diplomat.  Educated at Oratory School, Edgbaston and New 
College, Oxford.  Fellowship member, declined chairmanship.  Introduced by Conwell-Evans 
(q.v.) to Ribbentrop (q.v.) in November 1934 whom he entertained at Blickling Hall, his 
Jacobean stately home in Norfolk in June 1935.  Met Hitler and other leading German 
politicians with Conwell-Evans in January 1935 and May 1937.  Previously a member of the 
inter-war Anglo-German Association.  British ambassador to the United States, 1939-1940.  
Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, 1925-39.  Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1931.  
Parliamentary under-secretary, India Office, 1931–32.  Governor of National Bank of Scotland.  




Editor of The Round Table, 1910–16.  Secretary to the prime minister, Lloyd George (q.v.), 
1916–21.  Member of the Travellers’ Club.  
MacDonald, (James) Ramsay, (1866-1937) 
Labour politician.  Educated at a Drainie parish school.  Prime minister, 1924 and 1929-35.  
Lord president of the Council, 1935-37.  
Maisky, Ivan, (1884-1975) 
Russian diplomat, historian and diarist.  Soviet ambassador to London, 1932-1943.  His diaries 
were  published as The Maisky Diaries: Red Ambassador to the Court of St James's, 1932-1943 
in 2015. 
Mason, David Marshall, (1865-1945) 
Liberal politician, currency expert, peace campaigner and author.   Educated at Kelvinside 
Academy, Glasgow University and Heidelberg University.  Served on the Council from 1937 
and, with his wife and family, was an enthusiastic attender of Fellowship events.  Founder and 
chairman of the executive committee of the Sound Currency Association.  Member of 
parliament 1910–18 and 1931–35.  Met Hitler in 1936 and invited Goebbels to visit London.  
McGowan, Lord (Harry), (1874-1961) 
Chemical industrialist. Educated at Allan Glen's School, Glasgow. Chairman of Imperial 
Chemical Industries 1930-50. Director of British Overseas Bank and Midland Bank.  
Fellowship member, attended events and ICI was the second most generous corporate donor.  
Milne, James   
Businessman.  Represented Shaw Luthke & Co, a corporate member and donor.  Attended 
founding meeting and served on Council until resignation in October 1937. 
Mitford, Unity, (1914-1948) 
Socialite and ardent admirer of Hitler.  Fifth child of Lord and Lady Redesdale.  Educated at St 
Margaret's School, Bushey.  Fellowship member along with her parents.  Following the 
outbreak of war and while still in Munich, she shot herself in the head and returned to Britain 
as an invalid. 
Moore, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas, (1886-1971)  
Soldier, Conservative (Scottish Unionist) politician and animal protection campaigner.  
Educated at Trinity College, Dublin.  Council member throughout and regular attendee at 
Fellowship events.  Served in army, 1908-25.  Member of parliament, 1925-1964.  Chairman 
of the Home Guard Joint Parliamentary Committee.  Also sometime vice-president of the 
RSPCA, trustee of the International League for the Protection of Horses, chairman of the 
Anglo-Italian Society for the Protection of Animals and chairman Anglo-Hungarian 
Fellowship. 
Mount Temple, Lord, (formerly Colonel Wilfred William Ashley), (1867-1939),  
Soldier and Conservative politician.  Educated at Harrow and Magdalen College, Oxford.  
Chairman of the Fellowship from 1935 until his resignation in protest about Kristallnacht in 
November 1938.  Previously a member of the inter-war Anglo-German Association.  Also 
chairman of the Anti-Socialist Union, the Navy League and the Comrades of the Great War.  




Formerly member of parliament, minister of transport and under-secretary of state for war.  
Commanded 20th Battalion King’s Liverpool Regiment in Great War.  
Neurath, Konstantin von, (1873-1956) 
German diplomat.  Educated in Tübingen and Berlin.  German foreign minister from 1932 until 
1938 when he was dismissed from office and replaced by Ribbentrop (q.v.).  From 1939 served 
as Reichsprotektor of occupied Bohemia and Moravia.  Found guilty of war crimes in 1946 and 
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. 
Oster, Colonel Hans, (1888-1945) 
German soldier and resistance leader.  Chief of staff to Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr 
(military intelligence).  A central organiser of the German resistance.  Arrested in July 1944 
after failed plot against Hitler and hanged. 
Philby, HAR (‘Kim’), (1912-1988) 
Journalist, intelligence agent and traitor.  Educated at Westminster and Trinity College, 
Cambridge.  Member and employee of the Fellowship from 1936.  Attended the Fellowship 
dinner in honour of the Brunswicks in July 1936.  Previously assistant editor of the Review of 
Reviews, 1934-6.  A Soviet agent from 1934.  Subsequently a war correspondent for The Times 
in Spain, 1937-9.  Employed by SIS (MI6), 1940-51.  Defected to Soviet Russia in 1963.  
Appointed OBE in 1946 and awarded the Order of Lenin in 1965. 
Phipps, Sir Eric, (1875-1945) 
Diplomat.  Educated at King’s College, Cambridge. Guest at DEG Berlin opening ceremony in 
January 1937.  British ambassador to Berlin, 1933-7, and to Paris, 1937-9. 
Piggott, Julian, (1888-1965) 
Businessman.  Educated at Cheltenham College and Pembroke College, Cambridge.  Attended 
Fellowship’s founding meeting, served on the Council throughout and was a regular attendee 
at events.  Previously a member of the inter-war Anglo-German Association.  Manager of the 
British Steel Export Association, 1929–36.  Previously commissioner at Cologne, Inter-Allied 
Rhineland High Commission, 1920-1925.  Awarded an MC in 1917, appointed OBE in 1925 
and CBE in 1933.  Founder and chairman of the post-war Anglo-German Association in the 
1950s and 1960s.  Awarded the Grand Cross of Merit, Order of Merit of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 1958. 
Pitt-Rivers, George, (1890-1966) 
Landowner, author, anthropologist and eugenicist. Educated at Eton and Worcester College, 
Oxford.  Attended Fellowship events but was refused membership.  Secretary-General of 
International Union for Scientific Investigation of Population Problems, 1928–37.  Contested 
North Dorset constituency as independent agriculturist in 1935.  Publications include 
Variations in Sex Ratios as Indices of Racial Decline, 1925; The Clash of Culture and the 
Contact of Races, 1927; Weeds in the Garden of Marriage, 1931; and Problems of Population, 
1932. 
Pomeroy, Elizabeth 
Office secretary to the Fellowship. 
  




Pownall, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Assheton p, (1877-1953) 
Conservative politician.  Educated at Rugby.  Member of parliament, 1918–45.  Fellowship 
member and served on Council throughout.  London District Welfare Officer, 1939, chairman 
Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons, 1943–45. 
Proctor, Charles  
Industrialist.  Attended founding meeting of the Fellowship and served on Council until he 
resigned in January 1938. Joint managing director of The Dunlop Rubber Company which 
donated £50. 
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, (1893-1946) 
Wine merchant, amateur diplomat and German politician.  Educated at universities of Metz and 
Grenoble.  German minister for foreign affairs, 1938-1945, German ambassador to the Court 
of St. James's, 1936–1938.  Previously Reich minister ambassador-plenipotentiary at large and 
special commissioner for disarmament.  Founded the Büro Ribbentrop (later renamed the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop) as an alternative foreign ministry.  Founder member of the DEG.  
Agent in Germany for Johnny Walker whisky. Found guilty of war crimes in 1946 and hanged. 
Rosenberg, Rose, (1892-1966) 
Political secretary.  Educated at elementary school and commercial college in East London.  
Private secretary to Ramsay Macdonald (q.v.) as leader of the Labour party, leader of the 
opposition, prime minister and lord president of the council, 1923-1937.  Joined the Labour 
Party in 1918.  The first woman to be admitted to Strangers' Dining Room in the House of 
Commons.  
Rykens, (also Rijkens), Paul, (1888-1965) 
Dutch industrialist.  Founding chairman of Unilever.  Attended founding meeting of the 
Fellowship and served on Council throughout. Personally donated £20 as well as representing 
Unilever the largest corporate donor.  Following the war was one of the founders of the 
Bilderberg Group, the elite Atlanticist discussion group established in 1954 by Prince Bernhard 
of the Netherlands. 
Scholtz-Klink, Gertrud, (1902-1999) 
German women’s leader.  An early member of the NSDAP.  As Reich’s women’s leader 
(Reichsfrauenfühererin), she headed both the National Socialist Women’s League (NSF - 
Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft) and the German Women’s Enterprise (DFW - Deutsches 
Frauenwerk).  Also head of the Women’s League of the Red Cross.  Guest of honour at the 
March 1939 banquet jointly hosted by the Fellowship and the League of Health and Beauty at 
Claridge’s.  Also guest of honour at a reception at the Ritz organised by members of the 
Fellowship’s Ladies Committee. 
Sylvester, Albert James (AJ), (1889-1989) 
Political and private secretary. Educated Guild Street School, Burton-on-Trent.  Principal 
secretary to David Lloyd George (q.v.), 1923–45.  Previously private secretary to successive 
prime ministers, 1921–23, to secretary of Committee of Imperial Defence, 1914–21 and to 
secretary of war cabinet and of cabinet, 1916–21.  Published The Real Lloyd George in 1947 
and Life with Lloyd George in 1975. 
  




Tennant, Ernest William Dalrymple, (1887-1962)  
Industrialist and businessman.  Educated Eton.  Joined C. Tennant and Sons, his family firm, 
in 1908 and became a director in 1912.  Served in Intelligence Corps in Great War and was 
made an officer of the Order of the British Empire in 1919.  Married firstly Eleonora Fiaschi in 
April 1912 with whom he had four children before divorcing at the end of the war and, secondly, 
Irene Gage in February 1950.  Published his memoirs as True Account in 1957. 
Tiarks, Frank Cyril, (1874-1952) 
Banker.  Educated at HMS Britannia.  Fellowship member, donor and Council member from 
1937.  Guest speaker at March 1939 opening ceremony for DEG Cologne branch.  Partner in J. 
Henry Schröder & Co. from 1902.  Director of Bank of England, 1912–45 and of The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. Ltd, 1917-48. 
Vansittart, Sir Robert, (Lord Vansittart from 1941), (1881-1957) 
Diplomat, author and dramatist.  Educated at Eton.  Attended Fellowship events.  Permanent 
under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1930–38, chief diplomatic adviser to the 
government, 1938–41. Previously PPS to the prime minister, 1928-30.  Extensive publications 
including Black Record and The Mist Procession.   
Weigall, Julian, (1868-1945)   
Barrister.  Educated at Wellington and University College, Oxford.  Attended founding meeting 
of the Fellowship and served on executive committee and Council throughout.  
Wilson, Sir Horace, (1882-1972) 
Civil servant.  Educated at Kurnella School, Bournemouth and the London School of 
Economics.  Chief industrial adviser to HM Government, 1930–39; seconded to the Treasury 
for service with the prime minister, 1935.  Accompanied prime minister to Germany in 
September 1938.  Permanent secretary of HM Treasury and official head of HM civil service, 
1939–42. Previously permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1921–30. 
Wright, Elwin 
Travel agent and anti-Semite.  Salaried secretary of the Fellowship, 1935-7.  Employed by 
Thomas Cook & Sons, travel agents.  Later a member of the Nordic League.  Interned during 
World War II under Defence Regulation 18B. 
Wynn, Arthur, (1910-2001) 
Civil servant, author, medical researcher, communist and Soviet agent.  Educated at Oundle 
and Trinity College, Cambridge.  He was in Germany in 1933 and married a German 
communist, Lieschen Ostrowski, to enable her to escape Hitler's regime.  He married Margaret 
‘Peggy’ Moxon in 1938.  Both he and Peggy were members of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain.  He was recruited by the Soviets in 1934 as an agent recruiter for the KGB and known 
as Agent SCOTT.  His primary responsibility was to recruit for the ‘Oxford Ring’.  Authored 
(with his wife) Tory MP in 1939 under the pseudonym ‘Simon Haxey’.  He was exposed as a 
Soviet agent after his death having served as, inter alia, a member of the Advisory Council on 
Research and Development, Ministry of Power, 1955–65 and chairman of the Standing Joint 
Committee on Metrication, 1966-69.  
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Appendix III The Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft: founding membership list77 
 
 
DEUTSCH-ENGLISHE GESELLISCHAFT, Berlin W. 9.  
Schliessfach 14. 
 
Präsident: Herzog Carol Eduard von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha.  
Mitglieder:  
Herzog Ernst-August von Brunschweig und Lüneburg, Schloss Blankenburg A. H. 
Prinz Gustav Biron von Curland. Scloss Warenberg-Schles.  
Dr. Burchand-Motz, Bürgermeister von Hamburg 
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